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Denying Intimacy:
The Role of Reason and Institutional Order in the Lives of People with
Intellectual Disabilities
Jani Klotz
Abstract
This thesis explores differences in the ways that intellectually disabled people are
perceived, interpreted and related to within a Western context. Through a
comparison of familial and institutionalised forms of relatedness, it examines the
interrelation between these differences and the consequences that they have for
either denying or acknowledging severely intellectually disabled people's capacities
for sociality. Drawing on Carrithers' (1992) concept of sociality and mutuality, and
Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of language games, the thesis analyses the means by
which a meaningful and shared existence with intellectually disabled people can be
negotiated and developed. Although limited and restricted in their capacities for
symbolic expression, such people do have modalities of symbolic life upon which
sociality can be built.  By analysing the symbolic practices utilised by my three
profoundly intellectually disabled siblings, I seek to show how relationships across
the difference of intellectual disability are able to be symbolically mediated and
negotiated. I argue that it is necessary to engage in relations of mutual
interdependence in order to even recognise and perceive these practices as
purposeful and meaningful. The mutuality that ensues requires a level of intimacy,
empathy and commitment that is not easily sustainable, but which is necessary for
the maintenance of intellectually disabled people's existence as social beings.
These intimate relations are contrasted with clinical and institutional forms of
relatedness, both of which have been informed and shaped by a symbolic scheme of
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reason and normality. This symbolic scheme associates a capacity for reason with
normal humanness, where reason is identified as particular abstract, linguistic,
mental practices that are then deemed necessary for sociality. These are what
intelligence tests measure, and it is through such assessments that intellectually
disabled people are rendered asocial. The pathologising of intellectual disability as an
abnormal embodiment, and the clinical tendency to search only for deficits in
functioning and ability, has led to a denial or ignorance of intellectually disabled
people's abilities to be the independent sustainers and authors of mutuality and
sociality. I draw on my family's medical notes, records from the institution where
two of my siblings were sent to live, as well as observations made during twelve
months of fieldwork with a group of intellectually disabled people attending an
activities centre, and either living in community group homes or with their families,
to elucidate the ways in which such interpretations of intellectual disability become
instituted into daily practice.
The instituting of training and management practices within day centres, group
homes and institutions for the intellectually disabled are a consequence of the
perception that intellectually disabled people have no capacity for sociality as they
are. So too are the legal and structural obligations that inform the forms of
relatedness that staff have with the intellectually disabled people with whom they
work. These relations are based on separation and disengagement rather than
mutuality and intimacy. The aim in these institutionalised environments is to instil in
such people a range of normative social, domestic and vocational skills as though it is
upon these that their capacity as social beings are dependent. As a result, the
symbolic practices and dispositional behaviours through which intellectually disabled
people express themselves are not recognised as such, nor are they engaged with.
This undermines intellectually disabled people's capacity to be joint contributors to
social life in a way which incorporates their differences rather than trying to
transform them.
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Introduction
How is it that forms of sociality are generated and sustained with people who
have severe and profound intellectual disabilities? And why is it that such
people's capacities to create and engage in meaningful relations with others are
so readily denied or ignored? These are two of the central questions that have
motivated this thesis, and provide the underlying themes of the following
seven chapters. Although limited and restricted in their capacities for symbolic
expression, intellectually disabled people do have modalities of symbolic life
upon which forms of sociality and mutuality can be built. Through an analysis
of the symbolic practices and dispositional behaviours utilised by my three
intellectually disabled siblings, I show how relationships across the difference of
intellectual disability are able to be symbolically mediated and negotiated. I
argue that it is necessary to engage in relations of mutual interdependence in
order to even recognise and perceive these practices as purposeful and
meaningful. The mutuality that ensues requires a level of intimacy, empathy
and commitment that is not easily sustainable, but which is necessary for
intellectually disabled people to exist as social beings as they are.
I juxtapose this social and symbolic milieu with that of an institutional life
devoted to the normalisation, management and training of intellectually
disabled people. These institutional environments include government-funded
community activities centres, sheltered workshops, group homes, and large-
scale institutions. In such environments, intellectually disabled people are
trained to develop particular social skills deemed necessary for sociality. These
include domestic and vocational skills, as well as specific communicational skills
through which people are expected to express themselves and engage with one
another. Such institutional practices have been informed by clinical
Introduction
page 2
interpretations of intellectually disabled people as abnormal and deficient,
asocial beings. They disregard the fact that what makes us persons, and allows
for a multiplicity of persons, is our human capacity for mutuality and sociality,
as well as our creative potential to produce different symbolic systems through
which we engage, communicate and make meaningful the world to one
another.  
Despite a growing interest in the social experiences and perceptions of
intellectually disabled people, the study of intellectual disability remains a
relatively small field within the social sciences. Moreover, most of the
sociocultural research that has been done has tended to focus on the social
experiences of people with mild rather than severe or profound intellectual
disabilities (Edgerton 1967; Bogdan & Taylor 1982). This is partly a consequence
of the difficulties involved in using people who are severely intellectually
disabled as informants. However, it is also a product of the perception that
such people lack the capacity for symbolic expression. This view underpins
clinical perceptions (Kanner 1944; Wing 1996) as much as it informs some
sociocultural accounts of people with intellectual disabilities (MacAndrew &
Edgerton 1970). The association of symbolic representation and expression
with specific intellectual and linguistic competencies, and the notion that these
are a necessary condition for cultural behaviour, has allotted those who lack
such skills a place outside, or at best on the borders of, human encultured
sociality. This thesis therefore involves a critique of the implicit or explicit
denials of intellectually disabled people's capacities for sociality in a range of
written studies and social environments, including historical documents, clinical
and institutional records, and familial and institutional milieu.
In chapter one I provide a description of the forms of sociality and symbolic
expression that my three intellectually disabled siblings created and utilised in
their everyday lives within the intimate domain of our family life. Through an
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analysis of their particular, highly contextualised and often embodied, symbolic
and dispositional practices, I show how my siblings were capable of producing
and sustaining mutual and intimate relations with one another and their non-
intellectually disabled kin. Drawing on Carrithers' (1992) concepts of sociality
and mutuality, Bernstein's restricted codes (1971; 1977), Geertz's (1993a [1973])
interpretation of culture, and Wittgenstein's (1998 [1953]) notion of language
games, I analyse the means by which a meaningful and shared existence across
the difference of intellectual disability is able to be developed and maintained. I
show how my siblings' symbolic and dispositional practices were incorporated
into and helped define my family's specific form of life, and how my siblings'
existence as social beings ultimately depended upon levels of intimacy and
interdependence that were generated within these familial relationships.
In chapter two, I explore some of the consequences of disrupting this
familial intimacy. I examine the impact of social attitudes towards intellectually
disabled people in general, and explore how these came to affect the ways in
which I and my non-intellectually disabled siblings dealt with the stigma of
having intellectually disabled kin. The chapter also includes an account of the
tensions, difficulties and differences that were created when the intimacy of the
home environment was replaced with the anonymity of institutionalised and
clinical settings. In the second section of chapter two, I introduce my fieldwork,
which was done with a group of intellectually disabled adults living in "the
community" in government-funded group homes and attending an activities
centre or sheltered workshop. I outline the forms of relatedness that exist
within these "institutionalised" environments, and show how, despite recent
changes in policies towards intellectually disabled people, these relationships
are moulded and constrained by legal and institutional structures and
obligations that continue to undermine intellectually disabled people's
capacities to represent and express themselves as social beings.
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Having introduced my two main "ethnographic sites", I then turn to analyse
why it is that intellectually disabled people are perceived, interpreted and
treated as asocial and abnormal beings within both clinical and institutional
environments. I argue that the written documents that constitute the literature
on intellectual disability—which includes historical, philosophical, religious,
medical, psychological, welfare, educational and institutional records—embody
shared and implicit assumptions about the nature of human nature. These can
readily be interpreted as constituting a "symbolic scheme of reason and
normality", where a "symbolic scheme" represents the taken-for granted ideas
and values to which a cultural milieu conforms (Sahlins 1976). It is this scheme
that orders and informs clinical interpretations of intellectual disability. It also
informs the practices of training and management that have become the
dominant modes of engaging with intellectually disabled people in
institutionalised environments. Rather than merely being descriptions of
intellectual disability, such material is also constitutive of the environments
within which intellectually disabled people exist. As part of the discourse of
reason and normality I have therefore incorporated what would normally be
material for a literature review into my analysis of the ways in which
intellectually disabled people are perceived, interpreted and treated.
Throughout the thesis I make links between this material and my ethnographic
notes and siblings' clinical records in order to describe and analyse the inter-
related discursive forms drawn together by a symbolic scheme.
In chapter three I analyse the role that notions of normality play in this
symbolic scheme by looking at the history of medical interpretations of
intellectual disability. I explore the shift from religious interpretations of
intellectual disability as a mark of sin to scientific medical views based upon a
Cartesian view of the body. In distinguishing intellectual disability from
insanity, I argue that medical practitioners have based their interpretation of
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intellectual disability on notions of deficiency and abnormality. Although no
longer explicitly connected with sin, these interpretations are thoroughly
steeped in moral judgements that connect the continuing presence of
"degeneracy" with concepts of heredity. Through an analysis of my siblings'
medical records, I show how such notions of deficiency and abnormality
become morally and pathologically embodied in contemporary medical
interpretations and perceptions of people with intellectual disabilities.  
In chapter four, I argue that a pervasive and implicit regime of reason
underlies these medical interpretations of intellectual disability. By associating
reason with specific intellectual and linguistic skills and capabilities, and
assuming that these are necessary attributes for producing meaning and
engaging with others socially, intellectually disabled people have been
assessed, categorised and interpreted as lacking that which is deemed essential
for both normal humanness and human sociality. Through an analysis of the
role that intelligence tests have played in the diagnosis and assessment of
intellectual disability, I show how such assumptions continue to pervade clinical
interpretations of intellectually disabled people. Once again, I draw upon my
siblings' records to elucidate the role that such assessments have played in
rendering meaningless, bizarre, and irrelevant the practices that intellectually
disabled people utilise to express themselves and engage with others socially.
By not recognising or engaging with these symbolic practices, I argue that
medical and psychological practitioners have consequently ignored or
dismissed the capacities for mutuality and intimacy upon which such people's
sociality depends.  
In chapter five, I turn to the sociocultural literature on intellectual disability
and show how it emerged as a direct criticism of the limitations of these
medical and psychological interpretations.  Through an analysis of the work of
Robert Edgerton, Robert Bogdan, Steven Taylor, David Goode and John
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Gleason, I separate the sociocultural study of intellectual disability into three
distinct, though inter-related, "schools" of thought. Inspired by the seminal
work of Robert Edgerton (1967), the majority of early sociocultural studies of
intellectual disability tended to focus on the consequences of stigma, labelling
and incompetence for intellectually disabled people. They also focused more
exclusively on the social experiences and problems of mildly intellectually
disabled people, particularly their adjustment to living in the community. More
recently, there has been a shift towards analysing the experiences and
perceptions of intellectual disability as a social construction (Bogdan & Taylor
1976, 1982; Manion & Bersani 1987). This second "school" extends into post-
structural "discursive" analyses that seek to elucidate the connections between
discourses of intellectual disability, institutional practices and identity (Branson
& Miller 1989; Cocks & Allen 1996; Johnson 1998). Although different in their
styles of analysis, the work of Goode (1980a; 1980b; 1990) and Gleason (1989;
1994) represents a third "school" within the sociocultural study of intellectual
disability. By emphasising the centrality of relations and intimacy in encounters
with severely intellectually disabled people, Goode and Gleason analyse the
conditions that are necessary for such people to engage in meaningful
interactions with others. 
Despite their greater sensitivity to intellectually disabled people as social
beings, constructionist accounts do not often allow for an interpretation of
these people as more or other than just a product of these constructions. The
studies therefore tend to mask the social and symbolic agency of intellectually
disabled people and perpetuate the assumption that such people lack the
capabilities to be the independent sustainers and authors of mutuality and
sociality. Not all meaning is discursive meaning, and social life incorporates
generational and transactional processes as much as it involves the
reproduction of certain structural elements. While social and cultural factors
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have been instrumental in producing an historically informed and socially
constructed interpretation of what it means to be intellectually disabled, and
while these have subsequently influenced the practices and forms of relating
that exist in clinical and institutional encounters with intellectually disabled
people, they do not in themselves capture the totality of what it is to be
intellectually disabled, nor what is involved in engaging in social relations with
such people. While my analysis of intellectual disability in terms of a symbolic
scheme of reason and normality is similar to some of the post-structural and
constructionist accounts, I have also been inspired by the interactional analyses
of Goode and Gleason in my endeavour to analyse how intellectually disabled
people actually express themselves and engage with others socially.
In chapter six I return to my fieldwork notes and the records of my siblings
in order to examine the processes through which the symbolic scheme of
reason and normality becomes instituted into daily practices and relationships
in institutional environments. I also analyse this material with reference to
contemporary policies towards intellectually disabled people. This includes
normalisation and deinstitutionalisation policies, as well as the practices of
behavioural management and individual domestic and vocational skills
training. These policies and practices have been shaped by social and clinical
interpretations of intellectual disability. They are also informed by legal and
structural obligations that influence the ways in which staff are able to engage
with their 'clients'. While these policies and practices acknowledged that
intellectually disabled people are capable of learning, developing and changing,
they also continued to render the intellectually disabled in terms of
'deficiencies'. Constructed as lacking or deficient in particular skills and
competencies, intellectually disabled people are treated in institutionalised
environments as though they need to be managed and trained to become
social beings. As a consequence, very little attention is given to their own
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modes of sociality and senses of intimacy; to any intimations that they may
have of mutual sociality in everyday life.  
In my final chapter, I examine the connection between mutuality, sociality
and meaning, and the link between these and the different ways in which
intellectually disabled people are perceived and related to. In institutional
environments, staff relate to intellectually disabled people on the basis of
training and management practices. These reflect legal and institutional
requirements of maintaining professional levels of distance, separation and
disengagement. As a result, the range of symbolic practices and dispositional
behaviours that intellectually disabled people utilise to express themselves are
not recognised as such, nor are they engaged with. Consequently, as part of
their social training, the people with whom I did my fieldwork have been
encouraged to develop particular normative communicational skills. This
training occurred specifically during the weekly meetings that took place at the
activities centre and group homes, although it was also an aspect of the general
ethos of training and management that dominated most aspects of both
environments. These practices excluded any requirement that intellectually
disabled people relate to and engage with the staff.
In order to perceive the intent and meaning of intellectually disabled
people's symbolic practices and behaviours, however, I argue that it is
necessary to engage with them on the basis of intimacy and mutuality. It is
through relations founded on intimate mutuality that differences are able to be
symbolically mediated. It is also through such relationships that mutual forms
of sociality emerge and upon which intellectually disabled people's existence as
social beings depends. To ignore or deny the pre-existing capacities of
intellectually disabled people to generate and sustain modes of mutual sociality
and symbolic expression is therefore to undermine their existence as social
beings. By juxtaposing modes of sociality within a familial and institutional
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domain, it is possible to elucidate the consequences of forms of relatedness
based on either intimate mutuality or training and management practices.
While chapters one, two and seven conceptually frame this thesis and provide a
description of familial and institutional modes of sociality and relatedness,
chapters three to six provide an analysis of how notions of deficiency founded
on a symbolic scheme of reason and normality have become embodied in
clinical interpretations and institutional life.   
Chapter One: Ethnographic Encounters I
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Chapter One
Ethnographic Encounters I:
Growing up in a world of intellectual disability
My older sister Ursula and I were playing in the main bedroom at the home of
some friends of our parents. It was a large and luxurious room. A bay window
dominated one wall, with loosely draped curtains letting in the afternoon sun.
Textured rugs covered the floor, paintings adorned the walls, and an antique
dressing table stood in one corner, laden with boxes, bottles and brushes. We
were both drawn to this corner, and climbed up onto a stool to get a closer
look at ourselves in the large gilt mirror. The sound of adults talking drifted up
from the downstairs drawing room, and other children's voices could be heard
outside in the garden. Yet we were in our own secluded world, in this hidden
and forbidden room. We knew full well we were not supposed to be there but
nonetheless we were both enticed by the beauty, colours and scents of the
place. We drew open the drawers of the dressing table, pulled out lipsticks,
powder, and bottles of perfume and watched ourselves intently in the mirror
as we applied garish colour to our faces, to lips, eyes and cheeks alike. I cannot
remember whether we went downstairs to show ourselves off, or were
discovered in the act itself, but the consequences differed none. We were
soundly punished for our transgressions and scrubbed to a colour just as bright
as the pinks and reds of the lipsticks we had used.
This is one of my earliest memories, and like nearly all the memories I have
up until the age of three and a half, it involves me playing with my sister
Ursula. She was a beautiful, gentle child, with soft brown curly hair, olive skin
and brown eyes. We were close in age; two years separated us, with three
older siblings making five children in all at the time. Consequently, Ursula and I
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spent a lot of time together, climbing fences on country picnics, playing on the
swings in the back garden, drawing pictures, looking at books, playing with
toys and having morning tea together as we watched Playschool1. Being older,
she was the leader and I dutifully followed her quiet but definite lead as we
moved through the daily activities and games of childhood. I do not remember
us ever talking with one another, or playing anything highly organised, but we
understood and communicated in the way that siblings close in age often do.
We existed in each other's world, and within the wider world of our family.
When Ursula went to preschool I was devastated to be left alone at home,
packing my school bag each morning in the hope that one day I too would
follow her and my other older siblings into a larger world. The only difference
was that the world I would one day enter was profoundly different to the one
that three of my siblings experienced.
Three of the four older children in my family are intellectually disabled.2  In
addition, my eldest brother Joseph has had to deal with enduring problems due
to contracting encephalitis as a 20 month old baby.3 All four children were
                                              
1 Playschool is a popular children's television programme that has been
running in Australia since the 1960s.
2 The range of people, and their social and linguistic skills, who are considered
to be intellectually disabled varies considerably. The definitions of the American
Association on Mental Retardation and the World Health Organisation includes
all those with "subaverage intellectual functioning", or an IQ below 70, where
the disability is manifest before maturation and includes functional limitations
in at least two areas of independent living, mobility and language ability
(Bullock & Trombley 1999: 519-520; Schalock et al. 1994: 182). The majority of
research on the social lives of people with intellectual disabilities has been done
with those in the upper functional range, those with an IQ above 50, or the
mildly mentally retarded using the old terminology. Two of my siblings were
considered to be severely mentally retarded, and when using the term
intellectually disabled it is to such people that I am more specifically referring.
3 In a psychological assessment done in 1977 it was considered that Joseph had
"a residual organic impairment" related to the encephalitis, resulting in physical,
intellectual and psychological developmental problems. His problems were
thought to be related to the "familial disorder" that Maryla, Stephen and Ursula
were seen to exhibit (30/9/77). Joseph was included in all the early medical
records from 1961 to 1967 but apart from this single psychological assessment,
done when he was nineteen years of age in 1977, he does not appear in any
other records relating to intellectual disability in the family. He was not
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epileptic, three went to special schools, and two were on lifetime medication.
My sister Ursula died of pneumonia in 1969 when she was five years old, and
my brother Stephen died at the age of seventeen in 1978 following an epileptic
seizure. Stephen was five years older than me and had an open, friendly face
that often looked out on the world with a mixture of curiosity and amusement.
Although labelled autistic he was a very affectionate person who loved to be
cuddled, tickled and teased, and would always reach out to one of the family to
let us know what he wanted.4  Maryla is four years older than me, the third
                                                                                                                                              
assessed at the Grosvenor Diagnostic Clinic in Sydney, and, unlike our other
three intellectually disabled siblings, he attended a normal school. Due to his
obvious abilities in relation to our other siblings, his high IQ, and the fact that
he ceased having convulsions at seven years of age, my parents did not pursue
assessments and a diagnosis in relation to his problems. However, these
continue to cause difficulties for him, especially in the areas of employment,
independence, financial management, domestic responsibilities and
relationships. He has been on a Disability Pension since 1995 due to his
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and now has an advocate provided for by the
Citizen Advocacy NSW Association to help him with domestic, financial and
other social issues. In this thesis I do not include Joseph as one of my
intellectually disabled siblings, mainly because none of my family, including
Joseph, have thought of him in this way. My other siblings were far more
disabled than he is, and it is relationships with people who have more severe
forms of intellectual disability that I am concerned with here.
4 Like many terms that try to characterise and define a category of persons,
autism is a controversial and contradictory concept. First coined by Leo Kanner
in 1943 to describe what he called "early infantile autism", the term was used to
define a particular group of children who from birth (or up to 30 months of
age) did not fit the contemporary category of feeble-mindedness due to their
cognitive potential (Kanner 1944). Kanner argued that autistic children
exhibited similar patterns of unusual behaviour, including extreme aloneness or
social aloofness, delayed echolalia, and the need for obsessive repetitive
routines (Kanner 1944; L. Wing 1996). More recently it has been argued that
autism presents as a spectrum of disorders with similar clinical symptoms
rather than being a singular isolated disorder (Gray 1995; L. Wing 1996).
According to Lorna Wing, these include "Asperger's syndrome, a condition
characterised by borderline or normal IQ; social isolation or naive,
inappropriate social interaction; intensive interest in only one or two subjects; a
narrow, repetitive life style; limited or inappropriate intonation and body
language; and poor motor coordination" (L. Wing 1996: 327). David Gray
argues, however, that despite occasional media assertions that autistic people
are savants, displaying extraordinary powers of mathematical calculation or
musical memory, up to  four-fifths of all autistic people are profoundly
mentally handicapped (Gray 1995: 102). Autism was originally thought to be a
social condition caused by what was termed Refrigerator Mother Syndrome.
More recent arguments claim that it is a neurological condition due to
Chapter One: Ethnographic Encounters I
page 13
child born into our family. She is very Polish in appearance, taking after my
father, with olive skin, blue eyes, wide cheekbones and straight dark hair. Like
Stephen and Ursula, she hasn't any particular physical features that mark her as
disabled and yet her physical presence is strikingly different. It is the way she
holds herself, the way she walks, how she uses her hands; it is the way she is in
the world. She lacks any of the self-consciousness, and indeed capabilities, that
compel most people to act in accordance with accepted social norms.
When I was born into this family my intellectually disabled siblings were
already there, were already a part of the familial environment. I knew no other
world. I accepted it and sought to understand and relate to my siblings as they
were; not seeking to change them but to engage with them, play with them, be
with them, and, as I grew older, to help them if need be. The story that I am
about to tell concerns the different ways in which intellectually disabled people
are responded to. It concerns the ways in which these differences are
conceptualised, and the consequences that these various responses have for
either denying or accepting such people's capacity for sociality and mutual
relatedness. It is also the story of my family.  It focuses on the difference that
having a severely intellectually disabled brother and two sisters made to our
family life. It interprets what this difference involved within a familial domain,
and contrasts it with other historical and social interpretations of intellectual
disability. My argument will be that living intimately with disability brings its
own, quite crucial perspective.
 Meaning, Mutuality and Sociality
                                                                                                                                              
metabolic or genetic disorders, pre or post natal brain injury or viral infections
(Leser 1996: 45). However, as Gray points out, there is still no agreement as to
what causes autism (Gray 1995: 99).
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Far from being isolated, meaningless, non-symbolic, abnormal, or asocial, as
the behaviour of intellectually disabled people is so often described (Connors &
Donnellan 1993: 269; Goode 1990: 30; Kanner 1944: 211-4; Lea 1988; Leser 1996:
45; MacAndrew & Edgerton 1970: 28; Rose 1985: 37; Ryan & Thomas 1987: 47-8;
L. Wing 1996: 327; cf. Taylor & Bogdan 1998: 198-199; Gleason 1989: 62; for
similar criticisms of such interpretations), my siblings were continuously
creating meaningful lives for themselves. They were also intricately engaged in
the complex patterns of sociality and mutuality that constituted our family life.
The issue of meaning and its relation to sociality is a central dimension of this
thesis. Although I expand more fully on this in my final chapter, it is important
to introduce what I mean by "meaningless" and "meaningful" behaviour when
it comes to social perceptions of intellectually disabled people. In
anthropological terms I take the expression of meaningful behaviour and
interaction with others as forms of sociality, as that which is symbolic,
structured and purposeful, which exists within an interpretable and predictable
social context, and is open to change and transformation (Austin-Broos 1987:
142-5; Carrithers 1992; Geertz 1993a [1973]: 99; Kuper 1999; Parsons 1970 [1951]:
3-11; Sahlins 1976: 58-67). Sociality does not just mean becoming recognisably
encultured, nor is it merely related to social structures and institutions
(Carrithers 1999: 1033). It refers instead to the "intensity of social life", with the
recognition that human existence and experience is fundamentally shared and
social (Carrithers 1999: 1033; 1992: 1).
Sociality refers to shared existence within a meaningful world and as such is
based on mutuality and interrelations between people. In this sense mutuality
is, as Michael Carrithers (1992: 11) has put it, a view "which stresses that people
are so deeply engaged with each other that we can only properly understand
them if we understand even their apparently private notions and attitudes as
interpersonal ones". The contextual environment, and ultimately the form of
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relatedness across the difference of intellectual disability, influences the way
intellectually disabled people's expressions, behaviour and experiences are
perceived and interpreted. Different persons are constituted differently in
different environments (Carrithers et al. 1985). The joint constitution of social
life as a product of relations and degrees of mutuality across this difference
only occurs if intellectually disabled people's contributions to the social world
are accepted on their own terms.  However, without many of the predictable
dispositions that act as the usual markers of sociality, intellectually disabled
people are often presumed to lack any form of meaningful social existence at
all. The idea that their sociality can constitute a mutuality with the intellectually
able is largely dismissed.
Focusing on forms of relatedness that do not seek to change an intellectually
disabled person into someone socially more 'normal' but rather accepts their
expressions of difference as interpretable, allows for an awareness of meaning
and sociality as inherent in their actions and interactions (cf. Gleason 1994: 247-
249). Meaningful patterns of structured and purposeful behaviour are both
created within the context of relatedness and produce the very form that this
context takes on; it is both the product and producer of a social environment
(Geertz 1993a [1973]: 93-4). The context or "form of life" (Radcliffe-Brown 1965
[1952]: 6; cf. Wittgenstein 1998 [1953]: §19) that can be experienced, perceived
and created through particular types of relatedness—such as those of mutuality
embedded in kin relations—thus raises issues as to the public and shared nature
of this form of life, of the symbolic and purposive nature of it as a system or
"language game", and hence the capacity for it to be analysed and interpreted
(Geertz 1993a [1973]: 95-6; Wittgenstein 1998 [1953]: §7; cf. Bourdieu 1999
[1972]: 97; Jackson 1998: 8-10).5 My use of "language games" to connote such
                                                
5 While I use Wittgenstein's "language games" in conjunction with Radcliffe-
Brown's "form of life" I do so by incorporating an enriched analytical content
derived from symbolic anthropology and Carrithers' concept of mutuality. This
combination allows me to analyse the forms of engagement and symbolic
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forms of interaction is deliberately paradoxical. Rather than referring simply to
Language writ large, I use the term in the broadest sense as a system of
communication that mediates and interprets the intentions and experiences of
those involved. The term is also useful because it connotes a domain of sociality
and symbolic exchange that, although confined and limited in its nature, is also
open to possibilities.6
This interpretation raises serious questions about the ways in which
intellectually disabled people traditionally have been treated and perceived; a
perception that is embodied in Tredgold's 1956 statement that "they have eyes
but they see not; ears but they hear not; they have no consciousness of
pleasure or pain; in fact, their mental state is one of entire negation" (cited in
Bogdan & Taylor 1982: 15). It also raises problems for some contemporary
policies within the field of intellectual disability, including the practices of
normalisation, deinstitutionalisation, and community integration, and the push
for equal rights and a quality of life. While these have been introduced as
positive alternatives to the older practices of segregation and isolation, and are
an attempt to protect intellectually disabled people from real and potential
abuse, I argue later in the thesis that the forms of relatedness that exist in group
homes and activities centres often preclude the possibility and the legitimacy of
developing long-term relations of mutual engagement. The mode of sociality
that constitutes such institutional environments (for, despite no longer being an
institution, they are still institutional) is not conducive to producing a genuinely
shared social milieu.  Instead, these places are founded on the principles and
                                                                                                                                              
mediation that exist in encounters with intellectually disabled people without
entering into phenomenological interpretations of their lived experiences. I do
this because I am not fully able to apprehend the experiences of my siblings
from their perspectives.
6 Although I introduce Basil Bernstein's concept of "restricted codes" later in the
thesis, a concept which suggests deficits and limitations in communication and
social interaction, I wish to emphasise that intellectually disabled people do
utilise a range of symbolic systems. In fact, these symbolic practices become the
vehicles of mutuality and sociality, and are open to mediation through
engagement, imagination and use.
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practices of management, control, training and assimilation. These practices are
themselves built upon the interpretation that intellectually disabled people are
inherently abnormal and asocial, and that they are in need of being normalised
and socialised in order to be meaningfully engaged with.   
I too never came to know the people I did my fieldwork with as intimately
as I know my siblings. This was partly due to the shortness of the time I spent
with them—twelve months in all.  It was also because of the fact that,
structurally, I was inhibited from developing close relationships with the
intellectually disabled people with whom I worked. This prescription
conformed to the newly instigated Standards of Practice based on the NSW
Disabilities Services Act (1993).7 Consequently, although I observed similar
forms of meaningful behaviour, interaction and creativity in their daily lives
with one another, I do not feel able to rely on material from my fieldwork in
the way that I can on knowledge of my siblings. The boundary that had been
created, and to which I had to respond, meant that there was little possibility of
negotiating a shared social milieu out of which such interpretations and
perceptions might emerge. Without denying the difficulties that exist in relating
to people with limited modes of mutuality and dispositional behaviour, the fact
that they do exist, and that it is possible to develop a shared form of life across
                                                
7 The NSW (New South Wales) Disability Service Standards and the NSW
Disability Services Act (1993) were passed by the NSW Legislative Assembly in
accordance with the Commonwealth State Disability Agreement of 1991.
Throughout the 1980s there had been agitation for changes to the treatment of
intellectually disabled people in Australia. This resulted in the Richmond Report
(1983) which examined conditions in NSW institutions and emphasised the
ideologies of deinstitutionalisation and normalisation as an alternative social
policy. The Commonwealth Disability Services Act was established in 1986 due
to the recommendations of the Richmond Report and other similar reports and
submissions. Each of the States agreed to pass a complementary Act to the
Commonwealth Disability Services Act so as to uphold the Principles,
Standards and Objectives of the 1986 Act. Under the present arrangements, the
Commonwealth Government takes responsibility for employment services for
all people with disabilities, while each of the States are responsible for all other
services, including accommodation, activities centres and community
programmes (NSW Department of Community Services 1996).
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these differences, means that the institutional response to intellectual disability
perpetrates a violence against the disabled. Being trained to conform to
normative social practices and skills does not produce a social and cultural
person. It is a procedure that attempts to transform someone who has already
been constituted as "radically other" into a simulacrum of normality. Much of
this thesis is concerned with analysing just what this process involves, and how
it has come about.
The Intimacy of Living with Disabled Kin
We were a large family by contemporary standards, seven children in all by the
time my younger siblings, Tessa and Peter, were born. My parents were a
union of Irish and Polish Catholic migrants who met at university in England in
the 1950s. We emigrated from northern England in the winter of 1966 to Perth,
where my father had been offered a position at the University of Western
Australia as a Lecturer in Applied Mathematics. It was in Perth that my parents
first connected with other families like our own. For five years they had been
going backwards and forwards to different specialists in England trying to get a
diagnosis and some advice on my siblings' epilepsy, slow development and
unusual behaviour. Neither of my parents remember being given any helpful
information, or a diagnosis of "mental retardation". Notwithstanding this, the
records at the Alder Hay Children's Hospital in Liverpool show that the
paediatricians had certainly come to this conclusion with regards to two of my
siblings (30/4/65; 7/7/65).8 In Perth, my parents were introduced to a
physician at the University who took over the family concerns. She initiated
further tests which confirmed deficits in intellectual capability in three of my
four older siblings. However the causes of these conditions remained a
                                            
8 Throughout the thesis I draw on the medical records for my family dating
back to 1962. The dates refer to these notes, reports and letters.
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mystery. Instead, it was the viewing of a film on autism brought to Australia
by the English child psychiatrist and specialist on autism, Doctor Mildred Creak,
that gave my parents their first inkling that Stephen might be autistic. For the
first time they recognised his behaviour in another, and saw that he could be
understood in terms of this recently defined "syndrome".9 They realised that
they were not alone, and that there were special schools being set up that could
provide for at least one of their children.
The mixed emotions that this raised, and that my parents have had to deal
with since their older children were infants, is one that is familiar to many
parents of intellectually disabled children (Booth 1978: 218; Kearney 1993a,
1993b, 1996).10 Theirs is the responsibility, the expectations, hopes, fears and
disappointments. Yet, as Penny Kearney has pointed out, the common
assumption that parents only ever experience their handicapped child as a
burden and tragedy denies the depth of joy and pleasure that often
accompanies such a relationship (Kearney 1996: 56-8). Being born into this
world as a sibling of intellectually disabled people, however, has made my
perceptions and experiences somewhat different. I had no immediate
                                                
9 After an assessment in Perth it was considered that Stephen displayed autistic
tendencies, particularly due to his repetitive and obsessive behaviour and
fascination with spatial patterns. The interpretation of these as simply
characteristic of a deficiency and abnormality, rather than as potentially socially
and symbolically meaningful expressions of his own experience of the world, is
something that I analyse throughout this thesis.
10 The majority of the literature that examines familial attitudes to intellectually
disabled people tends to focus on the experiences and perceptions of parents,
or else utilises the parent-child relationship as a source for interpreting an
intellectually disabled person's actions and intentions (Booth 1978; Goode
1980a, 1980b; Gray 1995; Jacobs 1980; Kearney 1993a, 1993b, 1996). Much of the
autobiographical and biographical literature on intellectual disability has also
focused on the relationship of parents with their intellectually disabled child
(O'Halloran 1993; Vohs 1993). While there are an increasing number of studies
focusing on sibling attitudes to intellectual disability, these often tend to
emphasise the difficulties or consequences of such a situation for the non-
disabled sibling (Cleveland & Miller 1977). There is also a tendency to focus on
the issue of service provision, and the role that the family should have in
negotiations on their kin's behalf with such services (Bigby & Johnson 1995;
Krupinski et al. 1983).
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expectations, hopes, or disappointments. This was the world as I knew it, and
these were my brothers and sisters, the people with whom I most closely
associated. Although I became aware as I grew older that my siblings were
different, it was quite some time before I was affected by the view that this
difference was something of which to be ashamed.  
Memories of those early years for me are filled with the bliss and
melancholy that colour childhood recollections. The difficulties were real
enough for all of us but the immediacy of the familial environment made those
difficulties seem natural and just a part of everyday life.  That everyday life was
filled with activities, adventures and journeys, most of which I remember as
day trips from Sydney to the Blue Mountains and Hawkesbury River for
picnics, excursions to the northern beaches on hot summer days, visits to my
grandparents after church on Sundays, or else fooling around at home
enjoying a world of childhood games and family activities.
The almost weekly picnics during the cooler months of the year remain for
me the most special, enjoyable and easy time that my family  experienced. The
Holden11 station wagon would be packed to overflowing with all the children,
including a collection of blankets to sit on, warm clothes for later in the day, an
'Esky'12 that was filled with sandwiches, biscuits and cordial, and a box loaded
with plastic cups and plates, plus a thermos of hot tea or coffee. My father
would take his place behind the wheel, my mother in the front seat beside him,
and we would drive out of the suburbs into the wild dry scrubby bush that
surrounds the fringe of Sydney. Once out on these open country roads we
would search for a spot to unload, lay out the blankets in a place that caught
the afternoon sun, and open up the Esky for a long and lazy lunch. We often
whiled away the afternoon hours climbing trees or fences.  We walked through
                                                
11 A Holden is an Australian car made by General Motors.
12 The word Esky is a trademark term that refers to a portable insulated icebox
used for keeping food and drink cold.
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the long paddock grass, or lay in the sun until it disappeared behind some
trees. Finally we would pack up all our things and crowd back into the car.
The journey home as evening fell was often quiet with children dozing off
to sleep after a long day, curled up against one another in the back seat. For
part of each trip, however, my parents would strike up a tune that was familiar
to us all, and those of us who could sing would join in the chorus or repeat the
refrains led by my father in the front. Stephen in particular loved some of these
songs, and the words were sometimes changed around to include him in them.
He would squeal with pleasure and catch hold of my mother or brother Joseph,
or whoever was sitting next to him, to indicate his comprehension and
participation.  
These outings were happy times, and the boxes of slides attest to this,
showing images of my family relaxing and enjoying ourselves; brothers and
sisters holding hands with one another as we walked through the paddocks, or
sitting side by side on the blankets eating sandwiches and cake. My mother also
remembers these occasions with fondness:
I really loved those picnics. I think it was because we always went
to an isolated spot, a safe spot, a spot where we wouldn't come
into contact with other people. And we always had a good time.
And just as you were talking I was picturing Stephen as a younger
child. One of the things that he really liked was beakers. We used
to bring plastic beakers, or glass-plastic beakers, and he would just
love to play with those. And he would pour liquid from one to the
other—because of course we didn't bring jigsaws on the picnic,
thank goodness, so we had to find some other occupation. And he
would sit for hours just playing with them, or sometimes filling
them up with soil and just pouring from one to the other . . .
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sometimes stacking the beakers up. He really could be quite
occupied with that. The picnics were very enjoyable; they were
peaceful.
Looking back on those journeys to the countryside evokes memories of my
family happy in its separation from the wider, conventional, social world; a
world within which my siblings' differences became noticeable,
incomprehensible, problematic and socially unacceptable. I realise now that
they provided moments of relief from situations that forced interaction with
the wider society. A natural environment provided us with a peace and
freedom that society never could; a freedom to be ourselves without the
endless stares, judgement and apprehension of other people.  
I experienced a similar sense of calm and easy association during the bus
journeys that were a regular part of each day of my fieldwork with
intellectually disabled adults. Although the separateness of the staff set up a
counterpoint to the dynamics of the group, the atmosphere of those journeys
was tinged with familiarity. The bus provided a space away from social
expectations. It was a liminal space representing moments of transition
between one activity and the next (V. Turner 1967: 93).13 As such it allowed
                                              
13 I use the word liminal in accordance with Victor Turner's use of Arnold van
Gennep's concept of "the liminal phase" as a transitional and transformative
phase that exists between two other social states (V. Turner 1967; 1969: 94).
Robert Murphy has also used liminality as an explanatory concept to describe
the social state that physically disabled people find themselves in (Murphy 1990:
131). Rather than being transformed into a new social role, as van Gennep's
liminal stage implies, Murphy argues that the disabled are unable to recompose
themselves within the social world and therefore permanently exist at the
threshold of, and oftentimes outside, the formal social system (Murphy 1990:
45, 131). Being neither sick nor well, disabled people remain ambiguous
persons whose social and human status is in doubt.  They are forever "betwixt
and between" in the words of Victor Turner (V. Turner 1969: 95; Murphy 1990:
131). Interestingly, for Turner, there is a "certain homology"  between people
whose social status is inferior or marginal and liminality as a state of
"weakness" and "passivity" (V. Turner 1969: 99). Turner also argues that many
of the ritualised transitional qualities of liminality in tribal societies have
become permanent institutionalised states in more complex societies (V. Turner
1969: 107). In my use of the term, liminality incorporates these dual aspects.  It
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people to just be in the present, to be themselves, their presence justified by the
momentary movement that demanded nothing other than that they be in that
bus.
During the picnics we too were separated from some of the often
antagonistic demands, judgements and expectations of the social world. My
siblings were protected from pressures to conform to social expectations of
normality, to socially prescribed ways of being, behaving and interacting.
However, rather than being a liminal and transitional space, a space in-
between, the picnics (and family life in general) were constituted of a mutuality
and interdependence that permanently embodied my siblings' social presence.
The relief from demands to conform may have been similar, but the form of
sociality was entirely different. Within an institutional environment
intellectually disabled people are not considered potential contributors to the
social milieu. They are not considered to be the authors of their own social
lives.  Instead, they become recipients of practices of assimilation and
normalisation and are constantly subject to an ethos of training and
management. As a family we incorporated my siblings' differences rather than
trying to erase them. We acknowledged my siblings' capacities to create
independently and sustain a form of mutuality and sociality. We had our own
internally produced and externally inherited social and cultural mores, and
operated according to our own complex and shared mutuality and sociality.
Despite the tensions and difficulties experienced within my family there has
always been an underlying mutuality, intimacy and love, an "enduring, diffuse
solidarity" (Schneider 1968: 52), upon which our relations with one another and
                                                                                                                                              
refers to the institutionalised interpretation of intellectually disabled people as
abnormal and asocial beings. It also refers to the bus journeys or moments of
inactivity that represent a transitional phase between socially accepted
activities.  
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our sociality was built. As Schneider elaborates, family in the United States, as a
cultural category, is based on the principle of solidarity:
. . . because the relationship is supportive, helpful and cooperative;
it rests on trust and the other can be trusted. [It is] diffuse because it
is not narrowly confined to a specific goal or a specific kind of
behaviour . . . Two members of the family cannot be indifferent to
one another, and since their cooperation does not have a specific
goal or a specific limited time in mind, it is enduring (Schneider
1968: 52; author's emphasis).  
In this sense of shared experience the notion of a shared substance develops
upon which relations are established and around which they oscillate. While
such a notion of a shared substance can exist beyond the intimacy of kin to
include all those who are human, the humanness of intellectually disabled
people is often denied by categorising and marking their differences as
abnormal and asocial.  
The mutualism and relatedness across difference upon which my familial
environment was built acknowledged and incorporated in an unspoken way
the fundamental need to find a means for interaction and understanding
through which we could exist as a social entity. My siblings' humanness, and
their capacity to participate in this mutual and intersubjective engagement,
albeit in a limited and often opaque way, was entirely taken for granted. For,
although my family may have been unconventional in its make-up and in the
way we communicated and existed with one another, it was conventional for
us. It was the way we were, and outings such as the picnics where we remained
separate from other people allowed us to act and exist as though this difference
was unimportant.14
                                                
14 Whereas my parents may have perceived their disabled children differently
to this, my childhood perception of my siblings has allowed me to underline
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Like the picnics, home life also provided us with a socially enclosed world.
Here, the routine of daily domestic life gave an order and structure to the
world within which we all operated. This order and structure was in part a
cultural manifestation. It incorporated within it the values, attitudes and
lifestyle of a European-Australian, middle class, educated family. This order and
structure, however, also developed in response to the particular differences
that my siblings presented. Their presence, and the response of all of us to this
difference, produced another, different, way of being a family, of
communicating, being with, and relating to one another. It produced a unique
form of mutuality and sociality that was a product of the interdependence and
interrelatedness of my family members.
We spent many long hours together as children with all the accoutrements
of middle class life around us; books, toys, jigsaw puzzles, games, crayons,
television, a swimming pool, swings, sandpit, a table tennis table, as well as a
large garden with trees to climb and plenty of room to run around in. The
difference was that my intellectually disabled siblings often played and used
these objects in ways that were socially different and unexpected. These were
ways that did not conform to normal and predictable dispositions that
generally act as markers of sociality—although as a child I accepted their
engagement with these things as ordinary and everyday. In fact, I was drawn
into their world just as much as they were drawn into the wider world of the
family. Their way of utilising objects and engaging with us gave shape to the
world that we all lived in. Through such mutual encounters "we progressively
developed common schemes of communication, congruent practical
relevancies, mutually defined things to do in the world, and so forth" (Goode
1980b: 204-205)—as Goode has described it in reflecting on his own interactions
with a severely intellectually disabled person. These engagements therefore
                                                                                                                                      
and interpret an often ignored potentiality in social relations with profoundly
intellectually disabled people.
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produced a specific form of life, "a certain set of actions and interactions
amongst persons which are . . . interconnected in such a way that we can give a
general analytical description of them as constituting a system" (Radcliffe-
Brown 1965 [1952]: 6).
*
Maryla and Stephen both loved playing with jigsaw puzzles. In fact the
whole family partook in this rainy day activity, enjoying the satisfaction of
completing a picture by fitting the last piece of the puzzle into place. For Maryla
and Stephen, however, the process was always somewhat different, and the
interest went way beyond rainy days to become an almost permanent
preoccupation. Stephen had a special knack for finding pieces by sight alone.
He worked not with the picture, nor the emerging image, but with the shapes
themselves. His task was to work from one end of the puzzle to the other,
putting each piece into place one after the other in rows, rarely picking up the
wrong piece that was next in line. He would sometimes do these puzzles
picture side down as if to prove that it was the satisfaction and pleasure of
recognising shapes that motivated him. Stephen's sounds of delight and
satisfaction whenever he found a particularly difficult piece seemed proof of
this. Often he would get up in the middle of the night to continue with his
jigsaw puzzle and Joseph or I would try to get him back to bed before he was
discovered by our father. At other times, if Stephen lost a piece down the back
of the skirting-board as he sometimes did, he would come up to my mother
with a large knife in his hand to let her know he needed help retrieving it.
Doing jigsaws was one of Stephen's primary pleasures in life and I will forever
have memories of him and Maryla half lying side by side on the rugs in the
living room, the pieces spread out on the floor around them, as they did their
respective puzzles.
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Maryla is both more elaborate in her approach to the jigsaw puzzles but
also less capable. She begins each new puzzle by spending hours laying out the
pieces in a snake-like domino pattern across the floor, picture side down. When
she has completed this she then turns each piece over and replaces it in another
snake-like domino pattern picture side up. Having done this, and talking to
herself at the completion of each stage in a sort of incantation that comments
on what she has just done and is about to do, Maryla then begins the slow task
of putting together the puzzle in the same way that Stephen did, beginning at
one end and working her way across the board to the other side. Sometimes
she would have to call on Stephen to help her with a piece, and he would
respond with delight at being able to do it better than she could. Rarely would
she let anyone else help her. If we ever came too close to where Maryla was
sitting she would get distressed and want us to move away.  It didn't help that
we were mostly younger than her and as babies had a habit of wanting to eat
the pieces. Her memory of this, and the potential threat to her ordered world
that our intrusions represented, were reasons enough to keep us at bay no
matter how much we wanted to participate. It was all right to be close by if we
were involved in some other activity but not if it was clear we were trying to
intrude on her enterprise.
These days Maryla is much more amenable to shared work on a puzzle,
although this still has to take place on her own terms. When she comes to stay
at my parents' places for the weekend it does not take her long to go to the
drawer where the puzzles are kept, pull them out and begin the endless task of
doing the jigsaws over and over again. If Maryla feels that there is respect for
the fact that this is her puzzle then she is quite happy for someone to sit beside
her, even allowing them to point out the next piece in the sequence if she is
having difficulty finding it. This entering of her space is very special. It is quiet,
concentrated and occupied. There is no conversation other than about the
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pieces, and when the puzzle is complete Maryla finishes off with an incantation
before pulling out the next one and starting all over again.
The incantations that Maryla repeats involve referring to herself in the third
person, and are not confined to jigsaw puzzles. They also take place when we
are waiting at traffic lights, at the completion of each meal, when she has
questioned someone about plans for the rest of the day, after putting down her
'bits and pieces'15, or when she has observed and asked questions about what
somebody else is doing. The incantations go something like this: "Maryla just
putting your bit (sic) and pieces down, just putting your bit and pieces down.
Yes."  Or: "Mummy just going back to the Kirribilli house, she just going back
to the Kirribilli house, yes. Mummy not staying at the Chatswood house. No.
Not staying at the Chatswood house. Just going to the Kirribilli house. Yes."16
She repeats such comments over and over to herself, rocking backwards and
forwards as she recites the relevant phrase, and then finishes off with another
incantation before ending with "Ooha. Ooha. Ooha" as though satisfied that all
is as it should be. Try as I might, however, I still have not been able to fully
interpret what it is that she says to herself in this final incantation. They do not
appear to be recognisable words and yet when I listen closely she is definitely
saying the same thing each time in relation to each particular situation.
The same interest in ordering and patterns displayed by Maryla in her
approach to doing jigsaws was also expressed in her relationship with books.
When Maryla was living at home the books from one or other of the
bookcases in the house would be systematically pulled out onto the floor and
layed out in a snake-like domino pattern similar to the jigsaw pieces. She would
then begin at the end of the line and flick through each book, page by page
from front to back, laying them back on the floor, cover side down, in a similar
                                                
15 A collection of small objects which will be elaborated upon later in the
chapter.
16 Kirribilli and Chatswood are Sydney suburbs.
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pattern. Maryla would make her way through the books in this fashion,
transferring them one by one to the new line. When she had come to the end
she would then go through the books from back to front in the same way and
replace them in their original order.17 This procedure would take days, and the
rest of us were obliged to tread carefully around her closely guarded pattern
lest we disturb its order. Sometimes the collection would include a book that
one of us was reading but the effort required to recover it was often not worth
the trauma and trouble that it caused. Even if done in secret at the end of the
day Maryla would invariably know that a book had been taken from the pile.  
One of Maryla's most enduring and absorbing activities involves her
collection of 'bits and pieces', as it is described by the family. She spends most
of her time searching for these bits and pieces to add to her collection; a
collection of small objects that until recently she always held in her hands. This
occupation causes her to spend much of the time with her face to the ground as
she calmly and methodically peruses the space she is in for these valuable
objects (although when one of us tries to stop her the calmness can quickly turn
to frustration and anger). Yet not everything is collected. Sometimes she will
pick something up and discard it as rubbish while other objects are meaningful
treasures to be guarded and possessed.
Once, on Maryla's birthday, I went around the house collecting such things
in a tin for her. They included bits of foil, broken coloured pieces of plastic,
small bits of metal, safety pins, paper clips, some nails, a butterfly clasp off an
earing, a rubber band and other such small household objects. Maryla was
excited when I gave her the present, hearing that it contained small objects
moving around inside my father's old tobacco tin. After opening the present
                                                
17 When Maryla was a child she also had the habit of circling letters and
numbers in books. She usually did this with a pen and still to this day some of
my father's precious mathematics texts have the tell-tale signs of Maryla's
interventions in them.
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she pulled out each piece one by one, adding some to her collection while
discarding others over the side of the chair as rubbish. She even said that it was
rubbish. I was unable to see what the determining feature was that separated
these objects. Those that I would have considered rubbish, such as the broken
bits of plastic or metal, were quickly coveted and added to her collection, while
others such as the earing or rubber band were thrown away. While she
obviously appreciated the gift of bits and pieces, I hadn't quite understood their
meaning and value to her.
The fact that her collection has varied slightly over the past ten years adds to
this difficulty. More recently she has taken up an interest in bits of fluff and
loose cotton threads off clothing, as well as off-cuts of material, yet I am never
absolutely certain what will catch her attention. On one birthday when she was
given some new clothes she quickly pulled the shop labels off and added the
plastic tags to her collection, pushing the clothes to one side. Her excitement at
being given quite a number of plastic tags was palpable. On another occasion
she became fascinated with a metal ring on my car stereo and spent much of
the five hour journey from my home back to Stockton (the institution where
she now lives) trying to pull it off, much to our shared frustration and my
annoyance.
In the past Maryla always held these bits and pieces tightly in her fist for
most of the day, but there were times when she carefully and methodically laid
them out on the floor. This would generally be every meal or bath-time, or
when she went to bed, as this was when her hands had to be free. Like the
jigsaws and books, the laying out of these bits and pieces has always had a very
particular and repetitive aspect to it. It is done with complete dedication,
concentration and seriousness, and follows the same basic pattern each time.
Maryla repeats over and over to herself what she is about to do in a similar
incantation to the ones that she uses at traffic lights or when doing the books
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and jigsaw puzzles. After going through this for up to five minutes, Maryla
then proceeds to lay the pieces out on the floor in a spatial pattern so that each
piece is equidistant from others.  This is done in a precise order; usually the
reverse order in which she collected them. After doing this she leaves them
there on the ground but always has one eye out making sure that no-one goes
near them. Of course, this is the only chance the rest of us have to reclaim some
personal or necessary item, such as the screws and plastic pieces from the toilet
that she snatched up while it was being fixed, some jewellery she might have
found in a drawer, or a collection of paper clips from on top of a desk. These
moments are usually laden with anxiety and tension as we dispute the nature,
value, meaning and ownership of these objects. At times there is also humour
involved, especially when family members tease Maryla about wanting
something from her collection. Unless it is absolutely imperative that we
reclaim an object, the tendency has been to allow Maryla to keep it, allowing
her meaning, value and significance of the items to supersede our own.
At Stockton, Maryla has recently been trained to keep her bits and pieces in
a purse so that her hands are not always clenched. She had been working in the
craft room and was collecting bits of off-cut cotton and other pieces of fabric
and the sweating that this caused in her palms was damaging her skin.
Although this was given as the reason for initiating the change in habit it is
clear from Maryla's case notes that her collection also caused a fair amount of
frustration for the staff. Too much time was involved in convincing Maryla to
put the pieces down, and too much time was taken up in her actually doing so.
This has now been altered due to the whole purse being picked up and put
down in one go. Yet Maryla still spends much of her time searching for objects
to add to this collection, and now that the items are hidden away it is much
harder to see and reclaim a lost possession.  
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Every evening, the staff at Stockton lock Maryla's purse in the locker that
stands beside her bed. This is to prevent Maryla from spending much of the
night arranging her bits and pieces. We are supposed to do this as well when
she comes home for a weekend. The first time this happened, however, my
mother and I decided to let Maryla have the purse as we both agreed that her
bits and pieces are her primary love in life. Despite recommendations to the
contrary, coming home should be a special time rather than merely a
continuation of institutional practices.18 I shared the room with Maryla that
evening and watched as she spent half the night laying out the pieces on top of
the sheets before finally falling asleep with them beside her.
While Maryla is absorbed in what she is doing she is also constantly alert to
what is going on around her. She is fascinated by and totally aware of what
everyone is doing, and will sometimes ask after others in the family who are
not there, including our siblings who have died. We tell her that they have
gone to heaven and this seems to be satisfactory, not that she ever asks what
or where heaven is. It is enough for her just to be reassured that they are
somewhere else, and that this somewhere else has a name and is a place. In an
attempt to appease her distress over lost bits and pieces my mother used to tell
Maryla that they had gone to the moon, a procedure that usually eventually
worked to calm her down.
Maryla also keeps up an intermittent commentary on everything that
happens around her; who is eating what, going where, or doing this or that. If
my stepfather takes off his glasses at the table she will comment on this to my
mother, saying, "Oooh, Mummy, Tony's taken off his glasses". If someone uses
a different piece of cutlery to her or has something different to eat then this will
be commented on. She directs these statements to one person in particular,
usually my mother, or step-mother Wendy, and if not them then to the next
                                               
18 I discuss this issue further in chapter six.
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person in line. We have all learnt how to play these conversation games, and
can easily get Maryla upset if we do not respond to her appropriately.  
Maryla needs to know exactly what is happening throughout the day; when
she will be eating lunch and dinner, where she will be going, and when she will
return to Stockton. Life isn't always predictable, however, and there are times
when the unforeseen transpires. These are always tense moments as we all try
in our various ways to appease Maryla and convince her of the new order to
her schedule. Until she receives a satisfactory explanation, Maryla will not
retreat from her line of questioning. This usually requires repeating the new
order of events a number of times and then agreeing with Maryla when she
repeats it back. Nowadays, the staff at the institution where Maryla lives have a
behaviour modification programme in place to try and wean her off this form
of communication. The staff have been instructed to answer Maryla only once
and then ignore her questioning, arguing that this form of communication
represents her obsessive compulsive nature, and that it dominates too much of
their time. It hasn't worked though. Maryla still continues to ask questions over
and over, just as she always has, as this is the pattern in her way of
communicating. Only now she is ignored for the most part by those with
whom she spends most of her time.  
I noticed this on a recent visit to see Maryla.  She was coming out with my
husband and I for lunch and wanted to check with the residential care worker
that she was coming home to the ward rather than going to Sydney. He told
Maryla she was just going for lunch and then told her to stop talking. She
became quite agitated and upset. As we walked out to the car I fell into my
usual relationship with her and answered her questions, explaining over and
over again exactly what we were doing until she was happy and quiet. It took a
good ten minutes but finally she was satisfied and sat peacefully in the car until
we came to the river and unpacked the lunch. This is her way of
Chapter One: Ethnographic Encounters I
page 34
communicating and to ignore it is to cut her off from interacting and engaging
with others.
As a child and adolescent, Maryla was often the most difficult of my three
intellectually disabled siblings to engage with. This was not so much to do with
her having less of a capacity or desire to communicate than Stephen or Ursula,
but because she was more emotional and highly strung. If plans were changed
or things did not go her way she would often get intensely annoyed and upset.
If we interfered in her ordering of books or jigsaw puzzles she would get very
angry and annoyed. Sometimes when Maryla came home from school she
would repeatedly slam her school case on the kitchen floor, grind her teeth,
and scream in a high pitched and angry voice because she had lost a miniscule
piece of foil or plastic from her collection of bits and pieces that she had put in
her case for the journey home.  
Stephen, on the other hand, was a far happier and easier person to spend
time with. He was particularly curious and inventive and often his different
observations and ways of engaging with the world drew me into a milieu that I
otherwise may not have noticed: the sound of everyday objects being
rhythmically hit against one another; the observation of patterns in sand; the
enigma of light and the play of shadows; the freedom of climbing up high and
balancing in the swaying branches of trees; the pride of finding the next jigsaw
piece of a puzzle by sight alone. Whenever he heard an aeroplane going
overhead he would grasp someone's arm, usually my mother's, take her into
the garden, point up to the sky and say with utter joy, "Oooh, there's another
aeroplane up in the blue sky!"
As a girl, I adored Stephen, and was often in awe of him. He had a talent
and humour that still brings a smile to my face when I think of him. One of his
favourite occupations was building precariously balanced towers using such
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objects as milk bottles, playing cards and children's blocks. My brother Joseph
remembers playing with Stephen as a young child and commented that:
As far as the blocks were concerned, well, we would build. We had
all these blocks with letters on them, you may remember, and we
used to build with them and make words. I'd make words with
them.  [Stephen] didn't do that. He'd put them on top of each other
and build towers. And we used to do that a lot, and I think he
enjoyed that. He was happy. He liked playing with these.
Stephen's delight at climbing on top of the rickety wardrobe in the bedroom
that he shared with Joseph, and later Peter too, pulling out the crayons and
drawing coloured circles on the ceiling was amusing to us all, except of course
my parents. Stephen knew that this was a punishable offence but he continued
to do it with pleasure and amusement. Upon hearing my father coming down
the hallway we would all try to get him down as quickly as possible so that at
least he would not be caught in the act. The tell-tale marks up on the ceiling
were proof enough of his deviancy, however, and the expected punishment
would usually be meted out.
When I asked Joseph about his memories of those early years he recalled
that he related to Maryla and Stephen through play rather than verbal
communication. Joseph was aware of the difference that this made to their
relationship, especially when he saw how other siblings related to one another,
but he still remembers those times as fun and loving despite their difficulties.
When I asked him whether his relationship with Stephen was affectionate,
Joseph responded emphatically, saying: "Oh yes, yes, we certainly did [have
affection]. We got on very well on the whole . . .  It was fun. He certainly was
fun and it was nice having him around and I believe I loved him".
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Often Joseph was the only one who could influence Stephen. Consequently
he was put in charge of Stephen whenever we went out on picnics or to the
beach. Stephen had a habit of running away as soon as the car doors were
opened and Joseph was invariably the one to chase after him and encourage
him back. Mealtimes were another occasion that required careful intervention,
either in terms of getting Stephen away from his puzzles and to the table, or
enticing him to eat his meal long after the rest of us had finished. Joseph sat
next to him at the table and it seemed that Stephen would respond to what
Joseph said more than anyone else. My mother commented that even when
Stephen was very young he "was absolutely devoted to Joe; followed him
around with his eyes, if not with his body. [He] just adored Joe and would light
up the minute he saw Joe . . ." When Joseph left to go to boarding school I took
over his role in relation to Stephen. My memories of this time are very special
because Stephen would often turn to me if he wanted something done, or for
acknowledgment that he'd finished his meal or jigsaw puzzle, and that
interaction made me feel very close to him. There were few words involved, if
any, but the interaction was conscious, affectionate, and purposeful.
Symbolic Mediation, Language Games and Restricted Codes
It is more an object relationship that my siblings have with the world, rather
than a conceptual one, and yet on one occasion Maryla quietly removed the
laundry clothes from the baby's bassinet and replaced them with a photograph
of my new nephew while no-one was around. In her world certain objects are
for specific uses; sometimes this is in accordance with the rest of us, at other
times it is use of her own determination. This relationship to the world, while
also involving long and repetitive explanations and affirmations in Maryla's
case, partly replaces other forms of sociality that usually exist between people.
Rather than engaging through complex verbal communication and normative
social interactions, my intellectually disabled siblings often related to each other
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and the rest of the family through objects. All of us were drawn into this world
due to our relationships with one another and our shared engagement with the
objects that surrounded us. These objects symbolically mediated our worlds
(see Comaroff 1985: 1-6). They accommodated our differences. Their ability to
be vehicles for more than one system of meaning, and for systems of different
orders, was crucial in the maintenance of our mutuality (cf. Geertz 1993a
[1973]).
The jigsaw puzzles, books, blocks, and bits and pieces were all such objects.
They came to operate and exist within the family both as our means for
interaction with one another and as expressions of our particular form of life or
sociality. In the daily, though not necessarily entirely utilitarian, uses to which
they were put, these objects played the role of "language games" (Wittgenstein
1998 [1953]: §7).19 They existed between us as the entity through which we
related to one another. While sounds may be the most readily acknowledged
vehicles for conceptualising and communicating meaning, objects too, and the
dispositions associated with them, come to operate as public manifestations of
meaning. In fact, as Wittgenstein has argued, sounds are also related to the
dispositions of shared objects (Wittgenstein 1998 [1953]: §7-18, §23, §47). Rather
than existing within the mind or being singularly attached to an object, as has
been a traditional philosophical and anthropological interpretation of meaning,
                                                
19 By use I do not mean something that exists purely for utilitarian purposes (cf.
Sahlins 1976), as if it were concerned only with some purposeful application
towards a specific objective. Use here takes on a more ephemeral aspect,
implying both the purposeful action and utilisation of objects as well as the
outcome of a desire to relate to another person. For, if the meaning of things,
and indeed the meaning of language, lies in its use, it must first operate as
something which exists between people. It exists in the very act of
communicating and engaging with others. It is the outcome of being in the
world with others and making sense of this world as a negotiated and
potentially shared phenomenon. It is meaningful action and practice that
constitutes the social world. This communication, and the sharing of such
language-games, constitutes a life form, existing as it does within the
immediacy of a social context which is itself a product of the specificity of those
who give life to its form.
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meaning itself exists as the public expression and manifestation of use and
practice (cf. Austin 1975 [1962]; Geertz 1993b [1973]). As such, meaning is
shared, and generates shared experience, but is also constantly open to
negotiation (Austin-Broos 1997: 8-11; Bourdieu 1999 [1972]).
Symbolic mediation exists as a fundamental aspect of mutuality. It operates
as a means through which relationships across difference are negotiated. Even
when the meanings of these objects are opaque—such as my inability to get
quite right the significance of Maryla's bits and pieces when I collected some as
a birthday present—the very fact that my family respect that these objects have
meaning and value for my siblings means that we enter into a committed
process of negotiation and symbolic mediation. It was primarily through
objects that Maryla and Stephen expressed their form of sociality, and it was
through our intimate mutuality that their expressions became purposeful,
meaningful and interpretable. They become the very substance of our shared
sociality and mutual interdependence. Although the meanings we attributed to
these objects differed, their capacity to be vehicles for more than one meaning
allowed them to accommodate these differences. Our shared engagement with
these objects meant that we participated in the joint construction of our social
life. The particular and meaningful social lives that my siblings were capable of
were represented and articulated through these objects. The point of
articulation of these interpenetrating systems of meaning existed as an aspect
of our mutual sociality.
Therefore, not only are intellectually disabled people such as my siblings
fundamentally able to engender forms of sociality, mutuality and intimacy, but
their ways of doing so involve an engagement with the world. By virtue of our
coexistence, and the degrees of mutuality and intimacy that we shared, this
world became significant for all of my family. While to some degree the rest of
us were kept outside my siblings' specific modes of engagement with these
Chapter One: Ethnographic Encounters I
page 39
objects, we were also invariably drawn into and affected by their consequences.
My family provided the space within which this articulation was acknowledged
and engaged with. It came to be a cultural environment all of its own, and
those of us within it developed ways of acting and interacting through the
objects that surrounded us. These objects became sites for the mediation and
negotiation of differently articulated but symbolically meaningful systems.  
Within any particular shared social milieu behaviour has meaning and value
(Bourdieu 1999 [1972]). It is what someone does, and each person, each sibling,
did so in their own particular ways such that we all knew who they were and
could interpret what was going on without the need for words or explanation.
Yet, until I began this account, I was convinced that Stephen had always
communicated through speech. I distinctly remember him talking about the
aeroplanes because this was a phrase he used often, but I was sure that he had
always spoken to us about other things as well. It was only when my step-
mother pointed out that he never spoke that I began to question my own
memories and realised that he did not use language conventionally. When I
spoke to my mother about this she remembered the speech therapists at the
Autistic School trying to encourage Stephen to talk. As she commented:  
. . . they did want me to insist that he spoke, or tried to speak,
before he got what he wanted, before he, for instance, got a glass
of water. And I found this very time consuming and irritating
because, I mean, he knew I knew what he wanted. He knew that I
would get it for him, and it just seemed to be a stupid thing to
hang around waiting for this word to come which I knew he
wouldn't say. Because if he wasn't going to say the word there was
no way in the world he would say it. And you just couldn't force
him.
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Going back to Steve talking. If we were walking in the street [in
England] and a car passed by, he might say grey car, or just grey,
and I'd be so thrilled because he knew his colours and I'd be so
thrilled that he'd said grey car. But if another car went past which
was grey and I'd say  "what colour's that Steve?", he would
absolutely refuse to answer. We both knew that he knew but he
wasn't going to say it. Why should he?  
And it was the same with asking for water. If he really was
desperate to get the water and I wouldn't give him the water until
he said the word, all he had to do was to get his stool, stand up, or
he didn't even need a stool then, get to the tap, turn the tap on,
and fill the glass of water. He was quite capable of doing that. But
he wanted this interaction with me which of course he got because,
why not? Why shouldn't I do that . . .  with him? What's the point
of him talking? I mean conversation didn't mean anything much
to him. So I just told the teachers at the school that, for one thing, I
didn't have time to hang around, and I didn't want Steve to get
frustrated and upset and me upset with it. I just didn't think it was
worth it. So I didn't go along with it. I mean, I tried maybe for the
first week and then gave it up as a bad job.
This issue of communicating and "knowing" without words is not in itself
unusual. We all experience the world and interact with one another through a
myriad of forms and expressions, including sensation, body language,
intonation, eye contact and touch.20 However, a competency in language as
                                              
20  Part of Merleau-Ponty's (1962) phenomenological enterprise was an explicit
critique of the overtly cognitive rendering of human nature and understanding,
and an argument for knowledge as attainable through both the senses and the
intellect. It is interesting that many writers on intellectual disability turn to
phenomenology as a tool for interpreting the life experiences of such people
(Atkins 1998; Bogdan & Taylor 1976, 1982; Goode 1980a, 1980b, 1990), although
they tend to draw their inspiration from Alfred Schutz (1972 [1967]) rather than
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speech (and literacy) is one of the primary cultural markers of normality in our
society (Jenkins 1998b: 19). Definitions of intellectual disability have
traditionally and consistently incorporated references to deficiencies in
language ability and comprehension (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 336-7;
Connors & Donnellan 1993: 269; Howe 1976 [1848]: 45; Kanner 1944: 214;
MacAndrew & Edgerton 1970; Pinel 1962 [1801]: 172; L. Wing 1996: 327).
Language is considered to be that which connects ideas, knowledge, meaning
and creativity. The mind is seen as the necessary tool for humans to convey
meaning. Its capabilities are what define us as human and separate from
animals. However, language is often conceived as if it were solely a vehicle for
communicating preexisting notions and ideas, as though these exist as specific
and identifiable entities in the world. Those who are perceived to be deficient in
mental ability and linguistic competency are therefore often considered unable
to communicate meaningfully at all.  
In this way, language as a system of communication often becomes
Language, to the exclusion of other symbolic systems. It becomes the singular
mode of communication and the primary criterion for humanness. As Merleau-
Ponty argued: "To treat communication as essentially linguistic is to fall victim
to the 'ruse of language'" (cited in Goode 1990: 30). Because intellectually
disabled people are often lacking in linguistic competencies, it is assumed that
they do not develop and share any meaningfully articulated symbolic systems
at all. In the process their capacity for mutuality and sociality is undermined, as
is their human status. While the issue of language is important, and will be
explored more fully in the following chapters, what is important at this point is
the recognition that intellectually disabled people utilise and develop other
systems of symbols, such as the use of objects, as their means of
communication, interaction, mutuality and sociality; as attributes of culture.
                                                                                                                                              
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). In chapter five I outline some of these
phenomenological analyses of intellectual disability.
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However, it is not solely through the mediation of symbolic objects that my
siblings attempted some form of communication and interaction with others.
When Maryla is introduced to someone new she goes right up to them, looks
them in the eye, and grabs hold of their arm as she says "hello", turning back to
the person she is with to get some affirmation of her actions. While this is
Maryla's familiar way of communicating and acknowledging another persons
presence, it can often be responded to with apprehension and confusion by
those who do not know her. Their lack of recognition of the meaning and
intention in Maryla's actions and dispositions, and her inability to utilise
accepted social modes of interaction, both linguistically and behaviourally,
means that people often respond by not seeking any form of interaction and
engagement at all.  
Other intellectually disabled people I know will smell, stroke the skin, or
touch the face of someone they meet. Sometimes they will avoid any contact
whatsoever, while others will hit out or make noises from a distance (cf. D.
Williams 1996: 45). For many intellectually disabled people such forms become
their primary means of interacting with others. To engage with the world in
such a way makes interaction and mutuality highly contextual. The symbolic
systems that my siblings used were highly dependent on particular persons,
objects and places.  In this way they represent what Basil Bernstein has termed
a "restricted code", a mode of communicating that is implicit, shared, general
and contextual, and whose reference points are not transferable (Bernstein
1971: 143-148). As Bernstein elaborates: "The principles and meanings [of
restricted codes] are embedded in local contexts, in local social relationships,
practices, activities. To this extent they are relatively strongly related to a
specific material base (Bernstein 1977: 193-194; author's emphasis).21
                                                
21 Bernstein was interested to discover the means through which different
social/class relations become embedded in social identity and social roles. He
argued that different forms of social relations produce different communicative
or linguistic codes, and that the capacity of individuals to utilise these codes was
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Stephen and Maryla had no need or capacity for communication in the form
that we are socially accustomed to. While this limited their range of sociality
within the wider social world, it did not prevent other forms of sociality
emerging and existing within the confines of family life. It did not prevent us
articulating a degree of mutuality and sociality across shared and mediated
symbolic systems such as the jigsaw puzzles, books, blocks, and bits and pieces.
This capacity for sociality means that forms of mutuality are able to be
transferred to other social domains provided certain conditions are upheld.22
This requires acknowledging that there is a modality of symbolic life upon
which sociality and mutuality can be built. It also requires the inclusion of
objects and behaviours that are not normally utilised as means of engaging
with others. Therefore, it is not a lack of desire or the capacity to communicate
that necessarily marks one's relationship with intellectually disabled people, but
a very different way of doing so. When I was a child it never occurred to me
that Maryla, Stephen or Ursula should communicate with me in any other way.
Growing up with them meant that I absorbed and assimilated their systems of
signs and dispositional behaviours. Their dispositions carried a specific and
interpretable valency due to their shared and intimate nature, and were
accepted as meaningful and purposeful. They, and their actions, were an
integral part of our mutual interdependence and shared sociality.    
                                                                                                                                              
culturally rather than genetically determined (Bernstein 1971: 143-152). In the
situation that I am describing, these restricted codes are a consequence of forms
of difference associated with the disability rather than a product of social
relations. However, the form of the restricted code—its local, situational nature
whereby communication "goes forward against a backcloth of closely shared
identifications and affective empathy" with a dependence on "extra verbal"
rather than complex verbal articulation—is essentially the same. In fact,
Bernstein argues that restricted codes do not correlate with linguistic
competency per se, but with types of social relationships that are marked by a
sense of the "we" over the "I", including kin relations, peer group relations,
institutional bonds, and close friendships (Bernstein 1971: 146-147).
22 Much of the thesis will involve looking at the conditions that either support
or undermine this capacity.
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Shame, Incomprehension and Distance
My perception of my family began to shift as I grew older and became more
aware of how others responded to the differences that my siblings presented.
While those who are familiar with the idiosyncrasies of an intellectually
disabled person are more likely to predict what it is that they are
communicating, strangers often respond with apprehension, uncertainty and
fear. Despite my own experiences, I am still cautious when meeting someone
new who is intellectually disabled because I cannot initially predict or
understand their way of being in the world. This creates an uncertainty, and it
is this that so often isolates the intellectually disabled in their own world,
beyond the reach or desire of social interaction and intimacy from others.
Intellectually disabled people's social limitations, their non-normative
dispositions, and the institutionalised perception of them as asocial and
abnormal, creates a barrier between them and the wider society. It is difficult
for others to transcend these attitudes, in addition to the very real differences
and limitations that intellectually disabled people present.  
It is not just strangers, however, who respond with uncertainty. When I
interviewed my mother's sister, Christine,—who came out from Tanzania and
stayed with my family for a few months in 1970—she told me that she
remembered Maryla as "a very strange being" and added that: "As somebody
who only meets her occasionally you can't get through at all."  My mother
commented that Peter, the youngest child in our family, was terrified of Maryla
and Stephen when we came back from spending a year in Europe in 1973.
Maryla and Stephen had lived in an institution for the 14 months that we were
away and Peter was only two when we left. These responses make me realise
how much of our wariness of intellectually disabled people, and an inability to
relate to them, is due to unfamiliarity, and the difference that separates them
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from others. Rather than being an attribute of non-kin relatedness, this
separation and incomprehension is the consequence of a lack of mutual
interdependence, interrelatedness and intimacy. It is the product of forms of
relatedness that do not seek symbolic mediation and negotiation through a
shared and highly particular environment. It is, moreover, the consequence of
attributing to intellectually disabled people an incapacity for symbolic
representation, mutuality and sociality; of assuming that their modes of
articulation and engagement are inherently meaningless and asocial.
Despite the fact that such attitudes and their associated lack of engagement
and relatedness can exist between kin, it is generally through encounters with
strangers and within a clinical and institutional environment that these become
more noticeable. For my family, the occasions when this became most obvious
were when we ventured out into public spaces such as the beach or local shops.
It also occurred through our contact with medical and psychological specialists,
as well as at the institution where my siblings went to live. Whereas I generally
remember the picnics and time spent at home with happiness and a certain
ease, these other occasions evoke memories of anxiety, apprehension and
shame. For the remainder of this chapter I describe some of these encounters
with strangers before turning to examine institutional engagements with
intellectually disabled people in the following chapter.
On hot summer days we would often follow the path of many other Sydney
families and head to the coast, joining the snake-like crawl of traffic up Mona
Vale Road to the northern beaches, or eastwards to Queenscliff. The smell of
hot bitumen and exhaust fumes would add to the already oppressive heat of
the day as we children squirmed in frustration in the back seat of the car. On
arrival at the beach we would open up the doors to let in the cool ocean breeze
and out would leap Stephen, understanding this as his moment to run free. He
would take off in any direction, and even if there were other cars around
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would always manage to expertly weave his way through them without
seemingly being aware that the cars were even there. My mother would stay
with the rest of us, my baby brother or sister on her hip, and my older brother
would take off after Stephen, anxious to catch him before he disappeared from
sight. My mother later told me that Stephen and Maryla would often both leap
out of the car and take off, and that my father and Joseph would head after
them, my brother chasing Stephen while my father pursued Maryla.
With the family all regrouped, we would make our way with towels,
buckets and spades down to the beach. Weaving our way amongst other
families spread out across the hot sand I remember being acutely aware of the
responses of other people. Children would stare in wonder as my brother or
sister walked along in their unique way; Stephen with his joyful lurch and
Maryla stopping constantly to check out everything on the ground as she
searched for that obscure object to add to her collection of bits and pieces.
Stephen would often approach other people and initiate some form of
interaction with them that was incoherent to all other than those who knew
him well. It seemed to me that some parents would unconsciously pull their
own children closer as if to protect them from possible contagion by the
obvious difference that Maryla and Stephen presented. They could not
understand my siblings' ways of behaving and appeared to be threatened by
their seemingly unpredictable and incomprehensible natures. I found these
momentary interactions difficult to the point of being almost unmanageable.
My self-consciousness made me extremely aware of how others responded to
us as a family. I wanted to melt into the crowd but on most occasions was
unable to; we were different, my family stood out, and there was no escaping
it. And somehow, by being connected to Maryla and Stephen, I also felt tainted.
But we would press on, and find ourselves our own place in the sun, as far
removed from the other families as possible. From there we would go
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swimming in the cool ocean water or play in the sand. Stephen would make
loud squeals of delight as the water rushed up his shins, joining the rest of us as
we played in the waves. Maryla, on the other hand, would run screaming from
the waters edge, unable to appreciate or enjoy the luxury of the ocean. We
would spend all afternoon at the beach and as the day cooled would pack back
into the car and join the homeward traffic, arriving back with sodden towels,
sandy costumes and pierced ear drums as Maryla would invariably have
screamed most of the way home. She had learnt that when the traffic lights are
red the car has to stop, and still to this day repeats to herself an incantation to
do with the orange, green and red lights whenever she is waiting at lights. Yet
a traffic 'jam' opened up a whole different problem as there was no obvious
reason why we should be stopped. It was impossible to convey to her the
concept of congested traffic. A red light in front of her was all right but not a
long unbroken line of traffic. She would scream and scream, grabbing hold of
my mother or father in the front to demand an acceptable explanation. I would
be hiding in the back seat, imagining all the people in the neighbouring cars
looking over to see what was going on in our car.
The other less regular foray that we made out into the world as a family
was to the shops. People would move away from us as we walked around the
shopping centre, or tell their children not to stare and be rude as they firmly
pushed them on and away from possible contact with us. Often my mother
would ask me to stay in the car with Maryla and Stephen because it was easier
for her to go into the shopping centre by herself. We would wait in the car but
it would not be long before boredom and frustration set in. Stephen would try
to open the car door to run off, and if successful could often be found running
along the footpath towards our home almost two kilometres away.23 Maryla,
                                               
23 Stephen's ability to know the way home and to understand directions was
with him from early childhood. My mother often tells the story of the time in
England when she was at a local park with the four oldest children and Joseph
walked into the metal ear of a play horse and cut his head open. A woman who
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on the other hand, would start asking where my mother was. I remember now
that these comments were not so much questions as statements. It would be
more like: "Mummy coming back soon," or "Mummy just doing the shopping
now, she just doing the shopping. Yes." Yet these statements were always said
with the need for affirmation. If met with a negation there was likely to be
uproar. The scenes emanating from our car were enough to keep most people
at bay, as they either pretended to ignore what was going on or else looked
over at us disapprovingly.
Going to church was a different matter. We were regular parishioners in
those days and the other families were familiar with our presence. Despite their
acceptance of us within the service, however, we were never included as part of
the parish, nor did any of the other parishioners offer my parents any, much
needed, support. Generally, my parents found that they felt most comfortable
in the presence of other families who had intellectually disabled children.
Through the special schools that my siblings attended, and the various
organisations that my parents became involved in, we came to know quite a
few families with intellectually disabled relatives.
The need for appropriate schools for Maryla and Stephen had caused
problems for my parents and siblings in Perth. Stephen had been accepted into
the Spastic School but was asked to leave after one year because his mobility,
and inclination to climb anything in sight—the higher and more unstable the
better—caused problems for the teachers. Maryla attended the University
kindergarten but was considered to be a "great trial" and a drain on the time
and energy of the staff (15/2/66; 7/4/66). The psychologist who observed and
tested my siblings in Perth suggested that they needed forms of special
                                                                                                                                              
was at the park offered to help and while my mother took Joseph to the doctor
Stephen directed the woman to our home by leading the way without words. It
was over a kilometre away and involved numerous road crossings and turns
up different streets, but he got her to our place without any hesitation.
Chapter One: Ethnographic Encounters I
page 49
schooling that were unavailable in Perth at that time. The specialists whom we
saw in May 1967 at the Mental Deficiency Diagnostic Centre at Grosvenor
Hospital in Sydney had also emphasised the need to find "appropriate
educational facilities" (12/7/67). Access to an Autistic School in Sydney, and to
the Grosvenor specialists, were what brought us east across the Nullarbor Plain
in our Holden station wagon in the summer of 1967-8.
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Chapter Two
Ethnographic Encounters II:
The world of intellectual disability from the other side
A few months after arriving in Sydney, my siblings were all enrolled at various
schools: Stephen at the Autistic School in Belrose; Maryla at Inala, a Steiner
school for handicapped children; Joseph at the local primary school; and Ursula
at a nearby pre-school. Fifteen months later, Maryla moved to the Sunshine
School for Children for one year before finally enrolling at Crowle Home
Special School.  She was joined there by Stephen in 1973. I couldn't wait to start
at the local pre-school and join my older siblings in the morning hustle and
bustle. The fact that they all went to different schools each morning was not at
all unusual to me; it was just a part of the differences that existed between us.  
I knew that my intellectually disabled siblings were different, and that they
required more attention than the rest of us, but at this stage their difference
caused little more than momentary anxiety. I distinctly remember, however,
the occasion when this anxiety became cemented in my mind as an intense and
seemingly intransigent shame. I was walking to school one morning behind
some older kids when the Spastic bus went past. The children ahead of me
started making fun of the occupants of the bus, pulling faces, mimicking their
physical movements, and calling out "spastic", "retard", "dumb", "idiot" . . .  The
words still echo around in my head as I picture myself rooted to the spot,
mortified, not so much by their behaviour, but by the fact that this bus was on
its way to my home to pick up my brother and sister and take them to school.
This was 1975 and I was nine years old. I was devastated at the reaction of my
peers and realised only too well what it implied: that my brother and sister
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were something to be ashamed of; that their difference was not all right; it was
wrong, bad, disgusting, fearful, laughable; anything but acceptable.
My younger sister Tessa1 had a similar experience at around the same age.
As she told me when I asked her about her memories of growing up:
I think I was in 3rd grade, or 4th grade, and I took a friend . . .
home on a Friday afternoon, and Maryla and Stephen were there.
And I'm not sure whether I sensed, no I did sense that she was a
bit, obviously hadn't come across people like Stephen and Maryla
before, and was a bit reserved, maybe a bit frightened. But I don't
remember feeling that it was a huge deal. We just went on with the
afternoon.  I can't remember how long she stayed, but we played
and she left, and I didn't think any more about it.  
When I got to school on the Monday I felt everyone was looking at
me and talking about something that had to do with me, or about
me, but it was like whispers and gossip, and I remember feeling
very self-conscious. And then I remember somebody told me, 'oh
you've got a spastic sister and brother' and I remember feeling . . .
very mixed up inside. And I'm not sure if I was ashamed. I was
definitely embarrassed. I felt perhaps that I'd been found out, or
there was something wrong. Maybe I did know that there was
something wrong, but because the family, we acted like there
wasn't anything [wrong], I sort of carried that on. I was very very
upset. That's my first memory of really realising that they were
different.
                                                
1 Tessa (b. 16/3/68) was born three months after we moved from Perth to
Sydney.  My youngest sibling, Peter (b. 29/6/70), was also born in Sydney.
Neither of them were intellectually disabled.
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I then asked Tessa whether she ever denied that Maryla and Stephen existed
and she responded by saying:
Yeah, I wouldn't tell anyone about [my intellectually disabled
siblings] actually. I don't feel that I was hiding; I don't know
whether I was hiding them or whether it just got so involved. If
you started to say there were seven children in the family and then
you were asked what they did, then it was, you couldn't just sort
of end that in a couple of minutes. Yes, I wouldn't tell people
because I didn't like to be the centre of questions. I didn't want to
have to go into the whole detail of, you know, that Ursula had
died, that Stephen and Maryla are autistic, that they lived in a
hospital, or they were still living with us, and it was much easier to
just say that there was the four of us. And I don't know whether I
was denying it or whether I didn't want to go into it.  I guess a part
of it was denial.
I too went on to deny that I had older brothers and sisters. Despite my love
for them I would tell people that I only had two or three other siblings. When
the odd friend did come over to play I would be deeply embarrassed at the
presence of Maryla and Stephen doing their jigsaw puzzles on the living room
floor. I would be even more embarrassed if Stephen emerged from the
bathroom with his pants around his ankles as he sometimes did.  I found a
history assignment I had written when I was twelve in which we were asked to
write an autobiographical account of our lives. There is no mention of any
other siblings besides Tessa and Peter. We were then asked to get a friend to
write a description, and my best friend at the time wrote that I had "a younger
brother and sister. There [sic] names are Peter who is eight and is in third grade
and Tessa who is ten and is in fifth grade". When I went to my year twelve
school reunion a few years ago people asked me what I was doing with myself
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these days. I told them I was doing research on intellectual disability and when
they pressed me further about why I was interested in the topic I mentioned
that it was because I had three older siblings who were intellectually disabled.
What surprised me more than anything else was that so few of these old
friends knew about this. The success of denying my siblings' existence
disturbed me. Only those friends with whom I was very close ever came to
know or meet Maryla and Stephen. Despite having gone to the same school as
some of these classmates for 12 years, very few knew the true extent of my
family.
Becoming Institutionalised . . .
In August 1975, eighteen months after returning from a year in Europe for my
father's sabbatical, Maryla and Stephen were admitted to an institution as
minor-voluntary patients under the Mental Health Act (1958), amended section
21(b). The medical, welfare, educational and psychological specialists at the
Grosvenor Diagnostic Centre had been encouraging my parents since 1967 to
send my intellectually disabled siblings to an institution. They were of the
opinion that it would be better for all of us: that we other children needed to
have a normal family life, and Maryla and Stephen the opportunity to be cared
for and "managed" professionally. While Maryla and Stephen had spent 14
months in a psychiatric institution the year we were overseas, this move was
different. There was a finality to it that affected us all. This would be forever.
Never again would Maryla and Stephen live with us as a family; playing with
jigsaws on the living room floor, pulling down books, drawing on the ceiling,
taking hours to eat their dinner; making us laugh, cry, despair and fill with joy
at different times throughout the day.
Chapter Two: Ethnographic Encounters II
page 55
I remember our last day together living as a whole family. We all dressed
up in our good clothes and went down to the local park to take some
photographs and play on the swings and roundabout. I was in my favourite
burgundy and white summer dress with large flowers printed all over it. My
hair was tied back and I had my good white buckle shoes on. We all looked
really smart and formal, as though it were Christmas and we were having
photographs taken to send to my grandparents in England. The sadness in
everyone's faces in the photographs, however, is palpable. We knew that the
family was breaking up and that Maryla and Stephen were leaving to go to an
institution, a mental hospital, a "madhouse".  
Over the previous months we had visited a number of institutions as a
family to find one that was appropriate, and one that would take both Maryla
and Stephen so they would not be separated. The first available place for both
of them to live was Morisset Hospital, an hour's drive north of Sydney.  As
well as an institution for the intellectually disabled, it was also a prison for the
criminally insane. The buildings reminded me of a nineteenth century
Dickensian nightmare; concrete yards, dilapidated stone buildings, barbed
wire, and grills on the windows. After being at Morisset for only a few weeks
Maryla and Stephen were transferred to Stockton Hospital, north of Newcastle.
By comparison it was beautiful. A former naval base, the Hospital was situated
on a large property backing onto Stockton beach, with red brick and 'fibro'2
buildings scattered around the grounds, separated by pine trees, ovals and
grassland. But as I very quickly discovered, the surface appearance of Stockton
was deceptive. Although it had no associated prison facilities, it concealed
practices and attitudes that made my siblings inmates rather than kin in their
new home. Furthermore, they were now three hours distant from their family.
                                                
2 Cheap and common house cladding made of asbestos fibres and cement.
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Six months after Maryla and Stephen left to live at Stockton my parents
separated. My eldest brother went to live with my father, which left my
mother, younger sister and brother, and myself at home, a situation which
made it easier to claim that there were only three children in the family.
Weekends alternated between seeing my father and catching a bus up to
Stockton to spend the day with Stephen and Maryla. It was a strange time. We
would meet up with other families early in the morning at Hornsby railway
station and travel the long journey by bus to visit our respective intellectually
disabled relatives. It was like going to a gaol. There was that same sense of
furtiveness, of strangers being bound together by a shared secret and shame.
On arrival we would collect Maryla and Stephen from the ward (as it was then
called) and sit in the grounds under the Norfolk pines with all the other
families. We would unpack a picnic lunch and eat our sandwiches looking out
at all the other people in this same situation. Not only were Maryla and
Stephen now just two amongst hundreds of similarly intellectually disabled
people, but the distance between us grew wider. They were no longer just my
brother and sister, different, of course, but part of the family. They were now
officially institutionalised along with others similarly classified as mentally
retarded.  
Without the intimacy, mutuality and familiarity of the home environment it
was difficult to relax and enjoy each other's company. Maryla would
continually ask when she was going back to the ward, and Stephen would
seem distant and preoccupied. There were no books to pull down off shelves,
no jigsaws to spread out on the ground, no crayons to draw on the ceiling
with. The means through which we had previously mediated and negotiated
our differences were almost entirely absent. The activities through which we
had socially engaged with one another, and through which my siblings had
expressed themselves, were no longer central to our interactions. It was just us,
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a small group of kin amongst a large group of strangers, trying to make
something of this new situation, and not really succeeding.
The sadness at saying goodbye always seemed to be ours. Maryla and
Stephen appeared to be quite happy to return to the wards at the end of lunch.
I read in their records, however, that they absconded together not long after
being admitted, and that they constantly asked after the family and wanted to
know when they were going home. Perhaps they weren't so happy after all.
Perhaps it was us who wanted and needed to believe that they were settled in
order to alleviate the guilt and sadness at sending them away. Yet it is hard to
imagine how anyone could be happy in such an environment. These were
locked-up buildings: sterile, clinical and bare, each with an enclosed concrete
courtyard, dormitories lined with single beds, and staff in uniform. It was a
mental institution, and the residents were treated as both sick and in need of
treatment and training. Most of them were drugged and would wander
around the recreation room, or curl up in one of the old plastic chairs in a
corner, some screaming, some crying, many still in their pyjamas, some sitting
in a puddle of urine, others lost in their own withdrawn world. The never-
ending blare of a television dominated the environment. I remember standing
outside the locked and barred door looking in to where my brother and sister
now lived. The scene horrified me. To this day the journey past the BHP3
steelworks near Stockton still brings memories of dread and fear to my mind.
Despite the many changes that have taken place at Stockton since my
brother and sister first went to live there, and despite the fact that Maryla is
generally well cared for by the staff at Stockton, it is still a strange place.
Entering the grounds of the Centre, as it is now called, is to enter another
world. Maryla lives in Unit 13 (the new name for the same ward she has always
                                                
3 Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd.  One of Australia's largest companies involved in
mining and the manufacturing of steel.
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lived in) with forty other men and women. She shares a dormitory with three
women, the locker beside her single bed the only "private" space that she has.
Even this is locked by staff at night to prevent her having her bits and pieces.
She attends an activities centre during the week that is located in the same
grounds. These days, in accordance with community integration guidelines,
Maryla also goes on occasional visits to the local shops, attends community
activities such as girl guides, and participates in TAFE4 courses to learn
domestic skills. She eats her meals at one of the child size tables in the open
recreation/dining area with a bib around her neck. The TV is still blaring, the
kitchen still locked, the internal courtyard a concrete desolate space. The other
doors are no longer locked, and people can wander in and out more freely, but
the institutional smell and feel of the place is pervasive. Beneath it all this is still
a place of management, control and training.  When I was going through the
records at Stockton as part of the research for this thesis, I could hear Maryla's
voice as she came and went from the Unit, still asking questions and getting
frustrated. Hers was just another voice among the many different ones I could
hear but it resonated with me. I felt separate, cut off, an outsider. She too,
however, was also an outsider in her own home.
*
The year that my parents and non-intellectually disabled siblings had spent
in Europe in 1973 had given us an inkling of how different life could be without
Maryla and Stephen living at home.5 While there, we had the opportunity to
visit museums and castles, to wander around art galleries, and go to the theatre
and cinema. My mother had time to spend with me, making sure I kept up
with my school studies by making me write a story each afternoon about what
                                                
4 Technical and Further Education, a form of tertiary trade training college in
Australia.
5 Maryla and Stephen spent the 14 months that we were overseas living at
Ryde Psychiatric Hospital in Sydney.
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we had done that day. She would mark my spelling and grammar, began to
teach me French, and during the evening we would discuss the day's events
and plan our next exciting outing without interruption. I was so unused to all
these possibilities that I associated them with Europe, being unaware at the
time that museums, galleries and theatres also existed in Sydney.
When we returned to Sydney it became obvious that the whole family,
reintegrated with Maryla and Stephen, was feeling the tension and strain. For
thirteen years my parents had looked after their children at home, dealing with
regular epileptic fits, daily medication, a vast array of professionals, the
difficulties of finding appropriate schools, and many other problems associated
with having three of their seven children seriously affected by an intellectual
disability of unknown cause. When Ursula died in 1969 my parents had all but
given up. This seemed the final blow to their already exhausted and
emotionally drained lives. They continued to insist that we remain together as
a family but were aware that as all of us grew older, my parents included, the
harder and more isolating life would become.
My mother remembers that while people were supportive and sympathetic
when Maryla, Stephen and Ursula were young, they were less tolerant as my
siblings grew older.  It was also becoming increasingly difficult to sustain the
family as a distinct and separate social unit. We occasionally had friends over,
and my parents always organised birthday parties for us, but Tessa, Peter and
myself were wanting to move beyond the confines of family life through our
involvement in social activities, weekend sport, friendships and school. The fact
that government regulations required that my parents have their childrens'
names on a waiting list before they were 15 years of age in order that they
even be considered for permanent residential placement in an institution only
added to the pressure. Within a matter of weeks of making the decision, and
having been told that it would take at least two years, Maryla and Stephen
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were offered the places at Morisset. Despite my awareness that life was
definitely far simpler and easier without Maryla and Stephen living at home,
that the institution provided my family with a way out, and that at the time this
was one of the few options available to us, I was disturbed by the difference
between how we as a family related to and love our retarded kin, and the ways
in which socially instituted practices affect intellectually disabled people's lives.
. . . and Scrutinised
Three years after he moved to Stockton, and four weeks before his eighteenth
birthday, Stephen had a grand mal seizure in his sleep and died. His medical
certificate reads that he died of an "Anoxia Cerebri due to Antecedent causes
with mental retardation as a contributing cause". He died partly because he was
retarded is the implication of this report, as though retardation is necessarily
connected with demise.
My family have been subjected to numerous medical, psychiatric,
psychological and genetic tests since 1962. These tests are still going on as
medical researchers try to uncover what it is that made my family so different.
As new tests are discovered, so they are performed, and each new piece of
information on the family is duly added to the files in the hope of one day
making sense of my family's circumstances. When my youngest brother died
in January 1994 of a brain tumour Maryla was sent off for more tests. The
doctors wrote that ". . . this girl, indeed the family, still poses a diagnostic
puzzle.  The most recent information is that the youngest son, Peter (13/6/70)
(sic) died just a few weeks ago from a brain tumour. This leaves 2 out of 7 who
are apparently normal."  My brother actually died from a secondary cancerous
tumour as a result of a melanoma that had been removed from his shoulder
five years earlier. He had just completed the exams for his Bachelor of Arts
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degree, was highly intelligent, articulate, quick and witty, and there was
absolutely no evidence that he was anything other than "normal". The report
echoed my own earlier conclusion on the beach with my family: that we had all
been tainted by a potential abnormality.
When my younger sister was pregnant in 1996 with her first child, and the
first child of the next generation, the doctors at The Greater Ormond Hospital
for Children in London strongly recommended that she have genetic
counselling before making a decision to continue with the pregnancy. She was
worried about having a disabled child herself and had told the staff at the
hospital our family history of intellectual disability. Tessa had tests which
showed a potential "fragile-X chromosome disorder"6 and the geneticists in
London suggested that the same tests be carried out on Maryla and our
mother. They thought, hopefully, that this was finally the answer. Tests
confirmed that Maryla definitely does not have Fragile-X syndrome, and that
this condition is not the cause of our family history of intellectual disability. It
was back to the "unknown" file.
My siblings have had an extensive history of being scrutinised. Being
epileptic they were put under medical observation from infancy and treated
with medication.7 This led to investigations about what was causing the
                                                
6 Fragile-X syndrome is considered to be the most common form of a
genetically based intellectual disability (Dykens 1995: 522). The syndrome is
marked by an unusually large number of FMR-1 repeats on the X chromosome
(4/4/96) occurring as a "visible fragile site on the end of the long arm of the X
chromosome" (Scheerenberger 1987: 43; cf. Dykens 1995).  A repeat of over 55
sequences of the nucleotides that make up the DNA on either of the X
chromosomes puts the foetus at risk of inheriting the disorder at 10% or more
(Dykens 1995: 522; Scheerenberger 1987: 43). My sister had less than this
amount on one of her X chromosomes. Because it was borderline, however,
and due to the family history, the Senior Registrar in Clinical Genetics at The
Greater Ormond Hospital recommended further tests and sought other expert
opinions, both of which concluded that the possibility of having a child with
Fragile-X syndrome was "extremely unlikely" (18/4/96).
7 Epilepsy is a neurological disease generally associated with convulsions and
loss of consciousness. Some of the drugs that have been given to my siblings
over the years include Phenobarbitone, Mysoline, Dilantin, Phemitone, Epilim,
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epilepsy, and why Maryla, Stephen and Ursula were so much slower than
average in starting to walk and talk. Why were they not learning to read, write
or count? Why were they so different? And underneath it all, what was causing
this difference? My parents were wondering what was wrong with their
children and sought advice from numerous specialists who occasionally sent
them away telling them their children would grow out of it.8 Much of their
desire to know was a need to interpret and give meaning to their childrens'
differences. Part of it was externally motivated by the pressure to find my
brother and sisters schools that would accept them.9  Yet this desire to know,
this will to knowledge, is bound to some degree by the environment in which a
family is embedded. My parents sought professional help because that is the
background from which they came. My siblings were sent to special schools
because this was how society dealt with their difference. Other parents might
have chosen a different path, seeking alternative forms of assistance and
knowledge. Other cultures often interpret the causes and meaning of
                                                                                                                          
Tegratol, and Ospolot.   Phenobarbitone was later found to have unexpected
side effects such as behavioural problems and hyperactivity, and also damaged
Maryla and Stephen's teeth. Chris Atkins points out that these and other drugs
for epilepsy cause further impairments beyond those that the person is born
with (Atkins 1998: 22).
8  It was not until 1965, after three years of regular contact with the specialists,
that the records include a diagnosis of retardation, although both my parents
claim that they were never given this diagnosis, and that if they had they
would never have come to Australia. There is only one mention of retardation
earlier than this and that refers to my oldest brother, who in 1962 was thought
to have "some mental retardation" associated with his epilepsy, irritability, slow
walking and spasticity, as a result of his earlier encephalitic illness. However, by
1965 the records indicate that he no longer presented with any abnormal
features.
9 In a study of Mexican-American parents of disabled children, Marilyn
Mardiros noted that parents acknowledged the pragmatic necessity of a label
for their child's disability. As one parent comments: "You can call it whatever
you want.  He's disabled and he'll have problems the rest of his life. We need
that label to get us help" (Mardiros 1989: 57). The need to find "appropriate
schooling" was what finally brought my family to Sydney in 1968. Having been
labelled autistic, Stephen was able to enrol at the Autistic School that had
recently been established in Sydney. Maryla, however, who in many ways has
far more "autistic" tendencies, was not considered autistic and therefore my
parents had to find her a different school.
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intellectual disability in entirely different ways (Connors & Donnellan 1993;
Edgerton 1984a; Manion & Bersani 1987; Mardiros 1989; Miles 1992; Peters 1980;
Westermeyer 1979; Whyte 1998).
The cross-cultural study of intellectual disabilities and mental disorders has
brought to light differences in the ways that cultures interpret and diagnose
disabilities (Mardiros 1989; Miles 1992; Whyte 1998). Westermeyer argues that
while "folk concepts" incorporate references to witchcraft, magic and religious
taboos, they generally conform to universal conceptual interpretations and
experiences of mental disorder (Westermeyer 1979: 315). Others argue that the
cultural interpretation of illness and well-being profoundly affects the diverse
ways in which intellectually disabled people are perceived and the extent to
which they are incorporated within the community as competent and social
beings (Connors & Donnellan 1993; Nuttall 1998).
According to Marilyn Mardiros, Mexican-American parents believe that
problems within a marriage are a potential cause of a child's physical and/or
mental disability, as are past transgressions and divine intervention (Mardiros
1989: 60-62). These include such things as "breaking culture taboos, going
against the teachings of the Catholic church, conducting oneself in a way that
would disgrace the family, and mistreating family members" (Mardiros 1989:
61). Interpretations of disability have also been based on a belief in witchcraft,
or the evil eye, and culturally appropriate healing practices are consequently
sought as remedies (Mardiros 1989: 62-4).10  Similarly, in Pakistan, the cause has
been variously attributed to "exposure of a pregnant woman to the rays of an
eclipse or to the shadow of a corpse; parental sins; [or] possession by evil spirits
through passing under a haunted tree or place" (Miles 1992: 243). Miles has also
                                                
10 The Mexican-American parents that Mardiros studied utilised both the
dominant Western biomedical model and Mexican-American cultural models to
interpret the cause of their child's disability. They also used a combination of
both as sources of possible treatment (Mardiros 1989: 60-67).
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documented cases showing that retardation is believed to be the manifestation
of God's will, an inherited illness, the result of inadequate maternal nutrition or
the product of consanguineous marriages (Miles 1992: 243).11
Consequently, interpretations of intellectual disability, and the subsequent
social attitudes towards such people, must be understood within the context of
particular sociocultural and historical milieux. Such constructions,
interpretations and perceptions are often complex and multifaceted. As Miles
(1992: 242) has noted, they incorporate ideas and concepts from many different
historical and cultural sources. These perceptions also perpetuate a particular
construction and classification of the world as normal, normative and true. In
Western cultures, intellectually disabled children are slotted into such a scheme,
and their parents are consequently caught up in a world of medical,
psychological and educational professionalism that renders their child
abnormal, asocial and deficient. However, this can often contradict parents
own interpretations and perceptions (Goode 1984).
This gulf between ways of relating to and perceiving intellectual disability is
highlighted in the early reports that I examined from the Grosvenor Diagnostic
Centre in Sydney. The doctors often commented on how difficult my parents
could be, suggesting that they had an inbuilt defensiveness which prevented
them from accepting that their children were profoundly retarded (7/4/66;
9/5/66; 17/7/67). There was never any suggestion, however, that this
difficulty might be due to the fact that my parents understood and related to
their children, albeit imperfectly, very differently. That they, and all of us, could
                                                
11 Gray (1995) has shown that this pattern of drawing from diverse sources in
attempting to understand and interpret a child's disability also exists in parental
explanations of autism in Western cultures. At times, my parents sought a
religious interpretation of their children's disabilities. While this is an interesting
issue, to pursue this line of research was not my aim. I am interested in
analysing how my family came to understand and relate to my siblings as
encultured and social beings, and how this compares to the dominant
sociocultural and institutional interpretation of them as abnormal and asocial.
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do so according to the negotiation of various symbolic systems centred mostly
around object use, building mutuality over the course of years.  Judgements on
their children framed in stark terms of normalcy and pathology were therefore
confronting.
The files at the Grosvenor Diagnostic Centre also contained a series of
photographs of myself and my siblings that had been taken each time we were
assessed. These images of the family are interesting for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it is clear from the early photographs (25/5/67) in particular that all of
us were extremely uncomfortable and distressed at being examined and
photographed in the nude. Stephen is being held in place at his wrist by
someone whose arm appears at the edge of the image, his face a picture of
distress and fear. The blank surface of a door frames him. My mother sits stiffly
in a chair with me naked on her lap, both of us looking with uncertainty, fear
and anxiety at the camera lens. Maryla also looks unhappy and distracted. Only
Ursula appears to be calm and happy as she stands against an examining table.
Secondly, each of the images—except one final one in 1975 of Maryla and
Stephen seated at a table together clothed in their school uniforms, and the one
of me being held by my mother—is of each child alone and naked, in a bare
clinical room.12  
In contrast to the photographs of us as a family, engaging with one another
and surrounded by the paraphernalia of family life, these images separate my
siblings out as medical anomalies, as objects to be examined, observed and
analysed. They were being stripped bare and de-contextualised. For people
                                              
12 The same sort of images can be found in textbooks on mental retardation
(see Berry &  Gordon 1931). These images show individuals looking
uncomfortable and isolated, with no distinctive background or context within
which to place and interpret them. They exist not as social beings but as
examples of different levels of idiocy, imbecility, or mental defectiveness (as
levels of intellectual disability were termed in the early twentieth century). Each
image is accompanied by a description of the person's chronological age,
mental age, phrenology, stature, weight, grip, "vital capacity", and a description
of their capabilities, habits and appearance.
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whose communicative and social abilities rest on a high degree of
contextualisation, such a process creates and perpetuates an isolating, abnormal
and asocial perception.13 It is also a process that highlights a profound refusal
to negotiate and communicate, to look for the possibilities of symbolic systems
through which mutual sociality exists and can be built. The  development of
institutional practices based on such perceptions and interpretations have had
an enormous effect on intellectually disabled people's lives. By associating
deficits in reasoning and intelligence with the capacity for sociality, such
interpretations and practices have denied intellectually disabled people their
ability to be the authors of their own social lives. When I visited the Grosvenor
Centre in 1997 I spoke with the medical director. She was interested in my
research and wanted to know what had happened to the family. She helped me
as I looked through the files and as I was leaving said to me in a wistful and
perplexed tone: "You really love them don't you". It was as though the lens
through which she interpreted people like my intellectually disabled siblings
somehow precluded the possibility of true love, affection, intimacy and
relatedness. The scientific imagination upon which her assessments were based
                                                
13 The images at the end of Diane Arbus' (1972) collection of photographs also
emphasise this separation. Arbus had an interest in marginal, urban people,
particularly freaks and social outcasts such as midgets, giants, transvestites and
nudists. She preferred to photograph these people in the intimacy of their own
homes and each of the images in this collection is a vividly rich portrayal of the
uniqueness and diversity of such people's lives. Hers is not a medical gaze, nor
does it attempt to be objective. Arbus identified with her subjects and sought to
portray them in a sympathetic, compassionate, albeit awestruck, manner. In
contrast, however, the seven images at the end of the monograph are an
untitled collection of photographs of intellectually disabled people wandering
around in an unidentified landscape, a blurred, park-like space with trees in the
distance. The people have no names, there is no descriptive title, nothing to
define their subjectivity, location and specificity. They are photographed as
though they exist in a world outside this world, an unidentified and
unidentifiable world, finding pleasure and sociality only in relation to one
another. Such estrangement from the wider social world can be related to the
isolation of this institutional environment (the bare details of which are
revealed in a later monograph, titled Untitled (1995), that deals exclusively with
this series of photographs). However, there is also an underlying sense in these
images that Arbus had been unable to transcend the difference between herself
and the people she was photographing. That, unlike the other marginal people,
she was unable to engage with and relate to them.
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appeared to be entirely unfamiliar with the ways in which mutuality might be
built.14
My parents spent many long hours at the Grosvenor Diagnostic Centre
waiting as their children were assessed by paediatricians, psychiatrists and
psychologists, frustrated and distressed by the attitudes of these professionals
towards themselves and their children. We were being judged, my parents
criticised, my siblings categorised, and none of us, in particular Maryla and
Stephen, were willing to cooperate with the demands being placed upon them
to respond to these tests. My mother eventually challenged the doctors to
come and visit the family at home, to see for themselves that the threatening
environment of the Clinic produced a limited picture of the family, my siblings,
and the way we related to one another. I could find no reference to this visit in
the reports. As my mother commented when I interviewed her:
I didn't find the doctors, I mean they were sympathetic in the end,
but not much help. I mean they didn't seem to really understand
what I was going through or how the family coped with these
manifestations of retardation.
One of the classic things was after Tessa was born in 1968.  Before
1968, we came over to Sydney in 1967 from Perth and we went to
the Grosvenor Diagnostic Centre where all the children were
examined from head to toe; brain scans, blood tests, urine samples,
measurements, you name it. And we spent I think three days from
memory . . .  The first day wasn't so bad, but when we had to go
back the second day, Stephen and Maryla saw these men and
                                                
14 Of course there are exceptions to this, as is shown by Chris Atkins (1998) in
her analysis of nurse's perceptions of people with severe multiple impairments.
Rather than denying their difference, or attempting to change these people,
Atkins claims that the nurses she interviewed mostly sought to relate to the
people they worked with based on an acceptance of them as humans in need of
support, intimacy, and "situated belonging" (Atkins 1998: 132).
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women in white coats at the reception and so on, and they just
freaked out because they knew what they'd undergone the day
before, and they just ran off . . .  But of course they had the tests
done. And they hated it of course. They hated all this pummelling
with their bodies. They had to have x-rays done and all sorts of
things. And when we had to go at the end of the week for the
summing up of these tests the three doctors who we spoke to
[said] they didn't know what had caused the retardation. Ursula
wasn't so bad. Although she was upset too, she wasn't quite so
difficult to deal with. But they said they didn't know, with all these
tests done, what had caused the retardation, and in fact they put
them in the 'not known' draw.
. . . And because the children, . . . especially Maryla, had been so
difficult to control, this one doctor, Dr M was her name, I
remember [her] well, [she] said to me 'I don't know how you cope
with these screaming children'. She was an Irish woman and rather
gruff. And I was very angry with her because she was quite sort of
obnoxious to me. And I said, 'do you think that these children
behave like this all the time? I wouldn't be here. I would have
done myself in long before this if I had children that screamed day
in day out, day in day out'. I said 'no, they're like this because
they're scared stiff of these white coats, these stethoscopes and
knowing what's going to be done to them'. I said 'if you really
want to know what the children are like, you should come to the
house'.
I was expecting Tess at the time, and I said 'why don’t you  come
to the house one afternoon and see what the children are like?' I
threw out this challenge to them and after Tessa was born, we'd
already moved to Sydney, they took me up on the offer. I think
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Tessa was perhaps two months old at the time, [or] three months
old, and they came for afternoon tea. And Stephen and Maryla
were playing with their jigsaws and it was a reasonably peaceful
household. Okay, Stephen had a little scream and Maryla probably
had hers, and we sorted that out. But I think they saw for
themselves, right, it wasn't a normal family, but we coped.
A few months before moving to Sydney we were visited by a psychiatrist in
Perth who was interested in autism. She wrote to her colleague in Sydney
saying that she thought it was a good idea that the family be kept together
rather than sending my siblings to an institution (as those at Grosvenor had
recommended). As she commented:
You see, this family have never known intimately any other
children but their own and all their children are queer. Within the
confines of this queer family there is no doubt whatever that the
children play in a family way. They love each other, they help one
another, particularly the eldest and the youngest, who have at
present by far the highest ability. All their play is socially oriented
within, of course, their limitations, and both parents are obviously
very fond indeed of this queer collection of little oddities that they
have brought into the world. I would think that as long as the
family can get along as well as I saw them doing yesterday there is
more to be gained by family life than they would probably get
with treatment and training in a hospital school (30/10/67).
Both this psychiatrist and the staff at Grosvenor (according to my mother's
account) acknowledged the integration of my siblings into family life. Yet this
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acknowledgment seemed to have little impact on the diagnosis, treatment and
care of my siblings. Why?15
Scrutinising the Scrutinisers
David Goode (1984), David Gray (1995) and Timothy Booth (1978) have
explored the relationship between clinical and parental perceptions of mentally
retarded people, albeit in different ways. Where Goode and Gray both
emphasise differences in perception and interpretation, Booth explores the
process by which parents are drawn into the dominant medical interpretation
of subnormality. Through an analysis of parent's experiences Booth shows
how the medical diagnosis and degraded social status accorded a handicapped
child is one which evolves over time. He argues that this label and status is part
of a process of social construction based upon the social meaning attributed to
the handicap rather than being an inherent attribute of the child (Booth 1978:
204-6). Parents come to make sense of their child's differences based on this
diagnosis, and this in turn folds back on itself by influencing the everyday
social world of how parents interact with and relate to their child (Booth 1978).
Consequently, Booth argues, the construction of subnormality as a social status
is a medicalisation of difference that is dependent on "the network of
relationships which constitute the social world" (Booth 1978: 208).
David Gray, on the other hand, draws on Arthur Kleinman's notion of
explanatory models as a way of exploring different ways in which autism (as a
very particular form of intellectual disability) is conceptualised by physicians,
                                                
15 This does not mean that all families accept their intellectually disabled kin,
nor that society responds to intellectually disabled people in a uniform way.
Some parents abandon their children entirely, and some people who have
never had retarded kin absorb these people into their social world with
acceptance and love. However, what I have perceived and experienced in my
observations and relationships with my siblings stands in stark contrast to the
way society generally perceives and treats them.
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patients and families. Gray argues that parents develop significantly different
explanations to medical professionals as to the causes and consequences of
autism (Gray 1995). They do this as a way of coping with and making sense of
their child's problems. As such their models are "characterized by an eclectic
borrowing from biomedical and other explanations, the use of metaphor and
symbolic logic, and a lack of clear boundaries between conceptual categories"
(Gray 1995: 116). Some of the reasons for these differences are due to the fact
that the classification of autism is diagnostically blurred, lacking as it does some
of the genetic or biological markers that other forms of intellectual disability
portray. Moreover, these children do not develop in a uniform manner, and
parents tend to deny the seriousness of the problem due to their desire to have
"normal offspring" (Gray 1995: 108). Gray argues, however, that in attempting
to make sense of these difficulties parents do develop meaningful explanatory
models that help them cope.
David Goode (1984) also analyses the consequences of "socially produced
identities". He does so, however, in a way that highlights the tensions and
differences that exist between clinical and parental perceptions of retardation.
Goode argues that these differences are based on different types of social
interaction, and that while parents are often perceived by the medical
profession as delusional or uncooperative, their knowledge of their retarded
kin is based on an intimacy that allows them to perceive their child in other
ways (Goode 1984). Goode argues that clinical assessments are based on
"etic"—external, abstract and indifferent—interpretations that assess the child
according to normative standards and criteria. Familial perceptions, on the
other hand, are "emic", implying that they are "intrinsic to the actions of the
cultural members". They are one's own way of existing within and making
sense of intimate relationships that constitute the familial environment (Goode
1984: 233). Based on these different ways of relating, parents, clinicians and care
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givers grant "radically different identities" to retarded individuals such that
there is often profound disagreement over the person's potential,
competencies, behaviour and identity (Goode 1984: 229).16
Goode (1984) argues that parents develop an identity for their retarded kin
on the basis of intimacy. For him, intimacy is an aspect of social relations, and
different types of relationships produce different interpretations of a retarded
person's identity. In this sense, intimacy is an attribute of affect, and refers to
the sentiment of being one "substance", of "unity" or "oneness" (Schneider 1968:
52). It is also related to love, to a diffuse and enduring solidarity (Schneider
1968: 52). But intimate relationships with people who are intellectually disabled
are also a product of complex patterns of mutuality and sociality. This form of
relatedness is based on the symbolic mediation of shared objects through
which overlapping systems of meaning are negotiated. It involves particular
and locally generated "social idioms" (such as the jigsaw puzzles and bits and
pieces that my siblings used) that, although potentially "considered a source of
external embarrassment . . . nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance
of common sociality" (Herzfeld 1997: 3). Intimacy is a product of shared
language games through which a specific sociality or form of life emerges; a
sociality that fundamentally acknowledges the implicit mutuality of the
intellectually disabled participants. It is a sociality that recognises the ability of
intellectually disabled people to generate and sustain systems of symbolic
representation despite their limited and restricted codes of behaviour and
communication. These are the practices that build compatibility and solidarity.
                                               
16 Rather than utilising Goode's etic/emic distinction I prefer to use Sahlins'
(1976) concept of a "symbolic scheme" which I describe in the following chapter.
The problem with the etic/emic distinction is that it separates these two
domains as though they are somehow distinct, whereas the emic always carries
with it an etic dimension, and vice-versa. However, despite this difference
between my work and Goode's, his analysis, and especially his emphasis on
intimacy, is an important contribution to the study of intellectual disability. As
such Goode's work will be analysed in greater detail in chapter five when I
outline some of the sociocultural interpretations of intellectual disability.
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Without them, intimacy is difficult to sustain. However, when combined with
institutionalised forms of relatedness based upon separation, training and
management, intimacy and shared mutuality is almost impossible to attain.17  
Goode, Gray and Booth all focus on the relationship of medicine to
retardation and adopt a social constructionist position. Whereas Booth explores
how parents reproduce medical interpretations, and Gray acknowledges the
complex mix of medical and familial constructions in the production of an
intellectually disabled identity, Goode sets them apart according to whether the
relationship is clinical or intimate. In doing so he acknowledges the difference
between intimacy and objectivity, and explores the consequences of both in
terms of how an intellectually disabled person is perceived and related to
(Goode 1984: 231). Despite their differences, however, each of these writers has
focused on the issue of a constructed identity, and does so by contrasting
and/or assimilating the interpretations of parents with those of the medical
profession.
While it is obviously an intrinsic part of the social experience of intellectual
disability, this constructionism does not provide a full picture of the complexity
of relating to intellectually disabled people (cf. Bogdan & Taylor 1976, 1982,
1989; Branson & Miller 1989; Cocks & Allen 1996; Ferguson 1987; Gerber 1990;
Lea 1988; Manion & Bersani 1987 for other social constructionist interpretations
of intellectual disability). It does not allow for an analysis of who these people
are, as human beings who live within and also produce specific forms of
sociality. Neither does it acknowledge that sociality and meaning is something
which is created through mutuality and the symbolic mediation of shared
objects. Constructionism interprets meaning as something projected onto the
intellectually disabled, but not as something that is integral to them.
                                           
17 My concept of ' intimacy' and 'deficit' (see below p. 74) has evolved in
discussions with Diane Austin-Broos.
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Constructionism thereby fails to make an adequate assessment of the modes of
relatedness and symbolic expression that intellectually disabled people
participate in, develop and sustain.18  
To further this argument I propose to present field data I collected in an
activities centre and two group homes for intellectually disabled adults. While
the setting for these places was ostensibly a community environment, I refer to
them as institutional for they were characterised by institutionalised practices.
While institutions also have a form of mutuality and relatedness it is one that is
pervaded by notions of deficit.19 Within this environment intellectually disabled
people are implicitly characterised as abnormal and lacking in sociality. Affect
and solidarity are largely absent and therefore so too are modes of mutuality
focused on the sociality of intellectually disabled people as whole persons
capable of participating in the joint constitution of social life. Rather than
engaging with intellectually disabled people through the negotiation and
mediation of symbolic systems, the institutional environment assumes that
intellectually disabled people have little capacity either to articulate or negotiate
symbolically meaningful systems. The assumption that intelligence and reason
are the necessary competencies for sociality and symbolic expression underpins
this attitude. By inference, the form of relatedness that exists in institutional
environments is based upon management and training; on making
intellectually disabled people more socially normal; on making up the deficit. In
the process, the meaning, sociality and selfhood implicit in intellectually
disabled people's actions and interactions goes largely unnoticed (cf. Gleason
1994). Many factors both personal and organisational contribute to this
situation. My objective will be to compare and contrast forms of sociality and
mutuality in an intimate and institutional milieu.  
                                                
18 I explore these issues in more detail in chapter five.
19 See footnote 17 above. Mary Howard (1990: 167) also argues that
institutional practices are influenced by a "deficiency view" of mental
retardation.
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Being Managed and Trained
The activities centre where I began my fieldwork was funded by the New
South Wales Department of Community Services (DOCS), a government
department responsible for family, community and disability services. As a
state body DOCS handled all residential and community access services for
disabled people in the area. The Commonwealth government was responsible
for employment services throughout Australia.20 The activities centre was
officially called the "Xanadu"21 Community Access and Support Service. Xanadu
was "a day programme centre for adults with a developmental disability". Its
aim was to "provide a service to the consumers in accordance with their
individual service plans", which included such things as recreation, community
support services and access, living skills, and some pre-vocational training.22 In
accordance with the aims of the NSW Disability Services Act (1993) the
emphasis at Xanadu was on community integration, equal rights and an
enhanced lifestyle. Through the services that the centre provided, and each
person's individual service plan, Xanadu aimed to "assist clients to meet and
develop their needs and interests by providing creative and diverse
opportunities and experiences".
                                                
20 See chapter one, footnote 7 for details of the Commonwealth State Disability
Agreement.
21 In order to protect the privacy of the community of people with whom I did
my fieldwork all names of people and places are pseudonyms.
22 Individual Service Plans (ISPs) are written documents that detail the goals,
needs, interests and supposed aspirations of each individual consumer. They
also identify the person's achievements to date, various ways of attaining these
goals, and efforts to enhance their skills, life experiences and social
opportunities. According to contemporary disability rhetoric "consumers"
(rather than clients or patients) is the term that is used to refer to intellectually
disabled people. In this new era of consumer oriented welfare, intellectually
disabled people are considered to be the consumers of the service for
disabilities, and the staff are the ones who provide them with this service. This
change in terminology, mirroring as it does other changes in practice and
terminology in the field of intellectual disability, supposedly represents a shift
in attitude, treatment and power.
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This information on Xanadu appeared in the centre's transition plan. This
plan outlined the services that Xanadu must provide to the consumers. It also
stipulated the changes that were necessary in order for Xanadu to be fully
compliant with the NSW Disability Services Act (1993). The Act also has a
supporting set of Service Standards which reflect the principles and application
of principles of the Act. These outline the responsibilities of staff to consumers
and provide an account of consumers rights and the form of relatedness that
staff must adhere to when dealing with consumers. The Standards focus on
issues such as service access, individual needs, decision making and choice,
privacy, dignity and confidentiality, participation and integration, developing a
valued status, complaints and disputes, service management, employment
conditions, support and skills development.  Xanadu's daily activities reflected
these requirements and standards of practice.
Implicit within the guidelines for the running of Xanadu was an ethos of
training and management. The "needs and interests" of consumers are
interpreted as specific and necessary social skills rather than as intimate
relatedness. The aim is to develop a form of sociality in terms of skills and tasks
that are socially acceptable and utilitarian. The mutuality that exists is based on
attempts to equip people with these skills.  Interaction, and the form of
relatedness that exists within these institutional environments, is therefore
primarily based upon regulation and training. As such, an institution is rarely
able to acknowledge and sustain the capacity, or indeed legitimacy, of
intellectually disabled people to produce and participate in mutual socialities
through the production and mediation of meaningful symbolic systems.
Combined with this is a degree of "ventriloquism", of well-intentioned but
misdirected policy dictates that do not acknowledge or represent the inherent
differences and aspirations of the people in question (Cowlishaw 1999: 222-
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236).23 Accordingly, staff adhere to procedural requirements even though these
practices do not actually produce the desired outcomes. This was particularly
evident in the meetings that were held each week whereby the consumers
were required to speak without their participation and mutual sociality ever
being genuinely achieved.
There are very real and practical limitations, restrictions and difficulties that
contribute to this situation. The staff are restrained by legal obligations that do
not adequately address the complexity of relating to intellectually disabled
people. Not only do these determine the ways in which they have to engage
with consumers, but the fact that they are almost always responsible for at
least four consumers at any one time makes the intensity of developing and
sustaining necessary levels of intimacy and mutuality very difficult. Staff are
also moved around between different work environments and have spent
varying amounts of time in the service. This makes it difficult to maintain an
ongoing commitment to specific individuals. To add to these problems, paid
employment does not generally involve a requirement to generate intense
levels of human engagement and intimacy. Yet this is what is necessary in
order to uphold and develop intellectually disabled people's sociality. All these
issues, combined with the already considerable difficulties of sustaining
mutuality with people who have very limited and specific modes of symbolic
                                               
23 Gillian Cowlishaw uses the term "ventriloquism" in her study of the
relationship between racial power and intimacy in Australia. It describes the
process whereby "certain imagined virtues and desires were attributed to
Aboriginal people" (Cowlishaw 1999: 222), such that "community members
were participating in alien forms of interaction and discourse, and were
assenting to an agenda formed elsewhere" (Cowlishaw 1999: 233).
Interestingly, these practices evolved during the 1970s when equality, freedom
and self-determination became the official social policy towards Aboriginal
Australians. The very real and systematic differences between Aboriginal and
white people and their social practices were not able to be seriously
incorporated within this new policy (Cowlishaw 1999: 223). This is one of the
many parallels that exist in the history of practices and attitudes towards
indigenous and intellectually disabled people.
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expression, contribute to the problems involved in institutional encounters
with intellectually disabled people.
In Xanadu
Xanadu was set up in 1984 on the basis of a rent free agreement with the local
hospital. It was located in a small cluster of rooms attached to the hospital and
palliative care unit by a series of covered and ramped passageways. The
hospital was a separate organisation, however, and any specialists who visited
the centre came from DOCS rather than the hospital unit.  In fact there was no
contact whatsoever with the hospital staff, other than the occasional wave from
some of them having their lunch at the canteen when the bus went past. This
separation was also evident at the centre, for although it was busy with its own
daily comings and goings, there was a sense of being cut off, both from the
local environment and from the wider community. The hospital, a disorderly
collection of buildings set amongst tall gum trees and paddocks, was situated
on the outskirts of a small country town that relied on weekend tourism for its
economic viability. This town was twenty kilometres from the main rural
centre, the location of the DOCS office, other government services, the group
homes, sheltered employment facilities and the main commercial businesses of
the region.  
Every weekday morning the consumers who attended Xanadu were picked
up at their homes by one of two buses and driven to the centre to begin the
day's activities. This included those people in the area who were considered the
most dependent and intellectually disabled, and who were incapable of
working at the local sheltered workshops.24 Over the twelve months that I did
                                                
24 Sheltered workshops are now known as "business enterprises" in order to
emphasise their incorporation in the general market place as profit making
rather than charity organisations.
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my fieldwork I came to know many of the intellectually disabled people in the
area, not just those at the activities centre. This included people who worked in
open employment (in supported positions at businesses such as Macdonalds or
other takeaway food places), at the local sheltered workshops, or who were
moving around between these and other services such as the post-school
options programme.25 However, it was the people at the centre and those who
lived in two of the group homes in the area with whom I spent the majority of
my time.26 I engaged with them not through their records, believing as I do
that these are private documents, but by interacting with them at the centre
and at their respective homes. Rather than doing in-depth interviews, and
asking my informants how they perceived and interpreted their lives, I spent
my time just being with them and observing what was going on, what it was
they were saying and doing, and how they related to one another, to the staff,
and to myself. I also observed how the staff perceived, treated and related to
the intellectually disabled consumers.
Of the twelve people who regularly attended the centre, nine were women
and three were men. For the purposes of this study, I have given them the
pseudonyms Kate, Cressida, Sarah, Mary, Rachel, Daniel, Joanne, Martin, Polly,
Tony, Patricia and Jacky. Their ages ranged from Kate who was in her early
twenties to Mary who was in her mid fifties, although the average age in 1996
                                                
25 The "post-school options programme" is a recent initiative that aims to
provide pre-vocational training and recreational services for intellectually
disabled people making the transition from school to a work-related activity.
26 The majority of those living in the largest group home also came to Xanadu.
Apart from one woman, those living in the second home included people who
worked at various sheltered workshops in the region. There were other
intellectually disabled people in the area who lived "independently" in the
community. This meant that they lived in supported accommodation and were
visited by employees of the Department of Community Services and other
welfare services to assist with any issues or difficulties that might arise from
living independently. I met a couple of these people but have not based this
ethnographic study on their circumstances as my focus has been on the social
experiences of those people who are more dependent and severely
intellectually disabled.
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was about 35. Three of the consumers were permanently confined to
wheelchairs, while one of the men occasionally used his when experiencing the
after-effects of epileptic seizures. The majority were on some form of
medication, at least four were epileptic and two were incontinent. A number of
the consumers had serious medical conditions that affected their health and
lifestyle. Quite a few also had serious behavioural and/or psychological
problems that periodically resulted in physical acts of violence, psychotic
episodes, and extreme emotional outbursts. Some of these people had spent
many years in large government institutions (Mary, Cressida, Joanne, Polly
and Patricia). Two had lived with their families in the area and had moved into
the group homes when they opened (Sarah and Jacky), while Rachel, Martin
and David have always lived at home. Most people had at least one family
member living in the region, and those who didn't had an advocate appointed
to represent them at official meetings.
When I rang Xanadu to enquire about doing fieldwork I spoke to the
coordinator who asked me to come and explain my research to him. He was
supportive of my plans and, after checking with the Disability Services Area
Manager at the local Department of Community Services, agreed to me
coming to the centre on a daily basis as a "volunteer". When I was assigned the
role of volunteer I assumed that it would make no difference to the way in
which I proposed to relate to people. I soon realised, however, that it did, and
that I too had to have a place within the division that separated the staff from
the intellectually disabled consumers with whom they worked. As a volunteer I
was in essence an unpaid staff member, and it was my "duty" to uphold the
same regulations and standards that the staff had to observe.27 In fact, I was
                                                
27 In her recent ethnographic study of the deinstitutionalisation process
experienced by a group of intellectually disabled women, Kelley Johnson also
comments on this phenomenon. She too found that she was under pressure to
act as though she were a staff member, and that there was little space for her to
operate outside these confined parameters (Johnson 1998: 4; cf. Goode 1980b;
Gleason 1994; S. Taylor 1998b).
Chapter Two: Ethnographic Encounters II
page 81
introduced to this whole new world of conditions, standards and practices on
my very first day. I had some freedom to move around within the activities
centre, choosing who I wanted to spend my time with and what activities I
wanted to participate in for the day. But Xanadu regulations profoundly
affected the way in which I was able to relate to the people whom I had come
to the centre to get to know.
*
When I first walked into the activities centre I was overcome by a feeling of
familiarity. The smell, sounds and feel of the place were very similar to
Stockton in its more recent manifestation. The fact that the centre was attached
to a hospital only added to this familiarity.28 The rooms were clinical and bare,
with linoleum floors, plastic chairs and tables, and fake leather lounges. A large
television dominated the corner of one room, and a pervasive smell of cleaning
chemicals filled the air. There were few items in view in the main room, other
than an urn, a radio, a paper shredding machine and a trunk overflowing with
newspaper. A noticeboard with photographs from previous outings was on
the wall of the second room. Any craft tools, games or puzzles were safely
stored away in cupboards.  
Every morning when I arrived at the activities centre I took my place
amongst the group of consumers, making myself a cup of tea and settling into
a chair at one of the tables in the front room to wait until the mornings'
activities began. These were generally quiet moments of the day, and my
                                                
28 Xanadu's transition plan actually required that it move out of this location.
Although this issue was consistently brought up at meetings the problem of
financing such a move prevented it from happening in the near future. Three
years later when I visited the centre it was still located at the hospital. Likewise,
it has also been stipulated that Stockton must close because it contravenes the
NSW Disability Services Act. Over the past decade the majority of Stockton's
residents have been moved into community group homes. Those who still live
at Stockton, including my sister, are supposed to move into alternative
accommodation sometime in the next five years (although this time frame
keeps changing).
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entrance would be acknowledged by those gathered in the room in their own
particular ways. Kate would give a wave of her hand and a nod of her head
from her usual seat under the high window, her feet tucked up beneath her
body as she rocked her chair backwards and forwards and sang to herself.
Cressida, an older Aboriginal woman, would be in her usual spot as well, over
by the urn and sink, sipping on her third cup of coffee for the morning. She
would look up with a hint of a smile and point out her new clothes or the latest
pain she was feeling. She would urge me to come and sit beside her and attend
to these ongoing issues. Joanne would be seated over in the corner with her
back to the room, continuing with the unfinished and unfinishable task of
tearing up discarded newspaper into squares and filling up the garbage bin.
She would hunch up her shoulders when I entered the room and never say
hello, nor would she look at me. In contrast, a young man called Martin who
was always bright and cheerful would lurch over to where I was standing and
tell me about his weekend and how busy he had been, reaching into his pocket
as he spoke for a handkerchief to wipe the dribble from his chin. Mary would
look up from under her yellow baseball cap and mumble "hello" before falling
back into a semi-slumber, or wandering outside to have a cigarette. Sarah
would shout at me from the other end of the room to get her beads for her. I
would use these initial moments to reorientate myself to the rhythms and
moods of the room, ready to begin another day of observing and interacting
with this group of people in order to understand and make sense of their
world.
At first sight it appeared that these were the only people at the centre, but
through a hallway and off to the right was another room where the staff were
having their morning 'cuppa'. It was here that the coordinator had his desk,
where all the records and relevant documents were filed, where the staff did
their paper work, and where they ate their lunch and drank cups of tea and
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coffee. There was a serving window through which they could see into the
hallway and through to the second room where the television and craft
equipment were kept. Only staff were allowed officially inside the staffroom.
This included me as a volunteer, although at times the staff would
accommodate for temporary transgressions by having consumers stay for a
while if they did happen to venture in. This was so particularly in the case of
one woman. After a few minutes, however, Patricia would be asked to leave
the room and told to replace the rope on her way out.    
Across the door that led into the staff room hung a rope and this simple
device marked a threshold that could never be fully traversed. During the time
I spent at the activities centre there was much discussion about replacing the
rope with a door with double handles and locks. The staff, and especially the
co-ordinator, were frustrated by consumers coming into the staff room and
disrupting their work. No locks were fitted while I was there, but the rope and
this discussion symbolised the demarcation between staff and consumers. It
highlighted the role that the staff were employed to perform. The rope
signified the fact that the staff had a duty to train the consumers, to provide
them with opportunities to develop social skills rather than engaging with
them through shared and negotiated symbol systems. It highlighted the fact
that the consumers were there to be properly managed. The rope represented
and reproduced the boundary between those who were categorised as
intellectually disabled and those who were "normal". It reinforced the
separation between consumers and staff, and signified the spatial and
ideological institutionalisation of training and management practices. It
reflected the form of relatedness that existed at the centre and perpetuated the
notion that intellectually disabled people are supposedly lacking innate
capacities for sociality and mutuality.
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There were various daily activities that were part of this training regime,
and each of them aimed to develop the vocational and social skills of the
consumers. These ranged from delivering meals to the local elderly community
(a community integration and access activity that formed part of a wider
voluntary service called "meals on wheels"), visiting the library or shopping
centre, and doing craft work at a local cafe with some community volunteers (a
program that ended a few months after I started fieldwork due to lack of
interest). Activities also included going ten pin bowling and doing some
gardening at a small plot attached to a large wholesale nursery 30 kilometres
away. In between these main activities people spent time just 'hanging around'
the centre having cups of tea and coffee, wandering around between the
rooms, or sitting outside in the garden. Occasionally they would also do some
painting, drawing, cooking, or puzzles, look at magazines, have make-up put
on, watch television, perform karaoke numbers, or, as one woman did, smoke
with the staff. Every few months we would also go on an outing, to the nearby
boat harbour for the afternoon, to a park, or, as on one occasion, to a special
disabilities day at a local showground to watch a demonstration of police, fire
and rescue service operations.
The activities centre also provided pre-vocational training in the form of a
paper shredding machine. A number of consumers were encouraged to
operate the machine as part of their skills enhancement programmes.  Others
spent time tearing up pieces of paper for shredding. While I was at Xanadu a
group of women also spent a few weeks doing a paid contracted job that
involved tying lengths of string to cardboard tags for use on industrial
equipment. Through encouraging and developing these skills it was hoped that
some consumers might eventually "move up" to one of the sheltered
workshop environments and take their place in the wider community.  
Chapter Two: Ethnographic Encounters II
page 85
Every Monday afternoon a meeting was held during which consumers
were encouraged to tell one another what they had done over the weekend.
Once a month these meetings were more formal and dealt with procedural
matters relating to the running of Xanadu. As there was often very little to
discuss, these monthly sessions were used as an opportunity to go over the
rights of the consumers enshrined in the NSW Disability Services Act and the
accompanying Standards of Practice. Generally, however, a weekly routine
was followed, and each person was allocated a morning and afternoon activity
to assist them in the development of their social and vocational skills. These
activities were also seen to provide forms of community access and integration.
The staff at the centre—of which there were three full-time, one part-time
and three casual employees29—were employed to facilitate the training of these
skills by making sure that the expected activities took place. This involved
driving the consumers to and from various locations, as well as setting up the
necessary equipment for different activities. These were part of their "hands-
on" responsibilities, which also involved helping with mealtimes, toileting,
medication, and any physiotherapy exercises that people needed to do. I too
was expected to participate in these and other procedures, so that I also ended
up helping with the orchestration of lunch, toileting, getting people on and off
the buses and setting up activities, as well as chairing the weekly meetings.
The permanent staff members were also responsible for individual
consumers as their case managers. In this role they participated in the
formulation of individual service plans, kept daily records of each person's
behaviour and activities, and noted any deviations from expected and
acceptable behavioural standards. The staff attended meetings concerning
                                                
29 At any one time there were never more than five staff people rostered on at
the centre.  This included the coordinator who rarely took "hands-on"
responsibility for the consumers.  With twelve regular consumers this gave the
ratio of staff to consumers at anywhere between 1:3 and 1:6.
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those whom they were managing and communicated any information
concerning that person to their guardian and DOCS personnel. These were the
practices through which staff managed the consumers. They were based on a
combination of behavioural management and bureaucratic order, and included
record keeping, report writing, representation at meetings and making
decisions about courses of action concerning behavioural "problems".  In this
role staff had the power to intervene in the consumer's lives based on their
assessment of how consumers were behaving. This could range from
recommending that a person be sent to an institution for a short and intensive
period of drug enhanced therapy, to giving them an injection of Valium as a
way of controlling their behaviour. These responsibilities and expectations
were extended to other staff and could result in locking someone in solitary
confinement for short periods of time, ignoring repetitive questioning or
permanently maintaining a specified physical distance from certain persons
who were considered dangerous. Such recommendations were included in
consumer's personal records and individual service plans and served to inform
the actions of staff towards consumers.
Staff were also expected to participate in the development of policies and
procedures so that Xanadu would eventually become fully compliant with the
Department of Community Services policies, the NSW Disability Services Act
and the NSW Disability Service Standards.30 These obligations were the cause
of considerable frustration and stress for the staff, who complained that more
of their time was taken up doing paper work than the hands-on activities that
they were employed to perform. Most of the staff believed the expectations of
the Act were unrealistic and contradictory, and were disillusioned by the low
                                               
30 While I was at Xanadu I was asked if I would work with the second most
senior staff person to draw up a draft plan of Xanadu's policies and procedures.
This meant going through the report on Xanadu done by a government
appointed consultant and list all the areas that had been noted as contravening
the NSW Disability Services Act. It also required making recommendations as
to how these areas of Xanadu's operations could be changed.
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morale, bureaucratic red tape and lack of support that plagues the NSW
Department of Community Services. One of the issues that most frustrated
them was the requirement that consumers participate in all decision-making
procedures at the centre. The monthly meetings were a way of addressing this
recommendation although, as I describe in a later chapter, these occasions
often deteriorated into farce as the majority of the consumers lacked the
capabilities to engage with the world in this way. The meetings became a
formality, and a simulacrum of formality in the process, having all the external
features of an official meeting but none of the actual substance.31
The staff were all NSW government employees and as such they had to
comply with the conditions and standards outlined in the legislation and within
numerous DOCS policies. They were actively discouraged from developing
personal relationships with the consumers and were expected to maintain strict
professional standards and practices in accordance with these policies. They
were also required to relate to consumers according to the recommendations
of each consumer's individual service plans. There were occasional breaches of
these regulations. However, there was no systematic, structural or accepted
way within these institutional environments to build upon the potential for
mutual sociality. Training programmes for staff, while irregular, were aimed at
teaching staff how to equip consumers for life in the community. They focused
on issues such as behavioural management and sex education and reinforced
                                               
31 In using the term "simulacrum" I draw upon Baudrillard's notion of it as a
"displacement of the real by empty signs" (Herzfeld 1997: 6). However,
Herzfeld's (1997: 7) interpretation of simulacra as "an attempt to project familiar
social experience onto unknown and often potentially threatening contexts" is
also relevant here. The meetings disguise a true lack of substance and are also
an attempt by staff and policy makers to make the unknown conform to
"familiar social experience".  In this sense, following Herzfeld (1997: 6), the "less
literally face-to-face the society we inhabit, the more obviously cultural idioms
become a simulacra of social relations". Although ostensibly engaged in "face-
to-face" relations, the staff are obliged to engage with the consumers according
to an ethos of training and management whereby the consumers are
encouraged to develop socially acceptable dispositional behaviours.
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the obligation to provide consumers with community integration and help
them develop social skills. These skills were both vocationally and domestically
oriented. They focussed on developing the ability to operate a paper shredding
machine or place a certain number of objects into containers; two skills that
were required for working in the local sheltered workshops. They also
emphasised living skills such as independence, hygiene, cooking, cleaning, and
acceptable interaction with the public. As discussed in chapters six and seven,
none of the training programmes focused on how to foster communication,
understanding and empathy between the staff and the people they worked
with. Any tendency or desire to acknowledge intimacy and develop forms of
mutuality had no support or encouragement.
Training consumers to acquire these social skills, and discouraging them
from unacceptable behaviour, were the primary means through which staff
related to the consumers. This was the form of relatedness that dominated life
at Xanadu. It was based on an implicit and taken for granted interpretation of
the consumers as deficient and abnormal beings who, because they lack certain
capacities for reasoning and intelligence, are considered incapable of expressing
and sustaining forms of symbolic activity through which mutuality and
sociality can be developed. It was therefore assumed that the acquisition of
particular social skills and a conformity to normative social behaviours were
the necessary prerequisites for intellectually disabled people becoming socially
integrated beings.
Forms of interaction and relatedness based on training appeal to an
"elaborated code" that lies essentially beyond the grasp of intellectually disabled
people (Bernstein 1971: 143-148). This does not mean that intellectually disabled
people have no capacity for sociality and mutuality. On the contrary, their
capacity for communicating through restricted and specific codes, although
limited in their range of applicability, mode of articulation and contextual
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specificity, does allow for the potential to develop negotiated systems of
meaning through which mutuality and sociality are built. The symbolic
violence that is done to intellectually disabled people in institutional
environments occurs precisely because the forms of relatedness that exist do
not build upon these already established codes. They do not allow for
negotiation and mediation through the interpenetration of symbolic systems at
their point of articulation. Institutional environments and relationships
therefore undermine the capacity for intimacy. They also actively frustrate
attempts by intellectually disabled people to explore mutuality in social life.
Considering that social integration is an official government policy, it was
disturbing to see that at its most salient point, the point of articulation between
staff and consumers, the staff were actively discouraged from exploring mutual
sociality.
The Intimate as Institutional
Five months after starting at Xanadu I began doing fieldwork in one of the
Department of Community Services group homes. I was interested to find out
what home life was like for the majority of the people with whom I spent my
days. I also wondered whether or not there was any continuity between the
practices and relationships I observed at the activities centre and those taking
place at home. Whereas a work environment, which Xanadu was supposed to
emulate to a certain degree, usually has a number of legal, bureaucratic and
administrative processes in place as part of its organisational structure, home
life is generally considered to be a more intimate and personal environment. It
is a site of the familial. As such, it is usually free of the institutionalised
relationships, expectations, structures and protocols that characterise a work
environment.
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The first group home that I worked in was known as "Jeffrey Street".32 The
house was a beautiful, late nineteenth century building with north and west
facing verandahs. It had large bay windows, high ceilings, thick stone walls,
ornate railings and generous sized rooms. Situated on a large corner block
about two kilometres from the centre of the main town, the home looked just
like any other house along the street with a few extra cars parked outside. On
making my way through the permanently closed gate and suburban leafy
garden, however, it quickly became apparent that this was quite a different
environment to any ordinary home.  
When I first visited the house a white mini bus was parked in the driveway
and two people, who turned out to be staff members, were sitting smoking at
a plastic outdoor table in the concrete courtyard. Beside them a ramp led up to
the back door that opened onto a wide dark hallway from which the four
bedrooms, kitchen, dining room, television room and toilet block were all
accessed. The front door was permanently locked and the verandahs
inaccessible. The house was completely turned in upon itself. Most of the
windows looked out onto brick walls or the enclosed yard so that the place had
no relationship with the surrounding neighbourhood or environment. There
was nothing remotely personal, intimate or familial about Jeffrey Street. Nor
was there anything approaching the supposed requirements of community
integration other than that the house was situated in a suburban street.
Jeffrey Street was the largest of the five government group homes in the
area.  It could accommodate anything up to eleven residents. Seven people,
one man and six women, were permanent residents. Six of these
people—Cressida, Sarah, Joanne, Polly, Tony and Patricia—came to the
                                                
32 Again, the names and locations of these group homes and the people living
in them are pseudonyms. There were four DOCS group homes located in the
main town. They were known as "Jeffrey Street", "Hervey Street", "Corrie
Street" and "Brown Street". In addition to these, there was also a children's
group home.
Chapter Two: Ethnographic Encounters II
page 91
activities centre every weekday. They shared the group home with three other
women: Jane, who stopped coming to the centre because of her age and frailty
and spent each day at home with a staff member; and Jill and Kerry who were
living at Jeffrey Street on semi-permanent respite.33 Jill worked in open
employment at a take-away pizza bar while Kerry floated around between
various day programmes delivering pamphlets to letter boxes or washing cars.
Most of the residents required medication, three were incontinent, and two
were in wheelchairs. The permanent residents were generally considered by
staff to be the least functional and most "hands-on" (or difficult) of all the
consumers living in the region. Kerry could also be very difficult and
aggressive and on a number of occasions her disturbing behaviour was dealt
with using physical restraint and medication. Consequently, there were usually
at least three staff persons rostered on duty at Jeffrey Street during the
morning and evening shifts, and someone was always on night duty.
Owing to the requirements of the NSW Disability Services Act, Jeffrey Street
would eventually have to be disbanded. The proposal was that the group be
split between three smaller houses, two that would operate as permanent
households, the third functioning as a respite centre. At the time, however, all
but two of the residents, Joanne and Tony, shared a room with someone else,
and both of them had spare beds in their rooms for casual respite residents.
Kerry lived alone in a semi-independent flat attached to the house and was
only occasionally allowed to come and have dinner with the other residents.
                                                
33 Respite care is temporary accommodation for intellectually disabled people
who are living at home with their families. A few of the group homes had a
spare bed that was allocated for this purpose, and families in the region had to
put their names down on a roster in order to have access to this service. Kerry
and Jill's situations were somewhat different in that they had been in respite for
many months because their respective family's refused to take them back
home. This is a course of action that a number of parents have taken with their
intellectually disabled children as a way of protesting the lack of available
respite facilities and government placements. It is also a way of getting their
child some form of (albeit insecure) placement in a group home (Horin 1996a:
1; Horin 1996b: 9).
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There were no personal or homely possessions in the main rooms. The laundry
had shelves installed with each persons name marked on them for sorting
clothes; the dining and television rooms were bare and cheaply furnished; the
kitchen had lists of what people ate on the cupboard doors and there was no
food in sight. The only indication in the main rooms that people lived here
permanently was a portrait photograph of each consumer hanging in the
hallway. The bedrooms were more homely as each consumer had a chest of
drawers and bedside table upon which were arranged their few belongings,
such as photographs of family, some jewellery, books, a tape recorder and
music, or a favourite doll.
When I first began at Jeffrey Street I was asked to chair the weekly resident
meetings that they, like Xanadu, had to have. As an unpaid volunteer I was
seen to be independent and therefore the obvious choice for this new
requirement whereby the consumers have their say in the running of the
home. Once a week I would make my way to Jeffrey Street and meet up with
everyone after their day's activities. We would hold the meeting and
afterwards I would hang around for a few hours until bedtime, joining in with
whatever was going on; watching television, bringing in the laundry, making
lunches for the following day, having dinner, or sitting around having cups of
tea. The meetings only lasted a few weeks before falling into the basket of the
all too often discarded attempts at introducing the well-meaning but entirely
inappropriate expectations of the Disability Services Standards and Act. Even
though the meetings no longer occurred I was still able to go to the house each
week for the afternoon and evening and while there was able to participate in
and observe the home lives of those whom I spent my days with. Although the
staff knew I was at the house to do fieldwork they expected that I act as any
other volunteer and assist them with their duties, especially bathing, toileting,
cleaning and feeding. The staff were suspicious of my presence at the house
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and, unlike those whom I came to know quite well at Xanadu, left me well
alone to do what was expected of me.  
Like those at the activities centre, the staff at Jeffrey Street had a separate
work space where all official information, medication and personal records
were stored. They also used a separate bathroom. The permanent staff
employed in the group homes were different to those who worked at the
activities centre (although the casual workers tended to move between both
places), but they were all still employees of DOCS. As such they were both
bound by the same conditions, standards and practices, and displayed the same
frustration and angry sentiments as the staff at Xanadu. Despite the pervasive
institutionalised appearance of the place, it was more the routines and
regulations, the policies and practices, that gave to Jeffrey Street a dominant
ethos of training and management. It was the form of relatedness that existed
between staff and residents that made the intimate environment of this home
truly institutional. It quickly became clear that home life for those living in
government funded accommodation differed very little from daily life at the
centre. As I wrote in my notes after that first visit:
The kitchen is large and organised, with notices up for where food
should be placed in the pantry and who has their tea and coffee in
what way (although only the staff were included on this list). . .  I
was taken through to the office, a small room crowded with ledger
and record books, individual books and daily programmes. I
imagine the medication is kept in here as well. The house manager
gave me the "morning shift folder" to have a look through, which
gave details of who does what during the day and what is expected
of the staff. It also gave information about keeping accurate
records, recording "incidents" as they occur [which includes any
aberrant behaviour by a resident or an altercation between them
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and staff or other residents], checking medication twice, signing
any written notes, and various other  bureaucratic procedures and
obligations.
It was assumed by the house manager that this was the information I needed
in order to fulfil my role as a volunteer/fieldworker in the group home. The
individual record books contained personal information, including medical
histories, family contacts, and behavioural management details. They outlined
the way that staff were to interact with and treat each of the consumers and,
while I never read these files, I was regularly informed by the staff as to how I
was supposed to deal with each person's idiosyncratic behaviour. The emphasis
was on domestic skills training and changing undesirable behaviour rather
than on an ethic of relating per se. There was little emphasis on intimacy,
affection or the development of mutuality based on the shared and mediated
production of sociality.   
The Standards of Practice stipulated the legal procedures to which staff now
had to adhere regarding consumer's rights. These guidelines, and other
individual management plans, outlined the required modes of relating.
However, staff were given no advice, support or direction as to ways of
relating to these intellectually disabled people as fellow human beings. Despite
the rhetoric of integration and rights contained in the NSW Disability Services
Act, none of the requirements of the job incorporated the principle or policy of
truly relating to the consumers as social beings. They did not acknowledge that
for the majority of the residents, their contact with staff was the only social
contact they had with non-intellectually disabled people. The outcome for
intellectually disabled people could only be a very confined mutuality relatively
lacking in intimacy. Even within a 'home', the training and management
regime therefore could only produce a simulacrum of the socially normal.
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A few weeks after starting fieldwork at Jeffrey Street, the house manager of
the group home around the corner asked if I would also chair the weekly
meetings that they had to have. "Hervey Street", as the home was called, was a
smaller house and much less institutional in its feeling and set up. A short path,
bordered with Daphne and Kangaroo Paw beneath overhanging Banksia and
Jacaranda trees, hid the front door from view. Like all the other houses along
this tree-lined street, the group home was a red brick bungalow. The only
distinguishing feature was the extra car or two parked on the street outside.
Only five consumers lived at Hervey Street and all were permanent residents.
Sally and Jim worked together at the local sheltered workshop on the outskirts
of town doing unskilled manual labour such as packing and sorting out nuts
and bolts. Colin mowed lawns for a grounds maintenance operation that
employed intellectually disabled men. Shauna worked at "Keynton", a paper
shredding unit that recycled paper for packaging. Keynton operated out of a
corrugated iron shed situated in an industrial complex on the edge of the main
town.34 Mary went each day to Xanadu. Each resident had their own bedroom
which was filled with their personal belongings, and the main living areas of
the house were also more crowded with the paraphernalia of domestic life.
There was no separate office that could be locked up and kept off bounds such
as the one at Jeffrey Street.  Instead, the single staff member on duty did any
paper work sitting at a table in the living room. Staff shared a bathroom with
the residents and generally seemed to be more relaxed and engaged in the
daily flow of the lives of these people.
                                                
34 The paper shredding unit operated under the control of Xanadu as a mini-
sheltered workshop. Four people worked here on a daily basis (including
Shauna), although they and the numbers changed from month to month as
people moved from one location to another. While I was at the centre the
responsibility for the paper shredding unit was transferred to one of the
sheltered workshops. This was a requirement of the Commonwealth State
Disability Agreement (1991) which stipulated that employment and activities
centre responsibilities be separately managed by the relevant Commonwealth
and State government bodies respectively.
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While I was at Hervey Street I was privy to many discussions involving the
daily domestic lives of the residents. These ranged from decisions over
acquiring new furniture, disputes over domestic duties, discussions concerning
some of the difficult personal relationships between residents, where to go for
dinner on Friday evenings, as well as requests to move out of the house
altogether. These discussions often took place during the meetings that I
chaired, although they were also the subject of conversations that I had with
both residents and staff over the six months that I visited the house. I began to
notice, however, that beneath the apparent ease and familiarity of Hervey
Street there existed a structure that was not easily negotiated or changed. As I
wrote after having dinner at the house one night, "the routine marches on
forever, without the flux of daily life intruding". I had stood up after dinner to
help Shauna clear the table and wash the dishes but was harshly reprimanded
by the staff member for intruding on Shauna's duties. Similarly, at one
meeting, the issue of the weekly roster was raised by one of the residents (or
rather as a request to the house manager from a resident's sister). The
suggestion was that the roster be changed regularly for cooking and cleaning
duties so that residents did not have to cook the same meal and clean the same
room every week. The staff were reluctant to do this as to them it represented
an organisational nightmare. Every aspect of the resident's lives had to be
brought up at the weekly meeting, whether it was deciding how to spend their
money or checking if they could have a friend over for dinner. Despite the fact
that this was home, and that they were supposed to be in charge of their own
lives, the residents were ruled by an order and structure that was not of their
making and to which they constantly had to conform.
Despite differences in intensity, the same practices of management,
separation and training that dominated the form of relatedness at Jeffrey Street
and Xanadu also informed the relationships that existed between the staff and
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residents at Hervey Street. Each resident at Hervey Street had an individual
service plan that gave specific instructions as to how certain behaviour should
be dealt with, what skills needed to be developed, and how far the consumer
had come in their training. Staff often ignored the residents when they
attempted to join in a conversation. Even though they shared a bathroom and
did their work in the living area, the staff tended to have their 'smoko' or cup
of tea by themselves. They often reprimanded the residents for their
behaviour, such as when they violated this "relationship of separation" by
asking the staff personal questions, sought affection from them, or talked to
the staff rather than the other residents. Such behaviour was acceptable if
directed to other residents, and indeed was regularly encouraged, but not if it
was sought with the staff members.
One of the practices at Hervey Street that signified the continuation of this
institutional ethos of training and management was hidden in the very centre
of the house, in the filing cabinet that was discretely located in the main room
behind a cupboard. It was here that all the personal records of the residents
were stored, including family contacts, individual service plans, medication
records and other private information. The cabinet was locked in order to
protect the privacy of consumers, although the staff had access to this
information. Privacy was maintained between consumers, but not between
staff and consumer. Having the cabinet hidden behind the cupboard was an
attempt at privacy. It was also a way of giving the domestic environment the
appearance of normality. But it was not normal.  It just concealed a managerial
and institutional intrusion into the domestic and intimate space of these
people's lives behind a veneer of normality. Consequently, the intimacy of
daily domestic life became a site of separation and estrangement, a site for
instituting practices of normality. It became yet another arena for
implementing training and management practices.
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And yet not everyone succumbed to this form of relating, nor did all of my
fieldwork sites exhibit it equally. Certainly, Hervey Street was generally a
pleasant environment to spend time in. Initially I supposed that this was due to
the relative independence of the residents living there. However, when I
visited the local sheltered workshops and post-school options service—places
that only took the more independent and capable consumers in the area—I
found an even more pervasive regime of training and management. The
experience of Hervey Street staff, and their familiar round of 'home'
engagements, did at least count for something.
Although rules and regulations were a dominant feature of all my fieldwork
sites there were also a number of occasions when I witnessed them being
broken. Such breaches took place in moments of physical affection and
through expressions of genuine compassion. They included those occasions
when Patricia came into the staff room at Xanadu, when staff teased and joked
around with the consumers, when they gave Mary a cigarette and lit it for her,
and when a few of them participated in the karaoke sessions. However, there
was no systematic way of building upon these momentary connections. They
were transgressions, and staff who did not conform to general practices and
attitudes were ostracised. Such was the experience of one staff woman who
had a very maverick and passionate approach to her work and engaged with
the consumers as a friend, with empathy, compassion and affection. She had a
difficult and mutually contemptuous relationship with the coordinator at
Xanadu, and with various managerial personnel at the DOCS office, and
eventually ended up being forced out of the centre. She later obtained casual
work at one of the group homes but continued to find the atmosphere and
regulatory practices that exist in disability services very frustrating and
disturbing. Other staff members often told her that she was "too soft" on the
consumers, and that her friendly manner disturbed their behavioural
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management programmes. Those consumers who also failed to observe the
rules of disengagement that underpinned these institutional environments
were regularly put in their place.
What follows in the thesis is an examination and analysis of what I observed
at these different fieldwork sites and a reflection on how the relationships,
attitudes and practices that shape the institutional world of intellectual disability
compare to the intimate mutuality that constituted my family life. My
fieldwork experience exposed me to the various ways in which the perceptions
and interpretations of intellectual disability that have informed the medical,
psychological and behavioural records of intellectually disabled people were
being instituted and acted upon. These perceptions and interpretations, while
diverse, build upon and reinforce one another, giving form to the practices of
training and management that shape the contemporary world of disability
services and consequently, and more importantly, intellectually disabled
people's lives. They reinforce an implicit assumption that deficits in levels of
intelligence and reasoning ability automatically imply an incapacity for
sociality. The fact that my siblings, and the people with whom I did my
fieldwork, were capable of generating and sustaining their own patterns of
symbolic behaviour upon which mutual sociality could be built contradicts this
view.
While there have been some significant changes in the field of intellectual
disability, both institutionally and ideologically, my fieldwork experience has
led me to conclude that practices and attitudes are still moulded and informed
by an interpretation of intellectually disabled people as deficient and abnormal.
This abnormality is assumed to include an inherent incapacity for mutuality
and sociality. The aim, therefore, is to provide the intellectually disabled with
social skills and to train and manage their behaviour, as though this conformity
and skill acquisition will allow them to become socially integrated beings. In the
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following chapters I explore the historical roots of these interpretations and
attitudes and show how they have become socially instituted. I analyse how
they affect the lives of intellectually disabled people and how intellectually
disabled people negotiate their way around these practices and attitudes. By
comparing my relationship with my siblings to these institutional practices and
interpretations, I highlight the necessity of mutuality and intimacy for
perceiving and engaging with intellectually disabled people's sociality. I explore
the fundamental differences between a mutually constituted and shared social
world that is born of interdependent relationships and an institutionalised
world where the relationship is one of authority, power, conformity and
distance. In this latter milieu, rather than being a shared entity that all
contribute to and shape in their way, the social world becomes a normative
environment that values very circumscribed forms of sociality.
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Chapter Three
A Pathological Embodiment
This equivocal being, who seems to have been placed by nature
on the very confines of humanity . . .
Philippe Pinel
The denial of intellectually disabled people's capacity for mutuality and
sociality, for meaningful and intentional interaction, was underlined in my
siblings' records. These records included a combination of medical, psychiatric,
psychological, educational and behavioural reports. They also included the
daily observations made by staff at the institution where two of my siblings
went to live. My family has had to negotiate these professional interpretations
and practices; interpretations and practices that have the power to shape the
social world within which intellectually disabled people reside. This is not to
suggest, however, that there is unity and uniformity amongst these
professional reports. They are diverse but are also linked together by an
implicit "symbolic scheme" (Sahlins 1976).   
In Culture and Practical Reason, Marshall Sahlins (1976) argues against
materialist and utilitarian interpretations of culture, claiming instead that
culture operates according to a "symbolic scheme". As Sahlins explains, his
argument:
. . . takes as the distinctive quality of man not that he must live in a
material world . . . but that he does so according to a meaningful
scheme of his own devising . . .  It therefore takes as the decisive
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quality of culture—as giving each mode of life the properties that
characterize it—not that this culture must conform to material
constraints but that it does so according to a definite symbolic
scheme which is not the only one possible (Sahlins 1976: viii).
While Sahlins (1976: 213) argued that Western bourgeoise society operates
according to a symbolic scheme of material rationality, I wish to argue that the
institutional and clinical interpretation of intellectual disability operates
according to a symbolic scheme of reason and normality.1 It is the
pathologising of intellectual disability as an abnormality according to the logic
and significance of reason as the primary defining attribute of humanity that
constitutes these interpretations. This scheme involves a notion of normality
and reason where "reason" is understood as particular and normal human
competencies. These competencies are recognised systems of meaning and
forms of dispositional behaviour that reflect specific and conventional notions
of mutuality. In addition, they identify these modes not only with normality,
but ultimately with humanity itself.  
As Jenkins has argued: "The concept of normality does two things
simultaneously: it describes as normal that which is most typical or the usual
state of affairs; it then asserts that this is also the way things ought to be"
(Jenkins 1998b: 17; author's emphasis). The symbolic scheme of reason and
normality denies and denigrates the modes of mutuality and sociality that
intellectually disabled people engage in. It ignores their capacity for shared and
negotiated systems of symbolic communication. The implication of this denial is
that in order to become social beings intellectually disabled people must
                                                
1 The central place that reason plays in traditional theoretical interpretations of
culture, including structuralism, functionalism and historical materialism, is one
that Sahlins elaborates on in his discussion of the mind as more than just a
rational tool but also a symbolic and constitutive entity (Sahlins 1976: 58-67). I
explore this more fully in chapter four when I analyse the central place of
reason, rationality and intelligence in Western conceptions of normality and
humanness.
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conform to normative social practices, dispositions and modes of articulation
and relatedness. These attitudes and interpretations give form to the
institutional practices of training and management. The symbolic scheme of
reason and normality thus informs and orders institutional practices. It also
informs clinical interpretations and perceptions of intellectual disability. I
include here both medicine and psychology, as well as the practices enshrined
in special education, behavioural management and normalisation policies. The
symbolic scheme of reason and normality therefore exists as the implicit
ideology or cultural assumption upon which these practices and interpretations
are based.  
Jenkins has argued that medical science uses its status as a rational,
measurable, and objective interpretation of nature, the body and illness to
claim a hegemonic role in the interpretation of intellectual disability (Jenkins
1998b: 17-18; cf. Conrad & Schneider 1985: 17-29; Gleason 1989: 7, 54-57; Illich
1990 [1976]; Mehan 1988: 80; Ryan & Thomas 1987; Taussig 1992: 108;  B. Turner
1992: 9-15; Zola 1972). It is powerful, however, not only because it defines and
categorises intellectual disability, but because, like material rationality, it
combines the practical and utilitarian with that which is meaningful (Sahlins
1976: viii). In this sense the symbolic scheme of reason and normality exists
within the material utility of medical science such that our "social world is
presented as an enormous object [and hence natural] world" (Sahlins 1976: 195).
Consequently, a particular notion of what constitutes humanness becomes
associated with that which is normal and natural, and those who deviate from
this norm are labelled abnormal and unnatural. It is not medicine per se that
dominates the clinical interpretation of intellectual disability, therefore, but the
symbolic scheme upon which medical interpretations depend.
My aim in this and the following chapter is to elucidate the formation of
these implicit ideologies with regards to the clinical perception of intellectually
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disabled people. In this chapter I focus specifically on scientifically informed
medical perceptions and interpretations of intellectual disability. I outline the
history of these medical interpretations and use my siblings' records to
illustrate the methods by which intellectually disabled people become
pathologised by reference to normality and reason. (In chapter four I
specifically analyse the pathologisation of intellectual disability in terms of
reason.) The way in which a diagnosis takes place, the judgements and accounts
of physical and dispositional differences, and the practice of changing or
treating these conditions as abnormal, are all manifestations of this symbolic
scheme. I explore how this perception of abnormality has become grounded in
the physical to produce an image of intellectually disabled people as isolated,
bounded, and decontextualised from their social environment. As a
consequence, the medical gaze has rested solely on the physical as pathological
and has not recognised already existing systems of communication that allow
for the articulation of relatedness. Neither has it attempted to engage with
these.
Despite the fact that medical intrusions into the daily lives of intellectually
disabled people have decreased in recent decades—some of their
responsibilities having been taken over by psychologists, educationalists,
therapists, social workers, policy makers and residential care workers
(Foreman 1997: 225)—the symbolic scheme of reason and normality that
underpins the medical model remains constitutive of the way in which these
other disciplines conceptualise and treat intellectual disability. The institutional
engagement with intellectually disabled people is therefore based on control,
management, training and conformity. Its aim is to normalise that which has
been constituted as abnormal. The form of relatedness that exists in
institutional environments is therefore based on disengagement rather than the
negotiation of difference through the shared use of objects and the mediation
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of symbolic meaning. This symbolic scheme of reason and normality informs
the principles and practices of organisations like Xanadu and the group homes.
Institutional procedures are difficult to change because they embody an implicit
symbolic scheme which is integral to a scientific culture.  
*
In  June 1996, I began my search for the medical records pertaining to my older
brother and two sisters who had all been officially classified as mentally retarded. This
journey took me from the Alder Hay Children’s Hospital in Liverpool, England, to the
Stockton Centre for Developmentally Disabled People on the New South Wales Central
Coast, and, finally, to the Department of Community Services Disability Specialist Unit
(the old Grosvenor Mental Deficiency Diagnostic Centre) in Summer Hill, Sydney.
The potential nightmare of contacting all the people and places that my siblings had
been taken to since 1962—from Newcastle Upon Tyne, Birmingham, and Liverpool in
England, to numerous specialists in Perth between 1966 and 1967, and eventually to
Sydney and Newcastle—was obviated when at Stockton I discovered that most of the
family records dating back to 1965 had been collected, duplicated and collated in the files
of Maryla and Stephen. Not only did these records display an account of the numerous
tests that my siblings had undergone, but they also included within them more recent
matters relating to the other children in my family; such as the borderline Fragile-X
gene observed in my pregnant sister, and the death of my youngest brother in 1994.   
My parents had taken all of my older siblings at different times to different people in
search of an explanation for their epilepsy and developmental and behavioural
differences.2Although the doctors in England had diagnosed one brother and sister as
                                               
2 Of course, medical practitioners are not always the initial source of this
judgment.  It is often the observation of a child's different, unexpected, and
asocial behaviour by parents, friends and teachers that leads people to seek
medical or other professional advice as a way of interpreting and dealing with
this behaviour. However, medical discourses (and their associated practices)
have become the most powerful and determining interpretation of
intellectually disability. Despite ongoing criticisms of the power of the medical
interpretation (Ryan & Thomas 1987: 15-26), as well as debates between
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mentally retarded they offered no explanation for this. They connected the seizures with
febrile activity and noted that they occurred in conjunction with ear, nose and throat
infections, but made no inferences from this.3It was not until we came to Australia that
the medical profession started offering more specific diagnoses, such as that of autism
for my brother Stephen (although this was discounted by the professionals at
Grosvenor despite my brother going to an Autistic school for two years in Sydney).
With regards to the cause, the “problem” was definitely considered to be congenital
and/or hereditary.  As quoted from the medical reports, it was thought to be an
“inherited disorder . . . the true identity [of which] will be disclosed with the natural
course of the disease” (25/5/67). Later it became a “metabolic disorder”  (12/12/69),
then “an unknown metabolic disorder of recessive inheritance” (24/2/75),  and,
“although no definite diagnosis of the family disease was made in spite of many
investigations, [i]t is  [now] believed to be possibly a congenital metabolic disorder,
manifesting  [as] developmental delay, epilepsy, depigmentation and unusual behaviour
patterns” (10/7/97).   
On reading through the medical records I gained a haphazard and at times
contradictory history of the family, the occasional incorrect piece of information being
incorporated within this general perception of a familial abnormality. Much more
apparent than any inconsistency in these details, however, is the constant reinforcing
of assessments and diagnoses. Various medical authorities from 1962 to the present
                                                                                                                                      
medicine and psychology as to which discipline is best equipped to diagnose
intellectual disability (Rose 1985: 131-8), the recent development of prenatal
testing has reinforced the role of medicine as the primary source of the
diagnosis of a foetus' potential intellectual or physical disability. Consequently,
a  judgement of abnormality is now being  made prior to any possible
observation of behaviour.
3 It surprises me that nobody has investigated this connection.  My family lived
in northern England, in Newcastle Upon Tyne and Liverpool, between 1959
and 1965. Both cities were large, industrial, polluted environments and
although there are suggestions that a number of intellectual disabilities are the
consequence of environmental causes, such as lead poisoning or exposure to
infectious diseases (Heaton-Ward 1978: 23-28), this has never been considered a
possible cause of my siblings' intellectual disabilities.  Instead, researchers are
convinced that a genetic, biochemical cause will eventually be discovered. This
is the only avenue of research that they have pursued.
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have drawn on this same historical material, just as they have utilised the same
diagnostic tools to classify my siblings as retarded. All the details of the family, however,
whether correct or incorrect, are dutifully added to the files in the hope that one day
some biomedical specialist might finally crack the code to the "diagnostic puzzle" that
my family represents. My own visit to the Disability Specialist Unit at Summer Hill in
July 1997 was noted in their files, as was the information I gave them regarding the
present situation of the family.  When I spoke to the medical officer at the Unit about my
family and the research I was doing she told me that an “Adelaide enzyme” might yield
the final answer to my family history of intellectual disability. Pathologists in Adelaide
are researching the effect of missing enzymes on congenital metabolic disorders and she
believed that this fitted the particular peculiarities of my family's medical history.4 In
fact, this was where the most recent research on my family was being done.
What follows is a brief outline of the history of the medical interpretation of
intellectual disability interspersed with extracts from the medical reports of my
siblings. I use these to show how methods which were long ago discredited are
still being used in the diagnostic evaluations of intellectually disabled people. I
then show how these evaluations are based on fundamental notions of what is
considered to be un/natural, ab/normal, and less than/human, evaluations
that are themselves based upon the symbolic scheme of reason and normality.
From Theology to Scientific Medicine
Insanity or madness, and idiocy or imbecility, as mental illness and intellectual
disability were respectively called until the early twentieth century, were
recognised as mental disorders  by physicians such as Hippocrates as early as
                                               
4 Developments in biochemistry and genetics have ascertained that amino acids
are the building blocks of life, being as they are the main constituent of proteins
and enzymes.  Enzymes are a group of complex proteins (themselves made up
of chains of amino acids) which act as catalysts in biochemical reactions (Collins
English Dictionary).  
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the 4th century B.C.5 Hippocrates, however, did not distinguish between
insanity and idiocy, and neither did Galen, whose writings on mania and
melancholy influenced medical thought throughout the Roman world for over
1500 years (Judge 1987: 7; cf. Porter 1997).  
While no specific diagnostic distinction was made between these different
mental disorders, there were various treatments that sought to either cure or
ease the problem. Remedies such as blood-letting, the taking of bitters,
immersion in water, rapid movement therapy, and even exorcisms were
periodically performed from the ancient Greek era until the early 1800s to rid
people of these afflictions (Judge 1987: 10-11).  In fact, in 1744 in England, it
became a legal requirement under the Vagrancy Act that all those suffering
from mental disorders had to undertake such treatment (B. Turner 1987: 64-
71).Yet despite these early medical treatments, it was generally thought that
such disorders were manifestations of evil, or the result of divine retribution
for some sin or moral transgression (Bijou 1992: 306; Haffter 1968: 55; Howe
1976 [1848]; Judge 1987: 38; Kanner 1967: 165; cf. Eberly 1991; Potter et al. 1976
[1853]: 64). Alternatively, the people so afflicted were sometimes thought of as
Holy Innocents, their souls more amenable to God and their minds and bodies
less corruptible by sin (Ryan & Thomas 1987: 86; Scheerenberger 1986: 51-55).
This second view was less widespread, however, and medical treatments often
                                                
5 When discussing historical interpretations of intellectual disability I use the
terminology in use during that particular era so that my portrayal maintains
the original flavour of the period. When writing from my own perspective I
use the term "intellectually disabled" rather than the broader and more
politically correct term "developmentally disabled" (which includes people with
a "severe, chronic disability . . . attributable to a mental or physical impairment
or a combination of mental and physical impairments" [Pelka 1997: 96]).  I do
this partly because I am specifically focusing on people who have mental rather
than physical impairments, and also because I wish to stress the role that
intelligence and reason play in the perception of people who are intellectually
disabled. The question of labelling and "correct" terminology has been a much
debated topic of recent years in the disability field (Zola 1993). This debate,
however, and the accompanying changes in terminology, often masks and
detracts from the more important issue of the relatively unchanged perception
and treatment of the people so labelled.
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incorporated the former theological rendering, or were directly engaged with
ridding the person of their spiritual malady.6
These methods, which dominated the treatment of mental disorders in the
Western world for almost 2000 years, were ultimately challenged and
influenced by the radical transformations in the observation, interpretation and
understanding of nature that occurred during the Age of Reason in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The emphasis on experimentation and
precision, the use of new scientific technologies to observe the order and
patterns of nature, and the reliance on mathematics, logic, deductive reasoning,
and laws to elucidate the meaning of the universe, also profoundly affected the
way in which the body and illness came to be perceived. Rather than adhering
to former theological and pseudo-medical interpretations, physicians began
searching for the cause of illness and disease within a person's bodily fluids,
nervous system, and organs, including the brain.7 They began examining and
dissecting corpses in order to observe the relationship between disease, illness
                                               
6 According to Valerie Sinason, Protestants and Catholics in the seventeenth
century believed that a mentally handicapped child was the creation of the devil
and should therefore be put to death (Sinason 1992: 56; cf. Rosen et al. 1976: xiii;
Kurtz 1981). Sinason argues that this perception of the handicapped person as a
"flawed creation" continues to exist in psychoanalytic interpretations of
intellectual disability just as it did in religious theories of the genesis of mental
handicap (Sinason 1992: 60). As I go on to argue, this notion of a flawed
creation, or what I call abnormality, also lives on in medical interpretations of
intellectual disability.
7 The methods of treatment and interpretation based on the notion that disease
is part of the body has a history that of course dates back to early Greek and
Roman theories of bile, blood, humours and the passions, as well as to their
practices of immersion, surgery, purification, exorcism, and medication (Judge
1987: 9-10). However, as Roy Porter has pointed out, the Aristotelian-Galenic
concept of disease was related to the notion of essences or substances which
were themselves based on alchemical principles rather than on the laws and
principles of matter.  In the former rendering the body was believed to be
affected by vital forces whereas in the latter it is assumed to function as a
machine (Porter 1997: 203-215). Michel Foucault has argued that the shift that
occurred in seventeenth century medicine was significant and radical because it
resulted in the internalising of illness. Consequently, madness, as a specific type
of illness, was no longer thought to be due to an external cause, or a social
malady, but was believed to be caused by, and became an intrinsic part of,
one's own body (Foucault 1995 [1961]; cf. Porter 1997: 242).
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and the body, and, as Drew Leder argues in his essay on Descartes' concept of
the body, this focus reduced the experience and interpretation of illness to a
functional and mechanical problem (Leder 1992: 3).8 It became fashionable to
break down the body into its constituent parts in order to better understand
the processes by which it operates and hopefully elucidate the laws of nature
that govern these processes. It was believed that this would make it possible to
treat disease through the manipulation, alteration, and later even the
reproduction, of these specific components (Leder 1992: 20-1).  
The transformation in the scientific, philosophical and medical
interpretations of the universe not only altered the perception of the body and
illness; it also profoundly affected the way in which human beings were
conceptualised. F. Allan Hanson (1993) highlights the outcomes of this change
in his book Testing Testing: Social consequences of the examined life.  In it he argues
that:
The positivist program embraced a new, scientific view of the
human being.  Previously, the knowledge that had been
accumulated about the natural world was thought to bear little
relevance to questions about the human condition, because human
beings were not considered to be natural objects.  Created in the
image of God, and little lower than angels in the order of things,
humans were thought to exist on a more elevated plane of being
than the plants, animals, and inanimate objects that made up
                                                
8 The essays in The Body in Medical Thought and Practice, edited by Drew Leder,
critique this Cartesian medical paradigm from both phenomenological and
sociopolitical perspectives, arguing that it does not take into consideration the
lived experience of illness, nor the political and social aspects of the power of
medicine to define and discipline the body (Leder 1992: 1-6). Leder, however,
does not ultimately challenge the "metaphysical paradigm" that informs
Cartesian medical perceptions of the body. Instead, Leder proposes the
relativisation of differing perspectives so that the framework is widened to
include phenomenological understandings of illness alongside the knowledge
of Cartesian medicine.
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nature.  All this began to change in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries when, with the growth of a scientific world view, human
beings lost their patina of divinity and were placed squarely within
the realm of nature (Hanson 1993: 14-15).
Becoming part of nature, however, did not mean that all humans were
perceived as equal and naturally normal. The laws that were seen to govern the
functioning of the body/mind/self were only deemed to be natural if they
conformed to preordained concepts of what was taken to be normal.
This concept of normality, of the norm or normalcy, is, as Lennard Davis
(1995: 24) and Richard Jenkins (1998a: 150-53) both argue, relatively new. It
emerged during the period from 1840 to 1860 and was associated with the
development of nation states, nationalism, and industrialism, as well as with
concepts of race, gender, criminality, and sexual orientation (Davis 1995: 26;
Jenkins 1998a: 150). As Davis argues, it utilised, and was indeed based upon,
statistical methods; methods that were originally used in the mid-1700s to
inform state policy but which, by the late 1820s, increasingly came to be
associated with the body (Davis 1995: 26). This concept of normalcy, however,
related to far more than just physical attributes such as weight and height.  It
also came to be identified with an abstract notion of the average or normal
man (Hacking 1990: 1). As Ian Hacking comments, this "enumeration of people
and their habits" (Hacking 1990: 1) drew upon a combination of physical, social
and moral attributes. As such it was fundamentally based upon the values,
standards and aspirations of middle class Europeans, as well as on particular
cultural competencies such as language, literacy and numeracy (cf. Davis 1995:
26; Jenkins 1998a: 151; Jenkins 1998b: 17).
This powerful combination of discourses of identity, morality and normality
has had a profound effect on those who deviated from the norm, as Jenkins
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(1998a: 150-3) points out. It created an abnormal, incompetent identity; an
identity which was indelibly imprinted on the body. As Davis elaborates:
Thus the body has an identity that coincides with its essence and
cannot be altered by moral, artistic, or human will. This indelibility
of corporeal identity only furthers the mark placed on the body by
other physical qualities—intelligence, height, reaction time. By this
logic, the person enters into a relationship with the body, the body
forms the identity, and the identity is unchangeable and indelible as
one's place on the normal [bell or distribution] curve (Davis 1995:
31).
Combined with this creation of an abnormal identity and body was the
evolutionary eugenicist notion that the human species could and should be
improved.9 The consequence of this was that certain characteristics, certain
deviations from the norm, including such things as deafness, blindness, and
intellectual and/or physical disabilities, were, in the national interest, to be
eradicated. Controls on reproduction, and specifically the sterilisation of female
idiots, were instigated in order to diminish deviations from the norm and
improve the quality of the human race (Ashton 1995: 144-149; Davis 1995: 30-1;
Jenkins 1998a: 152; Jenkins 1998b: 17-18). Therefore, not only did this
"hegemony of normalcy" (Davis 1995: 48) breed an identity which was
considered fundamentally abnormal, it also stipulated that this abnormality
must be bred out of existence.
                                                
9 Although usually associated with the practices of Nazi Germany, eugenics
was a highly respected and seemingly progressive scientific and social theory in
the mid to late nineteenth century throughout much of the Western world,
including Australia (Ashton 1995: 144-149; Davis 1995: 30-1). The movement is
most readily associated with Francis Galton, who built upon Charles Darwin's
theory of the evolutionary advantage of the fittest to argue that society, and
indeed the human race, was ultimately perfectible and, with assistance, could
undergo a process of progressive improvement.  
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Not only were humans incorporated into a materialist paradigm that
therefore rendered their bodies as part of the laws and processes of nature, but
some of the differences that distinguished people from one another, such as
differences in intellectual capability, came to be considered as expressions of an
inherently abnormal and unnatural body/mind/self.10 The result of such
theorising is that people with an intellectual disability have come to be
perceived as somehow less than fully human (Jenkins 1998b: 19; cf. Bogdan &
Taylor 1998: 246; Branson & Miller 1989: 159; S. Taylor 1998b: 195-196).  Their
identity has been discredited (Goffman 1974 [1963]: 5). As Jenkins puts it:
Here, by the classificatory logic of statistical frequency—and,
indeed, by the classificatory logics of transformation and inversion
which are so familiar from structuralism—culture, being typical for
humans, becomes part of human nature. Thus incompetence in
things cultural—the inability to learn language, etc.—may be
interpreted as an indication of an unnatural and inferior humanity.
Although not an animal, the person with intellectual disabilities
may be classified as sub-human, an unnatural monstrosity (Jenkins
1998b: 19; author's emphasis).
In the nineteenth century, this scientific association of normality with human
nature gained enormous legitimacy, supported as it was by the perception that
science was "objective" and "beyond doubt or reproach" (Jenkins 1998b: 17-19;
cf. Gleason 1989: 7, 54-57). Not only did medical science pathologise those who
were intellectually disabled, it also positioned them as outside the range of
normal humanness. Combined with the much older practice of associating
humanness with the capacity for reason, it also denied to such people the
                                                
10 In the following chapters I explore in more detail the consequences of this
theory of an abnormal mind/self on the institutional and clinical perception and
treatment of intellectually disabled people. For the purposes of this chapter I
focus more exclusively on the pathologisation of the body as abnormal.
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capacity for human sociality. Competencies such as language are believed to
represent this capacity, and are used to reinforce the symbolic scheme of
reason and normality that has ordered and defined the institutional world of
intellectual disability.
This perception of the body and human nature as either naturally normal or
unnaturally abnormal has had a profound affect on the treatment of idiots and
the insane. As L. P. Brockett noted in 1856, quoting a visitor to the New York
Asylum for Idiots:
. . . the frightful number of these unfortunates, whose ranks
encumber the march of humanity,—the insane, the idiots, the
blind, the deaf, the drunkards, the criminals, the paupers—will
dwindle away, as the light of knowledge makes clear the laws
which govern our existence (cited in Brockett 1976 [1856]: 86).
Idiots were not only institutionalised or secluded from the wider community as
part of "the great confinement"—along with all those others who did not
conform to the norm and who no longer had a place in this newly
industrialising society (Foucault 1995 [1961]: 38-54)—but science, as the tool
which elucidates the truth and "light of knowledge", would ultimately alleviate
humanity of this "encumbrance". All that was needed was to discover the "laws
which govern our existence", including what it was that distinguished idiocy as
an unnatural and abnormal disorder. The contemporary field of medical
research has continued with this pursuit, and institutional practices still embody
the assumption that intellectually disabled people are biologically based
abnormal social beings who lack the capacity for meaningful and mutual
sociality.
Defining Idiocy
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This new approach to human nature and the body was accompanied by
dramatic increases in the specialisation and classification of illness, disease and
disorder. Idiocy and insanity were subject to this new medical gaze, and to the
associated nosological distinctions that characterised this scientific ordering of
the world. What determined these classifications were fundamental distinctions
between what was deemed to be naturally normal and unnaturally abnormal
or deviant. The "normal" processes and functions that order human bodies
were believed to have gone askew in those who deviated in any way from the
norm. Until the early nineteenth century, however, there had been little
development in the medical distinction between idiocy and insanity, despite
John Locke's differentiation over one hundred years earlier.  
Locke's 1684 definition of idiocy as distinct from insanity was based on the
principle that "Idiots make very few or no propositions at all, and reason scarce
at all" (cited in Digby 1996: 3; cf. Judge 1987: 30; J. Wing 1978: 245). Despite this
distinction, however, idiots and the insane were still locked up in the same cells
of the mental asylums until the early 1800s, and were not treated in specifically
different ways until the 1830s. And it was not until 1866 in the United States and
1913 in England that a legal distinction between mental illness and mental
deficiency was made (Manion & Bersani 1987: 233; Woods 1983: 1).11 The
distinction between idiocy and insanity that Locke had made in the late
seventeenth century, however, was eventually elaborated upon by Philipe
                                             
11 Anne Digby (1996: 2) and Nikolas Rose (1985: 93) have both pointed out that
a legal distinction between idiocy and lunacy based upon ownership and rights
to property has precedents in England dating as far back as the 13th Century.
However, as Digby points out, idiocy was still considered one of the forms of
lunacy until the medico-legal distinction of 1913 (Digby 1996: 2). Coincidentally,
the 1913 Act, which was passed in order to legally segregate those with an
intellectual disability from society (Chappell 1998: 215), occurred at the same
time that Freud's psychoanalytic method was gaining recognition as a
legitimate treatment for  various forms of neurosis and psychosis in Europe.
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Pinel, Jean-Etienne Dominique Esquirol, Jean Itard and Edouard Séguin in the
early decades of the nineteenth century.  
Pinel, Esquirol, Itard, and Séguin were all trained physicians who had been
influenced by the changes in medical and scientific practice that had taken place
over the previous two centuries. These physicians were also the founding
fathers of psychology, special education, and psychiatry. Through their work
idiocy became, for the first time, a specific illness requiring medical treatment
and diagnosis. It began to exist socially as a predominantly scientific rather than
theological problem (Bijou 1992: 306). The medico-psychological theories of
Locke, Esquirol, Pinel, Itard and Séguin also incorporated Enlightenment
questions concerning the nature of man in a state of nature, the distinction
between humans and animals, and whether innate ideas were
possible—concerns which were profoundly based upon an interpretation of
humans as rational beings (Rose 1985: 29-30).12 As Goodey (1994) points out in
relation to Locke's philosophical speculations, such questions drew upon
observations of idiots and utilised the condition as a comparison from which to
articulate what makes humans specifically human. However, this concept of
humans as rational also had implications for the body, for it was through the
senses, and sensory experience, that knowledge, ideas and abstract thought
were believed to develop. And it was within the body, and particularly the
brain, that the abnormal processes which marked the state of idiocy were
deemed to reside.
In their essay "Upon the Necessity of Establishing a Scientific Diagnosis of
Inferior States of Intelligence" Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon traced the
historical classification of idiocy, albeit decrying its lack of precision and
                                            
12 In their discussion of the everyday lives of institutionalised profoundly
mentally retarded people, Craig MacAndrew and Robert Edgerton also argue
that such people provide interesting material for the study of "both the nature
of man and the nature of culture-bearing animals" due to their being "on the
threshold between man and not-man" (MacAndrew & Edgerton 1970: 28).
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scientific empiricism (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 335). They claimed that the
French physician Jean-Etienne Dominique Esquirol (who was a student of
Philippe Pinel's) first clearly distinguished idiocy as a specific medical condition,
and that he based his classification on the centrality and power of speech which
is often lacking in such people (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 336). On noting the
difference between idiocy and insanity, Esquirol wrote in 1832 that:
Idiocy is not a malady, it is a state in which the faculties are never
manifested, or have never developed sufficiently for the idiot to
acquire the knowledge which other individuals of his age receive
when placed in the same environment. Idiocy begins either with
life, or during the period which precedes the complete
development of the affective and intellectual faculties; idiots are
what they must remain during the entire course of their lives.
Everything in the idiot reveals an organism either arrested or of
imperfect development . . . Insanity and idiocy differ essentially, or
else the principles of all classification are illusions. Insanity, like
mania or mono-mania does not commence before puberty . . .
Insanity may be cured; one can conceive the possibility of
suspending the symptoms; there is a diminution, or privation of
the forces necessary to exercise the faculties, but the faculties still
exist . . . The insane man is deprived of possessions which he
formerly enjoyed; he is a rich man become poor; the idiot has
always been in misery and want. The state of the insane may vary,
that of the idiot remains always the same. The one conserves much
of the appearance of the complete man, the other retains many
traits of infancy. In one case as in the other, there are no sensations
or practically none; but the insane man shows in his organisation
and also in his intelligence something of his past perfection; the
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idiot is such as he has always been, he is all that he can ever be
relative to his primitive organisation (Esquirol; cited in Binet and
Simon 1976 [1905]: 336-7).
The overwhelming impression that Esquirol gives of idiocy is a condition
thoroughly and incurably steeped in deficiency. This deficit is related to
imperfection, to a lack of development, and results in a miserable existence. It
resides in the faculties of communication, and affects one's affective, sensory
and intellectual capacities. A person so afflicted is deemed to be beyond
redemption. They are placed outside culture and sociality, and in the process
are linked with that which is primitive, infantile and unformed.
Although Esquirol was adamant that idiocy was not a disease or illness, he
did seek to understand its roots in some form of organic, physical defect, such
as a lesion of the brain. Esquirol claimed, however, that similar lesions which
might be discovered in the brains of the insane should not be considered the
cause of their insanity (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 337; cf. Barr 1904: 20). For
Esquirol, idiocy was a functional problem with organic causes which began in
the developmental period, and, as such, his view helped to establish a link
between behavioural interpretations and biological causes, a perception that is
sustained in contemporary definitions of developmental disability (see Accardo
& Whitman 1996: 87; Pelka 1997: 96; Scheerenberger 1987: 13 for American and
Australian definitions of developmental disability).
Philippe Pinel, the founder of modern psychiatry, is often hailed as the
humanist who released the chains from the idiots and insane.13 As head of the
                                               
13 Foucault (1995 [1961]: 264-265) critiques historical interpretations of the
perception and treatment of madness as a teleological progression towards
greater humanitarian practices.  Rather than liberating the mad, Foucault
argues that the interpretation and treatment of madness since the seventeenth
century has actually led to greater constraint and surveillance (Foucault 1995
[1961]: 241-278). The cause and treatment of madness ultimately came to reside
within the self, such that treatment required greater self-surveillance, moral
control, and an acceptance of self-responsibility.
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mental asylums at Biçêtre and Salpêtrière in Paris, Pinel was in a position to
apply his practical methods of treatment and, through detailed observations
and records of the inmates, set about the task of creating a nosology of insanity
and idiocy. He was also aghast at the chaotic intermingling of idiots and the
insane, and went about separating them physically as well as categorically.14  
Writing thirty years earlier than Esquirol, Pinel had also found no empirical
evidence that insanity was caused by an organic disease of the brain, claiming
instead that it was a functional disorder due to disassociation of ideas, and that
it could indeed be cured. Unlike Esquirol, however, Pinel was cautious about
declaring an absolute relationship between defects in the cranium of idiots and
their intellectual capabilities (Pinel 1962 [1801]: 4-5, 131; cf. Porter 1997: 495-497).
The "Specific Character of Idiotism" was described by Pinel as a product of the
"stupefied senses", of the "total or partial obliteration of the intellectual powers
and affections; universal torpor; detached, half-articulated sounds; [and] in
some cases, transient and unmeaning gusts of passion" (Pinel 1962 [1801]: 172).
Like Esquirol, Pinel saw idiocy as a totally deficient state, and one which
isolated those so affected in an asocial, meaningless world.  
Some of their "natural indolence and stupidity" might be relieved through
manual labour, Pinel claimed—a practice that is most readily associated with
Samuel Tuke's moral treatment at his York Retreat (Foucault 1995 [1961]: 241-
255)—but he still considered idiocy an essentially incurable malady (Pinel 1962
[1801]: 203). Consequently, Pinel devoted the majority of his life to the
treatment of insanity. After all, what satisfaction could there be in focusing too
much attention on an inherently incurable defect when the aim of the physician
is to heal? Therefore, while both Pinel and Esquirol made a distinction between
                                                
14 In her "Memorial to the Legislature of Massachusetts, 1843", Dorothea Dix
summed up the conditions of asylums, prisons, and almshouses in the north
eastern States of America and was equally aghast at the "legalized barbarity" of
these places that, among other things, did not distinguish between idiots and
the insane (Dix 1976 [1843]).
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idiocy and insanity, they also concluded that, unlike the insane, idiots were no
more than human brutes—ineducable, incurable and subhuman—and were
therefore best left to their own devices in the separate cells that now
constrained them (Barr 1904: 33-4).
It was not until Edouard Séguin attempted to treat and train idiots in the
1830s that a serious effort was made to deal with people who were afflicted
with this condition (Rosen et al. 1976: ix-xvii). Séguin's name is often associated
with that of his teacher, Jean Itard, who had worked on a famous case
concerning Victor, the wild boy from Aveyron. Victor had been captured near
the woods of Aveyron in 1801 and taken to Philippe Pinel, who diagnosed him
an idiot, and then to Jean Itard, who applied his theory of sense stimulation in
the hope of civilising and educating this "wild but natural" child. Itard was
unsuccessful, however, and claimed that Victor must indeed be an idiot since
his mind could not be penetrated by the tactile, visual and sensory stimulation
that was relentlessly applied to him (Rosen et al. 1976: xiv; Séguin 1976a [1864]:
154; cf. Rose 1985; Luckey 1967). Itard's experiments could only proceed on the
basis that Victor was not an idiot.  His failure to treat Victor, therefore, meant
that the child's "natural" state was idiotic (Rose 1985: 37).   
Séguin maintained Itard's "sensationalist" methodology but further
elaborated and refined his methods and applied them to the training of idiots.
Séguin believed that it was the method that was at fault, not the person.  While
accepting Pinel and Itard's prognosis that idiocy was an essentially incurable
malady, Séguin challenged their assessment that such people were also
inherently untrainable (Rose 1985: 37). He accepted the condition as an
abnormality, but not as fixed. Consequently, Séguin became the first to
acknowledge that idiots could learn and develop, as long as they had the
correct and appropriate training.   
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Drawing on Locke's theory of a connecting or intermediary link between
the senses and ideas, Séguin believed that there existed within all people "an
intelligent reflecting power that, seizing the notions of external objects as
furnished by the senses, reasons upon them and produces ideas" (Barr 1904:
34). Séguin believed that the senses were the doorway to the mind.  Therefore
the anomaly which creates the condition known as idiocy had to occur in the
functioning of the senses. Rather than relentlessly repeating sensory
stimulation, as Itard had done, Séguin deduced that the permanent impression
of these stimuli required the comparison, selection and increasing complexity of
tasks (Talbot 1967: 186). The senses must be stimulated one by one, and in
conjunction with the other senses and parts of the body, so that "correct
objective impressions" might eventually reach the mind (Séguin 1976b [1879]:
163-6). And, as with other philosophical and medical interpretations of the
Enlightenment, this process was deemed to be a natural extension of the laws
of Nature (Séguin 1976c [1880]: 174; Rose 1985: 29-30). Therefore, not only were
idiots unnatural and abnormal, but the laws of nature provided the guide that
would help transform this abnormality into something more normal.
Séguin termed his attempts to alter the mind of the idiot through sensory
stimulation the "psycho-physiological method" (Séguin 1976b [1879]; Séguin
1976c [1880]). This method marked the first medical/psychological/ educational
intervention into the lives of idiots; the overriding aim being to socialise and
civilise them, to make them "normal". Séguin's methodology was inherently
based on treatment and training, and relied upon assimilation and conformity
to a norm. As such, it was founded on the principle of producing sets of
dispositional behaviour which would correlate with socially recognisable and
acceptable systems of communication and meaning. Even at its original
moment, therefore, the treatment of idiocy was based on the transformation of
"incorrect" and "abnormal" sensory impressions and behaviours into "correct"
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and "normal" ones.  It took as already problematic and dubious the nature of an
intellectually disabled person's humanity, and sought to transform this
abnormal nature by making it conform to pre-established notions of what
normal human nature should be. It assumed that human nature is a precultural
fact, and not the product of the symbolic scheme of reason and normality that
identifies a particular range of meaning systems with "being human". This is not
to deny that there are very real and tangible "material constraints" that make
intellectually disabled people different, but that, as Sahlins has put it, as a
culture we have conformed to these constraints "according to a definite
symbolic scheme which is not the only one possible" (Sahlins 1976: viii).
Competencies which are perceived as cultural deficits are used as proof of a
deficient human nature (Jenkins 1998b: 19).  
In the process, however, an intellectually disabled person's total capacity for
sociality is also rendered deficient. Such people are then constituted as
abnormal, unnatural and inferior; as less than human. Because of this there is
no recognition that intellectually disabled people's particular sets of dispositions
or language games are meaningful and symbolic. Nor is there any
acknowledgment that these symbolic systems are able to be mediated and
engaged with. There is no "rendering of difference as compatibility" as Diane
Austin-Broos has put it, only the enforcing of a conformity built on a presumed
incompatibility.15 There is only the desire to instil in those who are different
                                              
15 The interpretation, perception and treatment of intellectually disabled people
has many parallels with the history of racism, especially in relation to the
experience of indigenous peoples. Indigenous people were originally thought
to be the evolutionary remnants of our early human ancestors and as such on
the inevitable path to extinction. When they defied this prognosis indigenous
people were then encouraged, often forcibly, to assimilate to the dominant
culture. Nowadays, despite the rhetoric of indigenous rights and self-
determination, the onus for mediation, negotiation and change is always on
indigenous people. Aside from issues of domination and power, the problems
encountered in post/colonial encounters with indigenous cultures have been
exacerbated by the enforced interaction of cultures that are based on entirely
different symbolic schemes. In the case of the engagement of indigenous
cultures with post/industrialised societies, this difference is embedded in both
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dispositions that conform to recognisable and normative values. As a mode of
engagement such practices and attitudes have nothing to do with mediating
differences. They lack the mutuality and necessity for negotiation that
underpins sociality and intimate relations, and ignore the fact that intellectually
disabled people can engage in relations of interdependence; that they can
engage with others as they are as part of a joint commitment (Carrithers 1992:
11).  
The Causes of Idiocy
By the mid 1800s idiocy had come to stand alone in the classification of mental
disorders as a specific and identifiable condition. However, there was already
dispute as to what idiocy was, what caused it, how to diagnose it, and how, or
indeed whether or not, to treat it. In a scathing attack in 1864 on both the
phrenological and anti-phrenological interpretations of idiocy, and the
increasing emphasis on ætiology and classification, Séguin argued that focusing
on theories of causation detrimentally undermined the more valid concerns for
the education and treatment of those afflicted by the condition (Séguin 1976a
[1864]: 155; cf. Wilbur 1976 [1880]; Barr 1904: 86; Bijou 1992: 306).16 Despite
                                                                                                                                      
the market place and in concepts of personhood (among other things); it is a
factor of local kin-based relationships versus the impersonalised individualism
of a consumer and labour based society (Austin-Broos; pers. comm.; cf.
Cowlishaw 1999).
16 Through his emphasis on training and treatment Séguin became one of the
founders of special education (Gleason 1989).  Samuel Gridley Howe was
instrumental in setting up the first residential and educational facility in the
United States solely for idiot children. He did so on the basis of Guggenbühl's
Abendberg institution which had been set up in Switzerland in 1842.  Johann
Jakob Guggenbühl was a Swiss physician who had taken a keen interest in
children who were classed as Cretins and believed that with a combination of
brisk, fresh mountain air, a good diet, regular baths and physical exercise,
various medications, and sensory training, these children could be cured. He set
up the Abendberg in 1842 and, as Edgar Miller has pointed out (1996: 369), the
institution rapidly gained an international reputation, with visitors from all
over the world coming to view the methods and techniques in use. Howe was
one of those visitors, as was Charles Dickens, and the institutions that sprang
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Séguin's criticisms, and despite the fact that social and moral aspects were (and
still are) considered potential causes of intellectual disability, the focus on
ætiology, on the organic, pathological causes of idiocy, was established as a
legitimate scientific concern by the late 1860s. Through such investigations it
was hoped that a cure for idiocy might be found, that more specific treatments
might be adopted, and that measures might be taken to prevent the existence
of idiocy (Rosen et al. 1976: 205).17   
Those who adhered to phrenological interpretations of idiocy, such as Franz
Joseph Gall and George Shuttleworth, sought to discover a clear functional
relationship between the shape, size and form of the cranium, the facial bone
structure, and the person's identity and behaviour as an idiot (Judge 1987: 8;
Séguin 1976a [1864]: 155; Shuttleworth 1976 [1881]; cf. Damasio 1994; Foucault
1984 [1976]: 31; Gould 1996: 22-3; Hanson 1993).18 These interpretations were
based on the principle that there is a norm, an average or standard, to which all
human physical attributes could be compared, measured and evaluated (Davis
1995: 26; Hacking 1990: 1). And, just as Pinel had done, it was the Greek god
Apollo who was used as the ultimate standard of human proportions, and
indeed perfection (Pinel 1962 [1801]: 128).  
                                                                                                                                              
up throughout Germany, Britain, the USA, and indeed Australia, in the latter
half of the nineteenth century were based on or influenced by Guggenbühl's
Abendberg (Judge 1987: 27-8; Miller 1996: 369).
17 This debate over treatment and cause marked a serious division between
different methods for dealing with idiocy. It also instigated a split that led to the
separation of medicine, psychology and special education as specific disciplines
concerned with different aspects of the condition (Gleason 1989). However,
those other disciplines that broke away from medicine, such as psychology,
psychiatry and special education, continued to be informed by the symbolic
scheme that pathologised the intellectually disabled as abnormal and asocial
beings.
18 In fact, the first anthropological excursions into the world of intellectual
disability supported and provided evidence for these phrenological
interpretations. Physical anthropologists with an interest in the evolution and
variability of the human species initially sought to measure the
anthropomorphic range of human variability. This eventually led to a concern
with what is "normal" in human nature rather than with variations, and this
"norm" was then used as the marker from which differences were measured
and interpreted (Gleason 1989: 89-90; Hanson 1993).
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While phrenological practices played a prominent role in early scientific
interpretations of mental disorders, and stimulated further research into the
anatomy and function of the brain and nervous system, they are now
considered rather clumsy proto-scientific attempts at describing these
conditions (Judge 1987: 8). Yet the present inclination to account for these
disorders in genetic, organic or biochemical terms can just as readily be
interpreted as a more refined method of correlating physical attributes with a
comparably deficient social being. Whereas the methodology has changed, the
theoretical assumptions have not. There is still a pathologising of intellectual
disability that renders people as fundamentally abnormal in both the body and
in the gamut of social dispositions. Despite changes in the methods used to
assess and diagnose intellectual disability, the practice of noting physical
characteristics, including measurements and descriptions of the cranium,
remained common practice throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  This is evidenced
in the reports on my siblings.  
*
Medical assessments of Maryla, Stephen and Ursula always began with an
appraisal of their physical appearance, mobility and behaviour. On the whole they were
considered to be attractive looking children, although their “unusual gait” was
constantly referred to as an indication of their retardation. More specifically, however,
physicians in England and Australia used phrenological evidence as part of their
assessments, one of them commenting that my sister’s  "head circumference  was 19.5"
[inches] and  . . . that she had a rather odd shaped head, having a broad forehead, widely
set eyes and a flat occiput” (10/2/65). Maryla is in fact very Polish looking, inheriting
this appearance from my father’s side of the family. My other sister, Ursula, was
thought “not to resemble either parent”  and it was noted that she had a “prominent
forehead, nose and right eyebrow” (25/5/67).  An examination of Stephen at the same
time noted that he “had a normal shaped head—51 cm. [in] diameter. His palate was
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high arched and his ears, nose and eyes were normal. Dermatoglyphic pattern was
normal on the hands. He had 4 areas of depigmentation over the posterior aspect of his
torso—just above the sacro-iliac crest.  There was syndactyly of [the] 2nd and 3rd toes
of both feet and he walked with an unsteady gait stooped forward.  Tendon reflexes
were grossly exaggerated” (25/5/67).
As well as these physical descriptions of my siblings, post-mortem examinations
were also performed on Stephen and Ursula when they died.19 These were done in the
hope of discovering a physical correlation between my siblings' retardation and their
brain structures. My brother's autopsy reported a “widespread demyelinating
condition of the brain”  suggestive of some “unknown metabolic ætiology”. This
diagnosis is still referred to in the current medical information on the family. When one
of the psychiatrists in Perth discovered that my mother was pregnant for the sixth time,
she commented in a letter to a fellow child psychiatrist in Sydney that she "needn’t say
how important it will be to get hold of the brain of this sixth child just supposing
anything went wrong with the birth” (30/10/67).  Luckily my younger sister was
spared this fate.
While I find it disturbing to read these assessments of my siblings it is not because
their descriptions are inherently wrong. My siblings did walk in unusual ways, and
did behave differently, and perhaps there are metabolic indicators that prove that their
differences do have a physiological basis. However, in focusing purely on an embodied
pathology and stressing that it is abnormal, such descriptions and assessments have
denied to my siblings the capacity for a cultural identity and social competencies. The
result is that their differences are perceived and interpreted as deficiencies; as core
human deficiencies which rendered them acultural and outside the realm of sociality. To
embody these differences in the physical nature of the person adds another layer of
complexity by making this difference insurmountable. Rather than acknowledging that
                                               
19 The use of post-mortem examinations to determine a connection between
the body's organs and the person's disability is common practice, as Grace
Woods has pointed out (Woods 1983: 48).
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they have limited but specific social competencies, the focus is on a deficient being who
not only becomes pathologically embodied as abnormal, but must be trained and
normalised in order to become part of social life.
*
John Langdon Down's 1866 classification of idiocy into six different types,
each with its own ætiology, symptoms and possible cures, was a serious
challenge to Séguin’s anti-ætiological stance.20 It also challenged the previous
homogeneity of idiocy as a single category (Kanner 1967: 167; Rosen et al. 1976:
xix).21 Prior to Down, any differences that were acknowledged were believed
to represent a vague and imprecise continuum from the lowest level of idiocy,
through the intermediate state of the imbecile, and onto the most competent
type of idiot, the moron or feeble-minded.22 Rather than interpreting idiocy as
                                               
20 Other ætiological theories of the late nineteenth century were developed by
William Wentworth Ireland and George Shuttleworth. Ireland believed that it
was important to distinguish the causes of various forms of idiocy so that
appropriate treatments and prognoses could be established (Ireland 1976
[1882]; cf. Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]). He outlined twelve classes of idiocy,
stressing the difference between congenital and acquired causation based on
what Kanner has called a "variety of specific structural anomalies in the central
nervous system" (Kanner 1967: 168).  Shuttleworth (1976 [1881]: 239) also
distinguished between developmental, congenital and non-congenital causes of
idiocy, claiming that the biggest difference existed between those where the
idiocy was congenital.  
21 Interestingly, as Leo Kanner points out, the challenge to the homogeneity of
both idiocy and insanity occurred at the same time, between 1866 and 1875
(Kanner 1967: 167).  
22 The terms used to describe these differences of degree in idiocy vary
between different people.  Jules Voison's symptomatic description of idiocy
was divided into complete idiocy, incomplete idiocy, imbecility and mental
debility, whilst Bourneville classified the state of idiocy into complete idiocy,
profound idiocy, imbecility proper, slight imbecility or intellectual retardation,
mental instability, and moral imbecility (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 338-341).
The term feeble-minded was in fact an American term that was adopted by the
English in the 1860s to designate those who were the least mentally afflicted
and the most capable of reasoning (Digby 1996: 2). There were, and still are,
ongoing debates over whether there is a difference of degree between these
gradations, or whether they are indicative of absolute differences in type,
especially when it comes to those "borderline" cases of mild mental retardation
or feeble-mindedness (Simonoff et al. 1996: 260). A whole class of people were
also labelled "moral imbeciles", and the usual debates over whether this was a
congenital, hereditary, or environmental condition prevailed.  Alcoholics,
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a sensory disorder, "disturbances of brain power . . . [or] simply nerve lesions
in the narrowed sense of the term", as Pinel, Esquirol and Séguin had argued,
Down claimed that idiocy and imbecility "were profound diseases involving
almost every organ and system of organs in the body" (Down, cited in Miller
1996: 363).  Down's contribution to the medical research on idiocy was a
scientific and clinical distinction thoroughly embedded in the organic matter of
the person. Research into Down's syndrome in the 1950s only served to
strengthen this original interpretation of a specificity in typology by exposing
an extra chromosome as the common feature of all people with Down's
syndrome (Porter 1997: 587-8).23
Down has been immortalised in medical nomenclature, identified as he is
with the "discovery" of what is known as Down's syndrome. As with places,
diseases or syndromes often take the name of a person, albeit the name of the
discoverer rather than the discoverer's hero or patron. Down initially termed
this specific form of idiocy "the Mongolian type of idiocy" (Kanner 1967: 167).24
Basing his classification on physiognomic features, such as the folded eyelid,
                                                                                                                                      
tramps, prostitutes and criminals constituted this category and, according to
Kerlin, they were thought to have a "mental disorder in which there is a loss or
absence of control over the lower propensities, or in which the moral
sentiments rather than the intellectual powers are confused, weakened or
perverted" (Kerlin 1976 [1889]: 306).
23 However, as Emily Simonoff et al. point out, the relationship between this
"genetic anomaly" and either behaviour or IQ is questionable, and thus raises
doubts as to any absolute relationship between the genetic cause of intellectual
disability and the consequent behaviour of the person (Simonoff et al. 1996). I
pick up on this issue later in the chapter.
24 In 1846 Edouard Séguin described a condition which he termed "furfuraceous
idiocy" and it was this condition that Down later termed "Mongoloid" (Porter
1997: 587). Cretinism was another common term for describing intellectually
disabled people (Judge 1987: 39). It had been used by Felix Platter in the late
sixteenth century to describe a specific condition identified by a short stature
and protruding tongue, features which made it easy to confuse it with what
was later called Down's syndrome (Judge 1987: 39; Porter 1997: 196-7).
Cretinism is actually a specific type of intellectual disability now known as
hyperthyroidism and was common in Switzerland in the nineteenth century
due to low levels of iodine in the water supply (Judge 1987: 39; Porter 1997: 196-
7). Along with Down's syndrome it was one of the first types of intellectual
disability to be extensively researched as a disease (Judge 1987: 39).  
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broad nose, protruding tongue and round face that were common to these
people, Down identified them as belonging to a particular class of idiots.
However, more than just being a descriptive term, it also incorporated Down's
initial theoretical conviction that such people represented an atavistic regression
to a "lower race". Through a similarity in facial features, and particularly the
epicanthic fold, Down associated these "Mongoloids" with people from
Mongolia. There were also other forms of idiocy that represented throwbacks
to other "races", including Ethiopian or Negroid, and Malay or American Indian
(Borthwick 1996: 404-406; Judge 1987: 42-43; Kanner 1967: 167; Miller 1996: 367).
Down later rejected these racial associations, arguing instead that ætiology was
the most suitable means for classifying, treating and diagnosing types of idiocy.
He based this classification on organic and pathological distinctions between
congenital, developmental and accidental causes of idiocy, associating these
with epilepsy or microcephaly, onset in puberty, and injury or illness
respectively (Kanner 1967: 167-8). Down classified "Mongolian idiocy" as a
congenital disorder and associated it with tuberculosis in the parents (Miller
1996: 368).  
However, despite Down's rejection, the connection between idiocy, race and
degeneracy had been made. As Anne Digby points out, the "diagnostic
significance of physical aspects of mental defect [were] revealingly termed the
'stigmata of degeneration'" (Digby 1996: 8). Degenerationist arguments were
based on both moral and evolutionary principles, incorporating references to
lifestyle and behaviour as much as to the supposed potential of the human race
to regress to an earlier human type. The atavistic argument was based on the
"theory of recapitulation", a theory which postulated that the "higher human
races had passed through and developed beyond the stages now represented
by the existing civilisations of the lower races" (Borthwick 1996: 405). In such a
theory, idiots were perceived as a throwback or reversion to our human
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ancestors; ancestors who were contemporaneously represented by other
"races" such as Mongolian, Malay and Ethiopian. These "racial" groups were
inherently assumed to be at an earlier evolutionary developmental stage to
Caucasians; socially, morally, intellectually and physically (Borthwick 1996;
Miller 1996: 368).    
Down was not alone in conflating race and idiocy within a singular
classificatory logic. In a survey of the public exhibition of mentally retarded
people between 1850 and 1940, Robert Bogdan (1986) describes how "freaks"
were commonly used to justify and typify contemporary scientific and medical
theories (cf. Mannix 1990: 91; Ryan & Thomas 1987: 105). Bogdan presents a
number of examples—such as the "Aztec" children from St. Salvador who were
exhibited in the 1850s as the missing link between apes and man, and the
brother and sister from Ohio who were said to be members of an extinct tribe
from the interior of Australia (Bogdan 1986: 121-4).  Not only were these
individuals supposed to represent the evolutionary link between animals and
humans, but they were also idiots. As a consequence, indigenous people and
the intellectually disabled were collapsed into a singular intermediary category
as strange and subhuman examples of man's evolution from savagery to
civilisation.  
These consciously manufactured tales of lost beginnings and tragic ends are
doubly fascinating in that scientists came from around the world to observe
these "ethnological curiosities". They then used spurious information generated
by the freak shows to classify people within the greater scheme of human
variation and evolution. Bogdan notes that John Langdon Down had as one of
his categories of idiocy the "Aztec type", and that both Shuttleworth and Ireland
referred to these "Aztecs" in their own diagnoses and classifications (Bogdan
1986: 125). What is most interesting with regards to the increasing
medicalisation of intellectual disability, however, is the fact that after the turn of
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the twentieth century these "freaks" were often accompanied by a nurse rather
than an attendant when performing in the shows (Bogdan 1986: 124). They
were now not only ethnological curiosities, and representative of the missing
link between humans and animals, they were also medical abnormalities.25  
In the introduction to her forthcoming book on the history of the natural
sciences, Jane Goodall compares the scientific approach to natural history with
that of the numerous circus and freak shows of the nineteenth century. Goodall
argues that both dealt with the systematic ordering of nature but in quite
different ways. Whereas natural scientists reified nature through the display of
comprehensive collections of fossilised specimens representing the normative
stages and categories of the natural world, the circuses portrayed aberrations
of this "natural order" as exotic, bizarre, sensational, and abnormal living
specimens of transgression (Goodall; forthcoming). The ambiguous status of
these aberrations was resolved by labelling them according to Linnean and
Darwinian categories, as the missing link, the homo troglodyte or homo nocturnus.
Therefore, rather than being a "caprice" or "freak" of nature, these aberrations
became part of the very order of nature, but only in so far as they represented
something absolutely other to those at the more "evolved" or "normal" end of
the spectrum (Goodall; forthcoming). This is the ordering process that the
intellectually disabled have been subjected to as scientists of all persuasions
seek to fit them into their various models. It is the process that has
pathologically embodied them as abnormal and unnatural beings.
By the late nineteenth century medical professionals had constituted
themselves as the sole diagnostic and prognostic experts in the field of
                                            
25 In his book Freaks: We who are not as others, Daniel Mannix argues that
circuses and freak shows actually provided the people who performed in them
with an independent source of income. Due to growing  moral outrage over
the exploitative nature of the shows, however, they disappeared, and as a
consequence the former performers were institutionalised and/or became
entirely dependent on public welfare (Mannix 1990).
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intellectual disability, interpreting it as an entirely organic disease (Digby 1996:
8). The medical interpretation constituted intellectually disabled people's
differences as abnormal and pathological and grounded these within the
physical. Medical science did more than just operate as a tool for categorising
and classifying aberrations from the norm, it also had a significant and
influential effect on those who were subject to its practices (cf. Conrad &
Schneider 1985: 17; Zola 1972). As Foucault put it, a person who was "simple
minded" came to be "a pure object of medicine and knowledge—an object to be
shut away till the end of his life . . . but also one to be made known to the world
of learning through a detailed analysis" (Foucault 1984: 31-2). Such people
became objects of knowledge rather than subjects in their own right.26 Their
differences were constituted as absolutely different. They were different "not
because they were like us, only damaged, but because they were intact and
complete specimens of a lesser order of being" (Borthwick 1996: 406). And, as
                                               
26 This fate is poignantly portrayed in Werner Herzog's (1974) film "The
Enigma of Kaspar Hauser". Based on a true story, the film tells the story of a
young man—rumoured to be of noble origins—who was found standing in the
town square of Nuremberg in 1828 in a seemingly catatonic state holding only
a bible and a letter. Kaspar had supposedly spent his entire life in isolation,
treated as an animal and chained to the wall of a cell. The film traces the various
ways in which Kaspar is treated and used by his fellow countrymen; the local
villagers, a family, the police, army, law, medical practitioners, philosophers
and churchmen. He is an object of disgust, fear and fun for the villagers; treated
as a vagabond criminal by the police; taught social manners by a kindly family;
is masqueraded throughout the countryside as part of a freak show; becomes
an object of fascination and potential knowledge for the doctors; a subject to be
taught and trained by a "philosopher-psychologist"; and a source of theological
speculation for the churchmen. Yet Kaspar does not conform to any of these
attempts to manage, train or assess him. He has his own form of logic and
understanding of the universe but it does not conform to the deductive
reasoning Kaspar's teacher is trying to teach him. Kaspar is told he must learn
to read and write in order that he come to know and understand God. Kaspar
tires of all the attention focused on him and, like the noble savage he is at times
portrayed as being, wants to return to his simple life in the cell. Those who
wish him to assimilate to society are dismayed and decide that he must be an
idiot after all. When Kaspar is murdered the doctors dissect his body and
discover that he has an enlarged liver and abnormal cerebellum. The film ends
with the head doctor skipping down the cobblestone lane with the medical
report in his hand, having finally discovered the answer to the enigma of
Kaspar Hauser.
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beings who have been constituted as socially deficient, these differences
precipitated the institutionalisation of training and management practices in
order to transform such people into social beings.    
Heredity, Degeneracy and Morality
A whole range of theories existed in the nineteenth century claiming variously
that idiocy was the consequence of sinful living or the intemperance of parents
(but especially the mother), a result of syphilis, masturbation, indigence, or
vice, or the product of the violation of natural laws (Barr 1904: 95; Brockett 1976
[1856]: 78; Howe 1976 [1848]; Ireland 1976 [1882]; cf. Gelb 1995: 2; Judge 1987:
38; Miller 1996: 368; Potter et al. 1976 [1853]; Rose 1985: 98; Rosen et al. 1976: xv-
xx). Often, theological, moral and scientific modes of conceptualising idiocy
existed side by side such that the laws of nature came to be proof of God's laws,
and both served to justify social and moral norms. The supposed moral
degeneracy of idiots was expressed in, and became a part of, their human
abnormal biology. The ultimate conclusion to such opinions was that those
who were affected by idiocy, as well as their progenitors, should not be
allowed to reproduce (Ashton 1995: 145-147). Idiots, the feeble-minded and
mental defectives were believed to be a "social menace" (Ashton 1995: 147), and
were considered "unfit to continue the species" (Howe 1976 [1848]: 51).27   
                                                
27 The combination of heredity and immorality as one of the primary causes of
idiocy continued to be accepted as fact well into the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, as shown by Richard Dugdale's 1877 study of the "Juke"
family, and Henry Goddard's 1912 study of the "Kallikaks" (Dugdale 1976
[1877]; Judge 1987: 49; Miller 1996: 366). Such accounts of the inherited
degeneracy of idiocy and feeble-mindedness across a number of generations,
and the association of these conditions with asocial, immoral and criminal
behaviour, only added fuel to the eugenics scare that swept across North
America and Europe in the 1920s (Judge 1987: 49; Wolfensberger 1977: 123).
The prevention of this cycle of degeneration was thought to require the most
stringent measures, including sterilisation, institutionalisation and the
prevention of marriage or sexual relations between intellectually disabled
people (Scheerenberger 1986: 61-2; cf. Charlesworth 1989: 82-3; Dugdale 1976
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Despite the controversy and uncertainty surrounding the process of
heredity in the nineteenth century, physicians continued accumulating data that
suggested hereditary illnesses or diseases were the cause of certain conditions
such as idiocy (Porter 1997: 587). William Wentworth Ireland, an American
physician with an interest in the diagnosis and classification of idiocy, had
strongly encouraged physicians as early as 1882 to note familial traits of
epilepsy, idiocy and neurosis, and suggested that idiocy was the defect most
likely to be inherited and was not just the result of sinful living (Ireland 1976
[1882]: 250). In 1904, Martin Barr, Chief Physician at the Pennsylvania Training
School for Feeble-Minded Children, felt confident proclaiming that heredity
was a proven law, and believed that it was one's social duty to preserve the
integrity of society through understanding and thus preventing the continued
"pernicious" inheritance of idiocy (Barr 1904: 123). There still remains a moral
obligation on the part of parents to reduce the number of children who are
born with intellectual or other disabilities.
*
The psychiatrist and paediatrician at the Grosvenor Diagnostic Centre informed my
parents in 1967 that, while there was not "enough incontrovertible evidence at this
time to give it a name", three of their children were mentally retarded and epileptic as a
result of "a familial disorder as yet undisclosed". They also "touched upon the genetic
                                                                                                                                          
[1877]; Radford 1991; Rhodes 1993; Smith & Polloway 1993). These practices
were legalised in many states of the United States of America in the 1930s
(Judge 1987: 48-9). And, as Sabagh and Edgerton (1962) have documented, in
North America in the 1950s it was a requirement that intellectually disabled
people be sterilised before being released from mental institutions and
returning to the community. While such practices are no longer accepted as
legitimate ways of dealing with intellectually disabled people, and despite
recent discussions over their rights to a sexual life (Held 1992; Rhodes 1993),
intellectually disabled women are still being forcibly sterilised and/or
prevented from having a menstrual cycle (Smith 1996, 1997a; Sweet 1997;
Trumble 1997). One of the people I worked with, a woman in her late twenties,
had a hysterectomy when she was fourteen and was going through early
menopause at the time of my fieldwork.
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implications for future children”, noting that my mother was a Roman Catholic and
therefore probably did not use contraception (12/7/67).  Dr R—the female doctor in
Perth who became the 'case manager' for my family during the time that we lived
there—responded to this comment on contraception by the doctors at Grosvenor saying
that she had spoken to my mother and stressed the “imperative” need for contraception
due to the family circumstances. Dr R was greatly relieved that my mother had already
“sought the advice of a broad minded priest” and was taking the “pill”.  “Thank
goodness” she writes (24/7/67).  One of the psychiatrists in Perth also wrote to her
colleague prior to our forthcoming move to Sydney in the hope that “people will be able
to accept them as they are and not feel too outraged at these good Catholics who have
filled the world with such oddities” (30/10/67).
The potential problems associated with further reproduction was one of the
specialists' primary concerns. However, they were also concerned with the social,
economic and intellectual climate of my familial home. In the medical records in England
it was remarked upon that my father was of Polish origin, that he still spoke with a
strong accent, was educated in the UK and had a PhD in mathematics. It was noted
that my mother was of Irish descent, that she came from a medical family, and that,
although she herself had a degree in law, she did not practice. It was also noted that the
“social history” of the family was “good” because we had a five bedroom house, that the
children were “well nourished", and the “family co-operative”.  Having made this
assessment, social factors were subsequently discarded as a potential cause of my
siblings' retardation, although along with this were most other alternative causes,
including environmental factors. The only factor that remains a potential cause is the
biological.
In the hope of discerning this biological cause the medical professionals sought to
discover whether there were any traces of a "familial disease" in earlier generations of
my family. A “family and contact” history had been taken at the Alder Hay Children's
Hospital in Liverpool and this was added to by those at Grosvenor. It was noted that,
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apart from the problems affecting the immediate family, a maternal great uncle had
suffered from convulsions until the age of five, and that one of his daughters was
epileptic; that a paternal uncle was mentally ill; that my mother’s cousin had TB and
that her paternal grandmother had also had TB.28 It was also remarked upon that my
own father may have had convulsions in childhood, and was slow to begin
speaking—although this was considered unreliable evidence—and that my paternal
great uncle was epileptic and possibly schizophrenic. My parents, however, were
considered to be “healthy” (9/5/66). A slightly later family medical history suggests
that there may have been  “a background of epilepsy or degenerative brain disease, or
even schizophrenia” on my father’s side of the family and that my mother has “two
cousins who had epilepsy” (19/5/67).29  
A fabulous kinship chart was drawn up by the specialists at Grosvenor on which
were marked the incidences of schizophrenia, tuberculosis and epilepsy that have
occurred in my family over the past three generations. The chart also included the
medical results of various biochemical, bacteriological, neurological and physical tests
for each of the first five children in my family. It was hoped that this chart might
indicate some pattern of the “very complicated picture of what appears to be a familial
disease” (19/5/67). And, as already mentioned, this medical history is still being
updated with recent information about the family. In 1988, a Paediatric Neurologist
who saw Maryla at Stockton Hospital mistakenly wrote that “She is one, of apparently
about eight children, of whom five have had neurological problems”. Interestingly, he
was just as concerned about the possible effects of blood marriages on retardation as
were those in the 19th century. In relation to the family’s “hereditary neurological
problems”,  the neurologist wrote that, “apart from severe retardation, and death,
                                                
28 It is interesting to note that tuberculosis was one of the diseases that John
Langdon Down singled out as a particular cause of idiocy.
29 On discussing these matters with my mother I discovered that some of the
details of this information were incorrect, although there were incidences of
epilepsy, retardation, mental illness and tuberculosis in the family.
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epilepsy seems to be a constant thread in the family history. There is no consanguinity”
(17/6/88).
What unites this history of medical and degenerationist hereditary theories
is the underlying message that the people so affected, and their parents, are not
fit candidates for reproduction. The segregation, sterilisation and study of
intellectual disability was entirely directed towards ridding society of "this
equivocal being, who seems to have been placed by nature on the very
confines of humanity" (Pinel 1962 [1801]: 127). Even Séguin, who continued to
pursue his educational treatment and training, supported this general
assessment. Having pathologically embodied those who are intellectually
disabled—and placed them in a category as sub-human, abnormal, unnatural,
deficient, and asocial by virtue of their differences and limitations—the only
"cure" was to train or ameliorate them; to make them conform to social norms
or incarcerate them. The concern of the medical profession was amelioration,
and it was the parents who were lectured to in order to prevent the supposedly
"pernicious" inheritance of idiocy from continuing (Barr 1904: 123). The concern
of the institution was management and training, and it too sought to eradicate
intellectual disability by transforming such people into socially acceptable
beings. Neither is able to accept and relate to intellectually disabled people as
they are. There is a profound refusal within both medical science and the
institution to negotiate and look for the possibilities of shared vehicles of
meaning and sociality.
The Road to Genetics
The earliest mention of genetics as the possible source of my family’s particular
circumstances was in 1966, when the senior physician at Walkersgate Hospital in
Newcastle Upon Tyne wrote to Dr R in Perth saying that “It certainly sounds a very
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queer family history and perhaps this is of genetic background” (16/5/66). Urine tests
had been performed to determine the  "normality" of amino acids ever since we lived in
Liverpool but at that time genetic testing was still in its infancy.  Although much was
made of the inherited nature of the “disease” it was not until the mid 1970s that the
first specific genetic tests were done on all of us children. I could find no records of
these tests, however, and only have vague memories of the strange and clinical nature
of the examination. I remember that it was inexplicably disconcerting to be having my
genes tested for some familial disorder, and that my parents were equally anxious and
distressed at the possible implications of these tests. The progress report from
Grosvenor in 1975 did, however, comment on the “recessive inheritance” of this
“unknown metabolic disorder”. This diagnosis was repeated verbatim in 1986 for
Maryla in a psychological report at Stockton, and the most recent tests that she has had
are all genetically related enzyme tests.  
While there may well turn out to be a genetic basis to my siblings'
intellectual disabilities, it is the uses to which genetic knowledge is put that
raises serious issues for those with any form of genetic "defect", or even a
predisposition to illness, disease or disability. Parents are often discouraged
from reproducing in such circumstances. It is the implicit value, or lack of value,
placed on intellectually disabled people's human and social status that
perpetuates the notion that such people are pathologically and inherently
abnormal, and that, as such, they lack the capacity for sociality. The
development of genetics in the latter part of the twentieth century has only
served to strengthen and reinforce this assessment.
*
The metamorphosis from sin to genetics as a primary cause of intellectual
disability places the breach of morality and normality both beyond and within
the self. The soul, no longer a consideration of medical science, has now
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become the genetic code of the person, and it is this that is blamed when a
person transgresses the boundaries of "normality". Despite the conviction for
over a century that inherited causes could and would be discovered for specific
diseases and disabilities, no studies had been able to prove that this was actually
the case. Interestingly, the final proof for the hereditary nature of certain
diseases and disorders came through genetic research into Down's syndrome
(Porter 1997: 587).  
The publication of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859, and the
popularisation of this theory by his cousin Francis Galton, gave to notions of
heredity an evolutionary and scientific perspective that, combined with Gregor
Mendel's observations of how characteristics are passed on from one
generation to the next, eventually led to the biomedical field now known as
genetics (Judge 1987: 40-8).30 Contemporary medical theories of intellectual
disability have been greatly influenced by research in the field of genetics. They
have built upon similar advances in biology and biochemistry, and have utilised
new medical technologies that allow greater visual access to the body and its
functioning. The observation of an extra chromosome in all Down's syndrome
people in 1959 was part of this technological and scientific development, as was
the understanding of the structure and hereditary capacity of DNA (Porter
1997: 588). These developments have encouraged faith in the use of medical
scientific processes to understand and hopefully prevent "abnormal" conditions
such as intellectual disability. For, as Peter Conrad and Joseph Schneider
remark: "It is assumed generally that if one could only know the cause and thus
                                                
30 E. J. Yoxen has pointed out that the early "Mendelian geneticists" faced
considerable criticism from their professional peers in the early twentieth
century because their theories were not acceptable to contemporary notions of
evolution and variation. Because of this, the field of genetics developed mostly
within disciplines focusing on plant and animal breeding, disciplines devoted to
the study of the general principles of heredity rather than with problems of
variation. It was not until the 1930s that the relevance of earlier studies of
potentially inherited abnormalities began to influence the biomedical fields in
terms of ætiological reasoning (Yoxen 1982: 146-7).
Chapter Three: A Pathological Embodiment
page 141
the 'true' nature of the deviant behaviour, one could prevent or, more likely,
control it closer to its source" (Conrad & Schneider 1985: 25).31
While many suggestions have been made as to the possible causes of
intellectual disabilities—some of them genetic, metabolic and pathological,
others environmental, nutritional and infectious, and still others, cultural or
familial (Scheerenberger 1987: 40-61; Heaton-Ward 1978: 7-31; Whittemore et al.
1986: 8)—there always remains a residual group that resists classification and
categorisation (Dykens 1995: 529; Scheerenberger 1987: 37-40). Despite the fact
that only 25% of people with an intellectual disability are known to have a
genetic basis to their disability (Bregman & Hodapp 1991: 708; Zigler & Hodapp
1986: 86-7), the medical model (and its associated practices) is still the dominant
mode through which such people are treated and perceived (Mehan 1988: 80;
Ryan & Thomas 1987: 15-26). The other 75% get drawn into the general
paradigm of abnormality that the medical model espouses. In addition, medical
researchers believe that a genetic or biomedical cause for all forms of disability
will eventually be discovered. As Bregman and Hodapp comment in their
review article, "Current Developments in the Understanding of Mental
Retardation":  
                                                
31 For Conrad and Schneider, deviance is a socially meaningful construct
representing "human judgements of conditions that exist in the natural world"
(Conrad & Schneider 1985: 31). Through their social constructionist and
symbolic interactionist approach, Conrad and Schneider sought to understand
the "meanings we attribute to different behaviour" (Conrad & Schneider 1985:
20). Following Howard Becker's 1960s theory of labelling, Conrad and
Schneider considered the stigma attached to such designations as deviant,
especially the effect it can have on a person's behaviour and identity, and how
others perceive and treat such a person (Conrad & Schneider 1985: 20).
However, due to their commitment to sociological interpretations of the nature
of labelling, the authors never considered the actual lived realities of the people
in question—the alcoholics, the mad, or the pro-abortionists. Just as clinical
specialists remain beyond the boundary of abnormality that they themselves
perpetuate and reinforce, Conrad and Schneider also do not enter the lives of
the people they write about as subjects engaged in a continual process of
interaction with these medically ascribed labels, identities and attributes. They
criticise the designations that medicine creates, but remain just as much
outsiders when it comes to really engaging with difference.      
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. . . developments in medical technology will reveal that those
whose condition is presently due to unknown causes, especially
those with mild intellectual impairments, will eventually be found
to have biomedical causes for their cognitive and adaptive
impairments (Bregman & Hodapp 1991: 707).  
There are now thought to be over one thousand genetic "abnormalities" that
are the cause of various types of intellectual disabilities, each having their own
behavioural and physical manifestations (H. W. Moser, cited in Dykens 1995:
522). These include Down's syndrome, Fragile-X syndrome, Angelman's
syndrome, Rett syndrome and Turner's syndrome, amongst others.  Studies in
the field of genetics have grown increasingly complex as researchers
acknowledge the dynamic interplay of genetic and environmental factors, as
well as the multiple interactions of individual genes in the production of a
genetic "defect" (V. Anderson 1974; Bregman & Hodapp 1991: 715;
Charlesworth 1989: 88; Simonoff et al. 1996). It is therefore no longer as simple
as suggesting that a single gene is the sole determinant of a specific disorder.
And, as Simonoff et al.  stress, it is difficult to establish a direct causal
relationship between genetic abnormalities and a persons' intelligence or
behaviour because of the diverse manifestations of syndromes (Simonoff et al.
1996). However, despite such criticisms, the quest to discover "behavioural
phenotypes" remains a legitimate scientific pursuit in the study of mental
retardation (Anderson 1974; Bregman & Hodapp 1991: 709; Dykens 1995).  
It is not so much that genetic interpretations of intellectual disability are a
false assessment. It is rather the implication that as an abnormality it must be
erased. The Human Genome Project is the latest development in this field. As
Tom Wilkie comments, its primary aim after mapping and analysing each of
the 3 billion "letters" within the DNA sequence will be to treat the "mistakes",
"disorders" or "errors" of nature that produce diseases, defects and disabilities
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(Wilkie 1993: 1-15; cf. Porter 1997: 588). It appears that Descartes' machine-body
is being manipulated and "corrected" at ever more particular levels. The
interpretations might have narrowed to specific diseases, germs, genes and
enzymes, as Luchins remarks (1989: 593), but the perception of abnormality as
an integral part of an intellectually disabled person's identity has been
sustained, and the stress on prevention is still integral to this judgement.  
In 1992, W. French Anderson stated that "[t]he goal of biomedical research
is, and has always been, to alleviate human suffering" (W. Anderson 1992: 150).
He went on to argue that "Gene therapy is a proper and logical part of that
effort" (W. Anderson 1992: 150; cf. Charlesworth 1989). Such "therapy" is the
controversial technique of altering a person's genetic make-up as treatment for
their disorder. The emphasis on correcting or treating any genetic, biochemical
or neurological defects as the cause of someone's "suffering" includes within it
those people who are intellectually disabled.  Individuals, and society as a
whole, must work towards relieving the human gene pool of these disabling
conditions, thereby preventing and minimising the effects and continued
existence of these defects (W. Anderson 1992; Berg 1976; Chadwick 1992;
Charlesworth 1989: 80-95; Marteau & Drake 1995). In fact, as Professor Lord
Robert Winston, a leading geneticist and "reproductive engineer", recently
commented, the "devastating effects" and "suffering" associated with genetic
defects means "the choice of what to do once a defect is identified is relatively
easy" (cited in Whelan 2000: 7).
Nowadays, with advances in prenatal genetic testing, parents who are
potential carriers of any "disorder", or women who are at "risk" of having a
disabled child, are encouraged to seek genetic counselling. Amniocenteses,
ultrasounds, urine tests and even the traditional family tree are used to predict
the genetic traits that might be passed on to one's child, and specially trained
genetic counsellors interpret these tests and inform clients of any such potential
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(Berg 1976; 44-45; Scheerenberger 1987: 61-6). In relation to reproduction,
parents are encouraged not to continue with a pregnancy if there is evidence
that the foetus is in any "serious" way abnormal. This includes such conditions
as Fragile-X and Down's syndrome. Despite not knowing what the cause was,
my parents were also strongly encouraged not to continue having children.
Consequently, the moral weight of guilt, shame and blame still resides with the
parents, who are made to take responsibility for the "choice" of reproducing an
intellectually disabled child. As E. J. Yoxen comments:
Genetic disease strikes at some of the deepest and most intimate
feelings about ourselves—as potential parents, as responsible
people, as marital or sexual partners and so on. The appearance of
hereditary disease in anyone's life, as a risk or a fact, is traumatic. It
jeopardises some of the most fundamental beliefs that socialisation
in contemporary society encourages us to hold (Yoxen 1982: 154).32
Those who advocate prenatal testing, genetic counselling and gene therapy,
however, rarely do so without taking into consideration many of the ethical
dilemmas that genetic research has produced (W. Anderson 1992;
Charlesworth 1989; Cotton & Wansbrough 1996; Smith 1997b). They are aware
of the controversial nature of gene therapy and the moral questions that this
                                               
32 Yoxen has also argued that genetics as a discipline developed within the
restraining power of other biomedical interpretations of disease and
abnormality such that "the phenomena with which genetics works are
intellectual constructs" (Yoxen 1982: 145; cf. Charlesworth 1989: 90; Rapp 1988).
This interpretation, while acknowledging that "many of the phenomena of
genetic disease are grounded in material reality" (Yoxen 1982: 144), propounds
the theoretical position that all phenomena are cultural or social constructions.
As such, any perception of disability involves the projection of cultural and
social meanings onto the material or person under observation. While Yoxen
challenges the overtly deterministic interpretations of a biomedical approach,
his idealist approach does not take into consideration the way in which such
observations and perceptions become part of a persons lived reality. For him
the process remains one way, whereas in fact it is the interrelationship of an
individual's biomedical make-up with their being and experience in the world
that creates a person's lived reality.
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raises concerning human life.33 But as Ruth Chadwick (1992: 119) points out,
despite the problematic use of such terms as defect or handicap in the field of
genetics, the moral role of geneticists is still fundamentally to replace "faulty
parts" and repair any genetic defect.34
Treating intellectual disability as a medical defect or disorder marks out the
condition as something that is not normal and natural. It consequently renders
people so affected as abnormal, unnatural and less than human, as nature gone
wrong. Their very being, their genetic makeup and biochemical balance, is
perceived as fundamentally askew. Despite their particular differences, all the
medical literature on intellectual disability unquestionably assumes a link
between a person's abnormal genetic, metabolic or physiological make-up, and
their behaviour, their being in the world, as intellectually disabled (Bregman
and Hodapp 1991: 707). The social response to this perception, both clinically
and institutionally, has been to treat such people as though they exist outside
the realm of sociality. In doing so intellectually disabled people then become a
deviation that must be eliminated, managed or trained. They must either be
removed from the social altogether or else trained to acquire social skills that
will enable them to participate in the social world. Yet intellectually disabled
people already have the capacity for sociality and mutuality, albeit in
                                                
33 In his criticism of the implications of prenatal genetic testing Christopher
Newell points out that such practices make society less tolerant of difference
and disability. Newell argues that by accepting these tests and advocating their
use "we are closing off various forms of humanness, and saying everyone has
to be 'normal'" (cited in Smith 1997b: 11).
34 The ethical dilemma implicated in the potential erasure of human diversity
and difference also carries with it the problematic assumption that behaviour
can be linked with specific genetic causes (Diprose 1991: 70; cf. Simonoff et al.
1996). In her analysis of the theory of genetics, Rosalyn Diprose claims that
geneticists portray the laws of nature as though they are bounded and closed.
Diprose argues, however, that genetics actually operates according to a process
of adaptation and aberration that results in the continual production of
diversity. In this sense, nature produces differences as manifestations of itself
(Diprose 1991: 73). Therefore the idea that some differences are acceptable
while others are not becomes a social and moral issue as much as an objective
and scientific one.  
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unconventional and limited forms. It is often highly contextual and embodied,
and requires participation in the negotiation and mediation of particular
language games and symbolic systems. It is through such articulations of
relatedness that the joint constitution of a shared social environment such as
the one I have had with my siblings develops.
*
Even though my parents initiated contact with the medical profession and
consistently sought from them a diagnosis of my siblings' conditions, there are
indications throughout the records that my parents were unwilling or unable to accept
the diagnoses of retardation they were given. In 1966, one of the doctors at Grosvenor
wrote that "it is probably rather good that they have such strong defences against
admitting [their problems]—they’d go under if they did" (7/4/66). Others were not
quite so sympathetic. In May 1966 one of the doctors in Perth wrote that he  had "told
Dr. Klotz that [he] thought that Stephen was moderately retarded and that he would
not reach normal intelligence. Dr. Klotz was obviously very disturbed with the present
assessment of his condition but I felt that the time was ripe for him to be made aware of
the situation fully" (9/5/66).  
My parents were considered "difficult" because they challenged the interpretations
of the medical profession and would read up on the medical literature when given any
possible diagnosis. The doctors at Grosvenor "gained the impression that though a
definite label would be a help to them in some ways (and was what they tried very hard
to provoke us into giving) it would also add fuel to their well-established mechanisms of
denial of their children’s condition . . .  Our impression was that part of the reason for
their 'shopping around' . . .  for opinions and advice (which seems to have been very
ably given in the past) springs from their understandable difficulties in facing the
tragic facts of their children’s handicaps, apart from the realities of lack of appropriate
educational facilities" (12/7/67).  
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The stigma attached to such a diagnosis was barely considered. The implicit blame
attributed to my parents for having more children despite their family histories—with
incidences of intellectual disability and epilepsy on my mother's side and mental illness
on my father's—the possible congenital recessive disorder that they had supposedly
passed onto their children, and the status of retardation as an abnormality that must be
eliminated, managed, treated and institutionalised, all contributed to their anxiety and
unwillingness to accept this definitive diagnosis. What did such a diagnosis say about
who they were, let alone what their children were?  The diagnosis was a final cut, a
separation that put their children on one side of a divide, with themselves somehow
straddling the gulf that separated their children as intellectually disabled from others in
the community.  It categorised their children as unfit for human social life, and assumed
that they had no capacity for culture and sociality. My parents had given birth to a
difference that was considered an aberration of normality,  manifesting as a deficiency
in social and intellectual capabilities, and the doctors wondered why my parents were
so "difficult"! Such attributes are considered the most advanced and definitive human
capabilities in our society and their children had been given close to zero on their score
cards.
My own distress at reading the medical records resonated with my parents'
responses. It is not so much that I too am implicated in this possible familial disorder,
but that I, like all of my family, knew Maryla, Stephen and Ursula as human beings; as
cultural beings; as integral and participating members within the sociality and
mutuality that constituted our family life. Like the rest of us, my intellectually disabled
siblings, albeit within their own limitations, existed within and helped to create the
symbolic systems that operated as the medium through which we not only made sense
of our shared environment but through which we communicated and related to one
another. Despite limitations to this mutual engagement, and their tendency to revolve
around very particular social idioms, symbolic practices and dispositions such as the
jigsaw pieces and bits and pieces, our interactions with one another through such
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objects were a way of meaningfully and purposefully engaging within our shared social
world. We did not separate, isolate or strip my siblings bare of vestiges of human
sociality. We did not perceive them as the medical anomalies they were constituted as
being. And yet, the medical interpretation has had a profound effect on my siblings'
experiences, increasing in intensity the more they moved outside the intimate and
essentially closed world of the family and into the public social world of  medicine,
education, and, ultimately, the institution where two of them went to live. The practices
and attitudes that my siblings have been subject to are similar to the treatment given to
residents of Xanadu and the group homes. Their everyday regime embodied forms of
institutional practice shaped by the legacy of medical science. This legacy includes the
symbolic scheme of reason and normality that still informs the field of intellectual
disability.
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Chapter Four
The Voice of Reason
 All our dignity, then, consists in thought.
It is upon this that we must depend, not on space and time,
which we would not in any case be able to fill.
Let us labour, then, to think well: this is the foundation of morality.
Blaise Pascal
Medical interpretations of intellectual disability have never existed in isolation.
Even when first formulated they had to contend with religious interpretations
founded upon moral notions of sin and guilt. Those that did emerge as
scientifically informed medical understandings of the cause and manifestation
of intellectual disability, however, still carried with them moral markers that
made of this difference an immorality (or amorality) now rendered as an
abnormality. Although medical interpretations dominated the assessment and
treatment of idiocy throughout the nineteenth century—and while medicine
has never lost its role in the overall diagnosis and interpretation of intellectual
disability—there was considerable debate by the end of the century as to who
was actually best qualified to make a diagnosis (Rose 1985: 101-102).   
The power struggle between medical practitioners and psychologists to
diagnose and categorise intellectual disability was ultimately influenced by the
development of the intelligence test. Intelligence testing also marked the
emergence of psychology as a rigorous scientific discipline in its own right, a
discipline in search of hard factual evidence based on precision, testing,
accuracy and statistical data (Rose 1985: 117; cf. Hanson 1993). The intelligence
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tests' seemingly accurate and numerical assessment of cognitive capability gave
to the interpretation of intellectual disability an absolute and quantifiable
specification that had previously been lacking in medical interpretations. When
intelligence tests were first introduced they became a powerful tool for
clarifying the concept of mental retardation, and by 1914 had become the
accepted method for "discovering the mentally slow" (Luckey 1967: 170-172).
They were designed specifically for this purpose and, to this day, one of the
most common uses of intelligence tests is for the diagnosis of mental
retardation (Aiken 1996: 276).  
Those with a measured intelligence quotient (IQ) of less that 70 on an
intelligence test were—and still are, according to the World Health
Organisation's classification—deemed to be intellectually disabled (Bijou 1992:
309; Bullock & Trombley 1999: 519-520; Schalock et al. 1994: 183). More
specifically, the test was used to categorise levels of intellectual disability such
as profound, severe, moderate and mild retardation, each of which was
associated with particular IQ ranges (Accardo & Whitman 1996: 194; Woods
1983: 3-15).1 Levels of intelligence were also ultimately used to determine the
                                    
1 Those with an IQ below 25 were considered to be profoundly mentally retarded, those with
an IQ between 25 and 35 severely mentally retarded, those with an IQ between 35 and 50
moderately retarded, and those with an IQ between 50 and 70 mildly retarded (Accardo &
Whitman 1996: 194; Woods 1983: 15-17; cf. Aiken 1996: 277-279;  Judge 1987: 34; Bijou 1992: 310;
Scheerenberger 1987: 12 for slightly different correlations of IQ scores with levels of
retardation). These categories broadly relate to the earlier terms of idiot, imbecile, moron,
and feeble-minded respectively. The change in terminology in the field of intellectual
disability is sometimes hard to keep up with, especially as there is a tendency to use
different terms in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia at the same time. In
the United Kingdom, the use of the generic terms "mental deficiency" and "mental
subnormality" in the early twentieth century were subsequently changed to "mental
handicap" and then "mental retardation" (Jenkins 1988b: 8; Woods 1983). The term now
officially used to describe intellectual disability in the United Kingdom is "people with
learning difficulties" (Jenkins 1998b: 8). In the United States mental retardation was
originally called feeble-mindedness but officially became developmental disability through
legislation enacted in 1970 (Kearney 1996: 22). In Australia, people with mental retardation
and an intellectual disability have historically been termed "idiots" or "mental defectives"
(Ashton 1995: 152), and are now also officially known as people with a developmental
disability.
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educability of children, with those having an IQ below 50 considered
ineducable, and those with an IQ between 50 and 70 educationally subnormal
(Rose 1985: 141; Ryan & Thomas 1987: 111; Woods 1983: 115).2
As an indicator of how influential intelligence testing has become, the
condition of intellectual disability is now defined explicitly by reference to IQ
and behaviour. The American Association on Mental Retardation defined
intellectual disability in 1992 as "significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning" occurring in the developmental period and associated with
limitations in at least two of the following adaptive skills: "communication, self-
care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety,
functional academics, leisure and work" (cited in Schalock et al. 1994: 182). This
recent definition of intellectual disability signified the transition from solely
emphasising individual cognitive abilities to a growing concern with an
individual's interaction with his or her environment. It accommodated for
changes that were occurring in the areas of service provision and special
education, as well as acknowledging that intellectually disabled people have the
capacity to learn and develop. However, as Coles et al. point out, despite the
recent stress on social skills and adaptation, the "individual's cognitive abilities
nevertheless remain a central construct" in definitions and interpretations of
intellectual disability (Coles et al. 1996: 187; cf. Accardo & Whitman 1996: 194).
And, as Joanna Ryan has also argued:
. . . whilst there is considerable argument about the precise criteria
for defining mental deficiency, and especially about where to draw
                                    
2 Such terminology emphasises adaptive behaviour rather than mental deficiency, as Lewis
Aiken (1996: 278) points out. The National Association for Retarded Children (USA) have
utilised a different classificatory system, only one that stresses relative functional
independence rather than potential educability. The terms they proposed were "marginally
independent" (IQ = 50 to 75), "semi-independent" (IQ = 25 to 50) and "dependent" (IQ = 0 to
25) (Aiken 1996: 278).
Chapter Four: The Voice of Reason
page 153
the line between 'defective' and 'normal', we do still have a reliable
idea of how people who are clearly mentally deficient differ from
those who are said to be of normal deficiency (Ryan 1973: 37-38;
my emphasis).
While medical researchers often take for granted these deficiencies, instead
focusing on determining the underlying biological causes of intellectual
disability, psychologists have tended to focus specifically on the functioning of
the mind and on assessing levels of intellectual impairment (Hodapp & Dykens
1994: 675). Despite their differences, however, the development of
psychological assessments of intellectual disability has reinforced and
perpetuated the symbolic scheme of reason and normality that the medical
model adheres to. Both medical and psychological interpretations of intellectual
disability have perpetuated the notion that reason, which is identified with
levels of intelligence, is a necessary criteria of normal humanness and sociality.
Consequently, intellectually disabled people are often denied an existence as
social beings who are able to utilise symbolic systems. Their limited abilities to
classify and figure the world beyond a confined environment are taken as a
lack of reason. Such clinical interpretations have thereby overlooked the fact
that mutuality and sociality make us human as much as extendable knowledge.
Human personhood is shaped as much through the symbolic mediation of
social relations as it is through the mediation of human, knowing relations with
the non-sentient world. In short, sociality can be built through restricted codes
even though these codes remain restricted.
As with medical diagnoses of intellectual disability, psychological
interpretations are based on an empirical combination of observation and
testing. Focusing specifically on the functioning of the mind and behaviour,
psychological assessments also label intellectually disabled people as deficient
and abnormal beings (Sacks 1986: 163-172; Shaddock et al. 1993: 52). In fact, as
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Nikolas Rose points out, the entire development of psychology as a discipline
has been profoundly based on studies of the "abnormal" (Rose 1985: 22-3). Like
medicine, psychology pathologises the intellectually disabled, searching for
deficits and aberrations from taken for granted norms, only this time in terms
of a capacity for abstract reasoning measured as specific mental skills and
communicative ability. These skills are decontextualised, isolated, abstract skills
which depend upon a capacity for language; although it is language in its
limited linguistic, verbal and literate sense rather than as the capacity for
symbolic representation and mediation. Despite the recent interest in social
skills and adaptation, psychological assessments and interpretations still tend to
separate intellectually disabled people from their contextual environment. They
still tend to test such social skills as acquired rather than applied skills. By not
recognising or acknowledging intellectually disabled people's preexisting
capacity for symbolic representation, mutual interdependence and sociality,
psychology, like medicine, has made the social aspect of intellectually disabled
people's lives secondary and obscure.
In this chapter I outline the history of psychological theories of intellectual
disability, focusing in particular on the practice of psychometric testing as a
significant factor in the diagnosis and classification of intellectual disability. I
also explore some criticisms of intelligence testing and look at the latest
developments in psychological interpretations of intellectual disability. I focus
particularly on individual development, learning and social skills acquisition,
and explore the influence of these more recent interpretations of intellectual
disability on contemporary institutional practices. I draw again on my family's
medical and psychological records to elucidate the role that these clinical
assessments have played in the perception, interpretation and treatment of
intellectually disabled people.
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I also analyse the central place that reason has played in interpretations of
normal humanness and meaningful sociality. I explore the association of reason
with intelligence, in particular its identification with specific skills such as
abstract reasoning, numeracy, and language. By isolating certain mental
operations as the definitive mark of intelligence, and of reason and normal
humanness, psychological assessments have radically decontextualised our
sense of what constitutes humans as persons. It is these characteristics that
perpetuate the underlying perception of intellectually disabled people as
abnormal and outside the realm of mutual sociality. The practices of
management and training that exist in institutional environments, as well as the
forms of relatedness between staff and consumers, have reinforced these
perceptions and interpretations. These practices are informed by clinical
assessments, perceptions and interpretations, which are themselves shaped by
the symbolic scheme of reason and normality.
 
Reason, Intelligence and the Development of Psychology
One of the most enduring and central themes in the history of philosophy is
the idea and ideal of reason and rationality as the defining attribute of
humanity (Damasio 1994: 52; Lloyd 1993). According to Genevieve Lloyd,
reason is thought "to express the real nature of the mind"; and it is through
reason and the cultivation of rational thought that the unwieldy passions
associated with the body are supposedly transcended (Lloyd 1993: 6).3 In such
                                    
3 Rousseau argued that while the truth unfolds, it must also be cultivated through Reason
perceiving the truth and purity of Nature (Lloyd 1993: 58). Similarly, though in a different
way, Hegel claimed that "Reason . . . is the conscious certainty of being all reality". It is " the
sovereign of the world", "the substance of the universe", which unfolds in History through
the dialectic process of Becoming (Hegel, cited in Russell 1989 [1946]: 704-706). For Hegel, the
mind, Reason, and human History are "all part of a grand unfolding of Nature into its self-
conscious realisation as the Absolute" (Lloyd 1993: 70).
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rationalist philosophies—which date back to Pythagoras but are most readily
associated with Descartes—the intellect, rather than sensory experience or
revelation, has been regarded as the source of knowledge and the necessary
grounds for belief (Russell 1989 [1946]: 55-56).4  
This celebration of reason as the necessary attribute of humanity and the
source of true knowledge has also influenced, and been influenced by,
Christian theology. In pictorial representations of the cosmos, such as those
done by Robert Fludd in the early sixteenth century, the truth of God was
portrayed as entering the soul through the three higher faculties of Reason,
Intellect and Mind (Godwin 1979: 48, 70; cf. Dante 1985 [1314]). The body, in
contrast, was reviled as "vile" and "corruptible" matter (Fludd, cited in Godwin
1979: 71). Idiots were variously thought not to have a rational soul or the
capacity for divine illumination, although some, like the Platonists, did
acknowledge that they had a corporeal soul (Goodey 1994: 216). Whereas for
Fludd the soul, as distinct from reason, the intellect and mind, was also essential
for the realisation of the truth of God (and nature), Enlightenment
philosophers relegated this capacity to the mind, and particularly to rational,
abstract reasoning.5 Reason, however, has not only operated as a philosophical
                                    
4 The celebration of reason and rational thought as the sole source of truth, although a
debatable philosophical assertion since its inception, has come under increasing fire over the
past century from a number of perspectives. Not only has their been a reassertion of the belief
that knowledge can only be attained through the senses (Merquior 1985: 17), but contemporary
science and philosophy has been pervaded by a critique of the concept of a universal truth as
either existent or knowable. Nietzsche, among others such as Artaud and Dostoyevsky, has
been used as a source of inspiration for critiquing the celebrated place of reason (Felman 1989;
Nye 1988). His own struggle with madness has gained revelational status as Western writers,
philosophers and artists grapple with the consequences of the over-determinism of reason
and rationality in Western notions of what constitutes humanness. While some, such as
Deleuze and Guattari (1984), theorise madness as a more essential state of being, as
potentially liberating and capable of rupturing the capitalist structure, there are others such
as Foucault (1995 [1961]) who have sought to trace the consequences of our emphasis on reason
and rationality for those who do not conform to its demands.
5 The incorporation of the soul as an essential attribute of humanity did of course exist in the
sixteenth century philosophies of those such as Descartes and Spinoza. However, the
emphasis began to shift to deductive abstract reasoning rather than spiritual revelation as
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and theological concept; it has also affected the way in which we interpret
human nature. As Lloyd puts it:
Reason has figured in Western culture not only in the assessment
of beliefs, but also in the assessment of character. It is incorporated
not just into our criteria of truth, but also into our understanding of
what it is to be a person at all, of the requirements that must be
met to be a good person, and of the proper relationship between
our status as knowers and the rest of our lives. Past philosophical
reflection on what is distinctive about human life, and on what
should be the priorities of a well-lived life, has issued in character
ideals centred on the idea of Reason; and the supposed universality
and neutrality of these ideals can be seriously questioned (Lloyd
1993: xviii).
The association of reason with that which is taken to be true, good, and natural
has therefore influenced interpretations of what it means to be a person, of
what constitutes the nature of human nature, and what is required to fulfil the
criteria of normal humanness. While of course there are other ideals that
inform a sense of personhood in Western culture, such as beauty, physical
prowess, wealth and power—and while of course the interpretation of
intellectual disability has no "consistency, coherence, or consensus within
cultures" (Jenkins 1998b: 222; author's emphasis)—I argue that rational thought
is the attribute most central to our perception of what constitutes a "real" and
"normal" person. Whereas those who are lacking in beauty, strength, wealth
and power still have to deal with the consequences of their situation, they are
rarely thought to exist outside, or on the margins of, humanity, sociality and
                                                                                                                                       
the means through which the truth of God's universal laws of nature could be perceived and
proven (Hampshire 1956: 59-66, 105-141).
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culture in the way that intellectually disabled people so often are. This is
because reason is considered to be the normal and necessary attribute that
makes human social life possible and, indeed, meaningful.  
The association of reason with normality, and the connection of these to
clinical interpretations of intellectual disability, has a history that dates back to
the first medical definitions of idiocy. John Locke, who is considered the
founder of modern psychology, was the first to argue that idiocy was first and
foremost a problem that resides in the faculties of the mind (Goodey 1994: 217).
Rather than upholding the Galenic propensity to search for physiological
causes, Locke claimed that what characterised idiocy was an inability for
abstract reasoning. For Locke, abstract reasoning was the mental faculty
necessary for the association of ideas, understanding, and knowledge (Goodey
1994: 216-222). As Locke comments in Book II (chapter 11, paragraph 11-12) of
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding:
How far idiots are concerned in the want or weakness of any, or all
of the foregoing Faculties, an exact observation of their several
ways of faltering, would no doubt discover. For those who either
perceive but dully, or retain the Ideas that come into their Minds
but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little
matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and
abstract, would hardly be able to understand, and make use of
Language, or judge, or reason to any tolerable degree but only a
little, and imperfectly, about things present, and very familiar to
their Senses. And, indeed, and of the forementioned Faculties, if
wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in Mens'
Understanding and Knowledge (cited in Goodey 1994: 219).
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For Locke, "all knowledge, and hence mind itself, comes about by mental
associations among sensory impressions" (Aiken 1996: 9), and the faculty of
abstract rational thought was what made sense of these sensory impressions.
This capacity to reason through the faculty of abstraction and discrimination
was considered the essential and defining property of humans, and that which
distinguishes us from animals (Goodey 1994: 240). By linking the capacity for
reason and abstraction with knowledge, understanding, truth, and
communication, Locke inadvertently condemned idiots to a state of
imperfection, deficiency and abnormality. They were also considered to have
little or no capacity for meaningful social action or interaction.
Locke's general interpretation of idiocy as an incapacity for abstract
reasoning has been incorporated into contemporary psychological definitions
and perceptions of intellectual disability (Goodey 1994: 250). His notion of
abstract reasoning has also become one of the most central and defining
features of the concept of "intelligence" (Aiken 1996: 19-20). Although
intelligence has also been associated with mechanical and social skills, it is the
understanding and managing of abstract ideas and symbols that are thought to
constitute the higher, linguistically oriented aspects of reason and intelligence
(Drever & Collins 1928: 9; Sacks 1986: 164). It is these skills that supposedly
allow for understanding, knowledge, communication and meaning. Such
interpretations of reason and intelligence have seriously undermined the
intelligent and meaningful component of other, more concrete, modes of
expression (Sacks 1986: 164). As Edgar Miller points out, "a strong theme in
modern psychological conceptualizations of idiocy is that . . . afflicted
individuals are unable adequately to process and derive proper meaning from
the incoming information that is provided by the senses" (Miller 1996: 362).  
Although idiocy has continued to be defined as a condition associated with
dysfunctions in the faculties or processes of the mind, there have also been
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slight divergences since Locke's definition as to what these specific mental
problems actually constitute. In 1801 Pinel argued that idiots were marked by a
"total or partial obliteration of the intellectual powers and affection" (Pinel 1962
[1801]: 172). Writing thirty years later, Esquirol claimed that idiocy was a
condition most readily associated with a lack in language and speech (Binet &
Simon 1976 [1905]: 336). For Séguin idiocy was a consequence of abnormal
connections between sensory perception and the functioning of the mind,
whereas for Howe "The poor idiot could not understand much of the spoken
words by which reason manifests itself" (Howe 1976 [1848]: 45; author's
emphasis).  
*
Scientific studies that sought to prove direct correlations between the brain,
intelligence and cognitive functioning have a history in medico-psychological
research dating back to the late eighteenth century (Judge 1987: 35-37; Gould
1996: 176). In breaking with dualist philosophies that radically separated the
mind from the body/brain, phrenologists such as Franz Joseph Gall and Paul
Broca studied possible connections between the shape of the cranium, cranial
capacity, and the various functions of the brain (Damasio 1994: 14-16; Gould
1996: 22-23; Hanson 1993: 200-204).6 By the 1890s, intelligence was generally
considered to be a collection of mental faculties (Aiken 1996: 19), and Alfred
Binet, who is heralded as the founder of intelligence testing, actually began his
psychology career in the footsteps of Broca and Gall by seeking to equate
                                    
6 In Descartes Error: Emotion, reason and the human brain, Antonio Damasio (1994)
eloquently describes the importance of phrenological endeavours of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. He argues that, long before their time, phrenologists perceived that the
brain was not an amorphous, singularly functioning organ but rather a composite of many sites,
each with its own specialised functions. Damasio acknowledges that phrenologists also
posited many erroneous theories that left their indelible mark on later neurological and
physiological research but maintains that their interpretation of brain specialisation has
subsequently been proven to be correct (Damasio 1994: 14-16).
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levels of intelligence with the cranial capacity of children's skulls. By the end of
the 1890s, however, Binet was beginning to doubt the veracity of any such
correlations and began questioning the unscientific and hidden biases that
affect such measurements (Gould 1996: 176-8).7  
There was also widespread concern towards the end of the nineteenth
century over how to diagnose and recognise those whose disabilities were less
obvious, those who were classified as feeble-minded and whose mark of
disability was hidden from view (Rose 1985: 97-102). As well as this, there were
growing concerns about the inordinate emphasis given to medical diagnoses of
idiocy and feeble-mindedness, especially when it came to issues of educational
placement (Rose 1985: 101-2). The eventual solution to these problems was
resolved through the widespread development and application of intelligence
testing. Rather than measuring the size and shape of skulls as the means for
understanding the functioning of the brain, intelligence tests drew on the
performative abilities of individuals recognised as particular abstract mental
processes. Rather than measuring the external characteristics of a person's
                                    
7 F. Allan Hanson (1993: 204) has argued that the advent of modern testing procedures that
"measure the differing capacities of individuals" had their roots in Darwinian theory. In
opposition to Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Hegel and Marx, who all essentially believed in the
fundamental equality of humankind, Darwin's theory of evolution was based on the necessary
differences between humans out of which natural selection occurs. However, and this is an
important point that Hanson does not pick up on, this process of evolution required that some
species would disappear as the more successful ones adapted more fully to the environment.
Francis Galton applied Darwin's notion of variation to the human and social realm and
developed a systematic process of measuring and identifying these differences (Aiken 1996: 7-
8; Hanson 1993: 205). Through his Anthropomorphic Laboratory that was set up in London in
the 1880s, Galton measured and collated numerous human abilities, including variations in
visual, auditory and weight discrimination, strength, memory, speed of perception,
sensitivity to pain and head size (Aiken 1996: 8). These measures of sensorimotor skills
upheld Locke's empirical philosophy that the senses were the doorway to intelligence, the
measurement and hereditary nature of which Galton was particularly interested in (Aiken
1996: 9). In order to successfully deal with his mass of material Galton devised "the notion of
the standard deviation and the statistical concept of correlation" (Hanson 1993: 205). This
process set up the concept of the norm, of a basic and central standard of measurement and
assessment of human differences. What began as a measure of difference and variation
therefore became an evaluation of that difference in relation to a norm (cf. Gleason 1989).
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body, intelligence tests examined the internal workings of the mind (Gould
1996: 23; Hanson 1993: 271).
Measuring Intelligence
The development of testing and measuring intelligence as a wide-scale and
state-sanctioned endeavour had its origins in late nineteenth century France
with the work of Alfred Binet and his student, Theodore Simon. Binet and
Simon bemoaned the lack of scientific precision in psychology and believed
that a specific diagnosis of idiocy had to be based on objective, quantifiable
facts rather than vague subjective interpretations. Rather than rely on the
imprecise categories of idiot, imbecile, feeble-minded and moron, as was the
trend of medical practitioners in late nineteenth century France, Binet and
Simon sought a measurement that would objectively categorise a person both
in relation to their innate intellectual abilities and in relation to all other people.
They believed that a universal measure of intelligence would transcend the
boundaries and idiosyncrasies of cultural nomenclature by providing statistical
data untainted by caprice, subjectivity or indifference. It would allow for
comparison, both across cultures and within an individual, especially with
regards to assessing whether there have been (or indeed can be) changes in a
person's intellectual capability. It would also allow for the assessment of
treatment and training procedures, and for an investigation of whether idiocy
can, in the end, ever be cured (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 333).  
Binet and Simon took as their primary assumption Esquirol's definition of
idiocy as "a weakness of the intelligence" (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 342) and
Pinel's interpretation of it as a deficiency of intellectual faculties (Rose 1985: 33).
Esquirol had also associated idiocy with a deficiency in language and speech
(Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 336), and the tests that Binet and Simon devised
Chapter Four: The Voice of Reason
page 163
emphasised linguistic capabilities as central features if intelligence. Reminiscent
of Locke, Binet and Simon's definition of intelligence was also based on the
"ability to judge well, to comprehend well, [and] to reason well" (Aiken 1996:
19). Binet and Simon argued that an accurate classification of idiocy, although
often combined with other observable physical symptoms, must take as its first
principle the fundamental and determining cause of the problem as inferior
states of intelligence. As they put it:
If the physician gives a child a diagnosis of profound idiocy or of
imbecility, it is not because the child does not walk, nor talk, has no
control over secretions, is microcephalic, has the ears badly
formed, or the palate keeled. The child is judged to be an idiot
because he is affected in his intellectual development (Binet &
Simon 1976 [1905]: 342).
Binet and Simon believed that developing a test to measure intelligence
would create a "precise basis for differential diagnosis" (Binet & Simon 1976
[1905]: 335). They argued that within the category "idiot" there existed a wide
variety of states and types of intelligence in need of scientific differentiation.
These differences, they believed, were not so much of type as of degree. As
Binet and Simon put it: "These inferior states are indefinite in number, being
composed of a series of degrees which mount from the lowest depths of idiocy,
to a condition easily confounded with normal intelligence" (Binet & Simon 1976
[1905]: 331).8 Therefore, it was the scientific ordering of differences between
idiots that was necessary. The consequences of this, as Rose argues (1985: 141),
had an overwhelmingly administrative and pedagogic aspect.
                                    
8 Working in the United States of America at the same time as Binet and Simon in France,
Naomi Norsworthy also concluded that the difference between "ordinary children and
defectives" was one of degree rather than of kind (cited in Luckey 1967: 172).
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In their 1905 article, "Upon the Necessity of Establishing a Scientific
Diagnosis of Inferior States of Intelligence", Binet and Simon outlined their
reasons for establishing a measure of intelligence, stating that it was in
response to a French Government directive to provide clear and precise criteria
by which to distinguish "defective" from "normal" children. The purpose of this
was ostensibly to weed defective children out of ordinary schools and provide
them with special education (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 331; cf. Digby 1996: 12-
3; Gould 1996: 178-183; Hanson 1993: 208-212; Luckey 1967: 171; Rose 1985;
Ryan 1973: 38-39). With the introduction of compulsory education throughout
much of Europe, North America and the Western world in the late nineteenth
century, the problem of children who were seemingly ineducable, or less easily
educated, caused considerable problems for teachers. These difficulties were
exacerbated by the problems associated with diagnosing idiocy and assessing
the potential educability of such people (Aiken 1996: 5; Digby 1996: 12; Rose
1985: 101-2). The development of the intelligence test was seen as a remedy to
this problem, and was devised specifically to assess mental deficiency.9  
This assessment of intelligence and potential for educability had an
altruistic basis, and drew on Séguin's belief that "defective" children could and
would benefit from special training. However, despite Gould's (1996: 182-183)
defence of Binet, it is clear that this altruism was marred by the perception of
idiocy as a state that one did not wish upon others without absolutely
irrefutable evidence. As Binet and Simon wrote: "To be a member of a special
                                    
9 Similarly, the first use of the intelligence test in North America was for the sole purpose of
measuring and assessing  mental deficiencies (Hanson 1993: 209). Henry Goddard, director of
the Vineland Training School for Feeble-Minded Boys and Girls in New Jersey, initially
wanted to test the accuracy of Binet's tests, and concluded that "Binet had certainly evolved
a very remarkable set of questions . . . that . . . did work with amazing accuracy . . .  [and that]
whatever defects or faults they do have . . . the tests do come amazingly near what we feel to
be the truth in regard to the mental status of any child tested" (Goddard 1976 [1910]: 358).
Goddard translated the 1905 Binet-Simon Intelligence Scale in 1908 and then went on to
revise and standardise this scale in 1910 (Aiken 1996: 16; Goddard 1976 [1910]).
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class can never be a mark of distinction, and such as do not merit it, must be
spared the record" (Binet & Simon 1976 [1905]: 331). To be classified as
subnormal was the worst punishment a child could endure, and one that would
effect his or her entire life. Consequently, Binet and Simon believed it was
imperative that procedures based on "the precision and exactness of science
should be introduced into [their] practice wherever possible" (Binet & Simon
1976 [1905]: 331).  
Binet and Simon argued that the definitions of idiocy by Locke, Itard and
Séguin, upon which some of the earliest tests of "intelligence" were based
including Galton and Cattell's sensorimotor tests, were too simple and sensory
in nature to adequately measure the complexity of intelligence (Aiken 1996:
10).10 The assumed correlation between intelligence and sensorimotor skills
upon which such tests were based was eventually disproved in the early years
of the twentieth century (Aiken 1996: 9-10).11 In comparison to intelligence
tests, studies of motor and sensory perception were also considered to be "tests
of the less complex mental processes" (Luckey 1967: 171-172). Instead of
focusing solely on sensorimotor and perceptual skills, Binet and Simon
developed a test that assessed a child's capacity to solve problems.
Consequently, their 1905 intelligence test diagnosed and assessed idiocy in
terms of specific and diverse mental abilities. These included abilities for
abstract reasoning, memory, numeracy, comprehension, time orientation,
object comparison, knowledge, and the combination of ideas into wholes
(Aiken 1996: 13). In order to measure such skills Binet and Simon included in
                                    
10 James McKeen Cattell visited Galton's Anthropomorphic Laboratory in London and was
familiar with Galton's particular form of "mental tests". Cattell then went on to develop
these tests back in the USA (Aiken 1996: 7).
11 Binet actually included sensorimotor skills in the earlier tests that he devised with Victor
Henri, along with a complex mix of other tasks, abilities and observations, including moral
judgement, mental addition, the recall of a series of digits and even cranial capacity (Aiken
1996: 11).
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their test "tasks such as the naming of designated objects, comparisons of
lengths of lines, repetition of digits, completion of sentences, and
comprehension of questions" (Rosen et al. 1976: 327), as well as visual
coordination, cognisance of food and objects, suggestibility, drawing from
memory, and distinctions between abstract terms (Aiken 1996: 12). Their test
ultimately assessed a child's capacity for judgement, comprehension and
reasoning through verbal and perceptual materials, although the emphasis was
always on the higher and more complex verbal abilities which came at the end
of the test (Aiken 1996: 13).  
Binet and Simon revised their initial test in 1908 in order to group the
questions in terms of their difficulty for different ages rather than on the basis
of their difficulty per se (Aiken 1996: 13; Rosen et al. 1976: 328). The "mental age"
(MA) of the child was thus devised, and this represented the "age" at which the
child had last been able to answer the questions. This revised test sought a
comparison between different levels of mental ability and as such was based on
the a priori assumption that a standard or normal level of intelligence could be
correlated with age. Intelligence in Binet and Simon's model was therefore
intrinsically bound up with theories of development.  Binet and Simon sought
to clarify the standard abilities of children at different ages and at different
points in their intellectual development. As Henry Goddard—who translated
and standardised the Binet-Simon Intelligence Scale in 1908 and
1910—acknowledged, by interpreting these normative abilities as "so
fundamental and human that they do not depend upon training, [Binet] is able
to say that to us, any normal child who has lived in the world three years is
able to do such and such things" (Goddard 1976 [1910]: 357).  
In 1916 Lewis M. Terman also revised and standardised the original Binet-
Simon intelligence test and scale (Hanson 1993: 209). This new test, which
Terman called the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, is still in use today,
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although since 1916 it has been revised three times, in 1937, 1960, and 1986
(Aiken 1996: 84-89). These tests include the measurement of perceptuo-motor
skills and verbal tasks, as well as memory, judgement, interpretation, and
abstract reasoning (Aiken 1996: 87-88). As well as popularising the use of
intelligence testing in North America, Terman was also the first to incorporate
the intelligence quotient (IQ) in his tests as a singular mark of intelligence.
Devised by William Stern, a German psychologist who also developed Binet
and Simon's intelligence tests, the IQ is a relative rather than absolute measure
of intelligence. As the ratio of mental age to chronological age, the IQ produces
a score that oscillates around the standard norm of 1 (or 100 when converted to
a percentage) as indicative of average intelligence (Hanson 1993: 210-212;
Luckey 1967: 172).12  
Through the development, standardisation and application of intelligence
tests by Binet, Simon, Terman, Goddard and others during the first decades of
the twentieth century a new way of defining, assessing, and diagnosing idiocy
was devised. Idiocy was a dysfunction of intelligence; the consequence of an
inferior or abnormal cognitive ability. It was based on the association of reason
with intelligence as an observable, testable and measurable phenomena. Such
quantifications ultimately allowed for distinctions to be made between normal
and abnormal levels of intelligence, the latter which then came to be associated
with gradations of intellectual disability.  Intellectually disabled people's
                                    
12 Terman's test, which was further revised by Robert Yerkes to allow for mass testing
through the use of multiple choice questions, also represents the first mass application of the
intelligence test, given with disastrous results, to army recruits in the USA preparing for
World War One  (Hanson 1993: 210-212). Goddard and Terman were both involved in this
testing, the results of which were to be used to classify the sort of work each recruit should do.
The average mental age of white American males, as Hanson points out, turned out to be 13,
with those from other ethnic backgrounds recording even lower age levels. This difference in
ethnic scores has been a crucial factor in criticisms levelled at intelligence testing, not
withstanding the fact that the tests were used to weed out potentially intellectually
undesirable immigrants to the United States.
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deficiencies, abnormalities and incapacities have subsequently been quantified,
measured and assessed by reference to such tests.
F. Allan Hanson (1993) has outlined the increasing dependence on testing in
Western societies, in particular in North America, and argues  that "our
addiction to testing influences both society and ourselves as socially defined
persons" (Hanson 1993: 1). Hanson's analysis encompasses both the way in
which tests define and produce certain kinds of persons, as well as the means
used to sustain a level of surveillance and domination over them (Hanson 1993:
3-4). While such an analysis tends towards totalising the cultural construction of
identity with problematic consequences for issues of agency, it does highlight
the role played by these constructions      in shaping the way we think about
and perceive others. Intellectually disabled people have been constructed as
lacking in intelligence for their failure to adequately pass the tests that are
supposed to measure intelligence.
The definition of intelligence and reason that is both assessed and reinforced
through these tests has been implicitly interpreted within the parameters of
decontextualised, isolated and abstract mental operations. Intelligence testing
ultimately relied on the capacity for, and development of, abstract mental and
linguistic abilities. The reliance on language in intelligence tests was recognised
as a problem when it came to assessing those who lacked the required verbal
and written communication skills (Luckey 1967: 172). Consequently, other tests
were developed, such as the formboards of Healy and Witmer, and the Merrill-
Palmer Test which relied on gestures rather than spoken communication
(Aiken 1976: 205; Luckey 1967: 173). However, these tests were fundamentally
assessments of abstract mental processes, and this became the hidden marker
of normality, sociality and reason, a marker that is still dominant in
contemporary definitions of intellectual disability. Rather than grounding
abnormality in the physical as medicine has done, psychological interpretations
Chapter Four: The Voice of Reason
page 169
of intellectual disability have grounded reason and intelligence in certain
abstract mental procedures, measurements and tests. As the most dominant
and influential form of this, intelligence testing has embodied certain concepts
of reason that have never been rendered in physical terms in the medical
model. This clinical interpretation has fundamentally affected the institutional
perception, management and treatment of intellectually disabled people. The
psychological and medical records of my siblings attest to the ongoing reliance
on intelligence tests and IQ scores as a means for diagnosing and assessing
intellectual disability.   
*
In November 1962, when specialists at the Alder Hay Children’s Hospital in
Liverpool were trying to determine the cause of Stephen’s epileptic seizures, they noted
that there was “no evidence of intra cranial calcification” (26/11/62). Apart from
prescribing drugs for the epilepsy and performing numerous medical tests over the
following three years, both on him and my three other older siblings, it was not until
August 1965 that the first of many intelligence quotient (IQ) tests was performed. In
keeping with the original purpose of Binet’s IQ tests, Stephen was tested by the local
school and child health doctors from the Public Health Office in Wallasey to determine
whether or not he was fit to attend a ‘normal’ school. At the age of five and a half, he
was made to perform the Revised Stanford-Binet Form L-M and was given an IQ of 38
and a mental age (MA) of one year and eleven months. Stephen was considered
mentally deficient and it was suggested to my parents that he attend the special
education school close by, which had been set up to provide for children who, on the
basis of their intellectual capabilities, did not fit into mainstream education.
The principal paediatrician at the Alder Hay Children's Hospital wrote to Dr R in
Perth that “This boy [Stephen] is definitely retarded, both from the physical and the
mental points of view” (21/12/65). He based this assessment on the Stanford-Binet test
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done in 1965 and a number of EEG and urine chromatography tests performed over the
previous three years. That single test was the only mention of IQ and mental age for
any of my siblings during the time that we lived in England. Within six weeks of
arriving in Australia, however, and over the intervening 35 years, there have been
numerous examinations of my siblings' psychological and intellectual capabilities.
These, combined with medical examinations and social adaptability tests, have
consistently diagnosed my brother and two sisters as mentally retarded, though the
degree to which they were considered to be retarded has varied over time. The original
IQ result was regularly referred back to as the hallmark, the yardstick, against which all
subsequent tests were compared. It became indicative of whether there had been any
improvement or deterioration in my siblings' retardation, or whether they were to
remain forever fixed at a particular level of intellectual impairment.
Miss L—the psychologist from the University of Western Australia’s Department
of Psychology who tested and observed Maryla and Stephen on our arrival in
Fremantle—focused particularly on their language (in)ability and performance on
formboard tests.13She also described my siblings' behaviour during testing and how
they related to my parents. Because Stephen had no speech he was tested on the
‘performative’ items of the Binet and Randell’s I’s test.  It was noted that he passed “the
straightforward formboards and other tasks where the requirements were more or less
self evident, at a good 4 year level”. However, as Miss L comments, “he did not
comprehend identification and matching tests above the 3 year level”. She deduced
from these tests that Stephen’s “manual dexterity and space-form perception” was at
three-quarters the normal age, “but consider[ed] his language, conceptual and
                                    
13 The use of formboards, or cut-out shapes that fit onto indents in a board, was first adopted
by Itard and Séguin in their training of idiot children (Drever & Collins 1928: 12-13). The
formboards were incorporated into the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale by Terman as
performance tests to assess the capacity for concrete problem solving in children without
relying on linguistic ability (Aiken 1996: 6; Drever & Collins 1928: 12-13).  
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comprehension level [to be] considerably lower”. She says this despite acknowledging
that Stephen “appeared to understand everything his mother said to him” (15/2/66).
Maryla was also tested in 1966 at an age of 4 years and 4 months. Miss L wrote of
Maryla that she was “hyperactive and distractible but not excessively so. The most
obvious abnormality [being] a speech disturbance” (21/3/66). After testing Maryla on
Randell’s I’s Performance test Miss L deduced that Maryla’s median age was 3 years 6
months, and her IQ was 80±5. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT)14
assessed Maryla’s verbal skills at 3 years and 4 months but Miss L concluded that her
“comprehension and use of language [was] below this level and not within ‘normal’
range either in quality or content”. She commented that Maryla “has a history of
delayed development in motor skills as well as speech and [that] it is possible that the
‘turns’ are secondary to the abnormal development”. However, Miss L also wrote that
Maryla “was surprisingly good on manipulative tasks —passed two items at age level
(formboards)”. She notes that this “is similar to the performance of her brother Stephen
. . . [and] the picture seems to be one of inconsistent development and selective
disturbance of function” (21/3/66).
Through tests administered at the Grosvenor Diagnostic Centre the same
‘discrepancy’ was observed between verbal and formboard tests, the latter “which
[Stephen] performed with insight and foreplanning”. Yet the concluding impression
was that “Stephen’s overall level of social and intellectual development appears to fall
within the upper half of the moderately retarded range” where “verbal skills fall well
below the moderately retarded range but some performance abilities extend to a good
mildly retarded level”. The mean result between these disparate results produced a
diagnosis in the “upper half of the moderately retarded range” (25/5/67). As someone
who did not rely on spoken language to communicate, it is not surprising that my
                                    
14 The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) measures receptive vocabulary and
intellectual functioning through the use of images rather than spoken words (Aiken 1996:
205).
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brother “could succeed at none of the verbal items of this [Merrill-Palmer15] scale at its
lowest limits—18 months to 2 years” (25/5/67).
By 1967 the results of the Merrill-Palmer test for intelligence had given Stephen an
IQ of 45 and a mental age of 3 years and 1 month. He was 6 years and 10 months old.
In 1969 the same tests produced a slight improvement in verbal skills, but not above
the 2 year level, while on the performance tests he recorded a result of 5 and a half to 6
years of age (12/5/69). Stephen was still considered to be below the mildly retarded
level, even on the performance tasks. In February 1975, during his final assessment at
Grosvenor by a third psychologist using the same Binet L-M test, Stephen was given
an IQ “below 30” and a mental age of 3-0 years indicating a “severe degree of
intellectual handicap” (24/2/75). He was 14 years and 7 months of age. This result was
referred to in all subsequent correspondence as the final assessment of Stephen's
intellectual disability.
Ursula was also tested at Grosvenor on our first visit in May 1967 and was given
an IQ of 54 and a MA (mental age) of 2-0 years. She was 3 years and 7 months old.  In
1969, just five days before she died, Ursula was again tested using the Merrill-Palmer
Scale of Mental Tests. She was very upset, anxious and easily distressed, as the report
indicates, and whether or not her performance was due to this, the psychologist noted
that “Ursula refused many items, and consequently began failing at the 18 month
level, though she did achieve some successes in the 3-1/2 to 4 year range i.e. in form-
board type items”. Consequently “no real estimate can be made of her intellectual level
except to say that the I.Q. obtained from testing, which would place her at the upper
end of the moderately retarded range, seems to be lower than her hypothesised potential
which would appear to be at least within the mildly retarded range” (12/5/69).
                                    
15 The Merrill-Palmer Scale is a performance test of a number of skills including "forms or
other objects to be manipulated, as well as copying, remembering words and sentences, and
matching or discriminating between forms" (Aiken 1996: 176). It is used as a popular non-
verbal substitute for the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Aiken 1996: 176).
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As with Stephen and Ursula, Maryla was also tested during these visits to
Grosvenor, although for her I have reports up to the present day. These reports
continue to use the IQ and MA as indicative of intelligence, comprehension and social
abilities. In 1967 it was noted that Maryla “was not sufficiently co-operative for her
intellectual abilities to be assessed adequately”. This was partly owing to her “bizarre
behaviour” during testing (12/5/67). Her MA was given at somewhere between 48
and 65 months using a combination of the Merrill-Palmer and the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test.  In 1969 a more precise assessment was recorded. On this occasion
the Stanford-Binet test gave Maryla an IQ of 37 and a MA of 3 years and 1 month,
while on the Merrill-Palmer she recorded an IQ of 54 and a MA of 4 years and 1
month.  In March 1974, specialists from the NSW Education Department used the
Binet Scale L-M to test Maryla once again, this time giving her an IQ of 35 and a MA
of 3 years and 5 months. She was 12 years and 4 months old at the time.
In 1977, having already moved to Stockton Hospital, Maryla was once again
intellectually assessed using the PPVT and the Stanford-Binet Form L-M. At 15 years
and 8 months of age she was given a MA of 1 year 9 months and an IQ of less than 30
on the PPVT, and a MA of 3 years 10 months and an IQ of less than 30 on the
Stanford-Binet test. The Clinical Psychologist who did the testing deduced that on “the
basis of this assessment, Maryla would appear to be functioning within the severe
range of mental retardation”, the results indicating that she has “deteriorated” since
the tests done in 1974 (5/7/77). He suggests that this might be due to a recent ward
change as it parallels a recent “regression in behaviour generally” and possible
“adjustment problems”.  In 1986, after an assessment using the same tests gave
consistent results that “are comparable with those of previous testing” (ie. a MA of 2
years 7 months and an IQ of less than 40 on the PPVT, and a MA of 3 years 7 months
and an IQ of less than 30 on the Stanford-Binet), Maryla was once again placed “in the
severe range of mental retardation” (28/7/86). While recent correspondence from
Stockton has generally been more concerned with behaviour modification and
Chapter Four: The Voice of Reason
page 174
individual service plans than intelligence testing and assessment, the classification of
severe mental retardation drawn from these earlier tests remains consistent. These are
referred to in any correspondence regarding possible community placement and other
management and training plans for Maryla.
The Loss of Meaning
The interpretation of the mind primarily as a tool for reasoning has tended to
overshadow many of the other complex and inter-related functions and
attributes of the mind, including its relationship with the body and emotions
(Damasio 1994: 197-199). It has also tended to prioritise only certain types of
mental abilities as rational and capable of producing meaning. The focus on
intelligence, and on the performance of tests to measure relative intelligence
and mental age, indicates that at the heart of such practices is the very issue of
reason itself. The mind has been prioritised as a tool for reasoning rather than
as an entity through which symbolic meaning is created and communicated.
Humanness has been defined according to reason, which has itself been
associated with specific mental processes rather than with the capacity for
sociality and engagement in social relations.   
The positivist interpretations upon which anthropology's "practical reason"
have been based are not dissimilar to such accounts of intelligence and reason.
Writing about the development of anthropology, Sahlins explains that:
Mind appears in Morgan's theory as the instrument of cultural
development rather than its author . . .  Passive rather than active,
simply rational rather than symbolic, the intelligence responds
reflexively to situations it does not itself produce and  organise, so
that in the end a practical logic—biologic in the earlier stages,
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technologic in the later—is what is realized in cultural forms
(Sahlins 1976: 58).
In such accounts, the propensity to create culture and engage in sociality is only
recognised as a product of a certain kind of mind. This mind is one that has
responsive and rational capacities rather than creative and symbolic
capabilities. The minds of those who are different, along with their actions and
interactions, are perceived as abnormal aberrations rather than potentially
productive of meaning and culture. This is the crux of the matter, the ultimate
source to which I trace this distinction between some actions as meaningful and
others as abnormal. The mind is perceived as the source of culture and
sociality. Yet this mind depends on an association of reason with intelligence
that excludes the different capabilities and products of some minds, and hence
the people associated with them. Some people are normal, others abnormal.
Some create and reproduce meaning, others never can. Some are considered
encultured and social beings, others unencultured and asocial. Intellectually
disabled people are considered incapable of creating meaning. They may use
language, but not to convey meaning to others (Kanner 1944: 214).16 While this
is often the accepted clinical view, it also extends to anthropological accounts of
intellectually disabled people. Craig MacAndrew and Robert Edgerton (1970:
28) argued that profoundly retarded people have a "dramatically impaired"
                                    
16 Kanner's early descriptions of infantile autism included a comment about meaning. He
claimed that although some of the children he studied developed the ability to speak, they
did not use language "to convey meaning to others" (Kanner 1944: 214). This, combined with
the notion that autistic people cannot relate to others, serves to isolate them in a world of
abnormality and asociality.  Consequently, as David Leser (1996: 45) writes, it is assumed
that "Autism sets up barriers that somehow engulf a child, making their world unfathomable
to us and, indeed, our world unfathomable to them". This attitude towards autism was echoed
in a recent television report (ABCTV 11/2/2000). In this programme the commentator stated
that autistic children live in a "frightening world" with "no speech, no imagination, no
social skills". Rather than leaving them in this isolated world, however, the report
described a new therapy based on mimicking the actions and gestures of these children in
attempts to draw them into the socially meaningful world represented by the therapists (cf.
Gleason 1989; Goode 1980b).
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capacity for culture and that this is related to their "lack of language skills". As
they put it, while such people "respond to some symbols, they create symbols
only rarely if at all" (MacAndrew & Edgerton 1970: 28).
Due to this assessment, and following Edgerton's lead, the sociocultural
study of intellectual disability has tended to focus on social issues such as
deinstitutionalisation, adaptation to the community, and the stigma associated
with being labelled "mentally retarded" rather than on the possibility of
meaningful interactions with severely mentally disabled people.17 Yet my
research has shown that severely intellectually disabled people do have the
capacity to create and engage in symbolic, patterned behaviour, albeit in a
limited and restricted form. The jigsaw puzzles and bits and pieces that my
siblings used represent the purposeful production of a symbolic life. It has been
through engaging with such symbolic activities that a mutual sociality has been
mediated and my siblings' social identity supported. My intellectually disabled
siblings may not have used language in conventional ways, nor expressed
normative dispositional behaviours, but their capacity to create recognisable,
repetitive and patterned modes of symbolic systems through their particular
uses of objects provided the grounds for social engagement. In this sense, the
jigsaws and bits and pieces became symbols of sociality. While my siblings'
very real deficits in intellectual ability affected their range of symbolic
expression, they did not entail an incapacity for sociality.
The identification of humanness, intelligence and reason with particular
linguistic skills, symbolic expressions and mental operations has profoundly
influenced the perception and interpretation of intellectual disability. This
association has undermined and denied the creativity, humanness and sociality
of intellectually disabled people, whose means of interacting with others,
                                    
17 These sociocultural studies are the focus of chapter five.
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expressing themselves and making meaningful the world are generally
embodied in very specific practices rather than the abstract and isolated skills
measured in intelligence tests. As John Gleason emphasises in his observation
of the meaning in profoundly intellectually disabled people's actions and
interactions:
To see relationships among human systems and people is not the
same as isolating variables and seeking correlations; rather, it is to
explore the meaning in an event in a spatial and temporal context
that respects the persons' patterns of interaction, communication
and participation (Gleason 1994: 248).
As far as my siblings were concerned, there was no acknowledgment that
an inability to conform to the testing procedures, that a failure to achieve a
"normal" level of intelligence, could be indicative of a difference that cannot
solely be interpreted in these terms. While there appears to be some
consistency in the results of the intelligence and performance tests that my
siblings have undergone since 1965, there is also a constant and underlying
theme that suggests that my brother and two sisters all scored well on
formboard and spatial tests. Interestingly, these abilities were responded to
with surprise by those administering the tests.  
The skills that my siblings did have, skills that I observed and admired as a
child—such as their method of doing jigsaw puzzles, Maryla's collecting and
patterning of bits and pieces, and Stephen's skill at balancing both himself and
objects in a precarious manner—were given no serious credibility. They were
not considered as evidence of an intelligence, of a different ability, adaptability
and way of being in the world. Neither were they acknowledged as creative
expressions, as the symbolic means through which my siblings expressed their
particular forms of sociality and communicated with others. Instead, these skills
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became indicative of an inconsistency in development. They suggested an
aberration in the expected pattern of overall intellectual ability.  As Gleason
(1989: 7-8) and Johnson (1998: 71) have pointed out, intelligence and
adaptability tests always stress intellectually disabled people's inabilities rather
than what they can do.18 "The focus becomes the handicap and the remediation
of deficit areas rather than what the individual is doing", comments Gleason
(1994: 256) and, as such, intellectually disabled people are rarely perceived as
doing anything meaningful unless it correlates with socially prescribed
behaviours and interactions. Notes from the medical and psychological records
of my siblings are evidence of the way in which intelligence and reason has
been associated with the capacity for meaningful human interaction. The
presumption of asociality where particular forms of reasoning ability are
lacking is evident.
*
                                    
18 Those people who exhibited particularly "unusual" skills were commonly known as "idiot
savants", a term coined by John Langdon Down in 1887 (Treffert 1989: xxvii). In his study of
this phenomenon and its history, Donald Treffert concluded that such people lack abstract
reasoning and cognition, emotional expression and communication, and are aloof, hyperactive,
impulsively driven and self-absorbed (Treffert 1989: 9-26). Treffert argues that idiot savants'
special abilities do not rely on general intelligence, and are mimetic rather than creative,
suggesting a different brain circuitry that bypasses the ones used in daily reckonings (Treffert
1989: 54). Treffert believes that these people exist in a world that lacks comprehension,
relevance and meaning. The skills that they obviously have, be they mathematical, musical
or artistic, are performed without understanding and represent a combination of functional
and structural brain disorders—though Treffert stresses the need to emphasise the functional
aspect of the disorder rather than its structural component (Treffert 1989: 230). What is most
disturbing about Treffert's Extraordinary People: An exploration of the Savant Syndrome,
is his desire to discover what it is that allows for such extraordinary skills so that the rest of
the population can harness them (Treffert 1989: xiii). Treffert also perpetuates negative
interpretations of intellectually disabled people, stressing their supposed lack of originality,
creativity, communication, comprehension and meaning. Tragically, some of the people
Treffert profiled lost their unique abilities once they were socialised into 'normal' behaviour
patterns. In the case of one set of twins who communicated with one another through numbers,
when they were separated they no longer had their mathematical mode of communication
and became locked in an isolated world where no-one understood their means of
communicating (Treffert 1989: 36-42, 80-1; cf. Sacks 1986: 199). Alternatively, Oliver Sacks
argues that such people "may be truly and creatively intelligent, and not just have a
mechanical 'knack', in the specific realms—musical, numerical, visual, whatever—in which
they excel . . . and it is this intelligence which must be recognized and nurtured" (Sacks 1986:
184; author's emphasis).
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There are numerous examples in the medical notes of my sibling’s seemingly
strange behaviour or appearance: "The younger sister . . . is undoubtedly slow and has
a funny gait” (7/4/66); “she was quite friendly with me—almost too friendly showing
no shyness or anxiety to me as a person but is reported to be very anxious when out of
doors” (7/4/66); “I thought [Stephen's] behaviour was decidedly hyperkinetic. He
would concentrate for a few minutes at a time with certain toys but generally he
wandered about the room opening and closing doors etc.” (9/5/66);  “she [Maryla] . . .
demonstrates unusual behaviour” (19/5/67);  “formal testing proved impossible, owing
to Marylla's [sic] bizarre behaviour and inability to co-operate” (25/5/67); “all 3
children were hyperkinetic, impulsive and distractible. They rushed excitably about the
room playing with toys only for short periods in a disorganised fashion, showing that
quality of ‘driven’ over-activity characteristic of organic brain disease. All 3 appeared
retarded clinically, especially Maryla. She also impressed as out of touch and somewhat
bizarre in behaviour—she mouthed objects, ground her teeth constantly or emitted
shrill shrieks. She is the most difficult to control, seems to have little sense of danger
and has rushed out on the road in the path of oncoming traffic. She did some odd
drawings and was left handed” (12/7/67). Commenting on Maryla's attendance at the
University kindergarten, Dr R wrote that “On the days that Maryla was there is [sic]
was necessary to bring in an extra mother solely to look after her, as she could not
conform in class at all. On the other hand she would suddenly turn round read the
lettering on the waste paper bin, or give one such other surprises” (19/5/67).  
At Stockton, the progress notes observe that Maryla “often pretends to talk to
herself and plays with imaginary objects” (1976),  is continually “obsessed with her
bits and pieces” and exhibits “very bizarre and inappropriate behaviour” (1978; 1983).
In 1994 it was noted that her “obsessive behaviour” was still “difficult to manage”. It
was also noted in 1978 that Stephen had made “no progress in any areas of training.
[His] obsessive behaviour, [and] main occupation [was] jumping over cracks in vinyl
sheeting on the verandah, and doing jigsaw puzzles”.
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What is most distinctive about these and other observations of my siblings'
behaviour and capabilities is their "objective" nature. Not objective in the sense
of being untainted by subjective impressions and biases, but objective in the
sense that they are devoid of any interaction or attempt at communication. In
all the reports that I read there is never any indication that my siblings were
played or engaged with. Never did the examiner seek to enter their world,
play their games, or interpret their drawings and behaviour as something
other than abnormal. Their actions in the world were considered strange,
bizarre, and beyond the reach of meaningful interaction. My siblings were
perceived to be lacking in intelligence, and unable to reason, communicate and
relate to the world as anything other than abnormal, isolated and dysfunctional
persons. The only course these professionals took with my siblings was to
classify and categorise their observations within the known parameters of
pathology and normality. Any anomalies, any obvious skills that did not fit
with this general impression, were responded to with surprise, but were also
drawn back into a general diagnosis of intellectual disability through the
overall perception of them as inherently abnormal and dysfunctional beings.
Forms of reasoning deficit promoted the presumption of asociality even when
evidence to the contrary was there.
Problems with Intelligence Testing
Alfred F. Tredgold—a psychologist who specialised in mental deficiency and
whose 1914 Textbook on Mental Deficiency (Subnormality) has been republished at
least twelve times—criticised the practice of relying on intelligence tests as the
sole diagnostic criteria of the deficiency. Tredgold's main criticism was that "the
intelligence quotient and social behaviour are not perfectly related" (Tredgold
& Soddy 1963: 3), a criticism that is still recognised in contemporary research
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into the relationship between IQ and social adaptation (Hodapp & Dykens
1994: 680). Although criticising the unreliability of the IQ, its non-transference
across different tests and its inconsistency, Tredgold argued that a diagnosis of
mental deficiency must be based on the joint criteria of educability, social
competence and intelligence (Tredgold & Soddy 1963: 3-7).  
Edgar A. Doll's assessment of social competence and adjustment was a
response to just such criticisms. The Vineland Social Maturity Scale was
developed by Doll in the 1940s as an additional and holistic method for
diagnosing  mental retardation. Drawing on developmental models of learning
and maturation, Doll developed the Vineland Scale in order to "quantify the
evaluation of social competence as a global aspect of individual maturation at
successive age levels" (Doll 1976 [1948]: 272). For Doll, social maladjustment
was inadequate, irrational, unrealistic, undesirable, unconventional and socially
objectionable (Doll 1976 [1948]: 270). Through the observation and assessment
of behaviour and social skills such as communication, daily living,
independence, socialisation and locomotion the social adequacy or inadequacy
of a person would be determined (Aiken 1996: 213-215; Doll 1976 [1948]).  
Therefore, it is not that intelligence tests were considered wholly invalid, but
that they were not singularly appropriate tools for diagnosis. Mental deficiency
was not just a deficiency in intelligence; it was combined with a deficiency in
social skills, independent functioning, and personal and social responsibility
(Aiken 1996: 213; Hodapp & Dykens 1994: 678; Luckey 1967: 172-173). The
contemporary definition of intellectual disability is based on a combination of
intelligence and adaptive behaviour and both are used in assessments of an
individual's level of disability (Jenkinson 1996: 97). The psychological tests that
my sister performed in 1986 as part of her assessment for potential community
residential placement included the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale (1984) to
measure her social competency, as well as the Stanford-Binet Form L-M in
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combination with the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test to assess her
intellectual capacity. An overall picture of Maryla's suitability for community
placement was drawn from the results of these tests, and included an earlier
and much cited medical diagnosis of "Recessive Metabolic Disorder of
unknown aetiology" (28/7/86). In combination with medical assessments, such
tests have been regularly used since 1965 to determine the social and cognitive
capabilities of all of my intellectually disabled siblings.   
During the 1970s, the practice of psychometrics, of intelligence testing, came
under increasing attack from many quarters, especially with regards to
potential discrimination on the basis of race, class and gender (Bijou 1992: 311-
312; Hanson 1993: 259-268; Judge 1987: 35-37; Persell 1981; Ryan 1973; Wortis
1978). In his book, The Mismeasure of Man, Stephen Jay Gould argues against
biologically determined theories that use a single quantifiable measure of
intelligence and then reify and rank these results on a linear scale (Gould 1996:
20-56). Such data, Gould asserts, are subject to cultural constraints and tend to
yield unintentionally biased results (Gould 1996: 59).  As he writes of his book:
The Mismeasure of Man is not fundamentally about the general
moral turpitude of fallacious biological arguments in social settings .
. . It is not even about the full range of phoney arguments for the
genetic basis of human inequalities. The Mismeasure of Man treats
one particular form of quantified claim about the ranking of human
groups: the argument that intelligence can be meaningfully
abstracted as a single number capable of ranking all people on a
linear scale of intrinsic and unalterable mental worth. Unfortunately
. . . this limited subject embodies the deepest (and most common)
philosophical error, with the most fundamental and far-ranging
social impact, for the entire troubling subject of nature and nurture,
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or the genetic contribution to human social organisation (Gould
1996: 20; author's emphasis).
Gould's account of the problematic and politically dangerous nature of
intelligence testing is, as always, vivid and lucid. However, it is not just race,
class and gender that is being categorised.  Intellectually disabled people are
undoubtedly the most affected of all people by these tests, and it is important
to remember that the tests were specifically designed to separate them from
the "normal" school population.  
To define mental retardation according to cut off levels in IQ and mental age
has always been a controversial practice despite its widespread use. These
controversies have extended into debates over the definition of intellectual
disability, of the relative worth of basing assessments and definitions of
intellectual disability on IQ scores, whether assessments and definitions of
intellectual disability should refer to intelligence at all, and, if not, what the
criteria for defining mental retardation should rely upon. Sidney Bijou has
criticised purely cognitive and intellectual functioning theories of mental
retardation for their reliance on intelligence tests (Bijou 1992: 310-315). His main
objection is that the test "attributes the immediate cause of retardation to a non
observable, hypothetical variable which is called 'inefficient cognitive
functioning', a variable derived by giving an individual's level of performance
on an intelligence test a second name, that is, inefficient cognitive functioning"
(Bijou 1992: 314). F. Allan Hanson (1993: 249) is even more explicit in his
criticisms, arguing that the concept of intelligence is itself entirely a product of
intelligence tests.
Jane Mercer (1975) has been more specific in her critique of the use of IQ
scores and intelligence tests within the educational system. Mercer argued that
such tests discriminate against the lower classes and non-Anglo ethnic groups,
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and mark some children from these backgrounds as mentally retarded for the
purposes of educational practices (Mercer 1975: 141). She claims that such
assessments violate the rights of children, especially "their right to be evaluated
within a culturally appropriate normative framework, their right to be assessed
as a multi-dimensional human being, their right to be fully educated, their right
to be free of stigmatizing labels, and their right to ethnic identity and respect"
(Mercer 1975: 141). Chris Borthwick (1996) has taken this criticism even further,
by arguing that the environmental biases that affect IQ scores for people from
different cultural backgrounds also need to be considered with respect to
people with Down's syndrome. Borthwick claims that:
If one asks why the relationship between IQ testing and people with
Down's syndrome have [sic] not been analysed in the same terms
as the relationship between IQ testing and blacks, the basic answer
is that people with Down's syndrome are universally regarded as
being essentially, rather than accidentally, different from the ruling
culture. Liberals, conservatives, socialists and racists alike 'know'
that people with Down's syndrome are intrinsically deficient
(Borthwick 1996: 404).
While not wishing to enter the nature-nurture debate around which
Borthwick's argument revolves—nor pursuing the claim that, aside from the
normal prejudices, physical and perceptual impairments have also operated as
the source of unhidden and unacknowledged biases in IQ assessments of
Down's syndrome people (Borthwick 1996: 407-408)—I do wish to take up
Borthwick's observation concerning the assumption of an absolute difference
between the minds of intellectually disabled people and others.  
Borthwick claims that the assumption of low intelligence as a "global
characterisation" of mentally retarded people builds upon the racial analogy
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instigated by John Langdon Down whereby "evolution, civilisation and
intelligence were all equivalent to adulthood" (Borthwick 1996: 406). Despite the
fallaciousness of such an equation, Borthwick argues, it underlies
contemporary perceptions and interpretations of intellectual disability and such
people's capacity for learning and language (Borthwick 1996: 408-409).
However, the association of language and intelligence with adulthood,
civilisation and evolution has far wider ramifications for intellectually disabled
people than Borthwick attests. Because of the implicit association between the
rational and abstract cognitive abilities that IQ scores are seen to represent and
a capacity for communication and meaningful social interaction, intellectually
disabled people have been positioned as being outside the social domain. Yet a
capacity for mutual sociality relies on far more than just these limited mental
operations. It relies on the capacity to create, engage in, and negotiate symbolic
practices. If our sociality is fundamentally embedded in mutuality, then our
capacity to interact is necessarily bound up in our ability to produce, mediate,
negotiate, utilise and share symbolic systems of meaning. Strangely, this is not
an issue that anthropologists have taken up with regards to criticisms of
intelligence testing.  
Focusing their discussions on child development, anthropological
psychologists such as Sara Harkness and Charles Super have argued that
interpretations of intelligence must be contextualised. They claim that
"psychologists have sought to uncover the underlying rules of behaviour by
experimentally detaching it from its usual context [while] anthropologists have
sought explanations for human behaviour in its varying contexts" (Harkness &
Super 1980: 2-3). Decontextualisation, they argue, ultimately affects the
interpretation of behaviour and intelligence as behaviour is removed from its
socially meaningful and structural site (Harkness & Super 1980: 5-8). While
Harkness and Super interpret child behaviour as a cultural and social
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phenomenon, they also tend towards interpreting those "other cultures" as
somehow internally uniform and relative to one another.
Robert LeVine takes up the issue of intelligence in his essay on "Child
Development and Anthropology", arguing that there is a continuity between
cultural values, ideologies and beliefs, and the research paradigms that
encompass studies of child development. LeVine claims that:
The psychological preoccupation with intellectual development and
the relative neglect of social and affective development reflect the
values Westerners place on the higher cognitive functions and on
competitive achievement in that area, as well as the connections
our institutions make between IQ tests, educational selection, and
economic distribution . . . In other cultures, different individual
characteristics will be seen as variable, problematic, and worthy of
study. Thus the concern of psychologists with child behaviour
variables most frequently reflects the concern of the culture in
which their social perceptions are embedded (LeVine 1980: 77).
The tests of intelligence that are used to measure internal cultural variation do
so on the basis of norms and standards that incorporate predetermined
interpretations of what intelligence is in the first place. In this way, argues
Robert LeVine (1980: 79), "folk beliefs acquired from one's culture incline one to
identify the known range of variation at home with the limits of the normal
and the natural for the human species". LeVine quotes studies that have
specifically focused on cultural aspects of cognition. These suggest that
cognition is directed towards different goals and uses different strategies within
different social and cultural settings (LeVine 1980: 82). In this way, intelligence
as an absolute and definable category and entity becomes highly problematic.
It must therefore be seen as a social and cultural entity that has specific
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meaning within the historical, economic and ideological constraints of
particular cultures. By inference, intellectual disability must also be interpreted
in this light. Within Western cultures intellectual disability has been interpreted
according to the symbolic scheme of reason and normality. Consequently,
intellectually disabled people have been perceived and treated as abnormal
beings who are lacking in reason and intelligence and who therefore exist
outside the parameters of meaningful sociality.  In order to move beyond such
assessments, the intelligence and meaning of intellectually disabled people's
actions and interactions must be interpreted within their own socially
meaningful contexts.
Intelligence is now acknowledged as an amorphous, complex and
multifaceted concept, something that is difficult to define let alone measure and
test (Hanson 1993: 249-283; cf. Humphrey 1992; Damasio 1994; Gould 1996;
Wortis 1978). Within psychology itself there has been serious criticism and
debate over the concept and definition of intelligence, especially with regards
to whether it is innate and unchanging, and whether the IQ score is an
adequate measure of intelligence (Bijou 1992: 310-313; Barnett 1986; Benson et
al. 1993; Detterman 1987; Hanson 1993; Hodapp & Dykens 1994; Hodapp &
Zigler 1986; Ryan 1973; Wortis 1978; Yirmiya et al. 1996). There has also been
increasing doubt cast on the hereditary nature of intelligence, as Cliff Judge
(1987: 36) outlined in his account of the controversy surrounding Cyril Burt's
research into intelligence.19 Despite these criticisms, research on the genetic
nature of intelligence still continues (V. Anderson 1974; Dykens 1995; Heaton-
Ward 1978; Judge 1987; Kaplan 1972; Zigler, Balla & Hodapp 1984). The
                                    
19 Burt's seemingly incontrovertible evidence supporting the hereditary nature of intelligence
was based on experiments that he had done with identical twins. Burt was later accused of
tampering with the data to prove his hypothesis. Judge argues that this had consequences for
the whole nature-nurture debate on intelligence, and on the politics of access to education
(Judge 1987: 36).  
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publication of Herrnstein and Murray's The Bell Curve: Intelligence and class
structure in American life in 1994 brought the supposed relationship between
race, intelligence testing and IQ to the forefront of heated debates once again.
Despite these ongoing controversies there has been a return to utilising
methods such as the intelligence test and IQ scores for grading and the
placement of children in both "normal" and special schools since the mid-1990s
(Carman-Brown & Fox 1996: 233).20
By 1986, the official term used to refer to intellectual disability in Australia
had changed to developmental disability (Judge 1987: 34; Kearney 1996: 19-
27)—or "DDs" as the staff at the group homes where I worked called the
consumers. Developmental disability does not equate as closely with
intellectual disability as mental retardation, mental deficiency and idiocy have
done. It is a broad generic term that is based on common needs for service
provision rather than a specific diagnosis. Developmental disability is defined
as a severe or chronic disability associated with intellectual and/or physical
impairment that is manifest in the developmental stage (ie. before 18 years of
age). This impairment results in functional limitations in three or more areas of
adaptive behaviour, including self care, learning, language, mobility, self-
direction, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency (Accardo &
Whitman 1996: 87; Kearney 1996: 19-21).  
This recent change in terminology was a response to some of the criticisms
levelled at the concept of innate intelligence embedded within intelligence
testing and IQ scores, a concept which condemned children and adults
diagnosed with low intelligence to a passive acceptance of their condition.
                                    
20 The NSW Department of Education stipulates that students requiring special education
services "must have a full-scale IQ score of approximately two standard deviations or more
below the mean on an approved individual test of intelligence". This IQ score is used in
conjunction with an assessment of adaptive skills and school performance (NSW Department
of Education 2000: 2).
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Developmental models of intellectual disability, on the other hand, arose out of
"a cataloguing of capabilities of retarded people" between the turn of the
century and the late 1940s (Detterman 1987: 2). In North America, a focus on
child development, and in particular the acquisition of language, was also being
experimentally and quantitatively assessed from the early twentieth century
(Luckey 1967: 171). And, in the 1950s, specific research by A. D. B. Clarke into
the capacity for learning and development of intellectually disabled children
ultimately influenced the psychological assessment and interpretation of
intellectual disability (Bullock & Trombley 1999: 520). Reminiscent of Séguin's
assertion over 100 years earlier, Clarke claimed that intellectually disabled
people could learn complex skills and task analysis, but that their capacity to do
so was subject to the effectiveness of training schedules (Bullock & Trombley
1999: 520).  
The developmental model of intellectual disability—which was adopted by
the highly influential International League of Societies for the Mentally
Handicapped in 1971 and used for the purposes of appropriate
programming—stated that "retarded children and adults are . . . capable of
growth, learning, and development" (cited in Scheerenberger 1986: 65). It
continues: "Each individual has potential for some progress, no matter how
severely impaired he might be. The basic goal of programming for retarded
individuals consists of maximizing their human qualities" (cited in
Scheerenberger 1986: 65). The studies by Clarke and others had concluded that
retarded people can change and learn, and that their retardation is in fact
exactly what the term refers to, a retarded development; one that exists along a
singular continuum with all other people but at a lower level. Having accepted
this interpretation, the emphasis turned to the provision of appropriate
services and methods to assist intellectually people to learn and develop. This is
the principle that informs contemporary institutional practices and which I
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observed at Xanadu and the group homes. It is the basic component of
individual service plans and, in fact, is stipulated as a requirement of all services
for intellectually disabled people.
Despite this shift in emphasis to learning and development, intelligence and
reason are still crucial and central issues in the research on, and perception of,
intellectual disability.  Intellectual disability is still an intellectual disability. It is
still a problem of the brain. Despite his support for the developmental model of
intelligence, Douglas Detterman argues that "any theory of mental retardation
must also be a general theory of intellectual functioning" (Detterman 1987: 11).
As he argues: "Standardized measures of human intelligence as they currently
exist in the form of intelligence tests are really global measures of system
functioning; they were designed to be that" (Detterman 1987: 5). However, and
this is the important point, intellectually disabled people's development is
always one of innate "inefficient cognitive functioning" (Hodapp & Zigler 1986:
117; cf. Barnett 1986; Detterman 1987: 4).
Such clinical interpretations of intellectual disability are firmly embedded
within the symbolic scheme of reason and normality that has shaped Western
culture and consciousness. As a consequence of associating normal humanness
with a particular interpretation of reason as intelligence, the practical,
utilitarian, abstract, linguistic, logical and cognitive functions of the mind have
been privileged as the necessary criteria for human sociality. Psychological
assessments perpetuate this association by prioritising such intellectual
capabilities. Medical interpretations perpetuate it through diagnoses that are
mainly a search for genetic variation understood as an explanation for
intellectual deficit and abnormality. The recommendation for dealing with such
deficits and abnormalities has ultimately depended upon some form of
institutionalisation. Historically, this included incarceration in mental asylums
as much as it now embodies contemporary institutional practices of treatment
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and training. At no time did medical or psychological clinicians propose that
observations of my siblings' sociality was necessary, or that there was anything
problematic in reading presumed social capacity from intellectual testing.
Instead, my siblings were considered incapable of creating and engaging in
socially meaningful actions and interactions. It was assumed that training,
treatment and management were the only possible steps towards alleviating
their presumed asociality. Such institutionalised practices were the general
response to a diagnosis dominated by an unexamined association of reason,
itself equated with levels of intelligence, with the capacity for human social
being.     
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Chapter Five
A Sociocultural Phenomenon
Since in Man the predominant feature is Mind,
and since it is by its development and evolution
that human progress has taken, and must take, place,
it is clear that the question of its disease, and particularly of its defect,
is one of supreme importance to the statesman,
the sociologist, the philosopher, and the whole community.
Tredgold & Soddy
As a consequence of these clinical assumptions, psychological and medical
interpretations of intellectually disabled people have placed such people
beyond normal or autonomous sociality. In sum, this situation has meant that
intellectually disabled people are only ever professionally "known" in terms of
their abnormalities or problems, be they physical, intellectual and/or
behavioural. Such a "case history" approach not only informs the way that
intellectually disabled people are perceived and treated but it also limits
responses to them (Gillman et al. 1997). Despite more recent concerns with
assessing intellectually disabled people's potential for social adjustment and
competence, and acknowledgments that they can learn and develop social
skills, such practices are still limited by institutionalised environments.
The overwhelming dominance of this clinical and institutional approach to
intellectual disability has meant that such people's pre-existing capacity for
sociality has rarely been acknowledged. Nor have their lives been readily
examined from a sociocultural aspect. Intellectually disabled people may have
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constituted a social concern or problem but they were not considered social
beings worthy of social analysis. This neglect was influenced by the assumption
that reason and intelligence were the necessary attributes for meaningful
sociality. Without them, it was impossible to be a normal human, let alone a
social person. However, just as concern for the proper diagnosis of borderline
retardation or feeble-mindedness precipitated the development of intelligence
testing, it was an interest in the life circumstances of mildly retarded individuals
in the community that precipitated one of the first sociocultural studies of
intellectual disability. Robert B. Edgerton (1967) is the person associated with
the first ethnographic study of mentally retarded people, and while he inspired
a number of analyses of intellectual disability from a cultural and cross-cultural
perspective, to this day the study of intellectual disability still remains a
relatively minor field within the social sciences. Following Edgerton's example,
many sociocultural researchers in the field of intellectual disability have
analysed the stigma and social consequences of being labelled mentally
retarded. They have also focused on social welfare issues such as
deinstitutionalisation, socialisation and community adaptation. In the first
section of this chapter I outline the contribution of Robert Edgerton's research
to the sociocultural field of intellectual disability, both through his own research
and through those who were inspired by his approach. I then explore the
uneasy alliance between these sociocultural studies of intellectual disability and
disability studies—a multidisciplinary field of research which emerged at
around the same time—especially with regards to critiques of the medical
model of disability.
While the sociological and social welfare issues that Edgerton researched are
important, central as they so often are to the life experiences of intellectually
disabled people, there is often a tendency to focus on these at the expense of
analysing other ways in which intellectually disabled people experience and
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make meaningful their lives. The work of Robert Bogdan and Steven Taylor
(1982) represented an important and significant shift in the sociocultural
analysis of intellectual disability. Through the words of two mildly retarded
informants Bogdan and Taylor provided the sociocultural field of intellectual
disability with an "insiders view" of the lived experience of mental retardation.
Bogdan and Taylor were also critical of Edgerton's uncritical acceptance of the
clinical interpretation of mental retardation, arguing instead that such clinical
interpretations must be analysed as a social construction; an approach which
aligns their work more closely with disability studies. However, while the
clinical model inadvertently denies intellectually disabled people's capacity for
human sociality, the social constructionist model ignores the fact that
intellectually disabled people are more than just the products of social
constructions, projections and meanings. In the second section of this chapter I
outline the contribution of Bogdan and Taylor, and show how their work has
influenced contemporary social analyses of intellectual disability as a social
construction.  
As a consequence of Bogdan and Taylor's phenomenological method, a
third "school" of thought has emerged in the sociocultural field of intellectual
disability. In the final section of this chapter I explore in detail the work of
David Goode (1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1990) and John Gleason (1989, 1994), who
both emphasise issues of intimacy, relatedness, communication and meaning in
their research with intellectually disabled people. Unlike Edgerton and Bogdan
and Taylor's accounts, which predominantly focus on the experiences of mildly
intellectually disabled people, both Goode and Gleason have focused their
research on relationships with and between severely intellectually disabled
people. While their concern with intimacy and relatedness has resonances with
my own analysis, there are also significant differences, both between them, and
between their work and my own. By comparing the difference between clinical
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and intimate relationships with severely retarded persons, and their connection
to differences in perceptions of such people's attributes and capabilities, Goode
has argued that identities are socially generated. His work consequently
remains partially within a social constructionist paradigm. Gleason, on the
other hand, has focused his attention on the possibility of meaningful
interactions between severely intellectually disabled people and uses these
observations to critique some practices in special education. He argues that the
pathologisation of intellectually disabled people as socially abnormal prevents
educators from recognising the intent and meaning in such people's actions.
My own analysis of the clinical interpretation of intellectual disability as a
product of the symbolic scheme of reason and normality seeks to understand
why such people are perceived as socially abnormal and what the institutional
consequences of this perception are. I also emphasise the fundamental sociality
of severely intellectually disabled people and seek to interpret intimate and
meaningful relationships with them by acknowledging that mutuality,
interdependence and interrelatedness can constitute their social life. I argue that
it is through the negotiation and mediation of symbolic systems that the
mutuality and sociality of intellectually disabled people is manifest and
recognised.      
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Labelling and Stigma: The work of R. B. Edgerton
In 1963 Robert B. Edgerton criticised the fact that, despite the enormous
amount of literature in the field of intellectual disability, nearly all of it was
from the perspective of "social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists and other
medical specialists" (Edgerton 1963: 372).1 As such, he went on to argue, it only
ever "consists of psychometric reports, demographic analyses, observations
from the school, medical office or clinic, and short interviews with the retarded
person or his family" (Edgerton 1963: 372; cf. Gillman et al. 1997).2 Edgerton
                                              
1 Robert Edgerton trained as a graduate student in anthropology at the
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) during the 1950s. He did his
doctorate there under the tutelage of Walter Goldschmidt and then taught in
the Department of Psychiatry and Anthropology at UCLA from 1962. Edgerton
was also instrumental in the development of the Socio-Behavioural Research
Group which was part of the Mental Retardation Research Centre at
UCLA—one of the 12 university based research centres to exist in the United
States in 1984 (Edgerton 1984a). Edgerton's main area of interest was
psychological anthropology, which at that time was influenced by neo-
positivist studies of the relationship between personality development, society
and culture.  His doctoral research was a projective study of the Menomini
Indians of Wisconsin; a study that sought to elucidate whether or not
"Menomini values, like their patterns of personality, were equally predictable in
terms of an acculturative process" (Edgerton 1978: 449-450). After completing
doctoral research Edgerton joined Goldschmidt's research team which was
attempting to determine the effects of ecological and economic changes on
cultural adaptation in East Africa. However, Edgerton had already begun doing
research with mentally retarded people by this time, studying the effects of
institutionalisation, and the institutional process, on personality and behaviour.
It is this area of research for which he has become best known.
2 It is arguable that there has been little change in the intervening period since
Edgerton made this statement.  Hugh Mehan points out in his study of
educational handicaps that the medical model is still pervasive and dominant.
As he puts it: "When mental states are equated with physical states, educational
handicaps become equated with diseases" (Mehan 1988: 80; cf. Ryan & Thomas
1987). Despite the growth of literature exploring intellectual disability from a
qualitative and sociocultural perspective, the majority of research is still
biomedically and quantitatively inclined. The Australian Journal of Intellectual and
Behavioural Disability only ever has such quantitative analyses, and while the
social study of disabilities is starting to make a mark on the academic scene in
Australia, it is still only through informal gatherings of like-minded researchers
(such as the Social Relations of Disability Research Network which has monthly
seminars at the University of New South Wales) rather than through any
formal journal or school. Although disability studies has become more
established in the academic scene in the United Kingdom and the United States
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sought to change this through his many sociocultural studies of the lives of
mentally retarded adults, although he is best known for his ethnographic
account of deinstitutionalised people entitled The Cloak of Competence: Stigma in
the lives of the mentally retarded (1967).   
The most significant feature about The Cloak of Competence was that for the
first time the lives of mentally retarded people, as conceived and articulated by
them, were deemed to be worthy of social analysis. There was, however, still
an underlying social welfare concern in Edgerton's ethnography, especially
with regards to the problems associated with deinstitutionalisation and social
adaptation. Despite this, Edgerton gave to his subjects complex, multifaceted,
and dynamic social and psychological experiences, transforming them from
objects of study into subjects with their own, albeit problematic, points of view
(Gerber 1990).3 Where previous studies had focused primarily on external
quantitative assessments of how mentally retarded people adjusted to the
community, Edgerton filled a void by providing an ethnographic account of
their everyday lives, thoughts and emotions, and how they felt about being
retarded and living in the community (Edgerton 1967: 7-8; cf. Edgerton 1963;
MacAndrew & Edgerton 1970 for an account of the everyday lives of
institutionalised adults).
Although Edgerton was trained as an anthropologist, and used
ethnographic techniques such as interviews and narrative description as his
means for understanding the life experiences of his subjects, he did not draw
upon contemporary anthropological theories of culture as his theoretical tool.
Culture, at that time in American anthropology, was understood to be a
collective, learnt and reproduced phenomenon, a "set of [symbolic]
                                                                                                                      
of America, the relationship of intellectual disability to disability studies still
remains problematic, as I shall argue later in the chapter.
3 I pick up on some of Gerber's criticisms of Edgerton's work later in the
chapter.
Chapter Five: A Sociocultural Phenomenon
page 200
representations that shaped action and informed events" (Kuper 1999: 165).
Mentally retarded people, Edgerton argued, did not adequately learn or
reproduce cultural patterns, nor could they be interpreted as a separate culture
or subculture (MacAndrew & Edgerton 1970; cf. Gerber 1990: 10).4
Consequently, despite Ruth Benedict's (1934) earlier anthropological analysis of
epilepsy and abnormality as cultural concepts, and despite the fact that
intellectually disabled people do utilise symbolic representations as their means
for interacting with others, Edgerton turned to Erving Goffman's symbolic
interactionism and his analyses of labelling, stigma and total institutions to
interpret the life stories and experiences of the people he studied.5
In the early 1960s Goffman had applied the technique of participant-
observation in his study of the stigmatising effects of total institutions on an
individual's identity and self-esteem (Goffman 1990 [1961]; Goffman 1974
[1963]). While Goffman (1990 [1961]: 130) acknowledged that those on the "back
wards" (ie. the mentally retarded) could have "a livable and continuously
                                             
4 In characteristic style, Edgerton changed this assessment and later argued that
groups of mentally retarded people such as those working in a sheltered
workshop could be studied as a distinct culture with their own beliefs, practices
and meanings (Edgerton 1984d: 501).
5 In 1934 Ruth Benedict published an essay entitled "Anthropology and the
Abnormal". Rather than dealing with questions of why abnormalities occurred
or how they could be treated, the whole notion of abnormality as a cultural
phenomenon was instead put under scrutiny. Through an analysis of cultural
attitudes towards abnormalities such as epilepsy, Benedict concluded that the
perception of such conditions is culturally relative and based upon different
values and interpretations of both human behaviour and social roles (Benedict
1934). Benedict argued that the American Indian cultures which she studied
valued the trance states that occur with epileptic seizures and associated them
with the authoritative and honoured role of spiritual mediums. In contrast,
Western cultures perceive epilepsy as "blots upon family escutcheon and as
evidences of dreaded disease" (Benedict 1934: 61-2). Where the latter are
branded "abnormal and reprehensible", the former interpretation of epilepsy
makes it "an essential attribute of ideal man" (Benedict 1934: 72). Consequently,
Benedict argued, both normality and abnormality are culturally and morally
defined, such that normality "is primarily a term for the socially elaborated
segment of [the chosen range of] human behaviour in any culture [while]
abnormality [is] a term for the segment that that particular civilisation does not
use" (Benedict 1934: 73).
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meaningful social world" once seen from the inside, he stopped short of
analysing their experiences, or "moral careers", claiming that such people lacked
the complexity and learning capacity essential for self preservation through
role-playing, denying, and passing. In contrast, Edgerton argued that mildly
mentally retarded people could and did have the capacity to develop ways of
dealing with their stigmatised identity, and that they do attempt to pass as
normal in efforts to conceal the stigma of their discredited identity (Edgerton &
Sabagh 1962; Edgerton 1967; cf. Gerber 1990: 11-14).
Goffman had also been influenced by symbolic interactionism, a theory of
social life most readily identified with the social psychology of George Herbert
Mead.  Mead (1934: 1-24) argued that humans are distinguished by their
capacity for language, for symbolic representation, and that meaning, rather
than being inherent in things or a consequence of abstract rationality, emerges
through the interaction of the self with society. One sees oneself in relation to
others, and how others perceive us, but also through the social roles that we
enact. Therefore, it is the social meanings that people attach to the world and
others that determines their actions (Taylor & Bogdan 1998: 11)  As Kathryn
Pyne Addelson puts it (in paraphrasing Herbert Blumer, a student of Mead's
who gave to symbolic interactionism its specifically sociological dimension): "It
is the social process in group life that creates and upholds the rules, not the
rules that create and uphold group life" (Addelson 1991: 81).
In the 1960s Howard Becker (1963, 1964) and Edwin Lemert (1967) applied
some of the insights of symbolic interactionism to their analyses of the social
processes by which certain behaviours are labelled as deviant. They theorised
that the problem of deviancy lay not in the act itself but within the
institutionalised and professional definitions and interpretations of behaviour
that labelled as deviant those behaviours which deviated from the norm. In this
way the process of labelling both produced and reinforced deviant behaviours
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in a self-perpetuating, circular relationship such that a person incorporated this
definition into their self-image and played out the deviant role assigned to
them (Whitehead 1993: 49-50; cf. Conrad & Schneider 1985; Ferns 1993: 135-6;
Mehan 1988).
While Edgerton incorporated the theories of labelling and symbolic
interactionism in his analyses of mental retardation, he was critical of the
application of deviancy theory to the experiences of mentally retarded people.
The dominant Parsonian/Durkheimian viewpoint was that deviance was a
product of disturbances in the social equilibrium rather than a natural product
of human nature. This "oversocialized view of man" (as Dennis Wrong put it;
cited in Edgerton 1978: 445), claimed that humans internalise the rules, values
and laws of society and culture and that they conform to these in order to
sustain social harmony and self-esteem (Edgerton 1978: 445-449). Alternatively,
as Becker and Lemert argued, deviancy is a social category that serves to
support the status quo or to maintain group identity in contrast to dominant
social expectations (Edgerton 1970: 538-539). Edgerton was frustrated with both
these interpretations of deviance, arguing instead that it was a complex process
which involved both deviant acts and deviant persons, and that the causes must
be sought in the interaction of sociocultural environments with human nature
(Edgerton 1978: 470). With regards to mentally retarded people, however,
Edgerton stated that the metaphor of deviance was inappropriate because such
people do not consciously or intentionally deviate from the status quo
(Edgerton 1970: 539; 1967: 209). Consequently he preferred to use the term
incompetence, and focus on issues of stigma and labelling, rather than adhering
to the theoretical concept of deviance.
Despite this general interest in competence, stigma and labelling, Edgerton's
early forays into the field of intellectual disability were somewhat different in
their preoccupations. They focused instead on the social relations and
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friendships of retarded individuals.  One of these early studies was a profile of
the "complex social relations" that "elite" patients in a mental hospital had with
one another (Edgerton 1963). These "elite" patients were comprised of a
subgroup of inmates of mainly Black and Mexican-American people from low
socioeconomic backgrounds. They were not necessarily the "high grade"
inmates (the 21% who were the highest functioning with an IQ above 50)6 but
were defined by their shared, often self-appointed, status as delinquents
(Edgerton 1963: 374). The elite patients set themselves apart from the other
inmates, claiming that they were not mentally retarded and therefore should
be in a prison or home with other delinquents rather than a mental institution.7  
In another early paper Edgerton and Craig MacAndrew argued that,
despite the general perception of severely mentally retarded people as
possessing "only the barest rudiments of those qualities which are taken to be
peculiarly human",  they do have the capacity for enduring and elaborate
friendships with one another (MacAndrew & Edgerton 1966: 613). Through a
description of a long term, emotional and "extraordinarily intense and
pervasive friendship" between two institutionalized males, Edgerton and
MacAndrew argued that severely retarded people do engage in complex
relationships that "are testimony to the essentially human character of even the
most retarded among us" (MacAndrew & Edgerton 1966: 620). However,
unlike mildly retarded individuals who have the capacity to "invest their
                                                
6 The other groups within the institution, the "low grades" and "middle grades"
are defined by having an IQ below 20 (30% of inmates) and an IQ between 20
and 49 (49% of inmates) respectively (Edgerton 1963: 373).
7 Interestingly, especially with regard to Benedict's earlier analysis of
abnormality, one of Edgerton's concerns in this essay was with the issue of
"normality" in social relationships and behaviour. He posed a number of
questions about the "intra- and inter-personal nature of 'normality'",
emphasising the seemingly "normal" and complex nature of the behaviour and
social relationships of this elite group, arguing that low IQ does not necessarily
prohibit a person from engaging in appropriate and competent social
behaviour (Edgerton 1963: 384). However, despite this initial interest in
normality, Edgerton never went on to explicitly explore the concept of
"normality" as a complex social and theoretical issue.
Chapter Five: A Sociocultural Phenomenon
page 204
behaviour with meaning" (Edgerton 1984c: 503), Edgerton and MacAndrew
argued that people with profound intellectual disabilities have very little or no
ability to create or respond to symbols (MacAndrew & Edgerton 1970: 28). By
associating a "lack of language skills" with "impoverished cultural and social
behaviour", Edgerton and MacAndrew (1970: 28) consequently disregarded the
social and symbolic nature of other forms of behavioural expression and action.
They ignored the means through which such people do communicate and
engage with others, such as repetitive dispositional behaviour or the conscious
utilisation of objects. In accordance with a symbolic scheme that identifies
human sociality with language, reason and intelligence, such an interpretation
relegates profoundly mentally retarded people to a status as "less human than
some infra-human species" (MacAndrew & Edgerton 1970: 28; authors'
emphasis). Despite acknowledging a capacity for relationships, this
interpretation denied profoundly mentally retarded people's capacity for a
broader sociality.  
Due to this interpretation, and because of his growing interest in the
problems associated with deinstitutionalisation, Edgerton went on to exclude
profoundly and severely retarded people from his anthropological analyses of
the social and personal issues that deinstitutionalised mildly mentally retarded
people have to contend with. He argued that severely retarded people cannot
and do not exist in socially normal and acceptable circumstances and therefore
were not suitable candidates for deinstitutionalisation. By extension, neither
were they suitable for his study of the consequences of deinstitutionalisation.
Those who were borderline retardates, and who had the capacity for "some
intellectual tasks", were, Edgerton believed, capable of adhering to certain
necessary social standards and conditions and were therefore worthy of social
analysis (Edgerton 1967: 2-3).8 This concern with the life experiences of mildly
                                               
8 Edgerton's distinction between mild, moderate and severe mental retardation
is sometimes confusing and contradictory. At times he argued that mildly
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retarded people set the parameters for the sociocultural study of intellectual
disability for over a decade. Not until David Goode's (1980a; 1980b) analysis of
relationships between severely retarded children and their parents did the
focus shift to picking up on Edgerton's earlier analysis of the possibility of social
relations between severely retarded people and others.
Edgerton's 'The Cloak of Competence'
Edgerton's The Cloak of Competence was published in 1967 at a time when there
was widespread criticism of the power of medicine, psychiatry, and the large
mental institutions to interpret and control the lives of mentally ill and retarded
individuals (for example see Goffman 1990 [1961], 1974 [1963]; Foucault 1995
[1961], 1986 [1963]; Laing 1960; Szasz 1977 [1961]). Due to this increasing social
pressure, mildly retarded and mentally ill patients began to be released into the
community, although there were concerns as to how they would fare and what
factors should be taken into consideration when deciding who to
deinstitutionalise. Edgerton spent the majority of 1960 and 1961 observing,
interviewing, and analysing the lives of a group of mildly mentally retarded
adults in order to gain some insight into these and other concerns. Most of his
informants had been deinstitutionalised in 1954 from Pacific State Hospital—a
large state hospital in California specifically for mental patients from which
Edgerton drew the material for his earlier papers—and were now attempting
to live as members of the general community. Through a series of formal but
                                                                                                                                          
retarded people were the casualties of sociocultural factors, including poverty,
malnutrition, parental neglect and racial discrimination (Edgerton 1978: 456;
Edgerton 1984a: 26-27, 37-40). However, he also argued that their
incompetence was innate, and a real disability that they must constantly deal
with (Edgerton 1967). In contrast, and more consistently, Edgerton wrote that
those who were severely mentally retarded were undoubtedly "organically" or
"clinically" so, and that their inabilities were due to this rather than any
sociocultural factors (Edgerton 1984a: 26). He also stated that up to 75% of
those labelled retarded fell into the mild category (Edgerton 1984a: 26).
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loosely structured interviews Edgerton sought to elicit from these people their
experiences of being mildly mentally retarded. Using these interviews
Edgerton built up life histories through which he formulated themes that were
of concern for mildly retarded people living in the community. These included
such issues as their relations with others, including sex, marriage and fertility;
their neighbourhood, home and possessions; their self-perception, outlook on
life, and employment, and what they did with their spare time (Edgerton 1967:
44).9
Theoretically, however, Edgerton was more concerned with how mildly
retarded people coped with life on "the outs" (as life outside the institution was
called), and how they adapted to living in the community. He sought to
understand the consequences of processes of institutionalisation, incompetence
and labelling, and argued that deinstitutionalised mildly retarded people relied
heavily on the support of non-retarded "benefactors" in order to successfully
cope with life outside the institution (Edgerton 1967: 193). They also
accumulated personal belongings to give the appearance of normality, made
up biographies that denied their hospitalisation, or stated that, unlike the
severely mentally retarded, they had been wrongly institutionalised and
labelled as retarded. Despite this common denial of their retardation and
institutional past, Edgerton argued that deinstitutionalised mildly retarded
people still had to deal with the reality of being incompetent, and that it was
this which most affected their life circumstances (Edgerton 1967; Luckin 1986:
94).
As a consequence of this assessment, Edgerton aimed to assess "the critical
problems that these retarded people face in the management of their
                                                
9 These issues, and the general theoretical concerns that Edgerton had with the
consequences of labelling, stigma and dependency, were returned to by
Edgerton in his follow-up studies of this same group of individuals (Edgerton &
Bercovici 1976; Edgerton, Bollinger & Herr 1984).
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incompetence" (Edgerton 1967: 142). Through analyses of their perceptions and
experiences of life in the community, he argued that they utilised a "cloak of
competence" to hide both the stigma of their discredited past as well as their
inherent incompetencies (Edgerton 1967: 59-69, 143). Edgerton and Sabagh had
earlier argued that attempts to pass as normal through "aggrandizement" were
positive and necessary indicators of mentally retarded people's capacity to live
outside the institution (Edgerton & Sabagh 1962). Edgerton changed his
interpretation in The Cloak of Competence and claimed that such attempts at
passing and denial were in fact negative and indeed rather sad attempts at
hiding the true and devastating nature of their retardation (Edgerton 1967; cf.
Gerber 1990).
Not only were many of the people Edgerton studied dealing with the daily
incompetencies of being illiterate and innumerate. They also found that being
labelled retarded, and being associated with others who were even less
competent than themselves, was the worst possible stigma they had to endure
(Edgerton 1967: 146-149). As Edgerton put it:
The label of mental retardation not only serves as a humiliating,
frustrating and discrediting stigma on the conduct of one's life in
the community, but it also serves to lower one's self-esteem to
such a nadir of worthlessness that the life of a person so labelled is
scarcely worth living (Edgerton 1967: 145).
They cannot accept themselves as mentally retarded and have self-esteem,
Edgerton argued, because the stigma of retardation is total. Therefore to
maintain self esteem mildly mentally retarded people must deny their
retardation (Edgerton 1967: 207-212). Not only do they utilise a "cloak of
competence" to pass as normal, but, as Goffman (1974 [1963]: 5) had also stated,
they have to deal with the perception that as people with a demonstrable
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stigma they were seen as "not quite human". This is a point that Jenkins (1998b:
19) has also made, although for him the focus is on competency rather than
stigma and the association of cultural concepts of (in)competency with the
constitution of the nature of normal humanness.
Edgerton argued that the stigma of mental retardation is expanded to
subsume all possible competencies and that such people are "by definition,
incompetent to manage any of [their] affairs [and are] forever doomed to
[their] condition . . .  There is no cure, no hope, no future. If you are once a
retardate, you remain one always" (Edgerton 1967: 207). Mentally retarded
people may seek ways to deal with this stigma, but they can never alleviate it
entirely. Despite Edgerton's criticism of IQ scores (and other measurements of
skills and competencies) as valid indicators of the potential success of social
adjustment to the community—and his argument that age, personality,
education, training, class and ethnicity are far better indicators of how an
individual will fair after being deinstitutionalised (Edgerton 1967: 196-
197)10—the subjects of Edgerton's study were all, according to him, burdened
by the stigma and reality of their low intelligence. Aside from seeing this as a
consequence of both the clinical reality of retardation and the stigma of being
labelled as such, Edgerton does not analyse why competencies associated with
cognition and intelligence (in the narrowest of senses) have remained so central
                                                
10 This concern with predicting the potential success of community adaptation is
an issue that Edgerton takes up in his later studies. Edgerton and Bercovici
(1976: 490) argued that the determining of what constitutes "successful
community adaptation" is highly ambiguous and controversial, meaning as it
does different things to different people, and especially to retarded people (a
point that Edgerton takes up as one of the essential aims of research, ie. to
discover what is meaningful for retarded people). The notion of successful
community adaptation also has very complex, unspecifiable and multifaceted
factors associated with it, and needs to be understood within a particular
context and over long periods of time rather than being just a measure of skills,
personality and competencies (Edgerton & Bercovici 1976: 489-495). Despite
these concerns, however, quantitative assessments of social skills and
competencies are still used in Australia as a means for determining the potential
success of deinstitutionalising intellectually disabled people, as I discovered
when I read my sister's case notes.
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to our perceptions of "normal" humanity. Neither does he explore why the
stigma of retardation should be so irredeemable in our culture; why such
people are discredited in all aspects of their lives; and why we accept only
certain forms of subjectivity, creativity and interaction as valid, meaningful and
social.
Rather than analysing these issues, Edgerton argued that the solution to the
problems associated with the stigmatised identity of mental retardation was to
change the mental-medical-psychological aspects of the term into a behavioural
one that does away with any reference to the stigma of low intelligence and
incompetence (Edgerton 1967: 212). He suggests this for several reasons, all of
them associated with improving the adaptation of mentally retarded people to
life in the community. It is to encourage mentally retarded people to be "willing
participants in their own improvement"; to make them more socially acceptable
in their appearance and behaviour; more independent, productive, satisfied,
and open to being educated (Edgerton 1967: 212-214; 1984c: 502). Ironically,
despite Goffman's (1990 [1961]: 154-155) criticism of the pressure on mentally ill
inmates to adopt the medical view of themselves as inherently ill, Edgerton is
arguing that the acceptance of the "sick-role" is essential for successful
community adaptation. As Séguin's treatments had done more than a century
earlier, the process of community adaptation includes attempts to transform
people who have been categorised as asocial and abnormal into normal and
socially acceptable persons. The practice of training and management regimes
in contemporary deinstitutionalised settings is an ongoing aspect of this.
Edgerton's Influence on the Study of Intellectual Disability
Through his use of Goffman's concept of stigma, in combination with Becker
and Lemert's notions of labelling, Edgerton set the parameters of the debate
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for the early sociocultural study of mental retardation. This confined it for the
next decade (and even beyond in some cases) to concentrating on the
consequences of labelling and stigma on a retarded person's self-identity and
experience (Angrosino 1998a; Bogdan & Taylor 1976; Christensen 1992; Davies
& Jenkins 1997; Gordon 1975; Heshusius 1981; Jenkins 1998a; Koegel 1986;
Kurtz 1981; Langness & Levine 1986; Lea 1988; Mardiros 1989; Mercer 1975;
Mest 1988; Raybeck 1988; Rowitz 1988; Susman 1993; Zetlin & Turner 1984).
Many supported Edgerton's 1967 conclusion of the dominant and negative
stigmatising effects associated with the label of mental retardation (Bogdan &
Taylor 1982; Langness & Levine 1986; Kurtz 1981; Mercer 1975; Raybeck 1988).
Following Edgerton's later conclusions (Edgerton & Bercovici 1976; Edgerton
1984b, 1986), others have argued that the consequences of labelling are
dynamic, complex, unpredictable, and not always negative (Angrosino 1998a;
Davies & Jenkins 1997; Gordon 1975; Mardiros 1989; Mest 1988; Rowitz 1988;
Susman 1993; Zetlin & Turner 1984).  
Those such as Douglas Raybeck (1988) argue that labelling is a process that
is dependent on social types. Consequently, "large scale social units" have
negative labelling effects due to decreasing interdependence and interpersonal
information and increasing inequalities and formal mechanisms for treatment.
This is the sort of process that Louis Rowitz outlines, whereby the label of
retardation "becomes intertwined with the entire diagnostic process and with
the approved interventions associated with that diagnosis" (Rowitz 1988: 1).
Rowitz argues that the inclusion of mental retardation within the generic label
of developmental disabilities has led to increased confusion and
homogenisation in the areas of service provision (Rowitz 1988: 2). There are
others, such as Marilyn Mardiros (1989), who claim that Mexican-American
parents utilise the medical label of mental retardation in positive ways to gain
access to essential services such as special education (a point which Rowitz
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[1988: 2] also acknowledges as one of the positive effects of labelling). Charlotte
Aull Davies and Richard Jenkins (1997), on the other hand, argue that
incorporating the label "learning difficulties" into one's self identity is a complex
process. To be properly understood it needs to be separated into discourses
about learning difficulties and experiences of being disabled in this way. Despite
these differences in opinion the focus on the impact of labelling and stigma has
had far reaching consequences in the area of policy development and
implementation. Through the influential work of Wolf Wolfensberger (1977),
the negative consequences of being labelled mentally retarded and deviant
were criticised and an alternative, known as the principle of normalisation, was
instigated throughout the social services for intellectually disabled people in the
USA, Europe and Australia.11
Following in the footsteps of Edgerton, and associated with the Socio-
Behavioural Research Group of the Mental Retardation Research Centre at
UCLA, were those who advocated the life history approach to the study of
mental retardation (Edgerton 1984b; Langness & Levine 1986). Rather than
adhering to a "case history" approach that pathologises and objectifies those
who are mentally retarded—and countering the overtly theoretical,
quantitative, and technical accounts of mental retardation that exist in
psychology and statistical sociology—researchers who adopt the life history
approach use informal interviews to develop individual biographies that
express the unique and diverse lived experience of being retarded (Gillman et
al. 1997; Goodley 1996). Such accounts stress and acknowledge the subject's
own interpretations and experiences of life (Easterday 1980: 221), and provide
him or her with opportunities to articulate an authentic self-identity and voice
(Atkinson & Walmsley 1999: 209; Booth & Booth 1996: 55).
                                                
11 Wolf Wolfensberger's theory of normalisation and the institutional practices
associated with it is discussed in greater detail in chapter six.
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In their different ways, researchers such as L. Langness, Robert Whitmore,
Paul Koegel and Harold Levine have sought to portray what they termed an
"emic" or "insider's version" of mental retardation.12 Using life histories they
focused particularly on issues of socialisation and incompetence and sought to
portray the complex and dynamic interplay of these with environmental, social,
familial, institutional and biological factors (Whittemore, Langness & Koegel
1986; Edgerton 1986). As Koegel, and Levine and Langness, point out, it is
possible to be socialised into a state of incompetence through a labelling
process that precipitates a loss of exposure to normal social experiences (Koegel
1986; Langness & Levine 1986; cf. Edgerton 1986). In this way, Langness and
Levine argue, incompetence becomes a double bind. A person is not only
perceived and labelled as inherently incompetent but becomes socially
incompetent through their lack of social experiences (Langness & Levine 1986:
197).
This interest in the processes through which people are categorised as
incompetent has continued to be a central feature of sociocultural studies of
intellectual disability. Focusing on these processes through the lens of stigma
and labelling theory, however, has often overshadowed an interest in the life
experiences of intellectually disabled people from other perspectives. As well as
this, incompetence has tended to be analysed as an individual experience rather
than as a social phenomenon. In a recent collection of essays edited by Richard
Jenkins (1998b) these theoretical concerns have been taken up and analysed
from various perspectives. The notion of incompetence has been expanded to
incorporate such issues as the effects of culture, economics and class on
perceptions and constructions of competence and incompetence. The
relationship of (in)competence to ideas of identity, personhood, sociality and
normality has also been explored. And, as the form of the term
                                          
12 Bogdan and Taylor (1982) were in fact the first to study mental retardation in
this way.
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"(in)competence" indicates, each of these more recent analyses acknowledges
that any study of "incompetence" must inherently include within it the social
and cultural notions of "competence" upon which it is based (Jenkins 1998b:
223).
The utilisation of narratives, life histories and auto/biographical based
research with intellectually disabled people has also continued and proliferated
in contemporary sociocultural studies of intellectual disability. These methods
of research are used as tools for making visible the experiences of intellectually
disabled people; people who are generally denied this opportunity because it is
often believed that they have "no capacity for understanding or conveying
their own situation or experiences" (Atkinson & Walmsley 1999: 209; cf.
Easterday 1980: 217). Some, such as Danny Goodley (1996), stress the need for a
critical reappraisal of the potential downfalls of this approach, particularly the
assumption that social theory can be readily linked with an individual's life
history. Goodley (1996) is also critical of the potential to assimilate a person's
life story to the researcher's own point of view (cf. Booth & Booth 1996: 63).
However, the general assessment is that such research provides an important
means for gaining access to the experiences of intellectually disabled people.  As
Tim and Wendy Booth argue, rather than interpreting the problems
encountered with this style of research as a consequence of the person's
disabilities, narrative research should be developed in such a way as to include
the stories of all of those who have difficulty articulating themselves (Booth &
Booth 1996: 67).  
Some of these life history and auto/biographical accounts of intellectually
disabled people have been analysed in terms of the metaphors that such people
develop to account for their life circumstances and experiences. Lois Easterday
(1980) recounts the story of a young man who used military terms and adopted
a military autobiography to account for his time in an institution. Reminiscent
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of Goffman, Easterday (1980: 220) argues that this man substituted one total
institution for another as a way of managing his spoiled and stigmatised
identity. Although also analysing mental retardation within the parameters of
stigma, Michael Angrosino (1992: 171-172) has sought instead to understand the
"interactive communicative contexts" through which mentally retarded persons
"create culturally appropriate metaphors by which to convey their sense of
identity to others". Rather than focusing on the content of their life histories,
Angrosino emphasises the "formal, stylistic properties of the narrative as the
main conveyors of meaning" (Angrosino 1992: 173). He argues that the
"metaphors of stigma" that mentally retarded people utilise help to produce
meaningful and "shareable" accounts of their identity and selfhood (Angrosino
1992: 175-176; cf. Angrosino 1994; Angrosino 1998b).  
Most sociocultural researchers in the field of intellectual disability have
generally been concerned with analysing the consequences of social, welfare
and educational policies. Just as Edgerton had done, they tend to focus on
issues such as deinstitutionalisation and community adaptation (Begab &
Richardson 1975; Heshusius 1981; Howard 1990; Johnson 1998; Langness &
Levine 1986). Others have analysed the consequences of quality of life
programmes (Atkins 1998; cf. Edgerton 1975) or special education practices
(Blatt 1981; Gleason 1989). The aim is to improve the lives of intellectually
disabled people by changing the way that these and other services are
provided (Atkins 1998; Begab & Richardson 1975; Blatt 1981; Edgerton 1986;
Gleason 1989, 1994; Goode 1984, 1990; Henschel 1972; Taylor & Bogdan 1989).
Edgerton too went on to write many articles about mentally retarded people,
constantly expanding and reworking his analyses and even criticising his own
negative projections of the stigma associated with being labelled mentally
retarded in follow-up studies with the people who provided the material for
The Cloak of Competence in the 1960s (Edgerton & Bercovici 1976; Edgerton
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1984b; Edgerton, Bollinger & Herr 1984).13 Edgerton continued exploring issues
of community adaptation, as well as taking on new social welfare concerns such
as the implementation of normalization policies (Edgerton & Bercovici 1976:
485-6) and the problems associated with aging and providing a quality of life
for the mentally retarded (Edgerton, Bollinger & Herr 1984). He also inspired
others to study mental retardation from a cultural and social perspective,
emphasising both the value of quantitative analyses and participant-
observation, and the necessity of studying the perception and treatment of
mental retardation in non-Western settings (Edgerton 1970, 1984a; cf. Manion &
Bersani 1987).14
Edgerton's call for cross-cultural studies of retardation has been taken up by
those such as Anne-Marie Henschel (1972), Joseph Westermeyer (1979), Larry
Peters (1980), Marilyn Mardiros (1989), M. Miles (1992), Jeanne Connors and
                                              
13 In these studies Edgerton discovered that the stigma of mental retardation
had become less of an issue for these people, as had their reliance on
benefactors (Edgerton & Bercovici 1976: 490-1; Edgerton, Bollinger & Herr
1984). Luckin comments that this decrease in stigmatisation was partly due to a
shift in the social perception of those who were unemployed. He argues that
this was a result of changing socioeconomic circumstances and increasing
welfare dependency in the USA during the 1970s. As a consequence of this, ex-
patients felt less "different" to many others in the community (Luckin 1986: 95).
14 Edgerton has written extensively about the importance of long-term
participant-observation as a useful methodology for unobtrusively entering the
lives of mentally retarded people and understanding their experiences and
points of view within a specific context (Edgerton & Langness 1978; Edgerton
1984a; Edgerton 1984c). However, rather than just describing their lives and
presenting a picture of the world from their perspective, Edgerton stressed that
participant-observation also requires an objective detachment so that the
researcher can analyse what these lives and experiences have to offer to a
broader study of labelling, stigma, socialisation, institutionalisation, and
personality development (Edgerton 1984c: 498). Such an approach, Edgerton
argues, allows the researcher to analyse the underlying meanings and
contradictions inherent in people's expressions of self, exposing more fully who
these people are rather than just what they think they are (Edgerton 1984c:
499). Although historically associated with anthropological studies of other
cultures through the early fieldwork of Malinowski and Boas, participant-
observation has more recently been taken up as a standard methodology in the
other social and behavioural sciences. Many of the people whose work I discuss
later in this chapter have utilised some form of participant-observation in their
research.
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Anne Donnellan (1993), Patrick Devlieger (1988), Mark Nuttall (1998), Susan
Reynolds Whyte (1998), and Sylvia van Maastricht (1998). The general aim has
been to understand the significance of intellectual disability within particular
cultures (Mardiros 1989: 55), especially with regards to the "medical" issues of
diagnosis, ætiology and treatment (Dentan 1967; Devlieger 1998; Miles 1992;
Westermeyer 1979). Implicit within some of these studies is a critique of the
dominance of the Western medical interpretation of intellectual disability, and
the inappropriateness of Western models of treatment and policy development
that are themselves based on cultural notions of independence and training
(Maastricht 1998; Miles 1992: 249; Nuttall 1998; Whyte 1998). Others, such as
Westermeyer (1979: 315), argue that similar interpretations of mental
retardation over dispersed areas "suggests a common human experience with
types of mental disorder, and a common need for understanding or explaining
these disorders" (cf. Peters 1980). Despite the growing interest in intellectual
disability from a cross-cultural perspective, it is still a relatively small field, as
Connors and Donnellan (1993: 267) acknowledge; a reality that is perhaps
indicative of some of the difficulties associated with studying people who do
not readily play the role of informants.  
 
An Uneasy Alliance: Intellectual disability and disability studies
At the time of Edgerton's groundbreaking sociocultural analysis of mental
retardation the disability movement was also gaining momentum. This
movement was comprised of a politically and socially motivated group of
physically disabled people calling for self advocacy, equal rights, and equal
access to services such as education, housing and transport, as well as
employment (Barnes 1998: 68; Barton 1998: 58). Grass roots groups such as the
Independent Living Movement in the USA and the Disablement Income Group
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in the UK were pushing for radical changes to the way that disabled people
were treated—socially, economically and politically—and challenging the
barriers that segregated, oppressed, and excluded them from full participation
in society (Barnes 1998: 69-70; de Jong 1982; Finkelstein 1998: 35-36).  
Social theorists also began to argue that the problems associated with
disability were as much a result of the social construction and experience of
disability as it was a consequence of a physical condition (Barnes 1998: 69).
These initial criticisms, although still steeped in what Colin Barnes (1998: 69) has
termed a "rehabilitation role", marked the emergence of the social model of
disability. Influenced by functionalism, symbolic interactionism, social
constructionism and labelling theory in the USA, and by historical materialism
in the UK, the social model of disability not only challenged the dominance of
the medical interpretation of disability, but it also ultimately criticised medically
informed sociological interpretations founded upon Parson's concept of the
"sick role" (Barnes 1998: 66).  
The existence of health and illness in society raised fundamental issues for
Parsons, especially in relation to "the functional prerequisites of the social
system" (Parsons 1970 [1951]: 430). Parsons' functional interpretation of illness
argued that sickness was a deviation from the functionally cohesive and socially
prescribed norm of good health. The onset of illness potentially incapacitates
people, preventing them from fulfilling their social obligations. The sick role
provides a legitimate way of being in this temporary state. Illness thus becomes
an alibi for incomplete sociality. However, this state is not without its own set
of institutionalized obligatory practices. Those who experience illness must
conform to the rules and demands of the sick role as a legitimate way of
alleviating expectations to fulfil their normal social obligations (Parsons 1970
[1951]: 430-437). Parsons provides four obligations that must be adhered to by
the patient if she or he is to be legitimately accredited the status of the sick role.
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These include: "exemption from normal social role responsibilities"; accepting
the passive role of being cared for by others; realising that this state is itself
undesirable and that there is an obligation to "get well"; and seeking "technically
competent help" in the form of a physician (Parsons 1970 [1951]: 436-7). Any
threat to the cohesion of the social system is thereby alleviated through
adherence to these socially and medically instituted practices, and a person can
exist as a sick person so long as they accept these conditions (cf. Murphy 1990:
19; Conrad & Schneider 1985: 31).
Like the physically disabled that Robert Murphy (1990) wrote about,
however, an intellectually disabled person may be categorised as medically
unwell but they are not in a temporary state of sickness. Theirs is not a
momentary deviation from normal obligations but a permanent state of being.
Their status and social role as sick is therefore more complex than the illness
that Parsons wrote of, although the same institutional relationships and
obligations cross over into the clinical and institutional experiences of
intellectually disabled people. Like the sick, they too become prisoners of the
medical profession and must work towards their own rehabilitation in order to
become accepted members of the community. They too are exempt from
normal social responsibilities, must be cared for by others, are in an
undesirable state that must be ameliorated or prevented, and are subject to the
professional assistance of institutional and clinical staff. But as people who can
never possibly transcend their difference, disabled people in general are
forever trapped within the liminal and ambiguous state of being permanently
damaged (Murphy 1990: 129-131).  This is their abnormality.  
The medical sciences, along with other medically informed sociological
interpretations such as Parsons' sick role, argues Barnes (1998: 66-67),
individualised disability. Medical science constituted the disabled person as the
problem such that the individual experience of disablement was taken to be the
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sole cause of any social or personal problems. By accepting this as natural fact,
medical sociologists were seen to perpetuate this individually informed,
pathologically based paradigm. Like disability theorists, Edgerton was also
critical of the dominance of the medically informed literature within the field of
mental retardation. However, his work—and the work of sociocultural
theorists such as Langness, Levine, and Goode, who, along with Edgerton,
were all associated with the Socio-Behavioural Research Group of the Mental
Retardation Research Centre at the University of California, Los
Angeles—cannot be readily incorporated within this social model of disability.15
Unlike disability theorists, and more in keeping with medical sociologists, they
accepted the reality of retardation as a physical phenomenon.16 Rather than
interpreting it as a social construction, Edgerton sought to determine the
individual consequences of the stigma attached to being labelled retarded, and
the difficulties that arose from living in the community with real
incompetencies (Edgerton 1967).
In contrast, the social model of disability claims that disability is
fundamentally a social rather than individual problem and it was in opposition
to such medical interpretations that the social model evolved. Rather than
analysing individual experiences, disability theorists sought to expose the social
and systematic nature of disability (Abberley 1987; Oliver 1986, 1990). They
consequently argue that the stigma, oppression, and deprivation associated
with disability are a consequence of the social construction of disability as an
abnormal deviance and/or the social relations and structures embedded in
capitalist societies (Barnes 1998: 69; Barton 1998). As Anne Chappell puts it:
                                                
15 I use the term "sociocultural theorists" to refer to those who study intellectual
disability from a sociocultural perspective but do not adopt the social
constructionist position advocated by those whom I have termed "disability
theorists".  
16 Included in this is the work of John Gleason (1989; 1994) which I discuss later
in the chapter.  
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The analysis of disability presented by the social model is that
disability is a social construct created by a range of historically and
culturally specific factors. It is the social and economic structures of
a particular society which create disability through processes of
prejudice, exclusion and discrimination (Chappell 1998: 212).
The separation of the individual from the social, of the physical from the
cultural, is signified in disability studies through the politically correct use of the
terms "impairment" and "disability" respectively. While this allows for an
analysis of the sociocultural, historical, political and economic aspects of
disability, the sole focus on the social has meant that the personal experience
and consequences of impairment have been seriously under-theorised. Only in
the past few years have disability theorists begun to explore the meaning,
embodied experience, and social consequences of impairment (Hughes &
Paterson 1997; Meekosha 1998; G. Williams 1998). Rather than analysing it as a
purely individual and personal phenomenon, however, those such as Gareth
Williams have combined a materialist phenomenological approach with
symbolic interactionism to explore the "interpretative process whereby
individuals construct meaning from their experiences" (G. Williams 1998: 240; cf.
Davis 1995; Hughes & Paterson 1997; Meekosha 1998). More recently there
have been studies that have criticised this social/medical dichotomy, and
argued that it is important to acknowledge that differences are both grounded
in the body and subject to social interpretations (Atkins 1998: 7; Singer 1999).
The recent focus on the body, on the dis-abled body in opposition to "able-
bodiedness", and on abnormality as a physical rather than intellectual
construction, has problematic implications for those whose impairment is
intellectual. As Anne Chappell (1998: 214-216) argues, intellectually disabled
people have been marginalised within the discourse of disability studies due to
this emphasis on the body, and on physical and sensory rather than intellectual
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impairments. It is, she claims, one of the consequences of including all forms of
impairment within a singular analytical category as "disabled". Rather than
critiquing the social model in total, however, Chappell (1998: 212) suggests that
the particular experiences of intellectually disabled people should be included
within this model of disability—along with all those other variables such as age,
gender, ethnicity, class and sexuality which make the experience of disability
diverse and specific.
Although there are obviously many important insights that the social model
of disability has brought to the study of those who are disabled—such as the
shift to focusing on the social structures that exclude disabled people and the
sociocultural constructions that inform professional and social perceptions and
treatments of those who are disabled—there are also some serious limitations
to the social model. Even the analysis of impairment, while offering personal
insights into the lived experience of disablement, in many ways perpetuates
some of these problems. By  constituting the medical model of disability as the
primary cause of the problems associated with being disabled, disability
scholars have denied the objective reality of intellectual, physical or sensory
impairments. Consequently, they have ignored the social implications of
differences that are undeniably embedded in the biological, and which
constitute part of the experiences and identity of those who are disabled. Like
labelling theory, it analyses the sociocultural experience of being disabled as a
projection of social meanings and constructions. By incorporating intellectually
disabled people within social analyses as "just like you and me", disability and
labelling theorists have unwittingly denied to these people their real and actual
differences.  In the words of Robert Gordon, such an approach has fostered a
"fundamental lack of respect for the meaning of real human differences"
(Gordon 1975: 138).
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A Social Construction: The work of Bogdan and Taylor
The work of Robert Bogdan and Steven Taylor marked a significant shift in the
interpretation and analysis of intellectual disability. Like Edgerton, Bogdan and
Taylor emphasised the usefulness of qualitative research methods with
intellectually disabled people (Taylor & Bogdan 1998).   However, unlike
Edgerton, they stressed the importance of phenomenology as a
methodological tool. Bogdan and Taylor argue that the primary concern of the
social scientist should be to understand "the social actor's frame of reference",
the meanings they attach to things in their lives, and how these meanings
influence the way that people act in the world (Taylor & Bogdan 1998: 3-7).
Drawing on a combination of Mead's symbolic interactionism and Berger and
Luckman's social constructionism, Bogdan and Taylor also argue that human
behaviour and action is a product of how people define and interpret the
world, and that the aim of social research is to understand how people
construct their realities (Taylor & Bogdan 1998: 10).
Edgerton's work was criticised by Bogdan and Taylor for adhering to a
medical interpretation of mental retardation (Bogdan & Taylor 1982: 208-214).
While acknowledging the devastating impact of the stigma associated with
being labelled mentally retarded, Bogdan and Taylor do not accept the
argument that a part of this stigma is a result of being incompetent and
retarded. In their book, Inside Out: The social experience of mental retardation,
Bogdan and Taylor (1982: 5) argued instead that, rather than being an
"objective condition", the entire meaning of the label of "mental retardation" is
dependent on social and cultural concepts "that exists in the minds of people
who attach that label to others" (cf. Taylor & Bogdan 1989: 23; Bogdan & Taylor
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1976: 47).17 For them, mental retardation is fundamentally a social construction.
As Bogdan and Taylor put it:
. . . the crucial issue in regard to the concept of mental retardation is
not that some people (the poor, minority group members) are
falsely labeled, or that the 'mildly retarded' are unfairly grouped
with the severely or profoundly retarded. Rather, we dispute the
efficacy and validity of the concept 'retarded' for any person,
including those with the most profound organic neurological
impairments (Bogdan & Taylor 1982: 5).
Therefore, rather than telling us anything about the mentally retarded, the
term "mental retardation" tells us about society and the methods by which
people who do not fit the demands of industrialised society are perceived,
categorised and administered (Bogdan & Taylor 1982: 9; Bogdan & Taylor 1976:
51). Through the application of treatments and services, and the experience of
being institutionalised and stigmatised, Bogdan and Taylor argue that people
labelled mentally retarded, rather than using a "cloak of competence" to hide
the stigma of being retarded, have been covered with a "cloak of
incompetence" that is impossible to discard (Bogdan & Taylor 1982: 222).
Through interviews with Ed and Pattie, two mildly retarded individuals
who had experienced life in an institution but were now living in the
community, Bogdan and Taylor (1982: 222) provide an account of the
subjective, lived experience of mental retardation. Bogdan and Taylor
acknowledged and empathised with Ed and Pattie as human beings with their
own point of view. Their aim was to understand how Ed and Pattie
constructed, thought and felt about the world and their place in it (Bogdan &
                                               
17 For Robert Murphy, disability is a "social malady" that is defined by society
and given meaning through culture (Murphy 1990: 4). It is a sociocultural rather
than a biomedical phenomenon; a "metaphor of the human condition" and an
"allegory of all life in society" (Murphy 1990: xi).
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Taylor 1982: 20). In contrast to Edgerton, Bogdan and Taylor therefore became
the first to fully acknowledge the integrity and lived experiences of mentally
retarded people from their own perspectives (Gerber 1990: 4; cf. Bogdan &
Taylor 1982: 4-18; Bogdan & Taylor 1976; Taylor 1998a).  
David Gerber (1990) has argued that, by interpreting mentally retarded
people as naturally and clinically retarded, Edgerton was unable to fully
appreciate and respect these people's own interpretations of their lives as
anything other than attempts at dealing with the stigma of their retardation.
Whenever they provided social reasons for their retardation it was interpreted
as denial. Consequently, what they said about themselves was not taken at
face-value.  It was only ever a mask, and Edgerton, as the social analyst, was
the one who could stand aside and interpret it as such. Therefore, argues
Gerber, Edgerton failed in his attempt to understand the self-conceptions of
mentally retarded people and subsequently denied them a valid voice (Gerber
1990: 5, 18). Rather than giving authoritative value to their experiences and
interpretations, Edgerton reinterpreted, or rather subverted, mentally retarded
people's experiences and explanations, seeing these as proof of their inability to
accept the reality of their circumstances (Gerber 1990: 10-15).18
In contrast, Bogdan and Taylor acknowledge the importance of the social
context within which human variation is thought to exist, and claim that it is the
way these differences are "thought about that matters" (Bogdan 1992: 316).
However, they do not acknowledge or interpret the relevance of assertions of
difference made by their informants when comparing themselves to those who
                                                
18 Gerber recognises that it is unfair to retrospectively criticise Edgerton for not
adhering to later interpretations of mental retardation as a social construction
(Gerber 1990: 5-6), an interpretation which Gerber himself problematically
accepts as true and unquestionable. Gerber acknowledges that Edgerton did, in
some of his later articles, propose that cultural, social, economic and political
systems could lead to different interpretations of retardation. However, Gerber
also argues that Edgerton still fundamentally adhered to a clinical model,
believing that a universal baseline level of competence could be discovered for
all cultures (Gerber 1990: 6).
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are severely mentally retarded. Although Bogdan and Taylor are keen to
emphasise the similarities between mentally retarded and "normal" people,
both Pattie and Ed—in much the same way as Edgerton's (1967: 146-149)
informants—had a deep disgust and fear of those who were profoundly
retarded, and were offended by any association with them, categorically and in
daily institutional life (Bogdan & Taylor 1982: 55, 133).  
As well as this, Bogdan and Taylor—like Edgerton and those social theorists
who adopted a life history approach to the study of intellectual disability—have
primarily focused on the life experiences of those who are mildly mentally
retarded. Despite arguing that all who are labelled retarded are subject to the
social construction of them as such, in most of Bogdan and Taylor's work the
social experiences of severely retarded people have not been analysed. The
reliance on interviews and the recording of life stories is often inappropriate for
those who have more limited forms of communication. Also, while being
labelled intellectually disabled has serious social consequences for all who are
caught up in the clinical and institutionalised system of services, it is not always
expressed as a personal concern for those who are more severely affected.  
The tendency to focus on the social experiences of those who are
categorised as mildly retarded circumvents the problems encountered when
analysing the lives of those who are more severely and obviously affected by
their disability. While social, cultural, historical and material factors have a
profound affect on the lives of all those who are labelled intellectually disabled,
they do not constitute the entirety of intellectually disabled people's lives.
Interpretations that only take these aspects into account, and which perceive
the experience of intellectual disability as a product of sociocultural
constructions and structures, tend to deny that intellectual disability is an
ontological reality that makes a real difference to the experience of being
intellectually disabled. Consequently, Bogdan and Taylor are unable to deal
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with the real implications of difference as productive of the sociocultural world
rather than just the products of it.     
Bogdan and Taylor have recently criticised their own earlier work for
adhering to a "sociology of exclusion" by only emphasising the consequences of
stigma, deviance, labelling and stereotyping (Bogdan & Taylor 1998: 242-243).
They now acknowledge that there are a variety of ways in which mentally
retarded people are perceived, and that a significant number of social
relationships with such people emphasise acceptance rather than exclusion.
Through familial relationships, religious convictions, humanitarian concerns
and/or friendship, they argue, it is also possible for retarded persons to be
positively perceived and treated.  Consequently, in such circumstances,
mentally retarded people's disabilities do not have a stigmatising or "morally
discrediting" effect (Taylor & Bogdan 1989: 27). Bogdan and Taylor call for a
"sociology of acceptance" as a way of understanding this phenomenon, arguing
that such intimate and accepting relationships are important in mentally
retarded people's lives (Taylor & Bogdan 1989: 22; cf. Bogdan 1992).  As they
put it:
. . . the definition of a person is not determined by either the
characterisation of the person or the abstract social or cultural
meanings attached to the group of which the person is a part, but
rather by the nature of the relationship between the definer and the
defined (Bogdan & Taylor 1998: 243).
Despite this emphasis on relationships, the constructionist approach that
Bogdan and Taylor adopt still focuses on differences in the definition and social
meaning of those who are retarded. It explores how these definitions
determine the way that such people are subsequently treated and perceived.
Difference for Bogdan and Taylor, although not denied, is primarily a
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consequence of social definition and categorisation, and what is important is the
meaning attributed to difference through the perspectives of those who are not
disabled (Bogdan & Taylor 1998: 245). Consequently, Bogdan and Taylor's
interpretation of mental retardation remains thoroughly within the rubric of
symbolic interactionism and social constructionism. Their particular approach
has also perpetuated and reinforced Edgerton's earlier dismissal of
anthropological theories of culture and symbolic representation as relevant for
interpreting the sociocultural experiences of intellectually disabled people. This
has meant that intellectually disabled people have been interpreted as social
beings only in so far as they are products of the labels attributed to them. While
we gain a sense of severely intellectually disabled people as human beings
whose humanness is a product of social relations with others, we do not gain a
sense of the meanings that they themselves create, nor of them as the authors
or independent sustainers of mutuality and sociality.
An emphasis on the social definition of, or meanings attributed to,
intellectual disability became increasingly prominent in the work of those who
took up Bogdan and Taylor's social constructionist paradigm. This includes
cross-cultural studies of intellectual disability, analyses of representations of
intellectual disability in the media, as well as post-structural and
deconstructionist accounts of the concept of intellectual disability. Rather than
interpreting intellectual disability as an ontological state of being, the tendency
in these cases is to use the variability of cultural and historical concepts of
"mental retardation" as proof of its inherent emptiness as a concept (Manion &
Bersani 1987; cf. Connors & Donnellan 1993). In such analyses the focus tends to
shift towards a concern with categories, constructs and labels, as well as to
social institutions and structures, and how these impact upon the interpretation
of intellectual disability. Rarely does it enter into intellectually disabled people's
lives as ones which are more, or other, than just the consequences of these
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supposedly overarching and deterministic constructs. In such accounts it is
impossible to get a glimpse of who intellectually disabled people actually are,
how they relate to and engage with others, and what sort of meaningful
worlds they inhabit and produce.
Analyses of images and representations of intellectual (and other)
disabilities in film, literature and the media by Paul Longmore (1985), Alan
Gartner (1982) and Robert Bogden et al. (1982) ignore the inherent sociality of
intellectually disabled people, implying that their experiences are entirely the
product of such stereotyping. The same can be said for more contemporary
analyses of intellectual disability that employ post-structural, postmodern
and/or deconstructionist methodologies. Such approaches to the study of
intellectual disability take these constructions as already given, as already
determining the social experiences of intellectually disabled people. They seek
to either explore more fully the social and individual consequences of discursive
practices (Cocks & Allen 1996; Johnson 1998), or to release intellectually
disabled people from the negative grip of these constructions by
deconstructing those very constructions that supposedly constrain them
(Branson & Miller 1989; Ellis 1998).
Many contemporary researchers who explore cross-cultural conceptions of
intellectual disability also tend to focus solely on the social and cultural
categories and meanings associated with intellectual disability. Describing their
research with the Navajo, Connors and Donnellan stated that:
The diagnoses of the individuals in this study included severely
multiply handicapped, severely mentally retarded, autistic, Down's
Syndrome, and educationally mentally retarded. All were non-
verbal and unable to express their own experiences; thus, data
were gathered from families, neighbors, caretakers, and others
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directly involved with these individuals as to how they were
regarded in the Navajo world view, to what extent the individual
was considered a competent member of the culture, how the
behaviour associated with the disabilities as [sic] dealt with, and
how problematic this might be (Connors & Donnellan 1993: 269).
Connors and Donnellan's study provides valuable information on some of the
sociocultural and historical differences in the perception, treatment and
interpretation of those who are regarded as intellectually disabled. It also
acknowledges that institutional practices exist within a specific sociocultural
context. However, Connors and Donnellan also deny or disregard three very
important issues. One is that the researcher, and the culture in question, must
recognise the differences they are observing as some form of intellectual
disability in order to study them as such—an issue that, as Jenkins (1998b: 4)
points out, raises epistemological problems concerning the use of "intellectual
disability" as an analytical category at all. Secondly,  it is assumed that being
intellectually disabled, these people are therefore "unable to express their own
experiences". And thirdly, that cultural constructions are the most significant
and theoretically meaningful aspect of a social analysis of intellectual disability.  
Unwittingly, such analyses perpetuate the clinical interpretation of
intellectual disability by ignoring the fundamental sociality of intellectually
disabled people. We tend to learn more about what they signify and represent
as objects of sociocultural construction rather than who they are as subjects
engaging in relationships with others. They may be products of cultural
categories but are not analysed as active participants in social life. They may
experience what it is to be labelled retarded but are not theorised as people
interacting with others as part of the mutual sociality of everyday life. This
denies to intellectually disabled people a status as encultured beings, who,
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although limited in their ways of participating in the social world, do seek ways
of meaningfully and socially engaging with others.
Intimacy and Relatedness: The work of Goode and Gleason
While also drawing on the methodological principles of participant-observation
and qualitative analysis, the work of David Goode and John Gleason has
provided us with a different and, I would argue, potentially more significant
insight into the lives of intellectually disabled people. Rather than focusing
solely on the stigma of labelling or the social construction of retardation, both
Goode's and Gleason's work therefore represents at least a partial break with
the first two "schools" of sociocultural analysis. Instead, Goode emphasises the
centrality of intimacy and familiarity in the construction of a positive identity
for intellectually disabled people, while both he and Gleason have made the
intentional and purposeful interactions of people with severe and profound
multiple disabilities the subject of their, albeit slightly different, analyses. While
intimacy and relatedness may have been implied as attributes of the social lives
of those with mild intellectual disabilities, they had never been the focus of
analysis. Nor had they been emphasised in relationships with, and between,
those who are severely intellectually disabled.19  
The first person to discuss intimacy and relatedness in relation to
intellectually disabled people was David Goode.20 Employing a combination of
ethnomethodological and phenomenological techniques, Goode sought to
enter the everyday world of multiply impaired children in an attempt to
                                             
19 An exception to this is Edgerton's early paper with MacAndrew on the
possibility of friendship between two severely retarded individuals
(MacAndrew & Edgerton 1966).
20 Interestingly, David Goode was trained in ethnomethodology at UCLA by
two of Edgerton's colleagues, Harold Garfinkel and Melvin Pollner. Goode was
also led to his research subjects by Edgerton (Taylor  & Bogdan  1998: 123).
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discover the grounds for their intersubjectivity (Goode 1980a; 1980b; 1990).
Rather than interpreting their behaviour and interactions according to the sorts
of "'scientifically' produced standards of 'normality'" that clinicians utilise,
Goode emphasised the importance of "naturalistic" contextual data gained
through the observation of interactions in everyday life (Goode 1980a: 97).  As
Goode put it, such clinical interpretations are:
. . . 'specifically indifferent' to the familial context of action. They
decompose meaningful familial interaction into clinically locatable
problems with regard to—in fact sometimes in direct contradiction
with—the lived realities of everyday family life (Goode 1980a: 97).
Goode's earliest work drew upon his interactions with a congenitally deaf-
blind and retarded girl called Chris who lived in a state hospital ward. Rather
than interpreting Chris' behaviour as meaningless, faulty, and in need of
remedial training—as the staff did, and which he too initially attempted to
do—Goode sought to understand it on its own terms (Goode 1980b: 193-198).
Recognising that Chris lived in a significantly different perceptual/cognitive
world to his own due to her disabilities, Goode decided that "only intimate and
persistent interactional contact . . . would be likely to enable [him] to enter [her]
world" (Goode 1980b: 187-188). Consequently, Goode developed "interactional
strategies" which included mimicking Chris' repetitive behaviour and her
perceptual, tactile engagement with the world in order to build up a basis for
intersubjectivity on Chris' terms.  
Goode discovered that Chris responded enthusiastically to sound
stimulation, especially to the rhythm and frequency of music, as well as to
touch. She used her tongue for sensory gratification and to gain information
about objects in her world. As well as these, Chris exhibited "autostimulatory
behaviours" such as finger flicking, rocking and head swinging in response to
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light and sound, although as Goode points out, the use of her senses was also
goal-oriented (Goode 1980b: 189-190). Chris also loved physical interaction, and
although she did not recognise or utilise linguistic symbols, Goode argues that
through her sensory interaction with the world and others, she did
communicate (Goode 1980b: 191). Chris used gestures, gross physical
movement and "background expectancies", such as sitting at a table in the
dining room to express her hunger, to communicate her needs and desires to
others (Goode 1980b: 191-192).  
Chris' difficulties stemmed from her lack of audiovisual perceptual abilities,
upon which, Goode argues, "we build our systems of symbolic communication
and organize our practical interactional activities" (Goode 1980b: 192).
However, through long term and intimate observations of her behaviour and
interactions Goode was able to gain an appreciation of Chris' abilities, and
perceive the rationale, intelligence, inventiveness and purpose in her actions
(Goode 1980b: 197-201). Goode argues that we all live in an intersubjective and
shared world. Drawing on Schutz's epistemological queries as to the
possibilities and nature of this shared world, Goode states that "we
progressively developed common schemes of communication, congruent
practical relevancies, mutually defined things to do in the world, and so forth"
(Goode 1980b: 204-205). Through entering Chris' world on her own terms,
Goode sought to establish such "common schemes of communication".  
Although at first Goode attempted to simulate Chris' deafness and
blindness, he realised that he needed to let Chris direct their interactions in
order to gain insight into what the world meant to her (Goode 1980b: 193-195).
This involved allowing Chris to play with him in such a way that she gained
sensory gratification from their interactions. It included such things as having
Goode rhythmically tap her ears, play music, swing Chris on his knee and rock
her. Through these interactions, and through mimicking Chris' actions, Goode
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recognised that there was an inherent purpose and rationale to Chris'
behaviour. There was a definite pattern to Chris' actions through which she
sought rhythmic sensory stimulation and gratification (Goode 1980b: 197-199).  
Goode's interactional encounters with Chris were ground-breaking for the
sociocultural study of intellectual disability. They represented the first written
sociocultural analysis of a severely intellectually and physically disabled
person's world. In doing so, Goode recognised that it was possible to find
intention and meaning in such a world. Rather than embodying culture in
linguistic capabilities and recognisable cultural enterprises, Goode
acknowledged that it was possible to develop a sense of a shared world
through purposeful and intimate interactions (Goode 1980b: 203-205).
Goode's interest in the possibility of developing communication and a
meaningfully shared and intimate world was elaborated upon in his analysis of
the communication system that existed between an alingual deaf-blind and
retarded child (Breta) and her family (Goode 1980a; 1990). His primary concern
in this situation was with whether or not such a "communicational relationship"
should be considered abnormal or extraordinary (Goode 1990: 29). Drawing
again on Schutz, Goode argued that all communication is, to a degree, partial,
incomplete and incoherent. While this may be intensified in relationships with
severely intellectually disabled people, in essence it represents the same form of
communication that we all utilise (Goode 1990: 29-30).
The ways in which behaviour and gestures are interpreted, such as inferring
knowledge based on prior experience, supplying props and leading questions,
and filling in the gaps which exist in relationships, has been interpreted by
Goode as "behavioural sculpting" (Goode 1980a: 101). He argues that in the
relationship between Breta and her mother the intention of this "sculpting" was
not entirely for the benefit of outsiders, but that it existed in order to
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"'normalize' the look and feel of the family for themselves" (Goode 1980a: 101-
102; author's emphasis). It was a way of including Breta in the ongoing
dynamic interactions of the family, not in conformity to expected norms of
behaviour, but in terms of how her behaviour was being interpreted by those
in intimate daily contact with her.
Goode incorporated severely intellectually disabled people within his social
analyses, and stressed such people's involvement in the wider social world
through intersubjectivity, interaction and intimacy.  In his work with Chris,
Goode was the one to develop and engage in the necessary interactional
strategies for intersubjectivity. He used observations of these intimate
interactions as source material for his analysis (Goode 1980b). In his research
with Breta, Goode utilised the perspectives and interactions of an (intimate)
outsider (Goode 1980a; 1984). As Goode himself acknowledged, he gained
access to Breta via her mother's "intimate glossed knowledge" and not through
his own interactions (Goode 1980a: 111).   
While Goode's primary interest has been to analyse the possibility of
communication and intersubjectivity between severely physically and mentally
retarded people and others, he has become best known for his contribution to
social constructionism. In a similar vein to Taylor and Bogdan's (1989) more
recent emphasis on a "sociology of acceptance", Goode (1984) developed the
notion of "socially produced identities". For Goode, "radically different
identities" are produced as a result of differences between intimate, accepting
relationships with profoundly physically and mentally retarded persons and
clinical, objective perceptions that interpret such people as negative and entirely
deficient, subhuman beings (Goode 1984: 229). Drawing on a number of
examples of different types of relationships, including his observations of
Breta's relationship with her mother, Goode argued that familiarity and
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intimacy are the necessary factors for perceiving recognisable human attributes
and competencies in a severely retarded person (Goode 1984: 244-245).  
Although intimacy may change the subsequent perception of, and form of
engagement with, a severely intellectually disabled person, it is the social
construction of intellectual disability and the symbolic interaction of meaning
based upon these constructions that Goode emphasises. As Goode elaborates,
the idea of a socially produced identity:
. . . refers to how a person's identity—who he or she is taken to be
in terms of the significance or meaning attached to his or her body
and behaviours—emerges out of a concrete and particular social
situation and is the product of social interaction with that situation
(Goode 1984: 231).
Despite his argument that communication implies far more than linguistic
competency, Goode later stipulated that the persons he studied "do not use
symbolic language" (Goode 1990: 30). Therefore, although he focused on the
possibility of intersubjectivity and communication, Goode went on to
emphasise differences in the social perception of intellectually disabled people
rather than analysing the symbolic systems that are developed and mediated
through the course of mutual interaction.21    
                                                
21 Chris Atkins (1998) has taken up the issue of intimacy that arose out of the
work of Goode and Bogdan and Taylor and applied it to an analysis of quality
of life policies. Rather than emphasising access to services, lifestyle, integration
and deinstitutionalisation as the necessary components for an improved quality
of life for people with severe multiple impairments, Atkins argues that such
people's quality of life, and indeed their very identity and "situated belonging",
depends on the interactions that they have with significant others (Atkins 1998:
7-8, 241). The intimate support through "just little things" that carers provide for
people with severe multiple impairments allows them to just be (human), and
to be accepted (Atkins 1998: 263). Atkins claims that contemporary practices in
the field of intellectual disabilities have the potentially devastating effect of
isolating people in a world where they do not become known and where the
meaningful things in their lives are never perceived (Atkins 1998: 238-9). As she
comments: "Removal of nurses who have become intimate with people with
severe multiple impairments means that their definition of quality of life
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John Gleason (1989; 1994), on the other hand, has pursued a course of
analysis that focuses on such issues through observing the meanings and
intentions that exist in severely multiply disabled people's interactions with one
another. Gleason argues that the way these people engage with one another,
and indeed with others who are non-disabled, is generally perceived as
aberrant, meaningless and in need of transformation (Gleason 1989: 62; cf.
Gleason 1994; Goode 1980b: 192-193; Lea 1988; S. Taylor 1998b: 198-199).
Gleason claims that this clinical interpretation of behaviour is the result of a
profound disturbance in disabled people's physical form and function. This has
meant that everything such people do, that all their actions and interactions,
have been observed and interpreted in the light of their disabilities and deficits
(Gleason 1994: 256-257). This subsequently denies to severely disabled people
the possibility of having their own already unique modes of meaningful
interaction within the specificities of their disabilities (Gleason 1994: 248).
With an interest in analysing the consequence of therapeutic and special
education practices—which included changes brought about by
deinstitutionalisation and normalisation policies—Gleason spent five years
observing the interactions of a group of residents at a state school for
physically and mentally retarded people. The emphasis in special education,
                                                                                                                                      
collapses for, without intimate interaction, there cannot be individualised
support for humans being" (Atkins 1998: 239; the term "humans being" is
drawn form the work of Draper and acknowledges that we are all human
social beings who engage with one another and the social world via our
individual identities, our bodies and emotions). This same concern was raised in
the work of Goode (1984: 246) and Taylor and Bogdan (1989: 33-34). It also
resonates with some of Gleason's arguments concerning the problems inherent
in contemporary special education practices, although his approach marks a
significant departure from these other interpretations. In a very different way,
and drawing her theoretical orientations from postmodernism and
deconstruction rather than interactionism and phenomenology, Elisabeth Ellis
(1998) has explored the "spatial politics of disablement" that separates non-
disabled from disabled people. Rather than adhering to what she interprets as
modernist and dichotomous modes of oppositional identity upon which this
separation is based, Ellis calls for an inclusive ideology based on "webs of
nurturance" which she identifies as familial proximity and connectedness (Ellis
1998).  
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from Séguin's early treatments right up to the present day, has been to instil in
intellectually disabled people more conventional modes of communication and
interaction. This has meant that staff tend to see and interpret the behaviour of
residents in terms of the conventional and dominant clinical and pathological
view of mental retardation. It has also meant that they only see as meaningful
and cultural those actions that conform to normative behaviour. While severe
and profound disabilities may set limits to the possibilities for communication
and interaction, Gleason argued that it does not inherently define what such
people do. Nor does it determine the quality of their actions and interactions
(Gleason 1989: 10).  
Gleason (1994: 260) argues that the implicit meaning and intention in
severely multiply disabled people's interactions can be observed if it is
acknowledged that what they are doing conforms to a recognisable pattern
and has relevance and meaning for them. By maintaining a sense of the context
within which these actions and interactions take place Gleason was able to
observe the intentional patterns in these people's behaviours towards one
another. By adopting a methodology that interpreted the relationship between
form and function in the production of meaningful content—rather than
focusing on the disturbances caused by a disruption to form and
function—Gleason acknowledged that such actions and interactions are
meaningful (Gleason 1994: 247-249; Gleason 1989: 79, 106, 152). He
consequently sought to understand what the behaviour and interactions
amongst the residents might mean to them (Gleason 1989: 2).
The contributions of Goode and Gleason to the sociocultural field of
intellectual disability are highly significant and important.  In their different
ways both incorporated severely intellectually disabled people into the social
world that was under analysis. Goode emphasised the importance of intimacy
and relatedness, while both he and Gleason acknowledged the meaning and
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intention in severely disabled people's actions and interactions with others. The
analyses of Goode and Gleason have many resonances with my own research
with intellectually disabled people. So does the discrepancy between their own
and staff observations and interpretations, the latter of which were based on
historically and clinically mediated perceptions. While I also emphasise these
issues, I utilise different theoretical tools to interpret the fundamental sociality
and symbolic intentionality of intellectually disabled people's actions and
interactions. Like Goode, I emphasise the role that intimacy and relatedness
play in the recognition of severely intellectually disabled people's sociality.  In
doing so, however, it is important to emphasise just what is meant by intimacy,
and to distinguish my own use of the term from how it has been used by
others.  
Goode used the concept of intimacy to highlight the nature of long-term,
empathetic relationships that people can have with those who are severely
intellectually disabled (Goode 1984). Through intimacy, Goode argued, a
positive social identity can be developed that emphasises the humanness and
competencies of the disabled person. Intimacy in this sense allows for the
production of a positive social identity. Intimacy also implies acceptance
(Bogdan and Taylor 1989), or, as Atkins has put it, "assisted belonging" (Atkins
1998). The purpose of intimacy in these analyses is to highlight differences in
the ways that severely intellectually disabled people are perceived and related
to, especially in comparison to clinical interpretations. While I accept that these
are aspects of intimacy, I argue that it is through what Schneider (1968: 52) has
termed an "enduring, diffuse solidarity" that intimacy exists. Intimacy,
therefore, is not just about acceptance of another, nor is it solely the necessary
factor in the production of positive social identities. Intimacy emerges through
mutuality, which itself exists as the fundamental ground of sociality.  
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Drawing on Wittgenstein's (1998 [1953]) notion of language games, and
Geertz's (1993b [1973]) concept of culture, I argue that meaning is public and
that it exists in the use to which words and objects are put. Behaviour in this
sense becomes symbolic, interpretable and meaningful; patterned dispositions
to act and interact in certain ways. Through intimacy, mutuality and relatedness
these symbolic systems and dispositions are recognised and engaged with.
Such symbolic practices contribute to the form of life or sociality that is
consequently created through such engagements. Intimate encounters with
intellectually disabled people allow for an awareness of their particular
symbolic practices and dispositions. The tragedy is that few people in
intellectually disabled people's lives have the aspiration to generate a sociality
and mutuality based on intimacy. Clinical interpretations tend to deny or
disregard that such forms of sociality and mutuality are even possible and
relevant. The practices of training and management that have been instituted
on the basis of these interpretations have subsequently had a profoundly
dominant and disturbing effect on intellectually disabled people's life
experiences.
Chapter Six: Instituting Practices of Reason and Normality
page 241
Chapter Six
 Instituting Practices of Reason and Normality
We had better find out what is normal for you before we
describe you as abnormal.
T. S. Elliot
The "historical bifurcation of the normal and the pathological", Gleason (1989: 7)
argued, has had consequences for the way that intellectually disabled people
have been treated, educated and managed. It has sanctioned staff attitudes
towards intellectually disabled people, and set the parameters for the way their
behaviour has been interpreted (Ryan & Thomas 1987: 67-82). On the basis of
their supposed abnormality, intellectually disabled people have been perceived
and treated as less than fully human. While this attitude has been challenged
through recent changes in institutional practice and legal obligation, and
through an increasing emphasis on the principles of normalisation and equal
rights, the ambiguous and problematic status of intellectually disabled people
remains a defining feature of the institutional world within which so many of
them exist. This is so in part because contemporary practices in the field are
informed and ordered according to the symbolic scheme of reason and
normality.
In order to be integrated into society, intellectually disabled people must
submit to an ongoing process of training and management. The policies of
normalisation and deinstitutionalisation, combined with the principles of
Chapter Six: Instituting Practices of Reason and Normality
page 242
equality and the right to an enhanced "quality of life"1, aim to transform the
intellectually disabled into socially recognisable people in order for them to
participate socially at all. The notions of humanness, normality and sociality
that underpin this management and training are thoroughly steeped in notions
of the rational and reasonable person, but with one further specification.
Instituted practice underlines the value of reason embodied in work; not the
moral and aesthetical dimensions of reason embodied in sociality itself, but the
practical utility of tasks understood as productive. Intellectually disabled people
are being trained to function in an impersonal, vocationally-oriented world,
and the skills and competencies that are encouraged are based on this aim.
Individual service plans (ISPs), individual training days, and behavioural
management practices are all geared towards aiding intellectually disabled
people to assimilate the social skills of a rational, working being. While this
may be an apt approach for the mildly intellectually disabled, it is a problematic
course for the severely disabled who mostly are unable to assimilate the
practices of a rational, working being. Indeed, in this context the practices
designated as 'work', and differentiated from other practices, remain quite
obscure to such people, while practices and socialities of interest to them
become institutionally invisible.   
In this chapter I use my fieldnotes to illustrate the way in which the
symbolic scheme of reason and normality is instituted into training practices
designated to cultivate a working being properly domesticated. The intrusion
of these practices into the lives of intellectually disabled people will be
                                            
1 There has been a recent emphasis in the services for intellectually disabled people on what
is called "quality of life" (Atkins 1998; Rapley & Beyer 1996). This supposedly focuses on
individual happiness and life enhancing activities rather than skills training and
normalisation issues. Despite this change in emphasis, "quality of life" goals have
effectively resulted in an additional qualitative assessment of service provision. They also
tend to stress lifestyle, health, independence and safety issues rather than intimacy and
social relatedness (Atkins 1998: 8, 150-157). As shall be argued later in the chapter, quality
of life practices also continue to incorporate skills training as an essential attribute of an
enhanced life. Therefore, quality of life is not an alternative to the principle of
normalisation. It is, rather, an extension of it.
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examined both in relation to Xanadu and to Stockton where my sister lives.
The proliferation of record keeping and surveillance as a means for managing
and training intellectually disabled people will also be examined with respect to
the increasing rationalisation of their world. Such practices, however, are not
just adhered to at the activities centre and sheltered workshops. They are
expected to be continued, vigilantly, in the intimacy of the home as well.
Policies of normalisation and integration provide a useful entry into these
issues.
Normalisation and Integration Policies
The theory and practice of normalisation was influenced by post-WWII political
concerns with human rights, civil rights, individualism, and social welfare in
Europe and North America (Whitehead 1993: 47-51; cf. Ashton 1995; Burton
1996; Cocks 1989; Stella 1996 for accounts of the parallel situation in Australia).
Such concerns included criticism of the conditions and treatment of
intellectually disabled people in institutions and a call for the disbanding of
these places of segregation and isolation and a return to community or
"ordinary" living (Whitehead 1993: 56).2 Some of the early proponents of the
movement also utilised sociological theories of deviancy, labelling and
symbolic interactionism. The specific application of these sociological theories
to the world of intellectual disability came through the work of Wolf
Wolfensberger, a clinical psychologist who had worked in institutions for the
mentally retarded in the United States since the 1950s. Wolfensberger's book,
The Principle of Normalization in Human Services, which was first published in
                                              
2 James Trent (1995) has traced the history of the deinstitutionalisation movement in the
United States back to World War II. In his book, Inventing the Feeble Mind: A history o f
mental retardation in the United States, Trent argues that conscientious objectors who
ended up being employed as attendants in the wards of mental institutions were so appalled
by the inhumane and barbarous conditions that they wrote and published accounts of these
places that precipitated public discussion about the need for reform (Trent 1995: 227-30).
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1972, had a major impact on the deinstitutionalisation movement, on the way
in which intellectual disability was perceived, and on the delivery of social
services to these people. Despite Wolfensberger's (1995: 366) claims to the
contrary, the principles of normalisation have been widely instituted
throughout the services for the intellectually disabled, at least in the United
Kingdom (Digby 1996: 15-18) and Australia (Ashton 1995: 151-152).
Yet the movement known as normalisation actually began in Scandinavia
and was more concerned with the right to an ordinary lifestyle than with a
theoretical analysis of deviancy and the implementation of social service
provision. Two of its foremost proponents were Bengt Nirje and Neils Bank-
Mikkelsen, and their emphasis, and the original definition of normalisation,
was "to let the mentally retarded obtain an existence as close to the normal as
possible" (Bank-Mikkelsen; cited in Nirje 1976: 363; cf. Emerson 1993). Theirs
was a concern for the rights, opportunities and conditions of existence of
mentally retarded people, and the concept of normalisation proposed by them
was based on a "normal respect for the integrity of the individual". Rather than
relying on legislation to change conditions, Nirje believed that a new "ethical
value theory" was needed and it was this that he called normalisation (Nirje
1985: 65-6; cf. Perrin & Nirje 1985). He argued that the mentally retarded
should have available to them the same rhythms, patterns and conditions of
life as those living in mainstream society. These should be based on a normal
and normative rhythm of the day, week and year, on a normal lifestyle and
developmental process, as well as access to the same sexual and familial
relationships, economic standards and living arrangements (Nirje 1976: 364-7;
Nirje 1980: 36-44; cf. Heshusius 1981). Nirje saw this new ideology as a cross-
cultural, universal ideal and practice because it was based on the normative
patterns of the society within which the mentally retarded person belonged.
Interestingly, he was influenced by Ruth Benedict's (1934) argument in Patterns
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of Culture  that different cultural patterns affect the development of individuals
and that a person needs culture in order to fulfil their potential as a cultural
being (Nirje 1985: 66). Nirje and the Scandinavian movement in general
concentrated on these "quality of life" aspects, whereby the cultural patterns
within mainstream society were to be reproduced in the environments in
which intellectually disabled people lived.
While there was a pedagogic and developmental element to Nirje's
principles (Nirje 1976: 368), the development of normalisation and its
implementation throughout the social services for the intellectually disabled
ultimately took a different turn. Through the influence of Wolf Wolfensberger,
the focus shifted to a concern with service provision, vocational and domestic
skills training and the necessity of community integration (Wolfensberger 1977
[1972]: 45; cf. Emerson 1993). Wolfensberger developed his own definition of
normalisation after witnessing the revolutionary treatment of mentally
retarded people in Scandinavia in the late 1960s. He combined the aims of
deinstitutionalisation and deviancy theory with these newly developed
normalisation practices to produce a more sophisticated and arguably more
influential theory of normalisation.    
The trend towards community integration in the United States had gained
momentum during the 1940s but Wolfensberger's analysis of the situation
gave to the movement a theoretical and sociological basis from which to
understand the social perception of mentally retarded people and the means to
achieve their normal integration (Emerson 1993: 4). Wolfensberger explicitly
based his theory of normalisation on the sociological theory of deviancy and
labelling as well as on Goffman's analysis of the stigmatising effects of total
institutions on self identity. As Wolfensberger argued:
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A person can be said to be deviant if he is perceived as being
significantly different from others in some aspect that is considered
of relative importance, and if this difference is negatively valued.
An overt and negatively valued characteristic that is associated
with the deviancy is called a 'stigma' (Wolfensberger 1977 [1972]:
13).  
According to Wolfensberger, mentally retarded people are regarded as
deviants and this deviancy is both a stigma and a social construct. It is a product
of ideology, of the beliefs, attitudes, interpretations and values associated with
mental retardation. These in turn impact on the treatment of the mentally
retarded. While Wolfensberger acknowledged the reality of mental retardation
as an attribute of the person, he argued that it is social values and attitudes,
combined with the lack of a normal lifestyle, that affects how we perceive and
treat the mentally disabled. Rather than focusing on intellectual disability as an
inherent attribute of the person, therefore, Wolfensberger was instrumental in
shifting the emphasis to ideologies, beliefs, interpretations and attitudes (Cocks
& Allen 1996: 284).
Another important contribution of Wolfensberger to the history and
treatment of intellectually disabled people lies in his reformulation of the issues
in terms of social roles and the negative value attributed to difference.
Wolfensberger's definition of normalisation was based on the utilisation of
"means which are as culturally normative as possible, in order to establish
and/or maintain personal behaviours and characteristics which are as culturally
normative as possible" (Wolfensberger 1977 [1972]: 28). By adopting culturally
normative means such as familiar techniques and tools to create a normative
life based on culturally positive options Wolfensberger argued that one can
support a person's behaviour, skills, competencies, experiences and appearance
such that they become more socially accepted and valued (Wolfensberger
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1980a: 14-15). The instituting of these practices through deinstitutionalisation
policies, combined with the training of normative skills and competencies, will,
according to Wolfensberger, precipitate normal behaviours.  Consequently, the
means by which these are achieved are as important as the goal
(Wolfensberger 1980b: 106; cf. Johnson 1998: 157). Just as Séguin had done
more than 100 years earlier, the treatment for intellectually disabled people's
difference became their socialisation, management and training based on the
development of normative social skills and competencies. Only this time it
included the right to live in the community as well.   
Wolfensberger's expansion and systematisation of the normalisation theory
stressed the need for mainstreaming services for the disabled as part of their
community integration. He devoted much of his work to the application and
management of normalisation principles in the human services and developed
a method called Program Analysis of Service Systems (PASS or PASSING)3 by
which organisations could be assessed according to their compliance with his
normalisation standards (Wolfensberger 1980b: 79; Emerson 1993: 9).
However, it was not just the intellectually disabled who were to be integrated
and normalised; the services that dealt with intellectually disabled people were
to be normalised and integrated with one another as well (Wolfensberger 1977
[1972]: 45-54; McCord 1982: 249). Within a relatively short period of time this
theory became the fundamental guiding principle for the treatment of
intellectually disabled people in the United States, Europe and Australia. It
became a "paradigm for human services" as Flynn and Nitsch (1980: 3) claim, or
a "meta-theory" as Wolfensberger himself writes (Wolfensberger 1980a: 7). As
Wolfensberger put it: "Today, [normalization] is a captivating watchword
                                                
3 Program Analysis of Service Systems Implementation of Normalizing Goals.
Chapter Six: Instituting Practices of Reason and Normality
page 248
standing for a whole new ideology of human management" (Wolfensberger
1977 [1972]: 27).4
*
Wolfensberger's theory of normalisation has been widely criticised for
many reasons, including its inherent conservatism, assimilationist undertones,
and emphasis on individualism. It has also been criticised for its social and
structural homogenisation, moral authoritarianism, and internal inconsistency,
as well as its lack of comprehension and theorisation of the real difference that
is intellectual disability (Ashton 1995; Branson & Miller 1989, 1992; Brown &
Smith 1989, 1993a, 1993b; Dalley 1993; Digby 1996; Emerson 1993; Ferns 1993;
Jenkins 1998b; Johnson 1998; McGill & Emerson 1993; Ramon 1991; Rose-
Ackerman 1982; Szivos 1993; Ward 1993; Whitehead 1993; cf. Wolfensberger &
Thomas 1994 for a response to some of these criticisms). British critics in
particular have focused on the ahistorical, idealistic and functional nature of
normalisation, arguing that it denies the structural and material inequalities
inherent in relationships between disabled and non-disabled people (Bleasdale
1996; Chappell 1992; Fullagar & Hardaker 1993; Oliver 1990; Stone 1984).
Others have argued that acceptance of the difference that is mental retardation
is paradoxical if this difference continues to be perceived as a state which must
be changed (Branson & Miller 1989, 1992; Szivos 1993).
Contemporary practices in the field of intellectual disability, which includes
normalisation, deinstitutionalisation, special education, disability legislation,
and training and management practices, reinforce the pathological
                                         
4 Wolfensberger changed the name of normalisation to Social Role Valorisation (SRV) in
response to criticisms, and what he saw as misinterpretations of the meaning, of
normalisation (Wolfensberger 1983). As he wrote , Social Role Valorisation is the
"establishment, enhancement, or defence of the social role(s) of a person or group, via the
enhancement of people's social images and personal competencies" (Wolfensberger 1983: 234).
People need to be seen to be living valued lives and they do so through developing their
social skills and leading as normal a life as possible.
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interpretations that the clinical model espouses (cf. Gleason 1989: 51-64). In
doing so, they reproduce and perpetuate the implicit values and practices
embodied in the symbolic scheme of reason and normality. Rather than
acknowledging, supporting and incorporating intellectually disabled people as
social beings, these institutional and social practices end up perpetuating the
deep division that separates intellectually disabled people as abnormal and
asocial others in relation to a normal social self. Proponents of normalisation,
and the practices associated with it, do not recognise that sociality is a product
of mutual relatedness and interdependence. Although Nirje (1976: 364-367)
stressed the need for access to familial and sexual relationships, and while
relationships in general are becoming an important issue in the field of
intellectual disability (Bigby 2000; McVilly 2000), these have tended to be
regarded as necessary features of a normal social life rather than encounters
through which sociality is developed and sustained.5
The problematic issue of normalcy has been central to much of the literature
on intellectual disability (Branson & Miller 1989, 1992; Jenkins 1998a, 1998b;
Ryan & Thomas 1987; Szivos 1993). It has, as Richard Jenkins points out, a
descriptive and prescriptive aspect, elaborating on that which is normal as the
most typical, but then asserting "that this is also the way things ought to be"
(Jenkins 1998b: 17; author's emphasis). The processes of normalisation and
socialisation to which intellectually disabled people are subjected are a
consequence of this normalising tendency. They accept only certain ways of
being human as normal and then enforce this norm upon those who deviate
from it. The norm thus becomes the status quo based on a cultural and
historical specificity of reason as personhood, as well as standardised notions of
productivity, literacy, numeracy, time management, and behaviour; the
domesticated individual as worker (Branson & Miller 1989; 1992: 24-25; cf.
                                             
5 This issue of relationships is a central feature of my final chapter.
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Chappell 1992; Jenkins 1998b; Oliver 1990; Stone 1984). It also emphasises such
attributes and competencies as independence, self-reliance, individualism,
mobility and reflexivity (Davies 1998: 116; Devlieger 1998: 56-58; Lundgren
1998: 217). These are the principles and aims that inform the institutional
practices of training and management. Although such practices may be
appropriate for those with mild intellectual disabilities, for people who lead
relatively independent or autonomous lives and have the necessary capabilities
to participate in the workforce, it is highly questionable whether they serve
any legitimate purpose for those with more severe forms of disabilities. The
people with whom I worked did not aspire to become "workers", and while a
"quality of life" was emphasised as a component of Xanadu's services, this still
existed within a dominant ethos of vocational and domestic skills training.
Their quality of life was seen to depend upon becoming skilled in normative
social practices.
Training and Socialising the Intellectually Disabled
Despite Wolfensberger's argument that social attitudes and values need to be
altered, the primary focus of the practice of normalisation has been on
changing the intellectually disabled individual and the services that provide for
him or her. Although Wolfensberger stated that "deviancy is in the eye of the
beholder", he argued that it is primarily the "deviant obstacle" that needs to be
eliminated. In this sense, integration practices need to be based on the dispersal
of "deviant" individuals so that they become less noticeable (Wolfensberger
1977 [1972]: 53-54).  In order for intellectually disabled people to be socially
acceptable, in order for them to become integrated into society, Wolfensberger
also stressed the need for such people to develop normative behaviour and
goals (Wolfensberger 1977 [1972]: 31-33; 1980b: 89-90). Intellectually disabled
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people are therefore worked upon so that their behaviours and social skills
conform more closely to the expected norm (Ashton 1995: 152). And, as Leonie
Stella has argued in her account of the setting up of hostel accommodation for
the intellectually disabled in Western Australia, "people were expected to learn,
develop and earn their way to a better quality of life and ultimately into the
community" (Stella 1996: 132).6   
The principles and practice of normalisation are still very much a part of
contemporary ideology and policy with regards to the treatment of
intellectually disabled people in NSW. Individual Service Plans (ISPs) are the
most recent form through which the skills and competencies associated with
normalisation are implemented, and, indeed, it is part of government policy
that all consumers have regular ISP updates. The emphasis in these individual
plans is on what goals the person should be working towards. These goals are
based on an assessment of the person's abilities, strengths and needs by
relevant staff in consultation with the intellectually disabled person and their
guardian or advocate. As noted in the transition plan for Xanadu, the aim of
the ISP is to provide a "written plan that outlines a set of goals that [the person]
can work towards. It . . . also describe[s] ways in which he or she will get help
to achieve these goals". These goals include vocational and domestic skills
training, as well as community integration and recreation.  
An Individual Service Plan (ISP) outlines the expectations, activities and
aspirations of all concerned. It stipulates what each consumer should be
working towards, as well as providing guidelines for how staff should go
about their duty of socialising, training and managing the intellectually disabled
                                                
6 Leonie Stella (1996: 132) also argues that there has been a change from  a "total focus on
training" to a concern with rights, relationships, responsibilities and a 'normal' lifestyle.
She sees this reflected in changes in accommodation for intellectually disabled people. In the
situations that I observed, however, there was a continuing emphasis on normalisation,
behaviour modification and training as guiding principles in the delivery of services to the
intellectually disabled.
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person. As the ISP notes for my sister commented: "After the goals are set and
the appropriate people sign the master plan, it is then the relevant staffs' job to
ensure that we will all work towards them" (Stockton ISP Notes). Each person
at the group home where I worked also had an "ITD", an individual training
day, during which a staff person worked one to one with a consumer to help
develop their social skills and encourage appropriate behaviour. This was
especially so in relation to domestic skills such as cleaning, cooking, hygiene,
banking and shopping.
It was not just staff at the institution, group home or activities centre who
were supposed to provide such training and maintain these aspirations. It is
also suggested that families sustain these practices when the intellectually
disabled person is at home. Ann Shearer (1982: 36) argues that if the principles
of normalisation are to be fully implemented in Australia they need to include
"specific education for parents" alongside the coordination of service provision.
Norman Megahey (1996b: 270) also comments on the role of social workers in
"normalising client relationships with family and community", while Kiernan
(1978: 419) argues that behaviour modification techniques will be more rapid
and effective if parents, teachers and all those involved with the person
implement the same practices.7  
Through coordinating the individual service plans that exist in the sheltered
workshops, activities centre and group homes, as well as extending them into
the familial environment, the ISP aims to provide a uniform plan within which
training and management can take place. As a document it seeks to provide a
total environment for the way in which staff and family interact with an
intellectually disabled person such that training becomes a part of their
                                            
7 Roy Brown (1982) argues that the goals of independence and integration will only be
achieved through the development of integrated vocational, educational, domestic and
leisure services combined with individual training programmes. These programmes require
the precise assessment and measurement of behaviour through such tests as the Gunzburg
Progress Assessment Test (PAC) and the Marlett Adaptive Functioning Index (FAI).
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everyday life rather than just a part of their programming period. As
acknowledged in the notes on ISPs for a similar activities centre: "the process
ensures that a consistent plan of action for staff interaction with each individual
client is implemented" ("Ballimore" Adult Education Centre).
The value, importance and, indeed, necessity of work lies at the heart of
these institutional practices of training and management. Work and "vocational
success" are seen as essential attributes of normalisation and adaptation to the
community (Edgerton & Bercovici 1976: 491; Wolfensberger 1977 [1972]: 51-52;
Woods 1983: 38-44).  As Simon Olshanky (1977) has emphasised, the aim of
normalisation is to change the behaviour of intellectually disabled people so
that they become better functioning, self-determining, self-directional beings
with opportunities to develop and fulfil their own potential. The value of work,
he claimed, "continues as one of the central facets of their lives.  Without work
they feel they are nothing. They feel useless, abnormal, childish, and
unwanted" (Olshanky 1977: 159; cf. Baron et al. 1998; Edgerton 1967). While
Olshanky stressed the importance of work for intellectually disabled people's
sense of themselves as worthwhile beings, he also argued that it is through the
experience of work as a normal aspect of social life that the intellectually
disabled learn to develop into socially accepted and acceptable people
(Olshanky 1977: 157).  
This positive valuation of work has a long history in Western societies,
connected as it is with the development of capitalism and the Protestant work
ethic (Weber 1978 [1930]; Giddens 1978). The value, and indeed necessity, of
labour as a natural aspect of human nature can be observed in the writings of
Rousseau (Foucault 1995 [1961]: 192). Marx built upon Rousseau's philosophical
proposition and argued that the value of human identity lies in our capacity to
labour. As an aspect of human nature it is therefore perceived as natural,
normal and necessary for people to engage in some form of paid employment.
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And, as Baron et al. (1998: 94) have argued, the attainment of adult status is
dependent on participation in the labour market.8 These social values are used
as a justification for normalising intellectually disabled people into the
workforce so that they are now expected to become "productive and useful
members of their society" (Shearer 1982: 38).9 If intellectually disabled people
are to be accepted as normal human beings they must engage in socially
recognisable and vocationally oriented activities. Consequently, an emphasis
on work and the development of vocational skills has become a central
component of training practices for intellectually disabled people.
The majority of the intellectually disabled adults in the area where I did my
fieldwork were employed doing light industrial factory work at local sheltered
workshops. A few were integrated into mainstream working environments as
kitchen hands or office workers, while a number of others were involved in a
post-school options programme that provided a range of activities focused on
developing work related skills and attitudes. Those with whom I spent most of
my time at the activities centre were too old to participate in the post-school
options programme and were generally considered incapable of working in
sheltered employment. However, the staff at the homes often commented that
those going to the activities centre were, like those employed at the sheltered
workshop or in open employment, also "going to work". When Jane left the
activities centre because of her age and increasing frailty, it was said of her that
she had "retired".  
                                                
8 Due to an increasing dependence on, and movement towards, "economies of signs" in the
workplace, as well as the changeable nature and the speed with which the workplace now
operates, Baron et al. argue that people with learning difficulties are becoming increasingly
marginalised as their capacity to learn and adapt to new skills quickly, and indeed to utilise
a wide range of symbolic patterns, is often severely compromised (Baron et al. 1998: 100-103).
9 Deborah Stone (1984) argues that people were administratively categorised by the welfare
state as disabled or non-disabled according to their capacity to work. Those who could not
work were categorised as disabled, as being in need of support, and this legitimised their
position within society. These days, however, in conjunction with changes to welfare
ideology and the principles of normalisation, intellectually disabled are encouraged and
expected to work.
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There was most definitely a hierarchy between the activities centre,
sheltered workshops and open employment, and people moved between them
according to their age, abilities and aspirations. The activities centre took the
least capable and independent consumers in the region, while those who were
most competent participated in supervised open employment positions. The
aim was to encourage people upwards, to provide them with the skills and
motivations required to do the more lucrative and lowly paid menial tasks that
took place at the sheltered workshop. From there it was hoped that a few
would move into some form of open employment.  
When I first arrived at Xanadu I was told by the co-ordinator that the
purpose of the activities centre was to provide "life enhancing" activities for
adults from the local community group houses and private homes. The stress,
he claimed, was on "quality of life" rather than life skills or task training.
However, the emphasis was clearly on providing productive and meaningful
activities and work opportunities and encouraging the attitudes and skills
necessary to move up to the sheltered workshop. Consequently, attached to
the activities centre was a small sheltered workshop where four people were
employed to shred paper for a local business. At the activities centre itself a
paper shredder also stood in a corner of the main room. It was turned on each
day so that someone could have their turn at learning how to do this
purposeful, socially valued, work. However, most of the consumers found this
work tedious, uninteresting and, above all, dirty.  Joanne was the only
exception. She spent all her spare time at the centre tearing up newspaper in
preparation for shredding. This was a closely guarded and solitary operation,
and one which never extended to operating the shredding machine as well. The
staff were constantly encouraging other consumers who were considered
potentially capable of sheltered workshop activities to spend time operating
the shredding machine or engaging in other work-related activities.
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For a number of weeks a group of women from Xanadu spent each
morning tying bits of string to cardboard tags for a local industrial company.
This work was being paid for, and it was valued by the staff as meaningful and
important for the consumers to participate in. I sat with the consumers and
helped to thread these strings. Two of the other women, Sarah and Kate,
wanted to sit with us and watch as we performed this task but did not want to
participate. A staff member came in and told them they should be helping us.
Neither were interested in doing this work. Both were happily engaged in
other activities; Kate rocking in her chair and singing, and Sarah watching what
we were doing.  
Sarah was told by the staff person that she either had to help us thread the
strings or do some paper shredding on the machine. Sarah told the staff person
that she wanted to thread her beads instead. These large wooden beads were a
favourite object of hers, and most mornings she would ask me to collect them
from the cupboard so that she could thread them onto a piece of plastic string.
When Sarah finished threading them, she would pull them all off and start all
over again. This enterprise of Sarah's reminded me of my sister's collection of
bits and pieces, and her love of jigsaw puzzles. To an outsider both seem to be
meaningless, purposeless and never-ending tasks, though engaged in with
absolute dedication and ceaseless interest by the person concerned. Threading
pieces of string onto cardboard did not seem all that different to the skill
required for threading the beads onto string but Sarah would not have
anything to do with the paid work, and kept insisting that she be able to do her
beads instead. The staff person told Sarah that she could do her beads, but only
after she had done her work, and that if she didn't help us or shred some paper
she would not get her beads at all, nor have any make-up put on later in the
day. The staff member wheeled Sarah over to the paper shredding machine
and told her to stop being difficult and to do some work. She stood over Sarah,
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handing her sheets of newspaper to feed into the machine piece by piece.
Although Sarah acquiesced at first, she was very annoyed, and demonstrated
her resistance by folding her arms across her chest and leaning back in her
wheelchair with a dark and angry scowl across her face. At this point, the staff
person gave up. Consequently, Sarah did neither the work nor her beads and
eventually went into a trance like state and fell asleep.   
I was later told that Sarah must only be given the beads as a reward; that it
is hard to get her to "do anything" and if she's given the beads whenever she
wants them then she'll "do nothing". This separation of only certain forms of
activity as "doing something", as productive and meaningful practice in
comparison to the meaningless and purposeless act of threading beads, was a
constant source of tension at the centre. Interestingly, it was the activities that
the consumers initiated themselves that were considered empty of purpose
and meaning. Those that the staff instigated, such as shredding paper, tying
string to cardboard, painting and potting plants, were considered socially
meaningful, purposeful and worthy of spending time on. There were
numerous occasions when I observed such tensions.     
Kate, the young woman who had also been watching us tie pieces of string
to the cardboard, spent much of her time at Xanadu sitting in the same place,
under the high window in the front room, rocking and singing to herself, and
flapping her hands in front of her face. She would quite happily remain there
all day if allowed. On this particular occasion the staff member also tried to get
Kate to join the rest of us in threading the pieces of string onto the cardboard.
She patiently showed Kate how to do it and gave her the board and string to
copy, whereupon Kate promptly threaded the cardboard in her own way. The
staff person gave up in despair, told her not to worry about it, and left the
room. I went out to get more string and when I came back, Kate and Cressida
were sitting at the table laughing. I was unsure what they were laughing about
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although it seemed to have something to do with the scenario that had just
been played out. They were clearly engaged in a matter of mutual concern.
When Martin drew all over a sheet of paper in thick dark lines, rather than
tracing over the dotted "M's" that covered the page, he was reprimanded for
not doing his prescribed activity. Teaching Martin to write his name was one of
his ISP goals, and Martin was given these sheets most mornings as a form of
training to develop this skill. Martin was 30 at the time, and lived with his
parents on a dairy farm that his family still operates. He did not read or write,
nor did he show any interest in learning to do so. Despite his illiteracy, Martin
was actively engaged in the world around him, always observing and
commenting on what was going on at home, with the staff, or with his fellow
consumers. Like Sarah—a strong-minded woman who, once she had been
taught her rights, believed she had the right to do nothing if she so
pleased—Martin also had a difficult relationship with the staff. The staff treated
him with some disdain because he sometimes talked back at them and even
went so far as to tease staff members on occasion. Martin would sit at the table
and painstakingly trace over the dotted "M's" while a staff member was
around, but as soon as they left the room he would start to draw on the page;
not a picture as such, but dark heavy lines in the same direction so that the
paper eventually tore. His scribbling was perceived by the staff as nonsensical
and deviant; his tracing of the letter "M" an achievement. Seen from another
perspective, scribbling was an activity Martin enjoyed and engaged in
spontaneously; tracing the letter "M" a meaningless chore that had to be
performed for someone else's gratification. Martin knew that he was writing
the letter "M" but there appeared to be no meaning or purpose in it for him.
Another person who came to Xanadu was a particularly quiet man called
Tony. He was in his late 30s and was confined to a wheelchair in which he was
usually slumped over, giving the appearance of being half asleep and unaware
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of what was going on around him. Tony was severely multiply impaired,
incontinent, and did not speak, although at times he made noises to affirm
whether he wanted to eat what was in front of him or not. Tony was also
epileptic, his body very frail, and often spent the afternoons lying on a mattress
resting rather than joining in the activities. He did not appear to engage with
anyone at the centre although over time I came to realise that Tony was
acutely aware of what was going on around him and could get easily distressed
by the more vigorous and aggressive behaviour of some of the other
consumers. They too were quite aware of him, and a number of times it was
one of the consumers who looked after him, holding him at the shoulders or
patting his head, before informing the staff that Tony had just had a seizure or
had wet himself.
One of the things that Tony enjoyed was playing with a box of yellow glass
bulbs. He would take them from the plastic container that they were kept in
and drop them into a glass jar, delighting in the noise of glass hitting glass. The
bulbs were sometimes given to him during those moments of "inactivity",
when people were filling in time between activities. Tony would be captivated
by these bulbs and could be occupied with them for quite some time. They
were one of the few objects that he was given to "play" with at the activities
centre. At the group home where Tony lived he was sometimes strapped into a
special chair with a table attached to it. Some wooden puzzles or paper and
crayons would be placed on his table. This was to aid Tony's posture, to give
him some physical therapy and also teach him tactile skills.  
On one occasion at Xanadu I noticed Tony taking an interest in the brightly
coloured nail polish jars that were sitting on the table. As I noted in my field
notes for that day:
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I'd been painting nails and he [Tony] was interested in the nail
polish jars. I gave them to him and he arranged all six of them in a
triangular pattern, each jar equidistant from the other. When I
gave him the one that I'd been using he placed it in the very
centre. I'd never seen him so alert. He also did a colour coded
puzzle, fitting the cylinders into holes around a wooden block. He
did this quite happily, at times seeming to follow the colour
scheme but then randomly inserting the pieces seemingly any old
way. When I gave him the domino blocks he just began to put
them back in the box rather than match the animals. All of them
have done this with the domino puzzle. He was bored with the
jigsaw wooden blocks but when given the light bulbs and clear
bottle he became animated again and began to fill up the bottle
with the bulbs, but only with a few, before putting them back in
the box and going back and forth like this.
I was interested in the purposefulness of Tony's actions, and his interest in the
objects around him. He definitely had a sense of what he was doing and the
order in which he wanted to do them, and was conscious of the patterns and
sounds that he could make with these objects. It reminded me of Maryla and
Stephen, who also liked to order the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, arrange objects
in an ordered spatial pattern, and make rhythmic echoing sounds by hitting
objects against one another. I wondered what meaning these actions had for
Tony and whether he approached these objects in the same way each time. I
watched him over the twelve months on those occasions when he came to the
centre and saw him continue to repeat this process with the bulbs and puzzles.
Rather than an arbitrary and aimless procedure, Tony's actions had a level of
intensity, order and engagement that Maryla and Stephen also showed with
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their respective activities. They were patterned and symbolic expressions upon
which mutuality could be built.
Jacky was another person who regularly came to Xanadu from the group
home that she shared with four other people. She was a young woman who,
although physically independent, was unable to speak clearly or
comprehensibly. Jacky used various high pitched noises and squeals to get
people's attention and had a tendency to grab someone's arm and drag them
around when she wanted to show them something. Jacky was one of the least
popular of the consumers, with both staff and the other consumers, and was
considered to be extremely difficult to "manage". She was also somewhat of a
loner. One of her interests was to keep everything in order in the main room.
To do this required that Jacky constantly rearrange the furniture so that the
chairs and tables were aligned and in their correct positions. It also meant
putting away anything that had been taken out of the cupboards, including the
cups for morning tea, a cloth to wipe the tables down, or the box of makeup or
toys. It caused Jacky great distress when the room was out of order, which it
often was with twelve other people sharing it. Consequently, Jacky spent much
of the day sitting in a corner squealing and crying, tearing at her clothes and
hair, or chewing her fists and hitting herself, much to everyone's distress and
frustration. The staff labelled Jacky's behaviour as obsessive-compulsive and
tried to stop her. Rather than using these expressions of order as possibilities
for negotiating mutual sociality they were categorised as abnormal.
One day when a group of us were at the local nursery doing some weeding,
the staff person complained that there was little point doing these activities as
the consumers spend their time "doing nothing while the staff do all the work".
Yet despite this comment, the consumers were doing all sorts of things. Kate
often sat in the tin shed stacking and unstacking a pile of plastic plant pots,
building a teetering tower out of them and watching as they swayed and then
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collapsed. Cressida would sit on a stool poking at the grass with a garden fork,
while Mary would sit under the awning of the shed smoking a cigarette as she
watched the rest of us. None of this was considered acceptable behaviour; it
was not the doing of productive work and was thus constituted as inactivity, as
doing nothing. I was told that the consumers would get bored if they were
doing nothing so their days were filled up with activities. Just as the staff now
have something "to do" in training and managing the consumers to make them
conform to normal social behaviours, so too must the consumers work; not
only towards becoming more normal, but by participating in socially
productive and meaningful activities as well. In fact, they must be normalised
through training and management procedures in order to be meaningfully
engaged with at all.
The interesting aspect about these observations is not so much that the staff
labelled the consumers' own actions as meaningless and abnormal, but that
they rarely, if ever, engaged with the consumers through these acts. As Goode
(1980b: 192-193; Goode 1984: 234-235) has argued, the behaviour of
intellectually disabled people is often interpreted as faulty and in need of
remedial training. It is this training, and the management of behaviour, that is
at the heart of institutional practices. By not observing behaviour as
meaningful, argues Gleason (1994: 256), staff "impose another order of
behaviour as therapy". Both Goode (1980b) and Gleason (1989) have also
pointed out, however, that it is possible to observe purpose and meaning in the
actions and interactions of severely disabled people.
While agreeing with both Goode and Gleason, I argue that what is central to
these institutional relationships is the lack of engagement of staff with
consumers on the basis of the consumers' own actions and behaviours. While
this lack of engagement also exists in relation to social skills training (as I argue
in the following chapter) there is a significant difference. Socially recognised
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activities are encouraged and enforced, while these other activities are
rendered "meaningless" and an expression of abnormality. This is an extension
of the clinical perception that interprets intellectually disabled people as
deficient in the core human attribute of reason, an attribute that supposedly
makes social life possible and meaningful. Consequently, there is no attempt
by staff at symbolic mediation, at negotiating the value and meaning of such
activities as the threading of beads, the rocking, the stacking of pots, or the
ordering of furniture. These activities are not seen as meaningful for the
consumers, nor as potentially meaningful for those who engage with the
consumers. Like my sister's bits and pieces, they are interpreted as obsessive,
compulsive, bizarre, and abnormal. It is as though meaning only exists in the
socially prescribed use of objects, rather than being an emergent entity that
exists through shared encounters with various objects. By not engaging with
the consumers on the basis of their own behaviours and expressions, the
capacity for creating and sustaining a genuine and mutual sociality has been
rendered impossible. By not recognising these dispositions as expressions of
degrees of mutuality and sociality there is no negotiation of different ways of
being within a shared social world.
The activities that are encouraged emphasise the development of
decontextualised capabilities based upon an elaborated code. Like the
decontextualised mental skills of intelligence tests, these skills have become
measurements of humanness, normalcy and the capacity for human sociality.
They ostensibly allow a person to develop transferable and utilitarian skills so
that they can function in the social world and work place.  These include such
things as operating machinery, packing boxes, potting plants, and putting nails
and similar objects into plastic bags. They rely on tactile, numerate and
sometimes literate skills, and are based on the recognition of such activities as
meaningful, relevant and purposeful. The restricted and contextualised codes
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that many intellectually disabled people inherently utilise are considered
meaningless and, because of this, such people are denied the capacity to
contribute to the social milieu as they are. This denial of their pre-existing
capacity for sociality and mutuality disregards the fact that none of us actually
lives entirely according to such paradigmatic principles, as Michael Carrithers
(1992: 113-114) has also pointed out. We all exist within culture and society
according to the dynamics of our interactions with others.  It is upon these that
our sociality depends and is, indeed, built (Carrithers 1992: 57).
Owing to the inherent contradiction between the interpretation of
intellectually disabled people as abnormal and asocial beings yet who are in
need of normalising and socialising, the practices that exist in contemporary
institutional environments have ended up producing a permanent state of
liminality. The ideal of transformation can never be achieved. The constant
movement from one activity to another at the activities centre reflected this
paradoxical and liminal state. There was nowhere to go, so the journeys that
constantly took place between one activity and the next became the defining
moments of each day. The consumers were locked within a bus that had no
possibility of ever really reaching its destination. Everyone, including the staff,
waited around for these moments of mobility, for these journeys that
legitimised their place within society. Being still and silent and doing nothing
but being in one another's presence was illegitimate; to be on the move
towards socially recognised activities was the only legitimate form of practice.
The bus journeys metaphorically represented this continual process of training,
socialisation and transformation that intellectually disabled people must
undertake in order to move towards becoming socially legitimate beings.  
Managing the Intellectually Disabled
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The training of vocational and domestic skills are not the only institutional
practices that affect the lives of intellectually disabled people. Behaviour
modification is also utilised as a means to change and ameliorate what are
considered to be undesirable and asocial behaviours (Cuvo 1976). With the
recent emphasis on deinstitutionalisation and community integration it became
increasingly necessary to reassure the community that behaviour could and
would be managed and changed to conform to socially acceptable standards
and norms (Johnson 1995: 213; Johnson 1998). This is what behaviour
modification practices attempt to do.   
The practice of behaviour modification was in part influenced by Séguin's
belief that intellectually disabled people could be trained. It has also been
influenced by recent developments in cognitive and behavioural psychology
(Kiernan 1978; Megahey 1996a: 20).10  The successful use of training programs
such as those that were developed by Jack Tizard in the 1950s and 1960s—who,
like Wolfensberger, combined the insights of behavioural and developmental
psychology with an emphasis on social causes of the problem of intellectual
disability—characterised the shift in emphasis from incarceration and custody
back to training and treatment (O'Connor & Tizard 1956; Megahey 1996b: 249-
50; cf. Sinson 1993: 57-8).11  As Phillip Roos puts it: "all behaviour manifests the
same basic principles, and is the product of the organism's interaction with the
environment . . . therefore behaviour is modified according to the principles of
                                                
10 Carman-Brown and Fox (1996: 229) argue that the success and influence of behaviourism for
the treatment of intellectually disabled people in Australia in the 1960s and 1970s was in
part due to the post WWII emphasis on efficiency, progress and empirical science.
11 The emphasis in some 18th century asylums, such as The Retreat run by William Tuke at
York, was on moral treatment. Rather than solely utilising physical treatments such as
purging, blood letting and cold showers, Tuke also incorporated intellectual, social and
behavioural methods of treatment. These included an emphasis on constant activity,
recreation, reading, diet, hygiene, religious devotion, diversion from morbid thoughts,
socialisation through mimicry, and the encouragement of rational discussion between
physician and patient (Kraft 1961: 400-403; Rose 1985: 24-25). In Madness and Civilisation
(1995 [1961]) Foucault argues that this new method, and the reforms instigated by Pinel in
France in the early 19th century, reflected a change in political attitudes as well as to ideas
of responsibility and guilt.  Morality replaced punishment in what became a more subtle form
of control and exclusion (cf. B. Turner 1987: 64).
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learning" (Roos 1977: 140). Consequently, behaviour modification techniques
aim to "free individuals from crippling behaviour, enabling them to interact
more meaningfully with their environment and thereby enhancing their
opportunities to develop their human qualities" (Roos 1977: 146).
Although used in combination, behaviour modification stands in contrast to
the principles of normalisation. The principle of normalisation provides the
theoretical and practical tools for understanding and transforming the position
and treatment of intellectually disabled people in society.  Behaviour
modification provides the techniques by which these can be attained (McGill &
Emmerson 1993: 60; cf. Rose-Ackerman 1982). Normalisation tends to
emphasise environmental factors and their affects on behaviour, arguing for a
change in practices, services and lifestyle, whereas behavioural modification
techniques focus exclusively on how to alter the individual. Normalisation
became an ideology, behaviour modification became the means by which this
ideal could be achieved.12  
In the case of those with whom I did my fieldwork, these practices were
incorporated into the individual service plans which were regularly referred to
during the course of each day. On my first day at the activities centre I was
informed by the coordinator that as part of their obligations to the consumers,
each person had an individual programme that was used by staff as a guide to
daily activities. Not only was this programme used for training and skills
development, but the ways that staff engaged with and managed the
                                                
12 Despite their different emphases, both normalisation and behaviour modification embody
the aim of changing individual behaviour so that the person functions normally, conforms
socially, and "fulfils" their own potential. Like clinical interpretations, normalisation and
behavioural management practices are based on the perception that intellectually disabled
people lack the capacity for sociality as they are. They blame the intellectually disabled
for not fitting in and pathologise their behaviour and experience (Brown & Smith 1989: 107;
cf. Goffman 1990 [1961]; Johnson 1998; Mehan 1988). They also force intellectually disabled
people to be participants in their own normalisation. As Gerben de Jong (1982: 53) argues,
contemporary practices of behavioural management are akin to the Parsonian concept of the
sick role in that the person must be seen to be working towards their own improvement.
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consumers were also based on the information in these plans.  The details of
the ISPs were not available to me. However, there were numerous occasions
when I was able to observe the role that these plans, and the behaviour
modification practices enshrined in them, played in the daily lives of the
consumers.
The staff constantly reminded me that Patricia was to be positively
redirected whenever she became irritable. This included getting her to tear up
paper for the shredding machine or sweep the floors. Patricia was one of the
more social of the consumers, and often came into the staff room to engage
with the staff. The staff used this practice of positive redirection to get rid of
Patricia when they'd had enough of her alternating aggressive and affectionate
behaviour. Within Patricia's ISP there were guidelines as to the progressive
measures to be taken if this was unsuccessful, ending in solitary confinement as
a last resort. Patricia often did not follow staff instructions and when in a bad
mood would continue to shout and squeal and shake her head, walking around
the room hitting out at people and creating a tense atmosphere for all those in
her presence. These scenes sometimes ended with her being shut in the small
broom cupboard near the toilets.  
Similarly, others at the activities centre were also engaged with on the basis
of their ISP guidelines. Kate loved to play with her hands and could often be
found rocking in her chair flapping her hands rhythmically in front of her face.
The staff were supposed to distract Kate from this by giving her an alternative
activity to do and throughout the day she was constantly being reprimanded
for her behaviour. Daniel enjoyed going up close to people and staring them in
the face, often wanting the other person to scratch his head. The staff all told
him to keep his distance and would not engage with him in this way even
though his way of communicating was through touch rather than spoken
words. Halfway through the year a young intellectually disabled man and
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woman from a nearby town joined the group from Xanadu for activities once a
week. The woman was very social and went around the room saying "hello" to
everyone and giving them a hug. The regular staff were unsure if this was all
right and checked with the staff person who came with her to see how they
should interact with her.   
Another woman, Kerry, who lived a semi-independent life in the flat
attached to the larger group home, was very curious about what was going on
around her and always asked numerous questions of the staff on duty. When I
first met her she wanted to know about my car, my family, why I wore odd
earrings and why I was "working" at the home. We had quite a long
conversation about these and other things but I was informed by a staff person
when I entered the house that I was not to have personal conversations with
Kerry and that I should make sure she knew nothing about my life. I was
informed that as a volunteer I too had to comply with these management
practices whether I liked them or not.    
Jill—who also lived at Jeffrey Street on semi-permanent respite, was more
independent and worked in a local 'take-away'—was very affectionate and
friendly and we had become quite good friends during my time at the house.
One afternoon when I arrived at Jeffrey Street she rushed over to give me a
hug but was reprimanded by a staff person and told to shake my hand instead
as this was the socially appropriate way of engaging with others. This was part
of Jill's ISP and it was enforced as a means of protecting her from potential
abuse by others.  It was also enforced as a way of engaging with Jill
generally.13     
                                                
13 The ethical dilemmas that can arise when relationships with intellectually disabled
consumers blur the distinction between professional care and friendship will be discussed in
the following chapter.
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Cressida, whom I had come to know at the activities centre and who lived
permanently at Jeffrey Street, was always wanting affection of some sort, be it
a pat on the back, holding hands, or just sitting side by side on the couch. She
had apparently been violent when living in one of the other houses a number
of years ago and I was told that, according to her ISP guidelines, staff were
never to turn their back on her. They were to refrain from maintaining eye
contact with Cressida and should always stay over a metre away from her.
One day when I arrived at Jeffrey Street I found Cressida sitting alone in the
television room.  There was nobody else around inside the house. She was in a
bad mood, with her arms folded across her chest and her head hanging down.
She told me not to talk to her as she was very angry, and then told me that
"they" were talking about her, meaning the staff who were sitting smoking at
the outside table. Cressida hates the thought of anyone talking about her, or
even looking at her sometimes. She often says that someone or other is pulling
faces at her, including both the staff and other consumers. I told her I had only
heard them talking about Sarah and how she had been taken to hospital that
afternoon after a series of epileptic seizures. When I came out of the TV room
one of the staff members was in the hall and she asked what Cressida had said
to me. She wanted to know whether or not Cressida had been "whingeing". I
said she had complained a bit but that otherwise we were just talking. I was
then told that I was not to let Cressida whinge and that if she ever did I was to
change the topic to something else, to something positive, as this was part of
her ISP guidelines.  
The same procedure was used with one of the other women who came to
the activities centre, although the consequences of her behavioural and mood
changes were essentially more serious. Mary was far more vocal than most
about her dislike of the activities centre, and often told disturbing stories about
her family and former life in an institution. She would tell stories about when
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she was taken away from her mother and sister as a child and sent to an
institution, about being locked in solitary confinement when she misbehaved,
given injections against her will, and forced to have an abortion. Mary often
complained about her fellow residents and those at the activities centre, saying
that they were nasty to her and that she didn't like them. These comments,
however, were to be ignored. They were interpreted as signs of regressive
behaviour rather than legitimate complaints about her life or specific problems
she was having with the centre or group home. This ideal of constant
behaviour and uniform emotional expression denied to Mary any possible
"normal" variation in mood and behaviour. It also imprisoned Mary in a world
within which her intellectual disability was used as the sole interpretation of her
behaviour and subsequent treatment.
This interpretation of behaviour in terms of the disability is similar to that
which Lynne Hannan observed in her ethnographic study of people with a
mental illness living in hostel accommodation. Hannan argued that the
absolute stigma attached to the status of mental illness meant that all behaviour
was immediately attributed to the "illness" (Hannan 1990).  Kelley Johnson
(1998) also notes this in her account of intellectually disabled women living in
an institution. She argues that the discourses of intellectual disability
"constituted the women as the problem" so that their behaviour was always
interpreted within the terms of this discourse (Johnson 1998: 77). This was very
much the case for the people with whom I worked. In Mary's case the
consequences of it were that she was periodically sent back to the institution
where she once lived for intensive drug therapy. Drugs such as Valium,
Risperidone or Largactil were sometimes used by the staff to control behaviour
or calm someone down, especially when they were "going off", although this
was only done if a person's ISP allowed and if permission had been granted by
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the guardian or advocate.14 On one occasion I was shocked to hear Mary tell
one of the other women to "stop mucking up otherwise you'll get the needle
too!" In fact, there were numerous occasions when the consumers would
discipline one another, repeating verbatim staff instructions as to how
someone was to behave. Their reproduction of the attitudes of staff towards
one another highlights the pervasive influence of these practices of
management and training in intellectually disabled people's lives.
One of the ways that Mary's house manager dealt with Mary's behavioural
"problems", which at their height included physical aggression towards one of
the other residents, was to call in a "programmer". This was a professionally
trained behavioural therapist who worked for the Department of Community
Services. Although they spend no regular time with the consumers, the
programmers are called in to intervene and work on a one to one basis with a
consumer when there are "severe and challenging behavioural problems" that
are disrupting the general atmosphere at the group home and/or the work
place. The programmer observes people's behaviour and interprets from this
what it is saying about them, and whether it can be attributed to a lifestyle,
medical, or communication problem. The programmer will then develop a
uniform management plan to be implemented by staff at the group home and
the work place or activity centre in an attempt to alter and ameliorate the
problem.
                                                
14 In the institution where Johnson did her fieldwork drug therapy was regularly used as a
legitimate form of behavioural management. Despite the implementation of service plans for
the women, staff had little opportunity to develop programmes for dealing with forms of
"challenging behaviour" and saw the administration of drugs such as Largactil and Melleril
as the basic means for managing these "problems" (Johnson 1998: 76). The use of drugs to
manage behaviour, however, is not confined to those who are intellectually disabled. There
is a growing trend in the United States and Australia in the use of drugs such as Ritalin to
treat children who have been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder.  As Mark Riley
points out, at the heart of the legal battles now ensuing over the use of these drugs is the issue
of defining what constitutes "normal" behaviour (Riley 2001: 10).
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As well as instituting these training and behavioural management practices,
the staff were also involved in the administrative management of consumers.
One staff person was responsible for between three and five consumers as
their case manager. Part of the responsibility in being a case manager involved
attending ISP meetings and keeping an up to date record of each consumer's
behaviour, mood, communication and participation in activities. These records
were used as references whenever issues concerning particular individuals
arose, such as behavioural problems. They became the (im)personal diaries for
the consumers, written about them, and for them, but not by them (cf. Bogdan
& Taylor 1976: 49; Bogdan & Taylor 1982: 217; Goffman 1990 [1961]: 7; Johnson
1998: 114-126; Ryan & Thomas 1987: 36 for similar accounts of the role that
records and reports play in the lives of intellectually disabled people).15 When I
began chairing the weekly meetings at Hervey Street, the smaller group home
around the corner from Jeffrey Street, I was accompanied on my first day by
the new house manager for Jeffrey Street. Kevin introduced himself to the
people living in the house and shook hands with all of them. Mary was
particularly put out by the fact that he already knew her name and seemed to
know all about her even though she had never met him before. Kevin had
heard about Mary, and indeed all the consumers, from other staff members
and through their record books, but Mary had no knowledge of who he was.
Nor was she ever likely to. Mary was especially conscious of the power that
staff wielded over her and did not like having things written down at the house
meetings because she could not read them.  
                                                
15 During the deinstitutionalisation process that Johnson (1998) observed it was the
impressions, assessments and observations of staff that had influence and were used in the
final decisions as to who would live in what form of accommodation. The women were
effectively excluded from the process due to this power differential despite officially being a
part of the consultation process. Kathryn Pyne Addelson (1991) also comments on the power of
professionals in her analysis of pregnant  teenagers in the USA. As Addelson states: "what
we call 'truth' is based on the authority of someone or other . . .  [and] in professionalized
fields, the confirmation or falsification of truths is handled by professionals. What is
relevant here is the authority the social workers had in constructing the explanations of the
young women's pasts . . ." (Addelson 1991: 102).
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It is the staff person's assessment and perception of consumers that is being
recorded. These are based on the underlying interpretation that intellectually
disabled people are abnormal, that they essentially lead aberrant lives, and that
they need to be both trained and managed in order to become part of society.
Whenever a particularly unusual or difficult situation arose an incident report
had to be filled in and signed by staff. A communication book passed between
the houses and the activity centre and it was through this and all the other
reports, minutes, and progress records that information about the consumers
was circulated. This included staff from the DOCS office, and it was through
such information and their conversations with one another, that staff became
uniformly informed as to how they were to engage with, manage and train
those who were in their care.
*
This ideal of integrated behavioural management, although different in that it is
combined with the contemporary ideology of normalisation and community integration,
is not entirely new. Even before my brother and sister went to live at Stockton Hospital
in 1975 the staff at the Grosvenor Diagnostic Centre were suggesting to my parents
ways in which my siblings' behaviour could be better managed. In fact, the people at
Grosvenor, as well as other professionals in the field, saw advice on management as one
of their primary roles and duties towards my parents (19/5/67; 19/2/69; 12/5/69). In a
letter to my father in April 1967 the then Director for the Mentally Handicapped in
NSW suggested that: "the first stage in discussing the problem of your three children
would be for them to be examined at the Mental Deficiency Diagnostic Centre at
Grosvenor Hospital, Summer Hill. After the appropriate diagnostic work-up, we could
then discuss the best possible avenues for management" (26/4/67).
In July 1967, after my siblings' second assessment at Grosvenor, it was surmised
that:  "only the passage of time and the further evolution of the condition will make the
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definite diagnosis clear and assist the parents in accepting fully the implications of the
situation with regard to management, training and placement. . . We recommended
that Stephen and Maryla needed an educational or training program for the retarded,
geared to their intellectual level and possibly in a residential setting, although such
placement may not be easy to find in view of their added behaviour disorder" (12/7/67).
On finding Maryla, Stephen and Ursula "extremely difficult to examine"  the doctors
gained an impression of them as "almost UNMANAGED and UNMANAGEABLE"
(25/ 5/67; capitalised in original). They blamed this on my parents "inappropriately
permissive techniques of child handling", acknowledging, however, that this "seems to
have been forced upon them by the exigencies of the situation—aside from their own
personality tendencies" (25/5/67). As they wrote: "We gave an interpretation that the
disturbed behaviour shown by the children had an organic rather than a Psychotic
basis and needed firmer control, fixed limits and expectations, and minimisation of
external stimuli rather than overpermissiveness (I feel this advice may have fallen on
deaf ears). We also recommended domestic or Mothercraft help for Mrs. Klotz in the
home, to assist in organising a routine for the children's medication, habit-training
etc." (12/7/67). There was little further elaboration in the records on just what this
management and training should include.  It was consistently alluded to as an
essential requirement for my siblings' progress and development but rarely expanded
upon. More often than not, the advice from Grosvenor took the form of drug therapy for
controlling my siblings' epileptic seizures and "managing their difficult behaviour"
(9/5/66; 19/2/69; 24/2/75).
In February 1975, when my parents sought advice from the staff at Grosvenor
"regarding the possibility of residential placement", the attending Senior Medical
Officer commented that: "although devoted to their two handicapped children, [the
parents] realise that little progress has been made of recent years and that the demands
of home life are causing difficulties for both Stephen and Maryla, and for the rest of the
family . . . They now function in the severely mentally retarded range of intelligence
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and because of increased difficulties in home management and their limited abilities in
self-care, performance and communication, residential placement in a State institution
for the mentally retarded is being sought (eg. Stockton Hospital)" (24/2/75). The
principal at Maryla and Stephen's school supported this recommendation, noting that
"Both children fall within the moderately retarded level & if in a better living situation
a better performance would be seen" (7/8/75).
Although the staff at Grosvenor tried to encourage management of my siblings'
behaviour in the home, outside of an institutional environment this is difficult to
implement. Families have a different way of engaging with and perceiving their
retarded kin, and the dynamics of an intimate home environment do not easily lend
themselves to managed training. This was one of the reasons why my parents were
encouraged to consider placement in an institution. It was believed that this would
alleviate pressure on the rest of the family. It was also thought that an institutional
environment would provide my brother and sister with what those at Grosvenor
perceived to be the necessary care and management for their progress and
development. It was at the institution that very specific programs for changing my
siblings behaviour were put in place, although this only began in earnest in the early
1990s.16
In Maryla's early ISPs the main aim seemed to be controlling and stabilising her
epilepsy.  Prior to these plans the general focus in the wards had been on toilet training
and hygiene. It was not until 1994 that the emphasis shifted to normalisation and
community integration. This change was primarily due to the recently instituted NSW
Disability Services Act (1993) which legalised the principles of community integration
and normalisation in all NSW government services and institutions. By 1996 Maryla's
"Lifestyle Management Plan" included the aims of "effectively manag[ing] her
                                            
16 The general tendency at the institution is for patients to be segregated according to their
different abilities. In this way the staff would work on the group as a whole rather than
focusing on individual skills and training, and people would be moved from ward to ward
according to developments in their abilities.
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challenging behaviours in the least restrictive manner possible. To improve her
independence and living skills . . . [and her capacity to] socialise in an appropriate
manner". This combination of normalisation, training and behavioural management
was seen as a positive way of improving my sister's social acceptability, independence
and lifestyle. While these included such things as joining the local girl guides and going
to cooking classes, there was a definite bias towards managing her behaviour.
In 1991, one of the staff on Maryla's ward used her as a case study for an
assignment on reducing compulsive behaviour. The "problem" they were having with
Maryla was "compulsive pacing of dormitories, corridor and bathroom for hours after
retiring at night" (Chadban 1991: 2). Over a period of time this "disruptive" and
"inappropriate compulsive behaviour" was decreased and replaced  by a "contextually
relevant alternative". This involved Maryla listening to a recording of a children's
story each night  before going to sleep. Maryla was thirty years old at the time. It was
considered that this constituted a change in her environment "more in keeping with
the principles of normalisation" (Chadban 1991: 9).  
Another consistent "problem" that the staff at Stockton have with Maryla is her
constant collecting of bits and pieces. This too is labelled as obsessive-compulsive
ritualistic behaviour, as it interferes with Maryla's other activities such as the crafts
and living skills lessons that are part of her social training (Chadban 1991: 5;
15/11/94). In April 1994 a Management Plan was drawn up with the aim of teaching
Maryla to carry her bits and pieces in a box. Due to the craft work Maryla was engaged
in at the time she had begun collecting bits of off-cut material and cotton thread which
caused her palms to sweat and the skin to peel. The strategy was to get Maryla to take a
box with her and when it got too full she was to dispose of the cotton in the dispensary.
As the plan noted: "It is important that Maryla is able to keep the box with her all day,
except for a few times when she will be encouraged to put the box down (meal times,
hygiene time, shower time, dressing etc).  THE BOX WILL NOT BE USED AS A
PUNISHER OR A REINFORCER.  THAT IS, SHE IS TO HAVE THE BOX
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REGARDLESS OF HOW HER BEHAVIOUR HAS BEEN. Using the box allows her
ritualistic and obsessive behaviours to be managed and allows her hands time to heal"
(29/4/94; capitalised in original).   
As I remarked in chapter two, Maryla now carries her bits and pieces around in a
purse which is locked up at night to prevent her arranging them as she likes to do. We
were asked to do this as well when Maryla came home for visits. However, my family
view Maryla's collection of bits and pieces as an integral component of her sociality,
and it is through our engagements with her over these objects that our particular form
of relating to one another has evolved. Ongoing discussions as to what is happening are
also a part of our interactions with Maryla. She needs to know exactly what is
happening, and this has to be regularly repeated and reinforced in order for Maryla to
be satisfied. In the past Maryla always directed these questions to one person in
particular, and it was from them that she elicited the information and affirmation
required. The staff at Stockton have been informed that this form of interaction with
Maryla must be changed.  According to her ISP guidelines, Maryla is now responded
to once and then told to stop asking questions. This has led to Maryla being mostly
ignored by those with whom she spends the majority of her time. However, another
change has also occurred. Instead of directing her questions to only one person, Maryla
now includes the names of everyone who is present before asking a question, a
procedure that can take quite a long time at family gatherings. This is a somewhat
poignant attempt by Maryla to maximise communication as the institutional forms
work to minimise it.
The Rationalisation of Daily Life
The interconnection between clinical interpretations and assessments, training
and management practices, and daily reports and updates on behaviour, has
created an environment in which intellectually disabled people are constantly
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under surveillance. Intellectually disabled people constitute a problem that has
to be worked on. Their beingness is not acceptable. It is asocial and abnormal,
and as such it has to be trained and managed to conform to normative social
skills and behaviour. This is what the staff are employed to do. Their work is
predicated on the notion that they be "doing something", as Shaddock et al.
(1993: 49-50) and Ryan and Thomas (1987) have also noted. This ethos of
training and management becomes an ongoing and ceaseless attempt to
continually redress the situation that is intellectually disabled people's reality.
Since they are not expected to procure this state of self regulation and control
themselves, the management and disciplining of this state is maintained in the
hands of those who work with, or on, them. As Murray Simpson puts it: "it was
a lack of ability to practice normality as a self-discipline which became the
primary pathological feature of mental retardation" (Simpson 1996: 103;
author's emphasis). Underlying this feature, however, is the implicit
assumption that human sociality rests on the capacity for reason, where reason
is identified with certain abstract skills and practices embodied in productive
work.
The implementation of coordinated individual service plans and behavioural
management practices in the group home, institution, work-place, activities
centre and, ideally, in the family home as well, has produced an environment in
which the surveillance and management of intellectually disabled individuals
has become increasingly vigilant. This "total environment" is one which is now
filled with reports, records, programmes, plans and meetings. The term was
coined by Goffman (1990 [1961]) to refer to the enclosed and totalising regime
of asylums. However, the contemporary practices of training and managing
intellectually disabled people in accordance with normalisation principles has
produced what I would argue is an even more totalised environment,
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especially for those who live in government-funded group homes.17 The walls
of the institutions may have been removed but they have been replaced by an
interconnected and reinforcing network of services, reports and plans that now
imprison each consumer.
Wolfensberger's legacy of integrating services according to the principles
and practice of normalisation has inadvertently locked intellectually disabled
people into a system that reproduces their identity as abnormal, deficient and
asocial beings. These services produce a uniform institutionalised response to
intellectually disabled people. They inform the ways that staff must engage
with consumers, and provide an outline of desired behaviours and skills to be
worked towards. Such a monolithic approach to services has produced what
Burton Blatt has called a "closed no-option system" (Blatt 1981: 10-11). Rather
than resulting in greater freedom and community integration, the
contemporary practices in the field of intellectual disability have therefore
created an environment of increasing institutional bureaucratisation and
rationalisation.
The production and categorisation of an intellectually disabled identity
which is then processed and ordered through the rationalised institutions of
society reflects these very processes. As an "administrative category" (Stone
1984: 233; Rose 1985: 106) intellectually disabled people are positioned within
these interlocking services as "serviceable objects" (Goffman 1990![1961]: 374; cf.
Foucault 1978; Handelman 1981), as people who are to be provided services for
the purpose of transforming their place within society. There are two aspects to
this process; one is the structure of services and their underlying
                                          
17 The continuation of institutionalised attitudes and practices within smaller residential
services in the community has been well documented (Halpern et al. 1980; Rapley &
Hopgood 1997; Szivos 1993). As Johnson notes: "The women in the locked unit remained locked
into the discourse of intellectual disability within which they had lived at the institution.
In fact the process of deinstitutionalisation itself was conducted within that discourse, and
it's implementation served to develop the discourse further" (Johnson 1998: 146; cf. Branson &
Miller 1992: 19).
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interconnectedness; the other is the role these services play in the daily lives of
intellectually disabled people.  
Gunnar Dybwad (1976 [1969])—a Professor of Human Development and
longtime President of the International League of Societies for Persons with a
Mental Handicap—argued that there is a strong correlation between the
prevention of mental handicap, its early diagnosis, intervention and treatment,
and the coordination of services and policies. Ann Shearer (1982) supported this
view and, adopting Wolfensberger's service oriented approach to
normalisation, argued that the Australian government and voluntary
organisations for the intellectually disabled required proper planning and
coordination otherwise they faced the problem of providing duplicate services
with different standards. The Commonwealth Disability Services Act (1986),
along with state legislation including the NSW Disability Services Act (1993),
fulfilled this criteria by legislating uniform standards for service provision
throughout Australia.
While the standardising and rationalising of services through such
mechanisms was supposed to aid intellectually disabled people's access to
adequate services, the outcome has more often been that such people
experience being trapped within them. The people with whom I worked
experienced this meta-institutional reality in their daily lives. Some of the
people with whom I worked, such as Martin, Daniel and Sarah, either lived at
home or had family in the area who were able to support them. They had
people who provided alternative environments and relationships to those that
marked the institutional nature of the group homes, sheltered workshops and
activities centre. Despite this, their families were still under pressure to adopt
the aims and stipulations of individual training programmes. The majority of
the consumers whom I came to know, however, lived in a group home, went
daily to the activities centre or workshop, and had little or no contact with
Chapter Six: Instituting Practices of Reason and Normality
page 281
relatives, or indeed anyone outside the service. They were permanently under
the auspices of the Department of Community Services and were constantly
subject to institutional practices of training and management.
The link between legislation and the instituting of practices of reason and
normality can be seen in the effects of the NSW Disability Services Act and the
Standards of Practice that aim to fulfil these obligations under the Act. Staff
were bound and limited in their interactions and relations with consumers by
their duties and responsibilities as employees of the NSW government. Normal
and intimate relationships were made difficult through legal requirements as
set out in this legislation and departmental policies. Despite the ideal of
extending to the intellectually disabled the same rights and opportunities that
the rest of the community enjoys, the Disability Services Act and government
policies end up legislating and instituting the form the relationship between
intellectually disabled people and staff must take.18 They also highlight and
reinforce differences between the staff and consumers, and trap consumers
within a legal definition of intellectual disability, as Angrosino (1998a: 27) has
argued. Institutional forms of relating are based upon the assumption that
intellectually disabled people are abnormal, deficient and asocial beings who
                                              
18 Johnson (1995) has analysed the clash between normalisation principles and legislative
practices that exist in the field of intellectual disability. She argues that problems arise
between conflicts over rights and responsibilities or between contradictory rights such as a
"duty of care" to the consumer and their right to a "dignity of risk". Johnson argues tha t
while power has shifted away from the medical profession, intellectually disabled people
are still caught within power relations wielded by other "knowledge-holders" in society. As
she puts it in her Foucauldian analysis of institutional practices: "while no longer regarded
as sick and in need of medical treatment, people with intellectual disabilities are now
subjected much more than previously to the power of  the 'lawyer-judge' and the 'advocate-
judge'" (1995: 210). Johnson (1995: 222-3) accepts that there is still a "collision of two powerful
discourses—medical and legal" and that this adds to the confusion experienced by staff and
the intellectually disabled in the process of deinstitutionalisation. Consequently, the legal
discourse has shaped the process of deinstitutionalisation but it also "governs relationships
and shapes the ways in which people with intellectual disabilities are viewed by those
around them" (1995: 222). Although such an analysis  is useful for exposing the
interrelationship of power and knowledge in institutional and clinical encounters with
intellectually disabled people, it does not allow us to explore the mutuality, sociality,
subjectivity and intersubjectivity of these people as anything other than objects or "others",
as anything other than the products of these discourses.   
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need to be trained to become social. They are based upon managing
intellectually disabled people's behaviour and also instilling in them forms of
communication and behavioural expression that conform to normative
standards of social action and expression.
Section Nine of the NSW Disability Service Standards states the obligation
that "Each person with a disability receives a service which . . . is sensitive to
their cultural and linguistic environments" (NSWDOCS 1996). While this
acknowledgment of different cultural backgrounds is important, it is done
within the broader framework of erasing and ignoring the differences that are
integral to people's actual intellectual disabilities. Stressing equality as a right
places an emphasis on treating the intellectually disabled as though they are the
same as everyone else. However, this ultimately ends up in a denial of who
they are, as they are, while at the same time making their differences the
reason for implementing programmes designed to incorporate intellectually
disabled people into normative social practices.
Owing to the institutionalised nature of the relationship between the staff
and consumers, and the time spent updating reports, designing management
plans and doing other paperwork, there was no such thing as time for "normal"
interaction. During my year at the activities centre the coordinator wrote a
letter to the assistant manager at DOCS who was responsible for Disability
Services in the region. He asked her if the staff could have a consumer-free day
each fortnight so that they could catch up on their paperwork. The staff often
complained about the proliferation of paperwork and how it interfered with
their "hands on" responsibilities but these did not involve just being with those
whose care they were responsible for. They were employed to work, and this
meant working on the consumers, guiding them towards a "normal" life and
providing them with training to develop social and vocational skills (cf. Ryan &
Thomas 1987: 48 for a similar account of this practice of "working on" mentally
Chapter Six: Instituting Practices of Reason and Normality
page 283
handicapped clients). It did not involve partaking in this life themselves or
engaging with consumers through their own symbolic systems. It did not
involve creating an environment within which a genuinely shared mutual
sociality could emerge through the negotiation and mediation of different
symbolic systems. The emphasis was always on forcing conformity to
normative social skills and behaviours as though this was what constituted
human sociality.
If, as Kelley Johnson (1998) has argued, there is no change in the underlying
ideology or discourse of intellectual disability, then there is no possibility for
real change in the way that intellectually disabled people are treated (cf.
Branson & Miller 1989, 1992; Cocks & Allen 1996; Simpson 1996). As Don
Handelman puts it:  
. . . administrative-frameworks may be affected by deeper, less
visible, structural ambiguities and disjunctions, whether within the
organisation itself or within the larger social order in which it is
embedded. In general, organisation adjustments to the surface
contradictions generated by such deep disjunctions fail to resolve
the latter, thus creating the conditions for the generation of further
dilemmas whose causes remain unrecognized (Handelman 1981:
19).
The attitudes and practices that existed in large-scale institutions will continue
to structure and inform the lives of intellectually disabled people wherever
they live. Introducing, instituting and legislating practices such as
normalisation, deinstitutionalisation, quality of life and equal rights ends up
being counter-productive when they implicitly reinforce the symbolic scheme
of reason and normality that constitutes intellectually disabled people as
abnormal, deficient and asocial beings. The fact that they must be trained and
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managed to become socially normal and integrated means that intellectually
disabled people are still not accepted as social and encultured beings on their
own terms. Their capacities for meaningful sociality and mutuality have still not
been acknowledged; they must be brought into being.
The "deep disjunctions" that exist between the practices and aspirations of
institutionalised environments perpetuate ongoing contradictions in the ways
that intellectually disabled people are dealt with. Informed as they are by the
association of reason with normal humanness, and by the value of reason
embodied in productive work, the forms of sociality and relatedness that
institutional environments precipitate are ultimately based on the requirement
that intellectually disabled people master particular domestic and vocational
skills. The contextualised, immediate, embodied, and often highly specific
symbolic systems that many intellectually disabled people actually utilise are
not recognised as potential mediums for developing and sustaining mutual
sociality. Having already been separated as radically other, intellectually
disabled people are subsequently reintegrated into the "socially normal"
carrying the total burden of their supposed deficient and asocial "otherness". As
such, intellectually disabled people only ever live a simulacra of sociality in
institutional environments, one which has all the trappings of normality but
none of the actual substance of mutual sociality. Branson and Miller argue that
the administration and rationalisation of contemporary practices of integration
and normalisation represent a "symbolic violence of humanism" (Branson &
Miller 1992: 17). The violence that is being perpetrated rests on the denial of
intellectually disabled people's inherent capacities for creating and sustaining
forms of sociality and mutuality.  
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Chapter Seven
Relating Across Difference
. . . humans are delicately attuned to one another, and to themselves in relation to
others, in a taut web of interaction.
The maintenance or destruction of that web
are matters of absorbing interest and overriding importance.
Michael Carrithers
To be human is to be embedded in social relations. Sociality is therefore
fundamentally based on interactions between people. Since people with
intellectual disabilities are caught up in relations with others—with kin, staff,
professionals, and friends—it is on these relationships that an analysis of their
identity as social beings must turn. The form that these relationships take,
however, varies across different environments, and can be related to
differences in the ways that intellectually disabled people are constituted.  The
different ways in which such people are perceived and constituted both
produce and are a product of these relationships. Institutionalised forms of
relatedness with intellectually disabled people are based upon and reinforce the
symbolic scheme of reason and normality. In such circumstances, intellectually
disabled people are perceived as though they are abnormal, deficient and
asocial beings. Accordingly, their actions and interactions in the world are
perceived as essentially opaque and meaningless. In keeping with the Greek
and Latin etymology of the term "idiot", people with profound intellectual
disabilities are perceived as ignorant and private persons. They are seen to lack
the rational tools necessary for knowledge and social relatedness.  
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As a consequence of this perception and interpretation, intellectually
disabled people are treated by those in clinical and institutional environments
as though they have no capacity for sociality as they are. Through the
principles of normalisation and integration, an ethos of management and
training is therefore instituted as a means for drawing these people into the
social world. The forms of relating that exist in institutional environments build
upon these practices and interpretations. In such circumstances, staff are
expected to maintain and reinforce a form of relating based on separation and
disengagement rather than mutuality and interaction. This lack of mutuality,
however, prevents staff from perceiving and engaging with the potential
symbolic nature and meaning of intellectually disabled people's actions and
interactions in the world. This subsequently limits intellectually disabled
people's possibilities as social beings.  
The consequence of instituting integrationist policies that are themselves
based upon the symbolic scheme of reason and normality is that, paradoxically,
intellectually disabled people are forced to conform to social norms that they
are never expected to be able to uphold. In attempting to normalise that which
has been constituted as abnormal, integrate that which has been constituted as
radically other, and socialise that which has been constituted as asocial, staff
seldom have the opportunity to engage with the intellectually disabled people
they work with as anyone other than people to be trained, to be constantly
worked on. Relationships that do exist are more akin to assimilationist policies
than the true mediation and negotiation of difference that is necessary for the
joint constitution of social life.
In this chapter I explore the role that relationships play in the lives of
intellectually disabled people. In the first section of this chapter I analyse the
weekly meetings that took place at Xanadu and Hervey Street in order to
illustrate ways in which institutionalised forms of relatedness come to exist in
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practice. These meetings, and the regime of training and management outlined
in the previous chapter, serve to heighten, maintain and reproduce differences
between the staff and consumers. Relationships between consumers
themselves are also considered to be meaningless and socially inadequate.
Because their capacity for symbolic representation and meaningful sociality is
largely denied, what they do and say is also often ignored. However, my
fieldwork experience and my relationships with my siblings have shown me
that intellectually disabled people do utilise various symbolic means through
which they engage with one another and with the wider world (cf. Gleason
1989). In the second and third sections of this chapter I explore these
expressions and relationships and contrast them with the staff's interpretations
and perceptions of consumer's purported asociality. The type of complex
scenarios that sometimes ensue is illustrated by the narratives of illness and
pain that were a regular component of my interactions with many of these
intellectually disabled people.
In the concluding section I turn to focus explicitly on issues of sociality and
mutuality. The capacity to create symbolic systems and patterns through which
meaning is able to be shared, negotiated, mediated and/or recognised, is a
fundamental component of humanness and a necessary feature of sociality. It
provides the means through which we interact and engage with one another.
Profoundly intellectually disabled people are limited in their capacity to create
and use symbolic representations. Those that they do utilise tend to be more
immediate, concrete, contextual, and embodied. Their capacity for sociality is
therefore almost entirely based on the immediacy of engaging with,
negotiating and mediating very particular dispositions and symbolic systems.
Such negotiation is essential for sustaining and supporting intellectually
disabled people's humanness. These ideas return to the starting point for this
analysis and thereby act as a summation of the argument.
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Managing Meetings
Institutionalised forms of relatedness are generally based on maintaining and
enforcing separation and disengagement.  These are evident in the formal
standards of practice to which staff are expected to adhere. They also exist in
the modes of training and management that constitute the daily activities and
practices within the activities centre and group homes. During my fieldwork I
witnessed the instituting of this form of relating at the weekly meetings that
took place at the activities centre and group homes. These meetings were a
requirement of the NSW Disability Services Act (1993), according to which all
consumers of a service provider are legally required to participate in the
decision making and running of services. The staff at Xanadu were particularly
frustrated by these requirements. They believed that such policies were
impossible to implement, based as they are on an ideology of rights and
equality that has little to do with the reality of severely intellectually disabled
people's capabilities. It was not that the consumers were all right as they were.
Their differences were still considered abnormal and asocial, and in need of
training and management. It was just that including them in decision making
processes was seen as a misguided ideal that was impossible to achieve. Yet the
area manager who was responsible for disability services in the region had
made it clear that these meetings had to take place, that she would be checking
the minutes to make sure that they did, and would be using them to "keep in
touch with what was going on".  
The coordinator of Xanadu decided that the way to deal with this
requirement was to separate the meetings into casual weekly gatherings,
where people talked about what they had been doing over the weekend, and
to hold the more formal meetings concerning management and decision
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making at Xanadu once a month. When the first of these meetings had been
held, during a consultancy period with Coopers & Lybrand in mid-1995, the
procedure had been to get people to stand when they talked.1 At the monthly
meetings this formality was continued, although there was rarely anything of
substance to be discussed, and the consumers rarely had anything significant to
contribute, or so the staff believed. Consequently, these meetings usually took
the form of a staff member reading through the Standards of Practice outlined
in the Act, and asking the consumers questions about these standards.  
Apart from recounting these Standards and letting the consumers know
what was happening at Xanadu, one of the aims of the monthly meeting was
to hear whether anyone had any problems that they wanted to discuss. Mary
often spoke at this point and told everybody at the meeting that she was not
happy at the centre, that she wanted to leave and spend her days at the group
home where she lived instead. She said she was too old to be coming to
Xanadu every day and that she did not like it there. Despite the fact that such
problems were ostensibly matters to be dealt with, Mary was encouraged by
the staff to talk about something positive instead, for example, the things she
did like about the centre. This was in accordance with Mary's behavioural
management guidelines. At this point, Mary would retreat into an angry
silence, and refuse to participate in the meeting any more. Alternatively, Martin
sometimes used these formal meetings to find out about future matters, such
as when his parents were to meet with his case manager to discuss Martin's
individual service plan. Martin was told that this was an inappropriate topic for
discussion and that he should wait until he returned home to ask about it.
                                              
1 Coopers & Lybrand were employed by the NSW Government to oversee the
period of transition after the Disability Services Act was passed. It was their job
to ascertain whether or not the group homes and activities centres complied
with the requirements of the Act, and to outline the necessary steps needed to
be taken for them to become fully compliant. An employee of Coopers &
Lybrand visited Xanadu over a six week period in 1995, and it was during this
period that the first meetings were held that incorporated consumers in the
decision making processes at Xanadu.
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Having used all his effort to stand, Martin would sink back down into his chair
and lapse into silence, along with all the other consumers.  
The formalities and agenda of these monthly meetings were dispensed with
at the more casual weekly meetings. All the consumers were expected to
participate in these weekly meetings, and a regular time was set aside each
week for them to occur. They existed as one of the activities that consumers
engaged in. The coordinator felt that it was necessary to encourage "more
normal interaction between people" and as such he decided that the consumers
should sit rather than stand when speaking at the meetings, and discuss things
in an informal and relatively casual manner. However, there were still a
number of rules that governed the procedure: everyone was to sit in a rough
circle waiting for a staff member to begin proceedings; minutes were to be
kept as a record of what people had said; only one person was to speak at a
time; and the discussion was to remain focused on the topic at hand. Only one
or two staff people were usually present at these meetings, the others using
this time to catch up on some paper work or sit outside and take a break. A
staff member would chair the meeting while I usually took down the minutes.
What follows is a description of one of the meetings that took place a few
months after I started fieldwork.
It was Monday afternoon and everyone had returned from their morning's
activities to have lunch at the centre. After lunch, once all the lunch boxes had
been put away, the tables wiped down, aprons removed, and people toileted,
the staff wheeled, encouraged, or guided all the consumers into the television
room for the weekly meeting. The minute book was recovered from a filing
cabinet in the staff room, and myself and Bill, the staff member who usually
chaired the meetings, also took our places at one of the tables in the room.
There was no agenda to be followed, so the meeting took the usual form of
getting people to say what they had been doing over the weekend. Before Bill
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had a chance to formally open the meeting Shauna spoke up. It was her
birthday, and she was excited about the party she was having at home after
work the next day. Shauna worked shredding paper at Keynton and lived at
Hervey Street with four other people, including Mary. Although not a regular
occurrence, she had come to Xanadu after work with her co-workers and
consequently joined in with the afternoon meeting. Shauna was a bubbly,
talkative person and on this particular occasion was addressing herself to Bill.
He reminded her, however, that she was to talk to the others present at the
meeting, not to him.  
After Shauna had redirected her excited monologue to the group of
consumers gathered at the meeting Bill asked her to ask somebody else if they
would like to tell everyone what they had done over the weekend. Shauna said
"Kate". She did not ask her anything, just said her name. Kate flapped her
hands and rocked in her chair, so Bill then asked Kate to ask somebody else to
talk and she pointed at me. I told everyone that I had been to Bondi Beach over
the weekend and had eaten fish and chips. Martin asked if I had enjoyed myself
at Bondi, and then he asked Rachel what she had done over the weekend, but
Rachel asked Shauna again. Bill was trying to get Rachel to ask Mary what she
had been doing, prompting her by saying, "what do you want to ask Mary?" It
wasn't right to go back to someone who had already spoken. This was against
the aim of the meeting where everybody was to have their turn at speaking, at
least each of the consumers present.  
Without being prompted Mary asked Rebecca to speak, but Rebecca was
quite happy sitting back in the lounge cuddled up beside her. Mary then asked
Kate, who was still rocking in her chair. At this point Patricia came in to the
room and told us that her "friend"—as the person who was paid to take Patricia
out shopping or to lunch on a regular basis was officially called—had been to
visit over the weekend, and then she wandered back out again. Daniel would
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not answer the question when Bill put it to him. He just kept saying "beddies"
over and over and flapping his hands. Joanne refused to speak, and Cressida
became annoyed about something and did not want to talk either. Nobody
said anything much about what they had done over the weekend. Not that this
information was unknown. The staff already knew what the consumers had
done as it was a regular part of their Monday morning conversations with staff
from the houses and the relatives of the consumers. In any case, most of the
consumers lived in one or other of these homes and had spent time together
over the weekend. However, this was the topic that was instigated by staff to
encourage "more normal interaction" between the consumers.
While everyone was sitting around in silence Martin suddenly asked Mandy
what she had done over the weekend. Mandy was one of the casual staff
members who worked at Xanadu two to three days a week. She had come in
from having a smoke outside and was sitting on the bench along the back wall
observing the meeting. Mandy seemed embarrassed that she was being asked
this question and quickly said that she had been to a friend's place for lunch
before reminding Martin that this meeting was for them, the consumers, and
not the staff, and that he should direct his question to one of the others present
instead of to a staff member. I had started to write Mandy's comments in the
minute book but she told me not to. She said that staff comments did not form
a part of the meeting because the meetings were for the consumers. It was as
though the staff were meant to be invisible; that their presence at these
meetings were as facilitators, or observers, but not participants. They were
there to train, manage and foster interactions between the consumers rather
than being potential participants in these interactions.
We sat around for a while after the meeting had ended until one of the
other staff members came in to tell us that it was "home time". Everyone was at
once animated. Those that could grabbed their bags, headed out to the carpark
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and climbed into their respective mini-buses to be driven home. Others were
wheeled out. After everybody had gone from the room, Bill turned to me and
said: "It's really hard having these meetings because you have to prompt them
so much and put words in their mouths, but if you don't do that they'd say
nothing. They've got very limited communication, but what else can you do?"
Bill had been trying desperately to get the consumers to talk to each other, but
conceded in the end that "it was almost impossible!" He thought that it
happened occasionally but that it was never really successful.
What surprised me about Bill's comments—especially since he was different
to most of the other staff members in that he spent a lot of time with the
consumers and genuinely liked them and the work that he did—was that he
too was convinced that these intellectually disabled people did not
spontaneously talk or interact with one another. While it is true that their ways
of engaging with one another were generally idiosyncratic, non-normative and
highly particular, the consumers did, however, develop and engage in mutual
relations with one another in ways that were meaningful and purposeful to
them. Each person had their own specific modes of communication and
expression and the consumers engaged with one another through these and
through the objects that surrounded them. The shifting allegiances and
animosities between the consumers made these relationships highly emotional,
changeable, complex and immediate. While it was not always possible to
interpret the motivating dynamics of these relationships, they definitely
existed, and provided an underlying mood and temperament to every single
day. Therefore, rather than attempting to transform the ways that the
consumers engaged with others by teaching them socially normative skills and
practices that they were not able to adequately sustain, these modes of
expression and interaction could have become the grounds from which staff
sought to incorporate the consumers into a broader sociality.
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However, this was not the accepted or expected role of staff. They were
under an obligation to provide the consumers with opportunities to develop
their social skills, and learning how to communicate and interact with one
another during the weekly meetings was one of these skills. In order to do so
required that the consumers learn to absorb a different set of social practices
and, just as Cowlishaw observed during her fieldwork with Aboriginal people,
"Teaching the discipline and etiquette of meetings and consultation became an
end in its own right" (Cowlishaw 1999: 232).  This extended into "managing the
voice of others", and resulted in a form of "ventriloquism", whereby the
participants in the meeting were spoken for and where their own different
modes of interacting and participating were rendered irrelevant (Cowlishaw
1999: 234). The weekly meetings at Xanadu had no other purpose than to
instruct the consumers in socially normative skills and practices. In this, the
meetings became an end in themselves. There was nothing to "meet" about
other than to learn how to "meet".
These meetings did not just take place at the activities centre. They were
expected to be a regular feature of life in the group homes as well. Although
the meetings at Jeffrey Street only lasted a few weeks, those at Hervey Street
continued every Tuesday evening for the duration of my fieldwork. During
these meetings the house manager, or staff person on duty, would outline the
agenda for discussion. This was usually taken from a list that staff had compiled
of issues that had come up during the week, although the residents were also
expected to contribute to the agenda at the beginning of the meeting. If they
forgot to mention something it was left for the following week. The same
format that was used at Xanadu was also followed at the house meetings. The
meetings were chaired, minutes were taken, and the consumers sat around in a
circle and were expected to speak in turn, speak out, and stick to the agenda.
Chapter Seven: Relating Across Difference
page 297
Like the meetings at Xanadu, Mary used these house meetings to raise the
problem of her continuing attendance at Xanadu. She also often said that she
was unhappy in the house, and that she would prefer to go back to the
institution where she once lived. Shauna, who usually had plenty to say, was
unusually quiet whenever she was asked if she wanted to say anything at these
meetings. Sally usually said "Elvis" or "Rock and Roll" when anything was said
to her. Colin rarely said anything, although if a suggestion was made as to
where they should go for dinner or what sort of furniture needed to be bought
he generally agreed with it. Such household decisions were easily manipulated
by the staff, or by the more capable consumers. They only had to ask leading
questions or make a suggestion and the other residents would mostly agree.
At least publicly. Sometimes the residents complained afterwards but were told
that they had to speak up at the meeting if they were unhappy, and that the
decision had already been made and agreed to. This happened on one occasion
when Jim asked if he could have his girlfriend over for dinner. Colin and the
girlfriend do not get on, but rather than opposing the suggestion, Colin agreed
to it, only to complain later to the staff person that he did not want this woman
coming to the house. She told him that he had to make his point during the
meeting, and to the relevant person, rather than complaining to her in private.
Despite being good friends, Colin was rather in awe of Jim, and would never
have disagreed with him publicly.
There was a lot of discussion at these house meetings about "financial
methodology", which was basically a proposal to drastically cut the amount of
allocated funding from DOCS in an attempt to deal with a budget deficit. The
staff were very distressed about this, especially as it meant that their numbers
would be cut and pay conditions altered. The effect on the homes would be
that staff would no longer be paid for their night-time shifts, even though they
would still be required to stay overnight. The house manager told the residents
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that this would mean that they would have to be in bed by 10.30pm. The
residents were all rather concerned about this and agreed with the staff that the
proposed changes were bad. The staff were quite open about their opposition
to these proposals but their comments were "off the record", as were all of the
comments they made, and were not included in any minutes. Like the
meetings at Xanadu, whatever the staff said was irrelevant as far as these
records went. The meetings were solely for the consumers.  
While the staff were involved in these meetings as facilitators and minute
takers, and even made suggestions at various stages during meetings
concerning the running of the household, they were not participants. The
residents were therefore regularly reminded that they were to direct their
comments to one another rather than to staff. I was also expected to maintain
this distance. When in the chair, I had to facilitate the meetings, and direct
people to speak, but when Mary said "sorry" to me after a meeting for saying
that I could not stay for dinner in response to my having to ask her to stop
talking to Shauna, the staff person told her that she did not have to apologise
to me but to her fellow residents. Mary then tried to apologise to the staff
person but was once again redirected to apologise to the other consumers.  
There are two inter-related issues here. One concerns the relationship
between staff and consumers; the other is the perception that staff need to
facilitate and train the consumers to relate to one another meaningfully. Before
analysing the relationships between consumers, I wish to explore more fully
the consequences of the institutional forms of relatedness that exist between
staff and consumers.
Instituting Relationships based on Disengagement and Separation
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Following the weekly meetings at Hervey Street I usually stayed around until
after dinner, watching television with the consumers, listening to music, or
having cups of tea while sitting outside on the patio. Sometimes I would be
shown the latest acquisition, a new table, some clothes or bedding, by one of
the consumers. These were more casual moments of the day, and people
moved around pursuing their own concerns. Yet there was still an ongoing and
pervasive atmosphere of separation and disengagement. The staff did not
engage with the consumers as fellow social beings. They were there to manage
the house, and spent their time updating records or training consumers to
learn domestic living skills. The staff rarely sat down with the consumers and
passed the time just having cups of tea together, a smoke, or a casual chat.
They rarely engaged with the residents through the residents' own interests. In
fact, the consumers were forbidden to ask personal questions of the staff, and
were discouraged from being affectionate and making personal contact. It was
all right for the consumers to do this with one another, but not with the staff.
Even within the relative intimacy of this home environment, the staff were on
duty, and this involved maintaining the relevant and expected training and
management procedures. It involved maintaining a form of relatedness based
on separation and disengagement.
 When I first visited "Keynton"—the paper shredding workshop that
operated as part of Xanadu—I met a staff person called Julia who was very
passionate about her work. She was disturbed by the departmental policies, the
new legislation, and the attitudes of staff, and found herself alienated from her
fellow workmates most of the time. Keynton operated out of a large
corrugated iron shed situated in a concrete industrial landscape. Despite this,
the atmosphere was very relaxed and friendly. The four consumers who
worked at Keynton seemed to know the men who worked in the other
buildings. They also appeared to enjoy their time with Julia, who sat and
Chapter Seven: Relating Across Difference
page 300
chatted with them, or read and knitted, while they did their shredding. After
work, Julia and the consumers would sometimes go for a drive to the local
park for a walk, and on one occasion they all went up to the city to visit a
woman who used to work with them. While I was sitting in the doorway with
Julia, talking and soaking up the afternoon winter's sun, she explained to me
that it was illegal for her to touch one of the women in the way that she had
just done. Kathy had said that she needed the toilet, and Julia had put her arm
around Kathy's shoulder to guide her to the bathroom. In an environment
where touch is such an integral component of communication, this legislating
against physical interaction only serves to further isolate and separate
intellectually disabled people from others in the community. The rule that staff
are to refrain from developing personal and emotional relationships with
consumers contributes to this atmosphere of separation. Despite these
requirements, a small number of staff did become emotionally attached to
particular consumers, taking a special interest in their welfare. But the principle
creates an environment where this now has to be done surreptitiously.
On one of my first days at Xanadu, while I was helping out at the nursery
repotting plants and weeding the garden beds, I was told by two of the staff
members not to become too familiar with any of the consumers in case they
became attached to me. I was told that their behaviour changes if a staff person
whom a consumer has become attached to leaves or is not on duty, and the
aim is to maintain consistent behaviour. I was also told not to be affectionate,
and that none of the staff were officially allowed to take consumers home with
them. Whenever I arrived at the activities centre, group homes, or workshop I
invariably felt a pressure to sit and talk with the staff as though I was one of
them. While I was not officially a staff person, it was into this role that I was
placed. At Xanadu the staff always had their morning tea and lunch in the staff
room while the consumers sat in the front room around the tables. Staff would
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make sure that those who needed it were medicated and that everyone had
their lunches and a drink, but they rarely sat down and ate with the consumers.
If ever I did they encouraged me to eat with them instead.
Unlike the majority of staff, I joined in with the activities as though I too
were a participant, threading string onto cardboard, playing ten pin bowls,
singing karaoke songs, delivering "meals on wheels", or just hanging around
watching television, drawing, or having cups of tea. Although I could
participate in these various activities I was also expected to lend a hand with
their orchestration and assist with toileting and feeding. In this environment
there were only two positions that could be occupied; that of staff or consumer.
Even the consumers would turn to me at times as though I was one of the staff,
asking me if this was "my day on", if they were allowed to have another cup of
coffee, or to try and get me to do something for them. So although my status
as a volunteer was essentially ambiguous I was constantly drawn into the
world of the staff, by their own calling, by the expectations of the consumers,
and by the legal requirements governing my actions as a volunteer. It was not
possible for me to share the world of these intellectually disabled people, not
because of any inherent difference between them and my siblings, but because
the structure and expectations of the environment continued to reinforce a
division that ultimately separated these people and myself as fundamentally
different.  
This atmosphere of separation was in accordance with the legal culture of
rights and obligations that now exists in these environments (cf. Johnson 1998;
McVilly 2000).2 Guidelines for engaging with the consumers were provided by
                                                
2 Although this new ideology of rights fundamentally affects the way that staff
relate to and treat intellectually disabled people, the problems encountered
when relating in ways other than those which have been socially and
institutionally sanctioned pre-exists this legislation. Aldo Gennaro—a theatre
teacher and performer who was instrumental in the performance of "Madame
Butterfly" at the Sydney Opera House in 1979 by a group of intellectually
disabled adults from the Lorna Hodgkinson Sunshine Home —was sacked
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a combination of the Disability Services Act and its accompanying Standards of
Practice, Department of Community Services policies, and individual
management plans. The structural and legal constraints of this institutionalised
environment perpetuated the interpretation of the intellectually disabled
consumers as abnormal and asocial beings in need of training and
management. These produced an environment where the forms of relatedness
were based on rules of disengagement rather than an ethic of relating per se.
The meetings reflected this relationship of separation and disengagement.  So
too did the practices of training and management. It was also evident at every
moment throughout the day; in the casual encounters between staff and
consumers, and the actions and attitudes of staff generally. The wearing of
latex gloves by staff whenever they toileted and bathed consumers was one
such practice. Despite the rhetoric of hygiene that underlay this practice, there
was a definite sense in which staff were keen to avoid all possible physical
contact with consumers. They used separate crockery and cutlery, and had
their own toilet which was kept locked. On one woman's birthday, the staff at
Xanadu covered the chocolate cake with gladwrap so that she could not dribble
when she blew out the candles on the cake that they too wanted to eat. Others
were said to smell, and the staff argued over whose turn it was to bathe and
toilet them. This separation and fear of contagion was deeply etched into staff
attitudes and behaviour and reflects the perception that the intellectually
                                                                                                                                              
from his position because his way of relating to these intellectually disabled
people was deemed inappropriate and unacceptable (Rex Swinton; former
Board Member of Sunshine; pers. comm.). The multi-award winning
documentary, Stepping Out (dir. Chris Noonan 1980), that was made of this
performance and the lead up to it shows Gennaro and the performers relating
to one another primarily through touch and physical affection. When
interviewed by Caroline Jones on her ABC Radio program "The Search for
Meaning", Gennaro cited his own experience of muteness as a child, and his
initial inability to communicate when he first went to the USA, as foundations
for his particular form of drama teaching. As Gennaro commented, his style of
teaching relied on those "little signals" as a type of energy, on creativity and
communication through physical and emotional expression, as essential
components of the theatrical process (Jones 1995: 113-122).
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disabled are somehow inherently diseased, dirty, and potentially contagious.
As Mandy said to me one day: "no wonder we get sick working here, getting
spat on and pissed on".  
This separation was generally combined with an attitude of authority and
control, communication taking the form of sarcasm, patronising, hassling and
teasing.3 This was particularly evident at Xanadu, Jeffrey Street, the sheltered
workshops and post-school options programme. There were times when I was
also drawn into this mode of relating as well, so pervasive and dominating was
it. If ever the consumers responded by speaking to the staff in the same way,
as Martin had a tendency to do, they were immediately reprimanded. One day,
not long after buying a new car, I was discussing with Martin where was the
best place to buy a car stereo. I was in the staff room and he had wheeled
himself over to the window to talk with me. Two of the other staff asked what
we were talking about and when I told them they laughed and said that I could
have just made it up as no-one else could understand what Martin was saying.
Martin's face and ears were burning and he was visibly upset by their laughter.
I felt stranded in the staff room with them, conscious that he was on the other
side. One day when I went out with the post-school options group for a picnic I
watched as one of the staff members joked around with the young
intellectually disabled adults in a rough but friendly sort of way. Every now
and then, however, she would look over to me and wink as though the joke
was on them and that this was a secret that we shared.4
                                                
3 In her ethnographic account of life in a group home, Mary Howard (1990)
also shows that staff interactions with residents were based on authority,
control and separation. These were due to the "deficiency view of the resident",
Howard argues, and this view was used to legitimise the role of the staff
(Howard 1990: 167).
4 Johnson (1998: 4) also talks about this pressure to conform to staff
expectations and behaviour, finding that it was almost impossible not to get
drawn into the activities of the unit where she did her fieldwork. On one
occasion Johnson found herself helping a staff member "manhandle" a woman
who was attacking another resident before realising what she was doing. At
other times she noticed the amusement or bewilderment of staff at her
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Communication amongst the staff was generally about the consumers, not
with them, and whenever I came in and said "hello", or made some comment
about the day, it was assumed by staff that it was to them that I was talking.
When a young woman came to start work at the centre she was introduced to
me as another volunteer, and although Mary was standing right beside us both
and telling this woman her name, she was ignored. Nor was she introduced.
When we went to do ten pin bowling it was only the consumers who took
their turn at knocking over the pins. The staff sat back and made sure that
everyone had their go, and kept a tally of the score—an aspect of the game
that only interested a couple of people—but they did not join in. Delivering
"meals on wheels" was a different matter because sometimes a staff person had
to accompany the consumer to the door to make sure the duty was performed.
Yet even in this activity the staff sustained their separation. They were there to
train the consumers to perform this social activity, but were not actual
participants in it. On one occasion Mandy complained that she was being "left
alone" to do the "meals on wheels" when in fact she was accompanied by six
consumers.  
These forms of relatedness carried over into the group homes as well. They
informed the general practices of staff and were the dominant mode of
engagement between staff and consumers. One woman was employed by
DOCS to work specifically as a "community integrator" for those living in the
group homes. This involved initiating activities such as taking a few of the
consumers to the local pub to play pool or the pokies. Sometimes it involved
going to a film, out to dinner, or to a fun parlour. The community integrator
                                                                                                                                          
attempts to engage with the women in ways that were different to the general
practices of behaviour management or custodial duty (Johnson 1998: 44). One
of the women whom I interviewed—who had worked at Xanadu as the
coordinator a number of years prior to my doing fieldwork there—told me
that after about four months she began to notice that her own behaviour  and
attitudes were shifting and becoming like that of other staff members, a
process which she found deeply distressing but highly pervasive.
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told me that she hated this job; that she found it tedious, embarrassing and
frustrating. For her it was not about going out with the consumers but going
out to do something for them. It was about providing an environment in
which the consumers could be socially integrated with the community. It was
about taking them to public places but not about actually fostering integration
through staff/consumer relations. The staff saw themselves as the mediators
or facilitators of community integration. Despite the obligation on behalf of
staff to foster social integration, they did not see themselves as a part of the
community to which the intellectually disabled people were supposed to be
integrated.  Yet true integration requires the fostering of mutual relatedness,
and this also has to occur through staff relationships with the consumers.  
The expectations and requirements of these institutionalised environments,
however, precluded the possibility of developing long term relations of mutual
engagement.5 There was no sense in which true integration, which depends
upon the creation of mutual spaces of engagement and joint contributions to
the social world, could be produced. Because sociality had been defined in
terms of particular and normative dispositional behaviours and competencies,
a regime of training and management had been implemented in order to foster
the development of this sociality.  Yet sociality is fundamentally embedded in
social relations. Without relationships born of intimacy, mutuality and
solidarity, without the negotiation and mediation of different symbolic
systems, it is impossible to produce and sustain a genuinely shared social milieu
with intellectually disabled people.
The importance of relationships for social integration and an adequate
quality of life has been well documented in some of the recent literature on
                                                
5 Oliver Sacks has stated that in order to perceive the inherently human,
intelligent and creative aspect of intellectually disabled people he needed to
drop his neurological gaze based on "defectology" and enter into genuine social
relationships instead (Sacks 1986: 163-167; cf. Sacks 1995).
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intellectual disability (Atkins 1998; Bigby 2000; Fullagar & Hardakar 1993;
McVilly 2000; Ralph & Usher 1995; Rapley & Beyer 1996). Keith McVilly (2000:
7) has pointed out some of the "ethical dilemmas" that arise when the
professional caring role that staff are employed to perform becomes blurred
by a personal relationship. Some of these dilemmas include the potential
incompatibility of different expectations associated with these roles, possible
power imbalances, and potential conflicts of interest (McVilly 2000: 7).6 These
are very real problems that staff have to contend with, not least because of the
overtly legal nature of their responsibilities. These requirements were
introduced in part to protect both the consumers and the staff; the consumers
from potential abuse by staff and the staff from potential threats of violence
from consumers. They were also introduced to protect staff from accusations
of abuse. Because of these possible dilemmas, there is a tendency in
institutional environments to emphasis the development of social relations of
intellectually disabled people with others who are not also staff members.
Both McVilly and Christine Bigby argue that the duty of staff towards
people with intellectual disabilities is therefore to increase the number of
people with whom consumers have social contact (Bigby 2000: 16-17; McVilly
2000: 17). Bigby specifically stresses the need to enhance "informal support
networks" for people with intellectual disabilities arguing that the formal
service system cannot "adequately fulfill tasks that require long term
commitment, advocacy, or an affective relationship" (Bigby 2000: 17). While
these are the sorts of intimate relationships that people usually have with
family members and close friends, there is a tendency to criticise the
dependency on family members as often the sole social relationship for people
                                                
6 Despite the emphasis on facilitating relationships and broadening the social
contact of intellectually disabled clients with others, the Department of Health
and Human Services in Tasmania has stipulated that staff working in disability
services "should not encourage social contact between themselves and clients
with whom they work, outside working situations" (cited in McVilly 2000: 7).
However, this contact with staff is their social world.
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with intellectual disabilities (McVilly 2000: 6). Rather than rely on family
relationships, the aim is to broaden the social network and nurture informal
social systems in order to foster friendships, such that the success of
community integration is sometimes measured by the number of relationships
that intellectually disabled people have with non-staff and non-family members
(McVilly 2000: 6).  While relationships with people outside the institutionalised
environment of the group home or activities centre are important, they are
encouraged without adequately addressing both the underlying requirements
for mutual sociality and the potential role that staff can play in fostering this.
Rather than training intellectually disabled people to conform to normative
social standards staff have the capacity to create an environment within which
intellectually disabled people are acknowledged as social beings. It is this that
can then be extended into the wider community. In order to do this, however,
it is necessary that intellectually disabled people be seen as the potential
authors and sustainers of mutuality and sociality.
The tragic irony in this situation is that while today the emphasis is on
normalisation and integration, those who work most closely with the
intellectually disabled are usually the least integrated with them. At the very
point where contact takes place between staff and consumer, at this site of
potential mutual sociality, the differences and distance between the two groups
are highlighted, reinforced and perpetuated. The place where the dissolution of
the boundary between intellectually disabled people and others could take
place becomes instead the site of its most forceful institution. Bound up in their
obligations of a duty of care, and their role in instituting training and
management practices, the staff rarely have the opportunity to engage with
the intellectually disabled consumers as participants within a shared social
environment.
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The need to change the dynamics and principles of staff relationships with
intellectually disabled people has been addressed by a number of researchers.
The emphasis has generally been the need to better encourage integration and
normalisation (Brandon 1991: 42-50; Goode 1984: 246; Peters 1980; Ryan &
Thomas 1987; Shaddock et al. 1993). As staff members at an organisation for
intellectually disabled people, Simone Fullagar and Ken Hardaker argue that
relationships need to be based on friendship and mutual respect rather than
pedagogic principles. As they write: "We have no choice but to transform the
relationship between ourselves as 'service workers' and the people with
intellectual disability we support. If we cannot do this, we cannot expect the
rest of society to change the way they relate to this group of people" (Fullagar
& Hardaker 1993: 43). Despite such criticisms, there has been no attempt on
behalf of the formal service system to address these issues. In fact, the
implementation of recent policies and practices has made it even more difficult
to attain.
About six months after I began my fieldwork I happened to meet Terry,
one of the former coordinators of Xanadu. Terry told me that she had
eventually left the activities centre because she could not condone the new
system that had been implemented while she was away on maternity leave.
This was the system of marking off activities and the behaviour of the
consumers on a daily basis. As Terry commented, this gave the staff a sense of
security at having performed their duties. Training programmes for staff were
also introduced at this time, and dealt with behaviour modification techniques,
first aid, and issues around sexuality. They were about intervention, training,
management and control. Terry stated that never once did she come across
material that dealt with issues of communication between staff and consumers.
Any communication problems were seen to be between the consumers
themselves, as though the relationships between consumers and staff were not
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the ones that needed working on.  When leaving Xanadu at the end of the year
I invited everyone to my place for a BBQ. After endless telephone calls and
miscommunication with the coordinator we ended up having to have a picnic
in a local park because there were concerns that I would not be legally covered
if an accident happened while the consumers were in my house. The
consumers were disappointed, as were most of the staff, and it was a sorry end
to my year with them as we sat in the patchy shade beneath some scraggy
gum trees in a local park with our sandwiches and cordial.
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Managing Relations Between Consumers
At Xanadu the staff genuinely believed that the weekly meetings were an
attempt to foster "real" and "normal" interactions between consumers. In order
to foster such "normal" interactions the staff would try to encourage each
person who spoke to ask another person what they had been doing over the
weekend. They were encouraged to ask questions, tell narratives about their
lives, and be curious about each other. In doing so, the consumers were being
directed to express themselves through normative, though highly formalised,
modes of communication. This practice of training and instituting normative
dispositional communication and behaviour, combined with an interpretation
of the consumers as incapable of inherently meaningful symbolic
representation and sociality, resulted in the staff being oblivious to, or
dismissive of, the often dynamic, complex and socially meaningful interactions
of the consumers.  
Patricia, more than most of the other consumers at the centre, constantly
sought to engage with the staff, often coming into the staff room in order to be
with them. She was a small woman, and very strong, and although Patricia did
not speak much she was constantly engaging with people through physical
contact. Sometimes she would place the top of her head against a staff person's
arm, back or chest. She would stand like this for a while, waiting for some
response, which usually involved the other person briefly putting their arm
around her. At any moment however, Patricia might grab hold of their head
and grip it in a neck vice, or hit out at their stomach or arm.  Sometimes she
would pat them on the head saying "there, there". Patricia would remain like
this until asked to leave and replace the rope that was supposed to be kept
across the doorway.
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This type of interaction did not just take place with the staff. Patricia was a
real "mother hen", and was always moving about the room comforting people
or assaulting them, one action often following the other in rapid succession.
She could give the softest of cuddles to someone who had been crying, or
suddenly lash out in anger, swearing and cursing, hitting her head against the
table or slamming the cupboard doors. Almost every day the same scenario
took place. Polly would be walking around the room in circles, talking
incessantly to herself in a high pitched voice. Patricia would get really annoyed
with Polly and tell her to "shut up", and then start swearing to herself, hitting
the table and her head with her fists, at which point everybody else in the
room would get tense and upset. Cressida would visibly retreat into herself,
folding her large frame further into the chair as if hoping to disappear from
view. Joanne would walk out of the room and sit at the corner table in the
television room in order to continue unimpeded in her task of tearing up
newspaper. Kate would start rocking even more furiously than usual as
though she could drown out the noise and disruption by immersing herself in
this rhythmic movement. And Martin would hunch his shoulders up around
his ears and tell Patricia to "shut up" and stop upsetting people. At this point
Patricia would become even more annoyed and would hit out at people, either
verbally or physically, telling them that they were "shits" or "fucks" or hitting
them on the back.
It intrigued me when I was told by one of the staff members that Patricia
only did this to get attention from the staff. It was hard to convince him that
she did it even when they were not present—although, of course, there was
always the possibility that she might have been doing it for my benefit. There
were many times when the interactions were less violent and unpredictable.
One morning when I walked into the local community centre where we had
been meeting up once a week I was greeted with sighs of relief from the staff
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as they were short staffed. The two staff members were sitting outside in the
sun while most of the consumers were indoors, seated at various tables around
the room. They were waiting for their morning's activities to begin, which
would entail a visit to the library or the local shops.  As I wrote that evening:
They had all had their morning 'cuppa' and were just waiting
around.  Then Bill came in and gave Martin some crayons to draw
with, and it seemed that everyone was to do some craft work if
they wanted to. They don't have to do it if they don't want to and
most of them usually don't. I sat with Martin and started doing
some drawing as well. He was using different colours and doing
his usual line drawing. We chatted about my car, and as my
partner hadn't fixed up a stereo in it, Martin said he was very lazy
and that he'd throw a bucket of cold water over him! While we sat
there, Cressida came up and sat behind me and she too started to
do a bit of drawing on the edge of the paper. She talked about her
new clothes, and her nail polish, and then Kate came and sat with
us. Rachel wheeled herself in from outside and we had a full table.
Rachel told me she had a new spiral book [for drawing in] and
wanted to show it to me but realised she'd left it at home. It was a
pleasant morning and I listened and watched as they all talked to
one another, touched one another or generally responded to each
other's presence. Kate and Cressida were talking quietly about
something and seemed to understand each other, but then
Cressida turned to me and said that Kate was kicking her. That
didn't sound like the Kate that I knew, who was so loving and
gentle, but later Rachel told Kate to stop laughing at her. I asked
Rachel if she liked Kate and she said emphatically, "no!" I wonder
what else goes on between Kate and the others.
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This is just one example of the many scenes that I witnessed. There were
often shifting allegiances, and strong expressions of friendship or animosity.
This was evident in the repetition with which people sat with certain others.  It
was also evident in the bouts of physical and verbal abuse that a couple of the
consumers were wont to display, especially Patricia. Sometimes there were
demonstrative displays of affection and pleasure; a big hug, kisses, and holding
of hands among friends. Sometimes it just extended to being aware if someone
was unwell or in a bad mood. At other times there would be a quiet
murmuring, a gentle buzz of acknowledgment and engagement between
those present. But more often than not there was just a general sense of being
together, of sharing space and time, with a familiarity that dispensed with the
necessity of formal interaction. Like Bourdieu's (1999 [1972]: 78) notion of a
"habitus", there were familiar patterns of dispositions that informed these
interactions. This familiarity emerged from their shared environment and was
generally based on relating to one another through their bodies, the objects
that they shared, and the immediacy of each person's emotions and actions,
rather than the more formal and socially elaborated forms of interaction and
self expression encouraged during the meetings. Yet the staff constantly sought
to train the consumers to conform to this other, normalised, mode of
interaction and expression, and interpreted their actual ways of being and
engaging with one another as asocial.
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  Narratives of Pain and Illness
As I pointed out in chapter six, it was expected that the staff be doing things for
the consumers, with the aim of providing a socially conforming and normative
environment within which they, the consumers, could enter the social world
and develop social skills. Accordingly, activities such as cooking, visiting the
library, painting, delivering "meals on wheels", going ten pin bowling,
shredding paper, tying bits of string to cardboard tags, tracing letters, and
gardening were part of the weekly agenda. The meaning and purpose of these
activities was assumed to be inherent in the activities themselves. In fact, their
very meaning was assumed, and it was this meaning as a socially normative
phenomena that was being made available to the consumers. Meaning was
thought of as a preexisting social fact rather than a product of interaction and
use. It was taken as normative, and these activities therefore conformed to
socially accepted modes of engaging with the world. The staff were given the
task of introducing these activities as part of an integrationist and
normalisation-driven agenda. They set out to train the consumers to conform
to these broader social activities. The fact that the consumers did not share
these meanings, nor the purpose behind them, was taken as indicative of their
asocial and abnormal existence. The accepted belief that they were incapable of
creating and utilising potentially meaningful symbolic systems meant that staff
did not engage with the consumers on terms set by the consumers themselves.
The consequences of this belief were sometimes complex and often
disturbing. In attempts to institute socially normative activities and encourage
the development of social skills, the staff often denied or ignored attempts by
consumers to communicate to them a sense of self.7 Even when utilising
                                             
7 This sense of intellectually disabled people as lacking a coherent and
meaningful self is similar to the experiences of those who are physically
disabled. Robert Murphy argues in his autobiographical ethnographic account
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socially recognisable modes of interaction, such as narratives of self, the
consumers were still redirected in their accounts, or else ignored altogether.
They were still judged as abnormal and asocial. This was the case with Mary,
whose stories about her former life in an institution, the death of her mother
and sister when she was young, and her outspoken dislike of the centre and
group home where she spent almost all of her time, were taken solely as
manifestations of an unstable and psychotic state of mind. They were never
encouraged, nor engaged with. It was also the case with Cressida, whose
narratives of pain and illness constituted the major form of interaction she
initiated with others.
Cressida was in her mid-40s, an Aboriginal woman who lived in Jeffrey
Street, the largest of the government funded group homes in the area. Prior to
moving into a group home almost ten years ago, Cressida had spent many
years living in an institution. I came to know Cressida over the course of my
fieldwork, both through the activities centre and from my weekly visits to
Jeffrey Street. As we sat there day after day, working at tying pieces of string
to bits of cardboard, having cups of tea while waiting for the day's activities to
begin, travelling in the buses, or watching television at her home, I began to
notice a pattern in the way she communicated with me. We would be sitting
quietly, side by side, the buzz of the local radio station or television filling up
the silences. Almost lost in our own reveries I would be drawn back by the
plaintive voice of this softly spoken woman telling me that she was ill, that she
had a sore, or that her stomach pained her. I noticed that as Cressida said this
she would reach out her hand and touch her stomach, which was the part of
her body that was generally the cause of this pain. In doing so she would
gesture ever so slightly to me, an offering or invitation to touch her also in that
place. I would do this, as one does to a person in pain, and Cressida would sit
                                                                                                                                          
of physical disability, that the social experience of permanent disability is
transformed into a state of being a damaged self (Murphy 1990: 85).
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back as though enjoying a soothing massage on tired muscles; the relief in her
body was palpable. I would ask her if that was better, or if that was the spot
which was sore, and she would affirm that it was but would not want me to
remove my hand.  
This interaction went on for months, and I began to notice that it was not
only Cressida who engaged me in conversations over her body, and its pain
and illnesses. Others at the activities centre would also come up to me and tell
me they were sore or sick. Sometimes, if I was to touch one of them
accidentally while helping to take off a jumper or replace a shoe, or just in
passing at some stage during the day, they would cry out at me in pain, telling
me that it was sore where I had just touched them. Of the twelve who
regularly came to the centre, five were frequently evoking pain or illness as
part of our interactions. And of another seven people whom I came to know
through the group houses, three were often telling me that they were sore, in
pain, or unwell.
Very little attention was paid by the staff to any of this behaviour. Like
most of the consumers comments and actions, they were seen to be
meaningless, purposeless, and irrelevant. They were interpreted as just another
manifestation of intellectually disabled people's abnormal selves. I was told by
the staff that Cressida was a hypochondriac, and that the way to respond to
her running commentaries on pain, illness and suffering, was to ignore it; to
not respond in any way that allowed her to indulge in these "fantasy" illnesses.
Cressida would be told to go to the toilet if she complained of having a pain in
her gut. That was generally the extent of the staff reaction. There was to be no
touching, no caressing, no soothing. There was to be no interaction. There was
nothing really wrong with Cressida so there was no real need to respond to
her. It was best ignored so as not to be encouraged and condoned. In fact, as a
worker, one is seen to have achieved a certain level of professionalism and
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control once such behaviour is interpreted as hypochondria. Yet it did not seem
to matter how often the staff told people not to make such a fuss out of
nothing, they continued to do it. It did not matter how often Cressida was
ignored, or told to go to the toilet, she continued to tell me that she was in pain
and reach out for me to touch her. One afternoon, when I arrived at the group
home where Cressida lived, I discovered that she was in hospital; that she had
become increasingly adamant about the pain in her stomach, finally prompting
staff to take her to a doctor. It turned out that Cressida had a blocked bowel.
This sequence of events played on my mind for the varying ways in which
Cressida and her narratives of pain were being treated. First it was denial;
there was nothing really wrong and such behaviour was interpreted as
hypochondria. Along with all of Cressida's behaviour, it was discounted and
identified with other disability behaviour. Then came an acceptance that
perhaps there actually was something wrong, medically speaking, and the
response was to gain confirmation from a practitioner and have the problem
dealt with professionally. When Cressida came home from hospital, distressed
at having had needles in her buttock and a drip in her arm causing her yet
more pain, there was no acknowledgment from staff that she was to be treated
with special care or indulged in any way. She was not allowed to play out the
role of patient once she had left the hospital. There was never any recognition
that it had taken the staff a number of months to respond to Cressida's signs of
distress. In fact it was all forgotten quite quickly. And Cressida's ongoing
narratives of pain and illness continued to be ignored just as they always had
been.
Intellectually disabled people often remain voiceless and powerless, without
the ability to ascribe to themselves an identity that is not reflective of their
social status as abnormal. It is assumed that such people have nothing to say,
that they have "no capacity for understanding or conveying their own situation
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and experiences" (Atkinson & Walmsley 1999: 209; cf. Bogdan & Taylor 1982;
Booth & Booth 1996; Felske 1994). I would contend that the response of the
staff to the narratives of pain I witnessed were in part a consequence of such
interpretations. They also represent an internalisation of the sick role, as Susan
Lea argues (Lea 1988: 66-67). There are so few ways in which intellectually
disabled people come to be socially positioned and "known" that they
themselves are forced to articulate their experiences and identities within this
paradigm. However, rather than interpreting such narratives as negative
consequences of labelling, as Lea (1988: 66-67) does, I would argue that
intellectually disabled people use these narratives of pain and illness to try to
insert themselves into the social milieu. They do so through attempting to
create a "shared space of disclosure" (C. Taylor 1985).8  
Charles Taylor uses this term to describe the space within which the self is
constituted, arguing that a shared space of disclosure is based on the various
communicational and symbolic means through which people come to be
subjects both for themselves and for others (C. Taylor 1985: 271-273). As with
most theories of culture and language, Taylor's operates at two, albeit inter-
related, levels. There is the constitutive and productive nature of language and
culture that can be said to operate at the meta level, at the institutional or
pedagogic level, informing and forming persons as particular types of persons
according to a normative notion of what constitutes personhood. There is also
the "interactional" aspect of language and culture that operates to create shared
spaces within which people engage with one another.  The former is the level
at which the symbolic scheme of reason and normality operates, and within
which practices of training and management are instituted. It produces a
formal, formalised, and public sense of personhood according to an inherited,
institutionalised and socially prescribed interpretation of meaning and identity.
                                                
8 I am indebted to Diane Austin-Broos for drawing my attention to Taylor's
work.
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Taylor argues that within "modern society and culture" people are expected
to project and express themselves in an abstract and self-reflective manner,
using the rational tools of language to articulate their experiences in a readily
acceptable and socially recognised form (C. Taylor 1985: 280). This
contemporary form of a space of disclosure evolved out of a Western
preoccupation with the role of reason and contemplation in the expression, and
indeed experiences, of the self and personhood (C. Taylor 1985: 280). However,
as Taylor argues, this preoccupation "utterly banishes earlier views of
specialised spaces of disclosure, so that they even cease to be fully
comprehensible" (C. Taylor 1985: 280). While true of other cultures and
historical periods, this is also true of the contemporary institutional encounter
with intellectually disabled people.
Not only are the ways that intellectually disabled people disclose a sense of
themselves rendered incomprehensible, but staff are also expected to teach
these people to learn how to conform to normative modes of self-
representation and expression based on the central roles of reason, self-
reflexivity, and language. Reason and intelligence have been associated with
the capacity for sociality and, in order to become social beings, intellectually
disabled people need to be trained to develop the necessary spaces of
disclosure through which they can present themselves to others as social
persons.  The staff are under an obligation to encourage this as part of the
expectations of community integration and normalisation. They have a sense
of what such a space of disclosure entailed, based on historical and cultural
perceptions of selfhood, and sought to train the development of these
normative interactions and communications during the meetings. The
intellectually disabled consumers were being asked to constitute themselves in
terms of a particular space of disclosure, a narrativized space based upon
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impersonal accounts of their lives rather than on an embodied and immediate
response to others.  
However, there is also another level at which language operates, and it is
through the combination of both that the narratives of pain I was witnessing
can be understood. Language, according to Taylor, is also used as the vehicle
through which people are brought together. Language in this sense does not
just apply to spoken narratives. It refers to all symbolic activity or "forms" (C.
Taylor 1985: 272-272). It can therefore include the symbolic practices of
intellectually disabled people, including gestures, bodily contact, the utilisation
of objects, and behavioural dispositions. While restricted in their applicability
and range of expression, such symbolic practices do have the capacity to
generate forms of sociality. Through interacting with others on the basis of
these symbolic practices and disclosures it is possible to create a "rapport
between us . . . what one might call a public space, or a common vantage point
from which to survey the world together" (C. Taylor 1985: 273). This then
becomes a way of domesticating a space, of transforming it and making it
livable. My sister's bits and pieces constitute such an activity, as did my
brother's use of jigsaw puzzles. These actions were ways of making things
happen in the world, of transforming the world. They became the vehicles
through which meanings could be mediated and sociality shared. They created
a "public space" through which we could interact with one another.
The narratives of pain I witnessed during my fieldwork were an attempt on
behalf of intellectually disabled people to create a rapport, a common vantage
point or "shared idiom" (Herzfeld 1997: 3), through which to view the world.
Through Cressida's actions and narratives of pain I was drawn into a common
space, a space of pain and illness that I was both familiar with and with which I
could empathise. Her narratives became one of the means through which we
related to one another, and in this sense created a level of intimacy and
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understanding that made our shared world meaningful and social. Like
Geertz's (1993a [1973]) notion of culture as a system of shared symbols, these
narratives of pain were generated by a shared symbolic system. They also
generated this symbolic system in the process of being articulated. It was, in
Wittgensteinian terms, a language game that worked—or that should have
worked— and the creation of this space of disclosure gave Cressida the
possibility of presenting herself as a public self, a social being, a person who
existed within a meaningful and socially shared world.  
The added complexity to this situation, however, is that in attempting to
constitute a shared space of disclosure through the sick role and narratives of
pain and illness, intellectually disabled people like Cressida are not engaged
with because what they do and say is not taken as potentially meaningful.
Unlike the sick, who can get better, these people are perceived as permanently
"unwell". Like the sick, they must work towards their own rehabilitation but
can never actually attain it because they are always and already constituted as
outside the social. In the process, their narratives and expressions of self are
disregarded. They cannot have anything meaningful to say, therefore, the staff
do not engage with them as such. Even when expressing herself according to
the normative standards of pain and medical illness, and even when utilising
recognisable narratives of self, Cressida's attempts at communication were put
under suspicion. The act misfired because there was no faith in the possibility of
mutuality.  Cressida was denied the valid and authoritative status as a person
capable of representing herself to others.9 Her attempts to enter into the social
milieu through her body and narratives of pain and illness were invalidated
and her status as a person both participating in and creating a shared social
                                              
9 This issue of the lack of authenticity and a valid voice for intellectually
disabled people has been explored by a number of people, including Angrosino
(1992; 1994), Atkinson and Walmsley (1999: 209), Bogdan and Taylor (1976;
1982; 1989), Booth and Booth (1996: 67), Branson and Miller (1989; 1992), Brown
and Smith (1989), Johnson (1998), and Ryan and Thomas (1987).
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world were consequently denied.  Interestingly, my siblings never used such
narratives of pain and illness at home, perhaps because there were other
means through which they and their actions were socially legitimised.
By denying and ignoring these narratives of pain, illness and selfhood, staff
undermine one of the means for mutual interaction that intellectually disabled
people's sociality and identity depend upon. While the intellectually disabled
people at Xanadu and the group homes were continually engaging with one
another, the lack of opportunity to develop shared spaces of disclosure with
non intellectually disabled people limited the consumers' possibilities for
exploring a broader, socially inclusive sociality and self-identity. When
extended to all their forms of symbolic practice, this loss of interaction and
mutual relatedness with non-intellectually disabled people prevents the
development of shared or negotiated symbolic systems or language games
based on who intellectually disabled people actually are. By denying
intellectually disabled people valid and potentially shared spaces of disclosure
within which they are able to express themselves as social beings, the
constitution of sociality as a joint and mutual endeavour is consequently
undermined. The opportunity to sustain a mutuality with non-intellectually
disabled others contributes to intellectually disabled people's humanness, and
their capacity to exist in the world as social beings. To prevent this is to lock
intellectually disabled people into a world where their symbolic,
communicative and social capacities are limited to interactions with their fellow
intellectually disabled consumers. It also results in practices of training and
management that are utilised as the means for drawing these people into the
social milieu.
The people with whom I worked, and my brother and sister, all expressed
themselves in an immediate, embodied, concrete and highly contextual
manner. This was as much an attribute of the narratives of pain that Cressida
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utilised, and the incantations and running commentaries that my sister
engaged in, as it was an aspect of other ways of acting in the world. These
expressions occurred through the objects that surrounded them, such as the
jigsaw puzzles and books and bits and pieces of my siblings, or the beads,
drawings and glass bulbs that people were using at the centre. Sometimes
these expressions of self occurred through their bodies, their emotions and the
gestures that they made towards one another. Robert Desjarlais comments
that such forms of expression and engagement represent an "acutely tactile
engagement with the world", arguing that they involve a "poetics of exchange,
confrontation, finite acts, and momentary occupations" that are fundamentally
different to socially conventional narrative forms of expression (Desjarlais 1996:
86-7).10 Due to the loss of spatial, political and economic grounds upon which
people are usually able to assert themselves, Desjarlais argues that mentally ill
and homeless people are often forced to rely on their bodies as the primary
means for expressing themselves and articulating their experiences. As
Desjarlais puts it: "With the loss of many possessions, and the public slant to
physical movements and functions, the body becomes, at times, the most
prominent instrument of engagement, awareness and retrospection"
(Desjarlais 1996: 78). The narratives of illness and pain I witnessed during my
fieldwork represent such tactile modes of engagement, as did the acts of
friendship, frustration or animosity that were expressed through physical
encounters. These involved such things as holding hands, sitting side by side on
the couch touching one another, or patting someone gently on the head, as
much as it involved pinching, hitting and scratching another person. Such
                                             
10 The possibility that experience is an historically and culturally constituted
phenomenon rather than an "existential given" is one that Desjarlais also
examines in his ethnographic encounters with homeless and mentally ill people
(Desjarlais 1996: 72). Desjarlais claims that Western notions of "experience" are
predicated on notions and forms of reflexive interiority, a narrative flow,
hermeneutic depth, individual agency and transcendence. All of these aspects
and expressions are thought to reflect and inform the true self (Desjarlais 1996:
73).  Desjarlais argues, however, that experience and selfhood are instead the
products of social, political, cultural and environmental factors.
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modes of engagement were constantly utilised by the consumers in their
relations with one another, but they were also enacted by the consumers in
their encounters with staff. Patricia did so when she came into the staff room
and grabbed hold of a staff member. David did so when he came up to a staff
person wanting them to scratch his head. Cressida did so when reaching out to
staff to touch her in the place that was sore. For others with whom I worked
these expressions of self involved patterns of dispositional behaviour, such as
walking in circles, rearranging the furniture or rocking in a chair. These were
the dispositions and patterns through which they expressed themselves, and
through which meaning could potentially be negotiated and mediated. These
were the actions through which mutuality and sociality could be developed and
sustained.     
Yet the potential for mutual sociality with intellectually disabled people
based upon such symbolic practices is not recognised or aspired to in
institutional environments. The ethos is entirely one of training and
management; of conformity and assimilation to normative standards. In this
situation, whatever intellectually disabled people do and say is interpreted as
abnormal and meaningless. Maryla's collection of bits and pieces is labelled
obsessive compulsive; Cressida's daily accounts of her bodily aches and pains
are dismissed as hypochondria; Mary's stories about her mother and sister's
deaths, and accounts of her experiences at various institutions, become
indicative of an oncoming psychotic episode; Kate's rocking and singing are
thought to be obsessive and disruptive; Joanne's silence and separation from
others while tearing up newspaper an aspect of her autism; Patricia's
alternating aggression and affection an expression of her intellectual disability
combined with an abusive past. By interpreting these dispositional acts as
solely pathological and abnormal, and ignoring attempts on behalf of the
consumers to use these as the basis for their encounters with others, the
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opportunity to produce a genuinely shared and interdependent mutual
sociality with non-intellectually disabled people is lost.
Through instituting practices of reason and normality staff encourage the
development of decontextualised skills and behaviours. These are based upon a
particular concept of what it means to be human, of what it means to be a
person. In our society, the attributes and practices that are most highly valued
are those of rational, conceptual, abstract thought, and of productive and
economically viable work. Intellectually disabled people do not fulfil these
expectations, and their expressions of self and encounters with others often
remain localised, contextual and immediate rather than abstract and
decontextualised. Relationships are usually with those in one's immediate
environment, with those with whom one comes into direct contact. These
include other intellectually disabled people and staff, as well as family members
and family friends. Intellectually disabled people's concerns are often
immediate, emotional and bodily. While the possibilities for their sociality and
mutuality are limited by these restrictions, it is possible to engage with
intellectually disabled people and develop socially meaningful relationships
through these actions in an inclusive rather than exclusive way. This requires
accepting their ways of being as legitimate and their expressions of self as
potentially meaningful. It requires engaging with them through
intersubjective, mutually inclusive relationships.
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. . . the innate capacities for sociality may be in individuals, but they are completed only
between them.
Michael Carrithers
While meaning and sociality is reproduced and recreated as an inherited
interpretation of the world, it is also socially produced. It arises out of shared
experiences and interactions such that people's actions and behaviours become
meaningful and interpretable as an emergent aspect of their shared sociality.
The meaning of intellectually disabled people's behaviour is open to
negotiation and interpretation once it is accepted that they have such a
capacity, and once they are engaged with in this way. When I first spent time
with the people at Xanadu I had no understanding of what they were doing.
Their behaviour, actions and emotional expressions seemed ad hoc and chaotic.
I was an outsider, and while they lacked the tools to articulate and express
themselves in ways that were socially familiar and acceptable, I lacked the
relatedness with them that was necessary to understand who they were and
what were their concerns. Over time, and through sharing their environment
with them, as they wanted to be, I began to perceive a coherence to their
identities and expressions that could operate as potential sources of mutual
sociality. This occurred with Sarah and her beads (pp. 249-250), Cressida's
narratives of pain (pp. 310-313), Tony and his glass bulbs (pp. 252-254), Joanne
and her newspapers (pp. 248-249, Pearl's alternating acts of aggression and
affection (pp. 260, 307-308), Jacky's reordering of furniture (p. 254), Polly's
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circular walks (p. 309), Mary's stories (p. 263), Kate's rocking (pp. 250-251, 261),
and Martin's drawings (p. 251-252).
These activities and dispositional behaviours reminded me of my siblings
and their jigsaw puzzles, bits and pieces, and incantations. Within the domestic
environment that we shared, these behaviours and enterprises became the
source of our interactions with one another. They became the means through
which our relationships were mediated and, although there were limits to the
range of these relationships, there was an implicit understanding that these
actions constituted fields of mutuality. They created spaces of disclosure
through which mutuality could exist. By being perceived and accepted as
symbolic practices, the ways or games through which my siblings sought to be
and present themselves produced the specific sociality or form of life that I
described in chapter one. It was only through our relations and interactions
with one another that these were realised.
In order to perceive their actions and behaviours as socially meaningful I
had to relate to my siblings, to be in relationship with them, to share a sociality.
I had to perceive, interpret and mediate their ways of being in the world as
ones which had their own dispositional patterns and integrity. These were
specific, contextual and particular modes of expression, and their sociality
remained meaningful, negotiable and communicable only through the
intimacy of my actual engagements with each sibling. Because of their
restricted and highly contextualised natures, the particular language games that
became the vehicles for mutuality required a level of commitment and an
intensity of engagement that usually only exists in relations of diffuse and
enduring solidarity. The patience, empathy and acceptance that is necessary to
engage with another who has very idiosyncratic and limited dispositions is one
that is difficult to create, particularly in a work environment. Yet this is exactly
what is necessary for intellectually disabled people to be recognised as, and to
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become, social beings. The development of sustainable forms of sociality for
intellectually disabled people therefore requires some very special
circumstances, and ones that are not able to be created in the sorts of
institutionalised environments that exist at present.
The forms of relatedness that exist in institutional environments preclude
the capacity, or indeed necessity, of building relations of mutual sociality.
Cultural, structural and legal obligations informed and reinforced these forms
of relating. The limited social imagination of institutional environments has
made a rational working being the only model of a social human being that it is
possible to cultivate. Without mutual sociality, however, humans lose what it is
that makes them encultured and social beings. Without this, behaviour also
loses its socially meaningful aspect. As Carrithers observes:
The speech we learn only makes sense in respect of the others we
learn it from and to whom we direct it. The values in behaviour we
acquire are sensible only in the perspective of others, or in our own
imagination of others' perspective. Indeed culture, here meaning
just largely mental goods, forms of knowledge, and values to live
by, which we have learned or created, is intelligible only in its use
by people and in respect of other people. Cultures, in other words,
presuppose relationships (Carrithers 1992: 30).
Once interdependent relationships with intellectually disabled people are
denied, once the necessity of intimate interaction is abandoned, such people's
behaviour is perceived as bizarre and abnormal.1 This is all the more so
                                    
1 There are many ethnographic accounts that illustrate the tendency of social
groups to perceive outsiders as strange, inhuman and abnormal (de Castro
1992; Hodgen 1964; Jackson 1998; T. Turner 1995). As Eduardo Viveiros de
Castro points out in his study of an Amazonian society, those doing the
defining only see themselves as the norm, as real and proper human beings
and people (de Castro 1992: 38). The lack of, or distance in, relatedness that
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because intellectually disabled people's actions and interactions do not
generally conform to predetermined cultural patterns and expectations. It is
increased in amplitude many times because intellectually disabled people tend
to utilise contextualised, restricted, concrete and embodied modes of
communication which demand intimate interaction. My experiences at the
centre and group homes, introduced in chapter two, made this painfully clear.
The consumers were at the activities centre and group homes because their
behaviour was perceived and interpreted as asocial and abnormal.
Consequently, everything they did and said was treated as such. Therefore
there was no development of shared or negotiated vehicles of meaning based
on the consumers own creative potential. There was no sense that this was
even possible. The activities and practices that were instituted were attempts to
inject something socially meaningful into their lives.
The assumption in such practices is that meaning only exists in that which is
culturally recognised. As described in chapters three and four, the culturally
recognised is defined in terms of a symbolic scheme of reason and normality.
However, while humans do things with and to one another in accordance with
accepted schemes, there is also an emergent aspect to meaning and sociality
that allows for the creation of new patterns of interaction, new relationships,
and new meanings. Our capacity to create symbolic systems through which
meaning becomes shared, recognised, negotiated and/or mediated is a
fundamental component of our humanness. This capacity, the infinite
                                                                                                                                   
such encounters are based upon tends to preclude the possibility of perceiving
these others as like oneself. It is only through contact that these perceptions are
challenged, although of course, as postcolonial theorists point out,
constructions of others do continue to be based upon initial projections of what
is not the self onto the other (Said 1991 [1978]). I would argue however that
such post-structural accounts of "self" and "other" simplifies the complexity of
relatedness across difference. Like Johnson's (1998) account of intellectually
disabled women, they tend to only emphasis the construction of identity of the
"other" as a product of discourse, rather than analysing identity, subjectivity
and meaning as an emergent aspect of social practice.
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variability and creative potential of patterns that are created by humans, is not
limited to "a foreordained dictionary of images to which the world conforms"
(Carrithers 1992: 165). Rather, "humans' ability to recognize themes or patterns
and variations is . . . infinitely extensible" (Carrithers 1992: 165).
Interpreting meaning as potentially infinite and extendible means that
culture and sociality are continually unfolding through processes of interaction
and transformation based on social practices and relations (Barth 1966;
Carrithers 1992). Rather than meaning inhering in an object, or depending
solely on rationality, mentalism, and culture as a static entity, meaning
becomes a symbolic and emergent aspect of negotiation, use and practice
(Bourdieu 1999 [1972]; Saleeby 1994). It arises from relations of power and
knowledge as much as it evolves through the intimate interactions of daily life.
The institutional and clinical world of intellectual disability is thoroughly
entangled in relations of power and knowledge. This is what Johnson's
"discourse of intellectual disability" refers to (Johnson 1998: 77; cf. Cocks &
Allen 1996: 305-6; Ryan & Thomas 1987: 114). It is what the symbolic scheme of
reason and normality produces. The sociocultural critiques discussed in chapter
five are a response to the power embodied in such clinical and institutional
accounts.
The fact that intellectually disabled people are perceived and treated by
clinical professionals and institutional staff in such profoundly disabling ways is
an aspect of this power relationship. This is in part a result of the break in
relating that takes place when the point of interaction is no longer based on the
desire to communicate with, and understand, intellectually disabled people as
they are. Rather than seeking the potential and emergent meaning in what
intellectually disabled people are doing, clinical specialists seek to understand
why and how their actions do not adhere to socially normative behaviours.
They apply a meaning to it based on the symbolic scheme of reason and
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normality, assuming in the process that such people are inherently incapable of
creating meaning, mutuality and sociality because they lack the supposedly
necessary normative social and mental capabilities. Such interpretations rely on
associating reason and intelligence with a capacity for sociality. Consequently,
what intellectually disabled people do is categorised as abnormal and in need of
normalisation. As described in chapter six, a whole apparatus of training and
management is introduced in institutional environments in an attempt to foster
socially normal expressions and behaviours. These include domestic and
vocational skills training. Therefore, relating no longer operates as a bridge of
emergent and productive meaning between different people but becomes a
one-way process of indoctrination and assimilation.    
As described in chapter five, social constructionist and discursive analyses
such as those by Bogdan and Taylor (1982; 1989), Goode (1984), Branson and
Miller (1989) and Johnson (1998) show how intellectually disabled people are
socially perceived and positioned. They show how meaning becomes projected
onto "the other" (Johnson 1998: 62-63), and how these ideologies and discourses
get incorporated into daily practices by structuring the environments within
which intellectually disabled people reside. As Johnson states:
My concern with the subjectivity of the women led inevitably to an
exploration of the basis for its constitution by others. Increasingly I
became aware that knowledge and the power involved in
prescribed associated practices were crucial in determining how the
women's subjectivity was 'captured' by others, so the ways in
which knowledge, practices and power were exercised in relation
to the women became a dominant theme in the study (Johnson
1998: 14).
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While I agree with Johnson's arguments about the power of discursive
practices to form and inform intellectually disabled people's lives, such post-
structural interpretations do not consider the possibility of "knowing"
intellectually disabled people outside these formal institutional paradigms.
Neither do they interpret intellectually disabled people as more than just
"others", the product of projected social meanings. For Johnson (1998: 62-63),
even familial relationships are informed by these dominant discourses. Like the
social constructionist interpretations of Bogdan and Taylor (1982; 1989), Goode
(1984), and Connors and Donnellan (1993), such post-structural accounts do not
see meaning and subjectivity as an emergent aspect of social practice and
mutuality. Meaning is only socially prescribed meaning. It is how others
constitute the intellectually disabled and, although open to diversity and
difference due to differences in types of relationships (Goode 1984), meaning is
not something which the intellectually disabled are seen to be capable of
creating for themselves. It is not something that is seen to be integral to their
expressions of self or their mutual encounters with others.
Without denying the importance of these social constructionist and
discursive interpretations of intellectual disability I have attempted to move
beyond these to show the necessary conditions for creating a meaningful
mutual sociality with intellectually disabled people. I have done so by
acknowledging that it is through social relations and practices, rather than
solely social structures and discourses, that sociality, identity and meaning is
produced (Bourdieu 1999 [1972]; 1994). While the symbolic scheme of reason
and normality informs institutional and clinical practices, and denies to
intellectually disabled people the necessary conditions for mutual sociality, it
does not constitute the totality of their social experiences and possibilities.  
The people I write about present a challenge to usual concepts of culture.
They represent a break with any recognisable re/production of culture. They
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do not generate acceptable patterns of behaviour nor do they learn the lessons
of culture and reproduce its norms. The gestures of intellectually disabled
people are the product of different dispositions, unexpected and unpredictable
ones, although once they are engaged with these gestures become meaningful
in relation to the person producing them and the context within which they
occur. They may not have as their precursor the historical predispositions of a
particular culture, but in being made, in being produced, they become a part of
that culture. Such gestures do not remain the sole object of that person because
in their production these actions and behaviours become part of the wider
world, existing beyond the individual person. They are in the world, interacting
with it and at the same time producing and shaping it. They exist in relation to
others who share this world.  
The reorganisation of found objects into the highly treasured and precious
collection of bits and pieces that my sister engages in is precisely such an act.
The purposeful and patterned encounters with jigsaw puzzles that both she
and my brother engaged in also represented such an act. They have both
significance for my siblings and reorder the world with which they are
interacting. These actions are not performed in a vacuum; they are using the
same objects that the rest of us interact with in new and creative ways. They
also have an impact on the lives of those who are not intellectually disabled. As
kin, we were all involved in their significance and played a role in relation to
whatever it was that was signified. The immediacy and intimacy of our
relationships with one another were necessary to support them as such. I did
not come to perceive the meaning in what my sisters and brother did because
of my construction of them as a sister, brother or human being. On the
contrary, I came to relate to them as people, as social beings, because we
existed within a mutually unfolding social world. I related to them and
discovered meaning and purpose in who they were because of our mutual
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sociality. This required an intimacy that was founded on our shared encounters
with the world, but also on my awareness that what they were doing made
sense and had meaning; it resonated with my own attempts to make meaning
out of life.
The form of sociality that is therefore required to uphold and develop
intellectually disabled people's sociality depends upon two interrelated factors.
It depends upon the acceptance of intellectually disabled people's actions and
expressions as forms of symbolic practice upon which mutuality and sociality
can be built. It then depends upon engaging with such people through these
very particular symbolic forms, thereby allowing these unconventional
behaviours and activities to become the vehicles through which sociality is
mediated. While this is more likely to be realised in a familial environment, it is
not limited to familial relations. It is almost impossible to achieve in an
institutional environment where the practices of training and management
founded upon a symbolic scheme of reason and normality are what informs
the dominant modes of relatedness. Even in a familial environment, however,
it is difficult to sustain sociality over long periods of time. Yet there are aspects
of the forms of mutual sociality that evolve out of familial relations which can
be built upon in the creation of alternative social environments for intellectually
disabled people. The issue becomes one of searching for the means through
which a social milieu can be created that recognises, supports and sustains these
very particular forms of sociality. The forms of relatedness that are necessary
rely upon some sort of vocational aspiration, where the motivation and level of
commitment goes beyond an institutionalised service industry founded solely
on work as a commodity, and extends to relations built upon mutual and
diffuse solidarity. Through such engagements, intellectually disabled people's
specific and restricted symbolic practices and expressions are both recognised
and able to be engaged with as such. By denying to intellectually disabled
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people the opportunity and capacity to relate to others meaningfully as they
are, they lose the very thing which is necessary for them to express themselves
as social beings.
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